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Abstract 
This thesis considers Eliot's critical writing from the late 1910s till the mid-1930s, in the 
light of his PhD thesis - Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley - 
and a range of unpublished material: T S. Eliot's Philosophical Essays and Notes (1913- 4) 
in the Hayward Bequest (King's College, Cambridge University); T. S. Eliot's Family 
Papers in the T. S. Eliot Collection at the Houghton Library (Harvard University); and items 
from the Harvard University Archives at the Pusey Library. 'Me thesis offers a 
comprehensive view of Eliot's critical development throughout this important period. It 
starts by considering The Sacred Wood's ambivalence towards the metaphysical philosophy 
of F. H. Bradley and Eliot's apparent adoption of a scientific method, under the influence of 
Bertrand Russell. It will be argued that Eliot uses rhetorical strategies which simultaneously 
subvert the method he is propounding, and which set the tone for an assessment of his 
criticism throughout the 1920s. His indecision, in this period, about the label 'Metaphysical' 
for some poets of the seventeenth century, reveals the persistence of the philosophical 
thought he apparently rejects in 1916, when he chooses not to pursue a career in philosophy 
in Harvard. This rhetorical tactic achieves its fulfilment in Dante (1929), where Eliot finds a 
model in the medieval allegorical method and 'philosophical' poetry. Allegory is also 
examined in connection with the evaluation of Eliot's critical writings themselves to 
determine, for instance, the figurative dimension of his early scientific vocabulary and 
uncover metaphysical residues he had explicitly disowned but would later embrace. Finally, 
it is suggested that, the hermeneutics of allegory are historical and it is used here to test the 
relationship between Eliot's early and later critical writings, that is the early physics and the 
later metaphysics. 
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Introduction 
This thesis starts from the premise that T. S. Eliot was a serious student of philosophy before 
turning to literature and it continues by attempting to determine the significance of this 
background in his development as a literary critic. It concerns itself only with Eliot's prose 
writings, and the importance of philosophy in the interpretation of his literary criticism up to 
the mid 1930s. The choice of this date is partly determined by Eliot's own suggestion in To 
Criticize the Critic (1965) that his critical career may be divided into three periods: the first 
runs to the end of his involvement with the Egoist in 1918; the second covers roughly the whole 
of the 1920s which then give way to a period "of public lectures and addresses, rather than 
articles and reviews. "' The stylistic tensions which mark the development of Eliot's critical 
voice are at their most evident in the earlier parts, if only because these writings are ultimately 
about the problem of the use and style of critical language. It is my intention to argue that 
Eliot's turn from philosophy to literature was instigated by the hope of finding in the literary, a 
style which would make up for the one which had defeated him in his philosophical studies. 
Eliot's search for style is not only a poetic but also a critical concern, where 
philosophy becomes a major protagonist throughout. As he himself noted towards the end of 
his life: "I spent three years, when young, in the study of philosophy. What remains to me of 
these studies? The style of three philosophers: Bradley's English, Spinoza's Latin and Plato's 
Greek. " 
2 
My purpose is not to determine which particular philosophical school is more 
responsible for Eliot's literary theories, but in which ways philosophy as a genre determines the 
development of his critical style, and, only in passing, also of his poetry. To this extent my 
consideration of the influence of individual philosophers over Eliot's work aims to depart from 
the sort of scholarship which tries to align his criticism with particular schools of philosophy. 
The importance of critics such as Jeffrey Perl, Donald Childs, Piers Gray, Richard Shusterman, 
Hugh Kenner, Anne C. Bolgan among others cannot be underestimated. Yet this approach is 
I T. S. Eliot 'To Criticize the Critic' in To Criticize the Critic: And Other Writings (1965)(London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1991), pp. 17-18. 
2 'To Criticize the Critic', pp. 20-2 1. 
potentially dangerous, particularly given the opacity of philosophy as a specialist subject. In 
poetry it tends to become a self-justifying process, where the critics tend to see in Eliot's verse 
the resolution and embodiment of his philosophical thought; on the other hand, Eliot scholars 
are sometimes tempted to consider his literary criticism as thinly veiled philosophical treatises. 
3 
On the 24 th October, 1913, Eliot delivered a paper at Harvard's Philosophical Club 
of which he was the president. He was twenty-five, and was studying towards a PhD in 
philosophy. The paper was entitled 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics'. 
4 As 
a whole this paper fires a waming shot about the process by which politics pursues 
metaphysical legitimization: 
So the question I would lay before you is this: what need and what right has politics to a metaphysics; and 
when a political theory has such philosophical affiliations of what sort is the relationship; is it logical or 
purely emotional? May the same generalisations lie at the basis of both structures? 
s 
The subtext to this set of questions is an equally worried concern about contemporary 
philosophy in general, with its false metaphysical pretensions which really hide a cheap 
emotional appeal rather than true intellectual coherence. Eliot notes: 
This is a time in which philosophies lend themselves, or at least offer themselves, with great facility to 
emotional consequences. A time of what a pragmatist friend of mine has called lyric philosophers. James' 
philosophical writings constitute an emotional attitude more than a book of dogma; the neo-realistic 
movement appears to the uninitiated at least a spontaneous outburst of genius, a song without words; and we 
observe Mr B. Russell directing with passionate enthusiasm his unearthly ballet of bloodless alphabet. 
Professor Bosanquet is the prophet who has put off his shoes and talked to the Absolute in a burning bush; to 
Professor Royce we owe the [illegible] of Christianity by the method of last aid to the dead. And the 
landscape is decorated with Bergsonians in various degrees of recovery from intelleCt. 
6 
-5 In the introduction to From Philosophy to Poetry: T. S. Eliot's Study ofKnowledge and Experience (New York: 
Palgave, 2001), Donald J. Childs addresses the problem of the philosophical appropriation of Eliot's criticism and 
poetry by various generations of critics. Childs begins by noting the early prevalence of the 'second-hand' Bradley 
approach, and then moves on to subsequent appropriations of critics grouped under a number of headings: 'the 
Bergsonian Eliot, 'the Indian Eliot', 'the Anthropological Eliot', 'the Poststructural Eliot', 'the Pragmatic Eliot', 
'the Serniotic Eliot', 'the Analytic Eliot', 'the Existential Eliot, 'the Phenomenological Eliot', 'the Hermencutic 
Eliot', 'the Psychological Eliot', 'the Mystical Eliot', and 'the Political Eliot'. Childs is not trying to discourage 
these approaches, but aims to delimit their individual application. Yet, he adds: "Criticism of Eliot that is unaware 
of the extent to which his early philosophical study of knowledge and experience is 'not abandoned' in his 
criticism, poetry and politics, and so on, is undoubtedly impoverished", p. 48. 
4A 
cover note suggests this title and states that it is a response to Walter Lippman's A Preface to Politics 
(Kenncrly, 1913); The Harvard University Gazette confirms that Eliot scheduled its delivery to the Harvard 
Philosophical Club for the 17th, but postponed it to the 20, The Harvard University Gazette, 9 (1 Ith October, 
1913). 
5 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics' (MS), T. S. Eliot's Family Papers, T. S. Eliot Collection, 
Houghton Library, p. 1. 
6 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', pp. 1-2. 
9 
In one long paragraph Eliot's black humour consigns all current philosophy to oblivion. The key 
complaint is that held against these "lyric philosophers", who "lend themselves, or at least offer 
themselves, with great facility to emotional consequences". Ibis was a premise which was to 
dominate much of his reviewing in the late 1910s, as a way of criticising the lack of rigour of 
non-scientific thought. At this earlier stage he is condemning all philosophy without distinction, 
metaphysical as well as scientific. Russell's passionate enthusiasm for his "unearthly bloodless 
ballet of bloodless alphabet" is happily compared to Bosanquet's chat with "the Absolute in a 
97 burning bush' 
. 
Whether one approaches the problem from an empirical or idealist perspective, 
Eliot seems to suggest, one ends up with the same meaningless jargon. 
'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics' amounts to Eliot's hammering 
the final nail in the coffin of his short involvement with Bergsonianism, initiated during his stay 
in Paris between 19 10 and 1911. But it also marks the beginning of a long struggle to shrug off 
Pragmatism which was dominating Harvard at the time: 
[Pragmatism and Bergsonianism] seem to me at bottom very different. Bergson denies human values; for 
pragmatism man is the measure of all things. The latter is a 'practical' philosophy. You choose a point of 
view because you like it. Yet the two philosophies, like all anti-thetical philosophies, tend to meet. For they 
both reduce the world to illusion ... 
Philosophy is to fit a need. On the other hand we cannot tell what this 
need is unless we philosophise. Pragmatism needs to be supplemented by a theory 
8 
of the relation of human 
life to the world. And with this completion it would I think cease to be pragmatism. 
Both Pragmatism and Bergsonianism are criticised for encouraging an unholy alliance between 
politics and metaphysics, each appropriating the other from their own extreme position. These 
extremes meet in the erroneous conclusion of refusing credibility to human values outside 
themselves: pragmatism by considering them in terms of cash value, Bergsonianism by 
allowing them but transitory value which is inevitably overcome by the unforgiving forces of 
the 61an vital of history. Human existence is thus reduced to a Behavioral animism, to biology 
and psychology, a position which Eliot rejects. Pragmatism makes all philosophy a political 
pursuit for which it illegitimately recruits metaphysical legitimization. Much of Eliot's later 
7 Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) was an Oxford contemporary of F. H. Bradley and, like the latter, was also 
considered a member of the late 19'h-century school of British Idealism. Bosanquent placed himself in the tradition 
of Kant, Hegel and, ultimately, Plato. Yet, he was well aware of 19'h-ccntury Anglo-American empiricism and 
materialism. The result was a brand of idealist philosophical thought that combined the Anglo-Saxon penchant for 
empirical study with a vocabulary and conceptual apparatus borrowed from the continent. This is precisely the 
kind of esoteric philosophy Eliot parodies as "the Absolute in a burning bush". 
8 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', p. 21. 
10 
critical development depends of his struggle to understand the metaphysical impulse of 
philosophy, While seeking their legitimate convergence. At this early stage Eliot must first tell 
them apart. 
The approach this thesis has adopted may be blamed for separating discourse from 
subject matter, and perhaps for underestimating the seriousness of Eliot's commitment to 
particular philosophical theories. But this seems to be the very separation called for in 'The 
Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics'. Indeed, Eliot is not an intellectual opportunist 
only concerned with utilizing a philosophical gravitas for his own literary purposes, but neither 
is he a believer in the synthesizing power of any particular brand of philosophy. He is, 
however, an intellectual aesthete of sorts throughout the 19 1 Os, but this is as good as a genuine 
philosophical position gets given the philosophical climate of this early period. He takes refuge 
in form. Early twentieth-century philosophy was, in fact, increasingly concerned with the 
mediation of ideas as the very site of philosophical doctrine. The rise of analytic philosophy in 
Britain is the point in case, with which Eliot first came into contact when Russell went to 
Harvard as visiting professor in 1914. Eliot was, however, familiar with his philosophy from 
his readings of New Realism, which hit Harvard two years earlier. This philosophical school 
was hoping to by-pass philosophy's cul-de-sacs by offering logic, within a empirical 
framework, as a way of clarifying and giving finality to philosophical questions. The picture I 
am left with is that of a young Eliot, who must leave academic philosophy, but who turns to 
aesthetics, precisely as a kind of philosophical commitment. Any speculation about Eliot's 
philosophical allegiances must be controlled by the intellectual climate in which he abandons 
philosophy when he decides not to return to Harvard in 1916. 'Me paradox is that Eliot's 
rejection of philosophy is coherent with new philosophical developments, even though these 
developments were calling for the end of philosophy and hailing the supremacy of science in 
the form of logic. One might say that Eliot rejects philosophy for philosophical reasons; the 
reason being that one can no longer hold intellectual positions on metaphysical grounds but 
must test the coherence of one's thought in the very language one uses to express the subject of 
his/her allegiances. 
it 
Though, by 1916, Eliot had just completed his doctoral thesis on the British idealist 
F. H. Bradley, it is possible to deduce that Eliot, at this early stage, had become a follower of 
Russell. Interestingly Bradley is not among the philosophers he attacks in 'The Relationship 
Between Politics and Metaphysics', though Bosanquet is, and he was an admirer of Bradley, 
but so is Russell. Whatever Eliot's misgivings about Bradley's brand of philosophy might have 
been, they did upset his plans to visit Marburg in 1914 to study German philosophy - and 
where he annotated his copy of Husserl's Logical Investigations - in preparation for Oxford 
and Bradley. The reality is that Russell is important because he represents the prevalent climate 
of dissatisfaction with the abstractions of philosophy and the growing concern with making its 
language subject to the exactitude expected from the sciences. Eliot may by the late 19 1 Os share 
this concern. Yet it is not as simple as that, given his constant questioning of the objectivist 
claims of science in both his doctoral dissertation and some of his graduate papers. The analysis 
of some of Eliot's unpublished graduate papers is particular helpful in exposing his anti- 
scientific bias as late as the period 1913-1914 when Eliot attended Josiah Royce's seminars on 
Logic at Harvard. Eliot's notes 'Description and Interpretation' and his paper 'The 
Interpretation of Primitive Ritual' are direct attacks on the scientific pretension to access and 
give account of data in its original form. 
The importance of Eliot's graduate papers is invaluable to avoid taking his early 
literary criticism and dissertation at face value. His graduate papers open a space in which 
intellectual doubts mingle with an attempt to find a firm philosophical position. 'Ibis kind of 
work has been pioneered by Jeffrey Perl whose articles have done much to focus Eliot's 
philosophical background. 
9 
His work is important because it has added additional material 
without which it would be easy to overemphasize Eliot's Bradleyanism in his dissertation, or 
Russell's logical rigour in his early literary criticism. Perl offers an explicit alternative to the 
Bradleyan overcompensation perpetuated by the likes of Anne C. Bolgan, who must be credited 
9 See Jeffrey Perl and Andrew Tuck's 'The Significance of T. S. Eliot's Notebooks' in T S. Eliot: Essays From 
the Southern Review, James Onley ed. (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 157-178, and 
Jeffrey Perl's 'The Language of Theory and the Language of Poetry- The Significance of T. S. Eliot's Notebooks, 
Part Two', Southern Review, 21, nol (Winter 1985), pp. 1012-1023. 
12 
for encouraging Eliot to publish his dissertationlo, or Hugh Kenneril, who while 
acknowledging the debt to Bradley finds little more to say about its significance. Donald Childs 
is among the critics who notes the short-comings of this sort of criticism and attempts a more 
sophisticated application of Eliot's dissertation over the interpretation of his early poetry in 
'Knowledge and Experience in 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock'. 12 This kind of work is 
not without its relevance, but fails to address the complexity of Eliot's philosophical 
background full on. One has to wait, perhaps until his T S. Eliot, Mystic, Son and Lover to see 
a broader approach to the philosophical question via the exploration of Eliot's Harvard years. 
Such explorations are only complete if one is prepared to dig into Eliot's unpublished material 
up to 1916. Childs does this to some extent, particularly with respect to Eliot's graduate courses 
and his early interest in religion, mysticism and Hindu philosophy which he studied under 
Professor J. H. Woods. But for fuller accounts one must turn to Jain Manju's invaluable T S. 
Eliot and American Philosophy (1992), which (following in the tradition of Piers Gray's early 
T S. Eliot's Intellectual and Poetic Development (1982)) excavates Eliot's philosophical 
experience found in his unpublished papers and notes, rather than just skimming the Bradleyan 
surface of his dissertation. 
It is the sheer impenetrability of Eliot's dissertation which has to be looked into in 
its own right. His reluctance to publish it in 1964 was because, as Eliot confesses in its 
introduction - with what degree of false modesty it is difficult to determine -, he could no 
longer claim to understand everything contained in it. This problem is symptomatic of Eliot's 
very struggle at the time he wrote it and not just attributable to the time span between its 
completion and publication fifty-two years later. Knowledge and Experience is challenging not 
just because of the specialist nature of its subject, but because of the obscurity of its style. 
Notwithstanding its philosophical worth - as J. H. Woods testifies in a letter in 1916 which 
10 Her casual discovery of Eliot's thesis initiated a campaign to convince Eliot of its publication. She succeeded, 
though it led to an extreme revisionist approach to reread all of Eliot's work in the light of Bradley's philosophy. 
See Anne C. Bolgan, 'The Philosophy of Bradley and the Mind of T. S. Eliot: An Introduction' in English 
Literature and British Philosophy, S. P. Rosebaum ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 197 1), pp. 251-277. 
11 See Hugh Kenner, The Invisible Poet (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959) 
12 See Donald Childs, 'Knowledge and Experience in 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock", ELH, 55, no3 
(Autumn, 1988), pp. 685-699. 
13 
encourages Eliot to return to Harvard to take the oral examination 
13 
- Eliot's 
dissertation is a 
laboured discursive effort which puzzles more than convinces, just as his early criticism also 
puzzles yet somehow convinces by a kind of rhetorical inertia, which hypnotizes the reader to 
go on nodding to the final full stop. It is this stylistic quality which first strikes the reader of his 
criticism, and it is my intention to turn to it as the means to do full justice to the relationship 
between Eliot's philosophical and literary experiences. 
One must consider the idea that Eliot abandons philosophy as an attempt to write 
better. Such a study must, then, seek the origins of this problem of style to determine precisely 
what Eliot rejects and what he keeps from his philosophical experience. It is perhaps easier to 
name what he rejects as 'metaphysics'. In the essays and reviews collected in The Sacred 
Wood, metaphysics becomes a by-word for stylistic impressionism and obscurity. This 
figurative use of the term sets in motion the rhetorical transformation of Eliot's philosophical 
baggage, as he seeks to overcome the ideological confusion endemic in philosophical thought; 
a confusion which must terminate in stylistic obscurity. One must be fully aware of this 
rhetorical dimension if one is not to fall into the very philosophical difficulties Eliot 
experienced while writing his thesis. This is perhaps the problem of Lewis Freed, whose 
informed and able account of Eliot's philosophical inclinations in T S. Eliot: The Critic as 
Philosopher (1979) is so close a re-enactment of Eliot's own philosophical explorations that it 
fails to offer a useful picture of the relation between the criticism and the philosophy. At the 
other extreme is Richard Shusterman, who tends to be more narrow and accessible in his scope 
but tends to change his mind every few years. He begins by considering Eliot as a Bradleyan, 
then is convinced that the real influence comes from Bertrand Russell, and finally makes Eliot 
an obvious pragmatist. His T S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism (1988) takes the reader 
through this journey of allegiances, but does not in the end help us to read the criticism on its 
own terms. We are, as it were, force-fed a line by the academic philosophers, that the criticism 
is the product of the philosophy with little hope for dissent. It is precisely this entrapment 
13 "The Division of Philosophy has accepted your thesis without the least hesitation. Prof Royce regards it as the 
work of an expert", 'From J. H. Woods, 23 June 1916', Letters, p. 142. 
14 
which Eliot was fighting in 1916, and we must do the same. The way out for both Eliot and 
ourselves is rhetoric. 
Rhetoric has a provisional character in the first stages of this thesis. I use it to point 
out a leaning towards a discourse-centred approach in Eliot's literary criticism. To impose a 
particular rhetorical method from the beginning would be an unjustifiable reading of Eliot's 
prose style. As we shall see, there is, in fact, only a limited amount of direct references to 
rhetoric in his early writings, mainly in "'Rhetoric" and Poetic Drama' and, later, in the Clark 
Lectures. Instead I propose gradually to tease out evidence from his own writings in order to 
form a definite picture of Eliot's rhetorical methods. The main problem in doing so is that, in 
his literary criticism, Eliot is interested in poetry, and, thus, has little time for rhetoric. Yet the 
poetry seems to naturally take him to rhetorical considerations. 14 In fact, the closest Eliot 
eventually gets to an overall poetic theory is through his interest in Dante's allegorical method, 
at which point the latent persistence of rhetoric becomes most evident. 
Allegory is not only important in determining a rhetorical method of interpretation 
but becomes a point of thematic synthesis in my argument. Allegory is particularly important in 
determining the permanence of Eliot's philosophical self-consciousness throughout his career. 
It is through allegory that he seeks to develop the idea of Philosophical Poets, an idea he 
borrows from his Harvard teacher George Santayana. 15 Allegory allows Eliot to recycle his 
philosophical interests to develop a general method of interpretation. The rhetorical struggle 
between science (or literal) and metaphor (or figurative) initiated in The Sacred Wood is 
eventually fulfilled by his criticism of Dante's allegory. This is a process which eventually 
reconciles Eliot with the metaphysical philosophy he was trying to leave behind; a return to 
metaphysics through the physics. 'Mere is, from this perspective, a fundamental coherence 
throughout his literary criticism in which his early scientific bias adopts new forms and can be 
rescued through re-reading. The Sacred Wood's stress on a literal, empirical and conceptual 
14 It is perhaps symptomatic that Eliot included the essay "'Rhetoric" and Poetic Drama' in The Sacred Wood, 
where he tries to redeem the term within the poetic context of the blank vcrse. 
15 George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1910). 
15 
exactitude remains, but imports into its mechanisms further levels of understanding in the light 
of later criticism. The metaphoric and metaphysical implied in Eliot's early literary criticism 
can finally be acknowledged. This amounts to a historicism about his own critical development, 
where the passing of time does not leave behind the most daring of his poetic theories or critical 
positions. It opens up a synchronic dimension where his criticism can be reinterpreted while 
maintaining a faithfulness to what Eliot meant when he stated it. 'Mis historicism, which may 
be said to fulfil his own 'historical sense', will be seen to fit into the allegorical tradition of 
figural prophecy. 
Ibis approach to Eliot's criticism is new insofar as it tries to uncover the workings 
of his prose style, while using the content of his writings as a foundation for the conclusion 
which are drawn - what this thesis offers in the end is a close reading of Eliot's critical 
writings. This involves the application of his statements about poetry to the critical writings 
themselves. I am not trying to suggest that all discourse can be analyzed in poetic terms, but, on 
the contrary, that the poetic must be subsumed under a wider bracket of hermeneutics. This 
Eliot explicitly identifies as the allegorical method in the particular context of Dante's poetry, 
and adapts it for his purposes as a form of rhetoric. It is only rarely that Eliot's criticism 
receives this sort of attention, perhaps it is only worth mentioning Edward Lobb's T S. Eliot 
and the Romantic Critical Tradition (19 8 1) and John Paul Riquelme's Harmony ofDissonance: 
T S. Eliot, Romanticism, and Imagination (1991). Lobb dedicates a whole chapter to Eliot's 
critical style entitled 'Eliot as Rhetorician'. Yet, his only interest in analyzing Eliot's critical 
style is from the point of view of technique to prove his participation in the Romantic tradition. 
In the end, Lobb gives us an image of Eliot as a skilful manipulator of language and of the 
critical argument, but little more. He fails to address Eliot's intellectual motivation and tensions 
about what he was trying to say and how he said it. In short Lobb analyzes Eliot's rhetoric as if 
it were poetry. On the other hand, Riquelme does well to address the possibility of using the 
allegorical model for purposes similar to mine, yet be does not seem to understand allegory in 
the medieval context and appropriates it to suggest 'deconstruction'. 'Mis kind of approach fails 
to read Eliot's criticism with enough attention to detail, and precisely in a way that confirms the 
16 
deconstructive method of Mr. Riquelme, that is, that Eliot's style is allegorical because its 
interpretation encourages a fluidity which refuses closure. Lobb too is keen to find a virtue in 
the apparent lack of a system in Eliot's criticism, and takes refuge in the latter's charming way 
with words. It is as if Lobb is saying that he is not quite sure what Eliot means but that that is 
the beauty of it because, hey, he is a great mimic, shows a great sense of irony and uses 
metaphors in unexpected ways. Riquelme, for his part, misses the coherence of Eliot's literary 
criticism precisely at the point where he denies his style the philosophical background which 
Eliot comes to see in Dante's allegorical method. Riquelme's main mistake lies in his neglect 
of Eliot's philosophical studies, which initiate his allegorical journey from physics to 
metaphysics, the very journey this thesis proposes to encompass. 
17 
Chapter 1 
Science and the Style of Philosophy 
This chapter considers Eliot's choice to remain in England shortly before completing his 
doctoral thesis while visiting Oxford on a Sheldon Travelling Fellowship between 1914-15. 
This choice has important consequences in the development of Eliot's career; it amounts to the 
apparent rejection of philosophy just when it seemed his natural career option. I will consider a 
number of explanations for this decision: whether it amounts to a general disenchantment with 
philosophy or a particular rejection of the puritanical philosophical environment at Harvard. 
One can explain Eliot's interest in literary criticism as an experiment in 
philosophical discourse, and as a way of marrying his literary and philosophical interests in 
ways which the philosophical environment at Harvard would not have allowed for. However, 
Eliot turns much of his early literary criticism into a critique of metaphysics which, for him, 
undermines philosophy as a whole. Just as he criticises its discourse he initiates a process of 
definition which involves both his interests and the development of a critical voice of his own. 
Eliot's criticism borrows as much as it rejects elements from philosophy. He rejects the 
metaphysics and borrows the science, which offers Eliot a stylistic model from which to draw 
in the development of his critical style. More importantly science provides the theoretical 
perspective to criticise metaphysics, but which ultimately - and this 
is my argument - will 
enable the regeneration of the latter. His adoption and development of a logical style reflect 
Eliot's stylistic bias in his dealings with philosophy as science in the 1910s. I will consider in 
this chapter the extent of Eliot's manipulation of logic for his own critical purposes, and argue 
its subversion by becoming a rhetorical tool which re-defines the original scientific status of 
logical arguments. More importantly, I will consider the cognitive grounding on which logic is 
rooted: whether it is empirical or latently metaphysical. 
Marriage, Literature and Philosophy 
is 
Towards the end of the 1910s Eliot had made rapid progress in the world of letters. This was 
achieved through the compulsive production of whatever reviews Eliot could get into 
magazines. The compulsion was partly financial necessity as well as the need to make a name 
for himself in the English literary world. These two are in turn the consequence of Eliot's 
marriage to Vivienne Haigh-Wood on the 26th of June 1915 and his decision to stay in England 
to become a literary man. Thus Eliot unexpectedly drops Philosophy as a vocation. He had 
written to Professor James H. Woods 
16 
only a month before his marriage with the intention of 
returning to Harvard or, at the very least, of continuing his philosophy studies at Merton 
College, Oxford, where he was about to complete his doctoral thesis on Francis Herbert 
Bradley and Alexus von Meinong. 17 Eliot wote: 
I hope you will let me know about next year, because if I do not have a re-appointment, financial conditions 
make it desirable for me to get as much assistant's work at Harvard as I can adequately perform in addition 
to my own affairs - in case there is room for me. I certainly should not resign in the middle of the year. 
' 8 
Eliot is requesting the assistantship he held before leaving Harvard for Europe in 1914 in case 
the "re-appointmenf 'to his Sheldon Travelling Fellowship - which was 
keeping him at Oxford 
- fell through. The next entry after Eliot's letter to Prof. Woods of the 6th May 
in The Letters Of 
T. S. Eliot, notes his marriage to Vivienne19. He did in fact get his Fellowship renewed, but 
turned it down as well as the assistantship by choosing to stay in England. 
20 One can only 
deduce that Eliot was predisposed to stay in England whether he got the assistantship or not, the 
marriage being the means to make this stay inevitable. The re-appointment to the Sheldon 
Travelling Fellowship may not have been as decisive as Eliot implies in his letter to Prof. 
16 Professor James Woods (1864-1935) taught Eliot Indian philosophy at Harvard where he was Professor of 
Philosophy at Harvard between 1913-34. He had joined the department as an instructor in Indian philosophy in 
1903. TSE recorded that 'a year in the mazes of patanjali's metaphysics under the guidance of James Woods left 
me in a state of enlightened mystification' Qfter Strange Gods, 1934, p. 40). 
17 The original title of Eliot's doctoral thesis puts as much emphasis on Bradley as on Meinong: 'Meinong's 
Gegenstandstheorie Considered in Relation to Bradley's Theory of Knowledge'. A later version drops Meinong 
from the title: 'Experience and the Objects of Knowledge in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley'. 
18 'To J. H. Woods, 6th May [1915]', Letters, p. 98. 
19 "On the 26th June TSE married Vivienne Haigh Haigh-Wood at Hampstead Registry Office in the presence of 
Lucy Ely Thayer (her close friend, cousin of Scofield) and Lilia C. Symes, Vivienne's aunt. Their ages are given 
as twenty-six, although she had just turned twenty-seven. TSE is recorded as 'of no occupation' and living at 35 
Greek Street, Soho. His father is described as a 'Brick Manufacturer' and Vivienne's father as an 'Artist (Painter)'. 
Their respective fathers knew nothing of the wedding beforehand", Letters, pp. 98-99. 
20 Letters, 'To J. H. Woods, 10th July 1915', p. 108. 
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Woods. In fact, Eliot never liked Oxford very much and had always preferred London. 
2 I His 
marriage to Vivienne settled his indecision. 
This interpretation is now commonplace among Eliot scholars. Peter Ackroyd's 
biography clearly states that Eliot felt under pressure to achieve great things from his family; 
that though Eliot 
was protected every step of the way and although his family expected great things of him, these were to be 
attained only within the confines which they understood. It is a familiar story and the imperative is familiar 
also: to get OUt. 
22 
Eliot had already made his first escape from New England in 1910, the year of his graduation 
for his A. B. in English Literature. He went to Paris to attend Henri Bergson's Lectures at the 
Colfte de France. Now he was to make his escape good, but surely at the price of a half- 
hearted marriage. The effectiveness of this escape, however, is testified by his eventual success 
as poet and critic, just as it is true that Vivienne had her own ideas when she married Eliot and 
23 fought hard to keep him in England as she was to tell Richard Aldington in 1922. Eliot's 
correspondence with his mother during this period shows no evidence of the marriage being a 
problem; the principal debate is over his decision not to pursue an academic career. The number 
of attempts on the part of Eliot's parents to redirect him back on the academic track illustrates 
this priority. Charlotte C. Eliot's hopes and fears are set out in a letter to Bertrand Russell in 
which she encourages the philosopher to intercede over Eliot's decision on her behalf- 
I am sure your influence in every way will confirm my son in his choice of philosophy as his life work. 
Professor Woods speaks of his thesis as being of exceptional value. I had hoped he would seek a University 
appointment next year. If he does not I should feel regret. I have absolute faith in his Philosophy but not in 
the verslibre . 24 
21 "1 do not know my own plans for the future. Day before yesterday came a telegram from Harvard, notifying me 
of my renomination to my fellowship. But I do not know what I should do with it if I had it. Oxford I do not enjoy: 
the food and the climate arc execrable, I suffer indigestion, constipation, and colds constantly; and the university 
atmosphere. If I could be allowed to stay in London and work at the Museum I should be content; but the War 
suffocates me, and I do not think that I should ever come to like England On the other hand I dread returning 
to Cambridge", To Conrad Aiken, 25 February [1915], Letters, p. 88. 
22 Peter Achroyd, T S. Eliot (London: Penguin Books, 1993), p. 39. 
23 "1 am English, and once I liked England - once I fought like mad to keep Tom here and stopped his going back 
to America. I thought I could not marry him unless I was able to keep him here, in England", 'Vivienne Eliot to 
Richard Aldington, 15? July 1922', Letters, p. 544. 
24 'Charlotte C. Eliot to Bertrand Russell, 23 May 1916', Letters, p. 139. 
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It is curious that Charlotte does not attempt a direct appeal to his son, but seeks the indirect 
influence of philosophers such as Russell or Woods himself; indeed it was through Russell in 
particular that offers of academic and journalistic work came to Eliot. 'Me result is that, far 
from fulfilling his literary interest from the beginning of his career, Eliot finds himself 
compromising. His first publications are not in literary magazines, but in philosophy journals; 
namely the Monist and the International Journal of Ethics, most of which are book reviews. 
Thus Eliot makes a quick start in the English world of letters at the expense, perhaps, of 
deferring his literary aspirations. 
From 'Three Poems', published in Poetry (vii. 1) in October 1915 three months after 
his marriage, Eliot's publications turn almost exclusively philosophical till the publication of 
'Reflections on Vers Libre' in March 1917. At this time he becomes the assistant editor of the 
Egoist, replacing Richard Aldington who had enlisted, and his philosophical output increases 
precisely at the stage he had intended to have given it up. Charlotte's effort to maintain Eliot 
directed towards philosophy had materialized into giving her son the opportunity to publish 
with the help of Russell. However, Eliot kept on with his poetry; he published 'Observation' in 
Poetry (September 1916) which includes the poems: 'Conversation Galante', 'La Figlia Che 
Piange', 'Mr Apollinax' and 'Morning at the Window'; also the dramatic satire 'Eeldrop and 
Appleplex, F in The Little Review (May 1917), where he also published 'Four Poems' in July. 
Equally, his reviewing for the New StatesmaW5 was the only concession to less philosophically 
technical subjects, yet they still show evidence of Eliot's dependence on the theoretical 
sciences. Thus, the sheer size of Eliot's strictly philosophical reviews cannot be ignored. Aiken 
notes that Eliot's encounter with the literary world of 1910s London was secured precisely by 
the idiosyncrasy of this mixed background: 
25 'An American Critic' [A Review ofl Aristocracy and Justice by Paul Elmer Moore, New Statesman, 7, no 16 8 
(June 24,1916), 284; [A review ofl Group Theories of Religion and the Religion of the Individual by Clement C. 
J. Webb, New Statesman, 7, no 173, (July 29,1916), 405-406; [A review ofl Social Adaptation by L. M. Bristol, 
New Statesman, 7, no 173 (July 29,1916), 405; 'Mr Leacock Serious' [A review ofl Essays and Literary Studies 
by Stephen Leacock, New Statesman, 7, no 173 (July 29,1916), 404-405; 'Giordano Bruno' [A review ofl 
Giordano Bruno: His Life Thought, and Martyrdom by William Boulting, New Statesman, 8, no 185 (October 21, 
1916), 68. 
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It would be easy to say that, even after his relatively brief exposure to Poundian London, philosophy 
began 
to bore him; but this is unlikely. It remained a bolt-holc for him, a discipline into which he could escape and 
which could provide him with a career if he wished for one. 
26 
Eliot's decision to stay in England is then not conditioned solely by a rejection of philosophy 
in 
general. In T S. Eliot and 4merican Philosophy, Manju Jain argues that Eliot disagreed with 
the particular philosophical climate at Harvard: the mixture of philosophy and politics 
illustrated by its president Charles Eliot's liberal Unitarianism *27 And he was not alone in this: 
the main dissent from Harvard philosophy was George Santayana who, in The Genteel 
Tradition, argued that its philosophical tradition was ultimately traceable to the radical 
puritanical origins of America. Jain notes that Santayana's 
analysis of the Harvard philosophical ethos makes explicit the connection between the Puritan environment 
in which Eliot was brought up and which he rejected, and Harvard philosophy with which he was 
dissatisficd, 28 
Santayana is perhaps the only continuous link with the Harvard philosophy department which 
Eliot keeps throughout his life. His influence is particularly apparent in the use Eliot makes of 
Santayana's Three Philosophical Poets in Dante in 1929 and his Turnbull Lectures in 1933.29 
Yet it is this association which proves fatal for Eliot's philosophical prospects in 1919 - 
notwithstanding the fact that by this date Eliot had given up the possibility of a return for good. 
Jain elaborates on an interesting incident at Harvard in which Professor Wood's suggested 
appointment of Eliot to a post in the philosophy department is rejected. The rejection came 
from Ralph Barton Perry who wrote to Professor Woods saying: 
If he is a sort of attenuated Santayana, [ ... 
] in other words if his recent poetry is now the most typical thing 
about him, I do not believe that he would be the right man to be permanently in charge of students 
concentrating in philosophy. Our great hope beyond my convictions is in the economic and the political, 
rather than in the literary applications of philosoph Y. 30 
26 Ackroyd, p. 58. 
27 This is a point Eliot made in a graduate paper he read for the Harvard Philosophical Club in 1913 entitled 'The 
Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', originally announced for October 17,1913, as 'Philosophy and 
Politics' in the Harvard University Gazette, 9 (1913-14). 
28 Manju Jain, T S. Eliot and American Philosophy (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), p. 38. 
29 Lecture I [Toward a definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Turnbull Lectures, VMP, p. 251. Also see 
'Philosophical Poetry' in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
30 Jain, p. 35. Jain notes that "Perry's comparison of Eliot and Santayana is a particularly telling one, for they had 
both rejected the Harvard milieu in which they had been educated for practically the same reasons. And if 
Santayana, who had resigned from the Harvard philosophy department in 1912, can be considered along with his 
contemporaries such as Henry James and Henry Adams, for whom the problem of the life of reflection in America 
could only result in exile and expatriation, or a terrible sense of isolation if they remained in America, this is the 
historical tradition to which Eliot, too, belongs", Jain, p. 36. Also see a letter from Charles W. Eliot on the 25th of 
July, 1919, to Eliot: "You mention in your letter the name of Henry James, I knew his father well, and his brother 
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Perry may have been right, particularly with respect to "the literary applications of philosophy". 
A few months before his marriage Eliot legitimises his disenchantment with philosophy in the 
following terms: "For me as for Santayana, philosophy is chiefly literary criticism and 
conversation about life . 
993 1 Given such an affiliation, Eliot made the right choice in staying 
away from Harvard - an affiliation which was the source of his uneasiness with philosophy 
in 
this early period. Santayana had, in fact, resigned from the department in 1912. To a large 
extent Eliot chooses to stay in England as a way of keeping away from Harvard's philosophical 
environment which becomes a general unhappiness with a career which refused to accept his 
literary interests. 32 As Eliot focuses his critique of philosophy through literature he develops a 
particular concern with the former's discourse, but which, in the end, does not involves its 
outright rejection. Eliot resorts to philosophy to formulate his early literary theory as much as 
to redefine the sort of philosophy he is interested in. 
Recently, M. R. A. Habib has argued that Eliot's literary project involved 
philosophy as a strategy which offered a classical re-ordering of the inescapable fragmentation 
of a Romantic present. He puts it as follows: 
It is precisely to the extent that [George Santayana and Irving Babbitt] were aware of the artifice of their 
classical enterprise, of its clash with the romantically determined domain of the historically possible, that 
they called for a combination of the talents of poetry and philosophy: poetry cannot merely 'return' by way 
of naive imitation to objective classical form but must bear within itself the struggle to redintcgrate 
subjectively the historically dispersed elements of classical vision. 
33 
Habib hints at a decreasing poetic autonomy which has to be deliberately compensated for by 
the philosophical re-construction of a world in which literature can properly sink its roots. More 
importantly, Habib shows an important insight into the relation between Eliot's poetry and his 
criticism, deducing that they illustrate a schizophrenic separation of powers between literature 
William very well; and I had some conversation with Henry at different times during his life. I have a vivid 
remembrance of a talk with him during his last visit to America. It seemed to me all along that his English 
residence for so many years contributed neither to the happy development of his art nor to his personal happiness", 
Letters, p. 323. 
31 'To Norbert Wiener, 6 January 1915', Letters, p. 8 1. 
32 In a letter to Conrad Aiken on 25th February 1915 Eliot wrote: "Oxford I do not enjoy On the other hand I 
dread returning to Cambridge [ ... 
] The great need is to know one's own mind, and I don, t know that: whether I 
want to get married, and have a family, and live in America all my life, and compromise and conceal my opinions 
and forfeit my independence for the sake of my children's future; or save my money and retire at fifty to a table on 
the boulevard [... 
] How thin either life seems! ", Letters, p. 88. 
33 M. R. A. Habib, The Early T S. Eliot and Western Philosophy (Cambridge, CUP, 1999), p. 64. 
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and philosophy. Where Eliot's criticism is diagnostic, his poetry is symptomatic of 
Romanticism; such a disjuction between poetry and philosophy seems an unavoidable point of 
departure for any project of reconstruction. He concludes: 
Just as Eliot's verse inevitably 'violates' his own critical opinions, so the influences behind his verse 
unavoidably incorporate elements from which Eliot recoils in his prose writing. 34 
Habib is referring here to Schopenhauer, a philosopher Eliot openly attacks in his criticism yet 
cannot avoid in his poetry through Jules Laforgue's own debt to this philosopher. 
35 
Philosophy infiltrates both genres; while his poetry may appear to incorporate the philosophy, 
the criticism becomes a point of resistance, a resistance symptomatic of a general insecurity 
with prose even as it desperately attempts to resurrect a tone of authority for its critique of 
Romanticism. In a sense Eliot's criticism of Romanticism is a way of criticising the very 
emotional vagaries he wants to exorcise from his own prose style. Ibis is all the more pertinent 
given that this emotional imprecision is precisely the heritage Eliot felt he had received 
throughout his philosophical training. It is the prose, rather than the poetry, which, lacking the 
poetic attention verse enjoyed in the 1910s, required the bigger effort of redefinition. The first 
step of this redefinition involves the consolidation of stylistic models, which, however, Eliot 
could only have found in philosophy. Hence, Eliot's dilemma at the beginning of his literary 
career lies in his being at a loss to distinguish between his disagreement with a particular kind 
of philosophy from his disenchantment with philosophical discourse in general. Consequently, 
he resorts to formal logic and science as a means both to imply a rejection of his metaphysical 
inheritance, while, by staying within the paradigms of philosophy, still salvaging some of it. In 
the end, Eliot's early literary criticism must be seen as a battle ground of discourses where he 
experiments with prose style as a means of redefining discourse in criticism. 
One of Charlotte Eliot's letters to Bertrand Russell, at the time Eliot had made his 
decision to quit philosophy, gives an unexpected insight into her son's dilemma: 
34 Habib, p. 64. This is perhaps most noticeable in Eliot's pre-1917 poetry most of which is compiled under the 
name 'Reflections of the March Hare'. See Chapter 4, 'The Negative Style of the Dissociation: Dr Johnson's Life 
of Cowley'. 
35 See Habib, Chapter 3: 'Philosophy and Laughter: Schopenhauer, Laforgue and Bergson, pp. 61-96. 
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My personal experience [has] been that the merc reading of Philosophy stimulates the mind and increases its 
creative power, so that I have sometimes read Philosophy as a preparation for writing. I do not see any 
reason why if my son makes Philosophy his life work he should not write all the poetry he desires, if not too 
much of the ephemeral 'vcrs libre'. I went yesterday to the library, to look for Tom's review in the 
International Journal of Ethics. I found and read it. It produced an excellent impression but I am too 
ignorant to understand and appreciate the article. I feel very grateful to you for having obtained for Tom the 
opportunity to do this work, and am very glad he is to join the Aristotelian Society. I saw in the Fortnightly 
Review an article by Ezra Pound, in which he mentions Tom as one of the most intelligent writers Yet I 
cannot read Pound. His articles seem over-strained, unnatural. 
36 
Charlotte Eliot is sensitive to the compatibility of philosophy and literary style, though perhaps 
only as a way of reconciling Eliot's desires with her own. Yet the point is genuine: Charlotte is 
saying more than she intends. Her implication is that philosophy is a precursor of literary 
activity; a sort of rhetorical mental exercise to prepare for the articulation of poetic thought. She 
admits that she does not understand and appreciate Eliot's article, but nevertheless likes it; yet 
she is prepared to dislike Pound's only on stylistic grounds. Thus philosophy is, for Charlotte, 
subsumed into poetics, perhaps as a way of making her shortcomings in the understanding of 
philosophy into a virtue. Eliot may not have agreed with his mother about the relationship 
between poetry and philosophy, yet he finds their relationship useful to point out their 
deficiencies. Take, for instance Eliot's comment s on Hegel in 'The Perfect Critic': 
Hegel arrived, and if not perhaps the first, he was certainly the most prodigious exponent of emotional 
systematisation, dealing with his emotions as if they were definite objects which had aroused those 
emotions. 37 
Here Eliot implies a criticism of the philosopher's style where, however prodigious the 
philosophical systernatisation, it fails to appreciate that its objects are not definite entities but 
indefinite emotions -poetic in this sense - which therefore defy the claims of exactitude of the 
very systematisation it promotes. He equally disapproves of the sort of poetry which claims to 
be the illustration of a philosophical mind set. This disapproval was behind his suspicion of 
manifesto poetics as he made clear in a letter to Ezra Pound in 1915.38 Eliot is clearly drawing 
a line between the style of criticism and of poetry, and by so doing is facing the difficult choice 
of establishing the stylistic paradigm for prose criticism and, ultimately, of philosophical 
discourse. Ile most significant part of this process is to determine what philosophy is in the 
36 ' Charlotte C. Eliot to Bertrand Russell, 18 January 1916', Letters, p. 13 1. 
37 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 9. 
38 "To Ezra Pound, 2 February [1915]', Letters, pp. 86-87. 
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first place. This process of definition is at the heart of Eliot's literary criticism; a question 
which is implied with obsessive recurrence throughout his career as a critic. 
39 
Eliot's rejection of academic philosophy can be interpreted As its formal reduction to 
style as a first step of definition. This reduction coincides with Charlotte's intuition of the uses 
of philosophical discipline for the sake of creativity, as well as a practical move by Eliot to 
recycle his philosophical knowledge by relocating it within his literary interests. Eliot 
retrospectively noted to Richard Wolheim that the interest of his philosophical background is 
remarkable only as a stylistic influence, and that the importance of the publication of his thesis 
and two philosophy articles - 'The Development of Leibniz's Monadism' and Teibniz's 
Monadism and Bradley's Finite Centres' - must be considered in this light alone. 
40 Wolheim 
notes that Eliot "spoke of his early academic philosophising as a 'curiosity of literature, 'a 
curiosity of biographical interest' ... and 
its interest (according to Eliot, that is) in the evidence 
it fumished about the formation of his prose style. -41 
Vers Uhre and the Problem with Philosophy 
In 'Francis Herbert Bradley' (1926) Eliot praises the philosopher's importance in terms of the 
perfection of his style: 
Certainly one of the reasons for the power [Bradley] still exerts, as a well as an indubitable claim to 
permanence, is his great gift of style. It is for his purposes - and his purposes are more varied than 
it is 
usually supposed -a perfect style. Its perfection has prevented it from cutting any great 
figure in prose 
anthologies and literature manuals, for it is perfectly welded with the matter. 
42 
Eliot idealises Bradley's synthesis of form and matter, making this perfection the reason for its 
being unacknowledged. It is too perfect to be noticed. This comment does not reflect Eliot's 
frustration with the difficulty he encountered in completing his doctoral thesis and which led to 
39 This concern is illustrated by Eliot's notes on 'definition' in his graduate philosophical papers, namely, 
'Description and Interpretation', Hayward Bequest, King's College, Cambridge. See Chapter 2, 'Description and 
Interpretation'. 
40 In 1959, on being asked by a researcher for permission to consult his student records at Harvard, T. S. Eliot 
wrote to the Dean of Harvard University that he saw "no objection to ... giving 
him this information, though it 
seems to me that inquiries of this sort are rather a waste of time", Eliot's Undergraduate Folder, Harvard 
University Archives, Nathan Marsh Pusey Library. 
41 Richard Wolheim, 'Eliot and F. H. Bradley: An Account' in Eliot in Perspective: A Symposium, Graham 
Martin ed. (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 169. 
42 'Francis Herbert Bradley, SE, p. 407. 
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his early disappointment with philosophical discourse. Two years earlier, upon Bradley's death, 
Eliot had been more explicit. In 'A Commentary' for The Criterion (October 1924) he wrote: 
Few will ever take pains to study the consummate art of Bradley's style, the finest philosophical style in our 
language, in which acute intellect and passionate feeling preserve a classic balance: only those who will 
surrender patient years to the understanding of his meaning. But upon those few, both living and unborn, his 
writings perform that mysterious and complete operation which transmutes not one department of thought 
only, but the whole intellectual and emotional tone of their being. 
43 
Eliot's eulogy of Bradley's philosophical style alludes to its limited appeal only to "those who 
will surrender patient years to the understanding of his meaning". More importantly, Eliot's 
praise hinges on a mysterious transmutation of emotions and intellect which intimates an 
unknowable something about Bradley's style. This ineffable quality, in so far as it may be 
understood as metaphysical, illustrates Eliot's emphasis on the link between style and the 
problems of philosophy. These two accounts of Bradley's philosophy illustrate Eliot's 
ambivalence towards philosophy. 
A few months before his marriage Eliot wrote to Norbert Wiener (1894-1964), who 
was later to be the founder of Cybernetics and Professor of Mathematics at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology between 1932-59. In 1914-15 he was using his Sheldon Fellowship to 
study with Bertrand Russell and G. H. Hardy at Cambridge, having received his Ph. D. from 
Harvard at the age of sixteen44: 
In a sense, of course, all philosophising is a perversion of reality: for, in a sense, no philosophic theory 
makes any difference to practice. It has no working by which we can test it. it is an attempt to organize the 
confused and contradictory world of common sense, an attempt which invariably meets with partial failure - 
and with partial success. 45 
The feeling of disillusion implied in these comments is profound That philosophy has no 
bearing on ordinary life is perhaps the gravest criticism one can make of the discipline. Yet 
Eliot is conditioned by his reader, who in this case - Norbert Wiener - 
is a serious student of 
analytic philosophy and disciple of Bertrand Russell. Eliot, himself an aesthetic philosopher in 
comparison to the scientific rigour of Wiener, is criticizing philosophy in a way that agrees 
with the latter's approach. Eliot adds: "I am quite ready to admit that the lesson of relativism is: 
43 The Criterion, 3, no 9 (October 1924), p. 2. 
44 Letters, n3, p. 66. 
45 'To Norbert Wiener, 6 January 1915', Letters, p. 80. 
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to avoid philosophy and devote oneself to either real art or real science. (For philosophy is an 
unloved guest in either company).,, 46 He is not so much calling for the end of philosophy as 
prescribing its scope to either a hard science or no science at all. Eliot adds: 
Still, this would be to draw a sharp line, and relativism preaches compromise. For me, as for Santayana, 
philosophy is chiefly literary criticism and conversation about life; and you have the logic, which seems to 
me of great value. The only reason why relativism does not do away with philosophy altogether, after all, is 
that there is no such thing to abolish! There is art, and there is science. 47 
Eliot concludes that the term philosophy may be misleading: there is either science, or there is 
'literary criticism' and conversation. Eliot's re-definition of philosophy lends itself most 
radically to an aff irmation of the non-existence of the term under revision; philosophy is 
posited as an abstraction whose existence can only be articulated as a non-cntity. In so doing 
Eliot is paradoxically establishing the metaphysical scope of philosophy. The effect of this 
negative articulation is to define philosophy in terms of metaphysical ineffability, rather than 
rendering the term meaningless. Eliot is not simply rejecting philosophy but conditioning its 
status, as he admits soon after: "of course one cannot avoid metaphysics altogether, because 
nowhere can a sharp line be drawn - to draw a sharp line between metaphysics and common 
sense would itself be metaphysics and not common sense.,, 
48 Philosophy is an inescapable 
metaphysical inference operative in the arts and sciences: "And there are works of art, and 
perhaps of science, which would never have occurred had not many people been under the 
impression that there was philosophy.,, 
49 
Eliot's conclusion is indeed relativist, and undermines the very faith that it preaches 
because it refers to philosophy as an unverified a priori in whose existence there is no reason to 
believe, other than as it pragmatically provides a ground for science and the arts. The important 
dimension of Eliot's argument is that, in the end, he neutralizes relativism by positing 
philosophy outside its scope; because it does not exist, philosophy cannot be abolished, which 
is a kind of affirmation. This rhetorical flourish, however, cannot completely make up for the 
emptiness of the assertion. The disillusionment is clearly that of an Eliot struggling to make 
46 'To Norbert Wiener, 6 January 1915', Letters, p. 8 1. 
47 'To Norbert Wiener, 6 January 1915', Letters, p. 8 1. 
48 'To Norbert Wiener, 6 January 1915', Letters, p. 80. 
49 'To Norbert Wiener, 6 January 1915', Letters, p. 8 1. 
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some sense of the self-conscious idealism of F. H. Bradley, which in his doctoral thesis led him 
to conclude that: 
A philosophy can and must be worked out with the greatest rigour and discipline in the details, but can 
ultimately be founded on nothing but faith: and this is the reason, I suspect, why the novelties of philosophy 
are only in elaboration, and never in fundamentals. 
50 
Ibis is an important concession to the inescapability of metaphysics in his doctoral thesis, but 
which in his criticism becomes an important concern; a concern, that is, with the possibility of 
metaphysical articulation or else the ultimate ineffability of all discourse. 51 
In 'Reflections on Fers Libre' written for New Statesman (March 3rd, 1917) Eliot 
states: 
It is assumed that vers libre exists. It is assumed that vers libre is a school; that it consists of certain theories; 
that its group or groups of theorists will either revolutionise or demoralise poetry if their attack upon the 
iambic pentameter meets with any success. Vers libre does not exist. 
52 
This time, Eliot first poses a hypothesis which it immediately negates in order to eventually - 
as we will see - posit; a process or argumentation that in his letter to Wiener appears only 
in an 
embryonic form. Eliot's negative reasoning is ultimately paying homage to Bradley who in his 
Principles ofLogic, states that: "Unless you have a meaning and an idea ... you 
deny nothing; 
since an idea is needed for denial, since a meaningless idea is none. -53 Yet this homage is 
undercut by the ultimate uncertainty of negative judgement: though "every negation must have 
a ground, and this ground is positive [. ] The ground is unstated and it is unknown. -54 
Despite this problem, Bradley encourages the reader "to get as clear an idea as we can of the 
positive ground our denial rests on. -55 This demand is problematic because it depends on a 
theory of knowledge which does not necessarily make this ground readily available in the first 
50 KE, p. 163. 
51 This struggle parallels Eliot's statement in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' that "art never improves, but 
that the material of art is never quite the same", ('Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 5 1). Here art is the 
metaphysical inference of all literary productions. This metaphysical inference is precisely the a priori Eliot is at 
pains to articulate through the term 'tradition' in this essay, by considering it, not as an ineffable a priori, but as an 
ideal sedimentation of works of art through history. However the rhetorical strategies at work in his letter to 
Wiener are more clearly apparent in an earlier essay in literary criticism: 'Reflections on Vers Libre' (1917). 
52 ' Reflections on Vers Libre', SP, p. 3 1. 
53 F. H. Bradley, Essay VI: 'The Negative Judgement' in Principles of Logic (1883), 2 vols (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1928), 11,285-667 (p. 665). 
54 Bradley, Chapter III: 'The Negative Judgement', Principles, 1,114-125 (p. 117). 
55 Bradley, Chapter III: 'The Negative Judgement', Principles, 1, p. 125. 
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place. In fact, it is the denying which is itself utilized by Bradley as the medium to uncover this 
positive ground. And this is precisely the problem with Bradleyan metaphysics that Eliot 
struggles with in his article on Vers Libre. This struggle is evident in that in this article Eliot 
uses Bertrand Russell - increasingly antithetical to Bradley - as a parallel point of 
departure; 
his dismissive "vers libre does not exist" is also inspired by Russell's Law of Contradiction 
which finds that any denoting phrase which involves a contradiction has an empty referent; 
hence it does not exist. As Richard Shusterman notes: "In 'Reflection on Yers Libre' Eliot 
cleverly employs reductive analysis to argue the notion that vers libre is merely an empty 
,, 56 battlecry and that there really is no such thing as free verse. 
In 'Reflection on Fers Libre' Eliot begins by invoking the presence of vers libre 
through negation while he could be said to be putting the term under logical scrutiny: 
If vers libre is a genuine vcrse-form it will have a positive definition. And I can define it only by negatives: 
(1) absence of pattern, (2) absence of rhyme, (3) absence of metre. 57 
Verse by definition must abide by a number of rules which the alleged freedom simply 
contradicts. In this context then the term vers libre seems an impossible term, yet a term which 
retains a validity: 
The decay of intricate formal patterns has nothing to do with the advent of vers libre. It had set in long 
before [
... 
] And as for vers libre, we conclude that it is not to be defined by absence of pattern or absence of 
rhyme, for other verse is without these; that it is not defined by non-existcrice of metre, since even the worst 
verse can be scanned. 58 
Eliot is, as he proceeds, not so much querying the existence of vers libre, as trying to find out 
what verse really is insofar as an idea of freedom can be attached to it. He is taking on a logical 
approach which reduces ontological questions to an epistemological concern about the logical 
rigour of denoting phrases, a rigour which inevitably concerns itself with terminology. In the 
case of vers libre Eliot devotes himself to exposing how far it is a contradiction in terms. 
Hence, 'Reflections on Vers Libre' seems a desperate attempt to rescue the epistemological 
56 Shusterman, Richard, 'Eliot and Logical Atomism', ELH, Vol. 49. Issue I (Spring, 1982), 164-178 (p. 169). 
Shusterman is, however, more interested in using this conection with Russell as a way of proving that at this stage 
Eliot was totally under the spell of this philosopher: "However, the connections that have been drawn betwen 
Eliot's Bradleyan philosophy and his early criticism are not so striking as to convince me that this philosophy was 
a major influence on the criticism", p. 164. 
57 'Reflections on Vers Libre', SP, p. 32. 
58 'Reflections on Vers Libre', SP, p. 36. 
30 
validity of discourse by appealing to the hard science of analytic philosophy in the absence of 
non-scientific routes to certainty. E! ut it is not quite that, for it subverts the scientific 
absoluteness of Russell's logic which Eliot uses to open his article. The answer lies in Eliot's 
conviction that 
the ghost of some simple metre should lurk behind the arras in even the 'freest' verse; to advance 
menacingly as we doze, and withdraw as we rouse. Or, freedom is only truly freedom when it appears 
against the background of an artificial limitation. 
59 
The meaningfulness of the term depends on the redefinition of 'freedom' and 'metre'. Logically 
'free verse' cannot exist because it is a contradiction in terms: to be so verse would simply stop 
being verse, yet 'freedom' is itself revealed as dependent on limitation. 'Ibus Eliot manages to 
attribute to vers libre a degree of reality; the degree of involving the metaphysical inference of 
freedom which is not empirically verifiable because it depends on the ghost of a lurking metre. 
In turn metre reveals its own empirical limitations, as metre itself becomes a metaphysical 
inference of absolute empiricism never totally fulfilled in practice. It is a ghost, and more 
interestingly, which alludes to Polonius, who Hamlet kills after noticing him hiding behind the 
arras. Polonius, the ultimate rhetorician and spin-doctor of the court, is re-interpreted by Eliot 
as a premonition of insubstantiality - as already empty -, which 
here allegorizes metre. The 
existence of metre is never totally fulfilled by verse, anymore than verse ever totally escapes 
from it. Ultimately, Eliot falls short of condemning vers libre to non-existence, but concludes 
instead: "the division between Conservative Verse and vers libre does not exist, for there is 
only good verse, bad verse, and chaos. ', 
60 
At this point we could turn Eliot's analysis of vers libre over to the article that does 
the analyzing. The adoption of Russell's logic in 'Reflections on Vers Libre' is itself the ghost 
of a metre which Eliot's critical rhetoric adopts but never totally fulfils. It might seem so, but is 
not an absolute surrender to logical rigour. Eliot adopts logic as a stylistic prop which, while 
flaunting the absence of an absolute referent for vers libre, manages to create the illusion of 
rhetorical inevitability about the more or less attenuated existence of the term. This 
59 'Reflections on Vers Libre', SP, pp. 34-5. 
60 'Reflections on Vers Libre', SP, p. 36. 
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appropriation of a logical appearance compensates for the vague metaphysics of the negative 
method of Bradley without rejecting it in practice. 
'Reflections on Vers Libre' allegorizes Eliot's concern over the ontological status of 
philosophy as an inferred metaphysics. Judgement is a matter of style precisely at the point 
where ontology becomes an epistemological question of scientific and logical rigour; at the 
point where verse becomes a technical question about the measure of metre. Yet, in 
'Reflections on Fers Libre', the logical style is limited to the fact that in answering the question 
about the existence of vers libre one must admit that metre is as much an inference as is actual 
poetic fteedom. Just as metre haunts the poet, so metaphysics haunt the philosopher in the form 
of the absolute; something which cannot be positively uttered or fulfilled in practice. This is an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs for Eliot, which he expressed to Norbert Wiener thus: 
[The Absolute, Reality or Value] does not exist for me, but I cannot say that it does not exist for Mr Bradley. 
And Mr Bradley may say that the Absolute is impliedfor me in my thought - and who is to be the referee? 
61 
As Eliot completes his thesis he finds this question unanswerable. Reaching a conclusion which 
resembles an answer becomes a possibility only within the assumption that there is a referent to 
validate our judgement. This is a belief which Eliot finds increasingly doubtful. As he tells his 
mentor at Harvard, J. H. Woods, 
I had great difficulty, even agony, with the first draft [of the doctoral thesis], owing to my attempt to reach a 
positive conclusion; and so I should like to turn it into a criticism and valuation of the Bradleian metaphysic 
- for it seems to me that those best qualified for such tasks are those who have 
held a doctrine and no longer 
hold it. 62 
This criticism and valuation becomes a scientific approach based on a scepticism which still 
retains the ruins of an Absolute, as the belief one no longer holds. This statement amounts to a 
contradiction which Eliot is only able to resolve at the expense of making dogma a formal 
excuse to hold on to epistemological certitude, and in this he approximates pragmatic positions. 
Belief is not a particular set of philosophical dogmas, but simply the act of believing itself. The 
contents of philosophy become the relative expression of an Absolute which remains an 
unverifiable and unknowable donný, which is thus discarded for the benefit of a scientific world 
61 'To Norbert Wiener, 6 January 1915', Letters, p. 80. 
62 'To J. H. Woods, 28 January 1915', Letters, p. 84. 
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of observable data. Consequently, philosophical discourse becomes not a problem of content, 
but solely of logic which Eliot imports into literary criticism as a descriptive approach towards 
evaluation. 
The roots of this development are to be found early in Eliot's postgraduate years. 
Habib's close reading of Eliot's unpublished philosophical notes and papers shows that his 
critique of Kant involves a dissatisfaction with the distinction between noumena and 
phenomena. This distinction translates as that between form and content, where form takes the 
status of unknowable a priori. Ibat: 
Eliot insists that the distinction between the a priori form and a posteriori content of experience is quite 
provisional, which leads him to doubt that 'pure' conception, i. e. the pure form of a concept free from 
empirical content, is impossible. 63 
Habib is referring to Eliot's 'Report on the Kantian Categories' in Three Essays on Kant64. 
Although Eliot argues that there is no absolute distinction between noumena and phenomena he 
is unable to articulate the overlap so that by the time Eliot abandons philosophy he does so to 
adopt a scientific approach which appears to give priority to form over content. He does so, 
however, by firmly establishing forrn in the realm of phenomena. This shift attempts to avoid 
Kant's metaphysical dualism which implies the unknowability of noumena. In practice, Eliot's 
resolution does not explain unknowability but artificially enforces a science with the intention 
of discarding metaphysics from his early literary criticism. It concentrates, instead, on the 
literary object as a focus of scientific attention. Thus in Eliot's early literary criticism - 
specially that anthologized in The Sacred Wood -, he explicitly 
declares allegiance to science 
instead of metaphysics. Here, Eliot criticizes Coleridge for his emotional metaphysics and 
praises Aristotle for his scientific intellectualism. 
65 The relation Eliot sees between emotions 
and metaphysics establishes the latter's indirect, hence, deformed, contact with the senses. 
Eliot appears to find refuge in form in the late 1910s; refuge from the 
aforementioned threat of the relativist fallacy, where content may never achieve the absolute 
63 Habib, p. 108. 
64 Three Essays on Kant are at the Hayward Bequest, King's College Library, Cambridge. 
65 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 12 & p. 13. 
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dimension philosophical discourse claims for itself, where philosophical theories are just 
reactions to other theories, no better no worse, but only increasingly obscure. Eliot includes an 
implicit criticism of any theory of content in contemporary literary movements, like Imagism or 
Vorticism, as he makes quite clear in 'Reflections on Vers Libre': 
But I am not here concerned with imagism, which is a theory about the use of material; I am only concerned 
with the theory of the versc-form in which imagism iscast. 66 
Eliot is suspicious of thematic claims of theories, where theme refers to specific thought 
content. This is, for him, the worst kind of philosophy: not only vague and unscientific, but 
plainly wrong by falling prey to relativism. Aesthetics should not be mixed with thematics - 
including morality67 -, it becomes reductive, and thus limits the disinterested encounter with 
the object. This is Eliot's view in this early critical stage: an aestheticism that is profoundly 
suspicious of thematic thought-systems and which he generally identifies with the problems of 
philosophical discourse. Consider Eliot's comments on Vorticism in a letter to Ezra Pound in 
1915: 
I distrust and detest aesthetics, when it cuts loose from the Object, and vapours in the void, but you have not 
done that. The closer one keeps to the Artist's discussion of his technique the better, I think, and the only 
kind of art worth talking about is the art one happens to like. There can be no contemplative or easy chair 
aesthetics, I think; only the aesthetics of the person who is about to do something. I was fearful lest you 
should hitch up to Bergson or James or some philosopher, and was relieved to find that Vorticism was not a 
philosophy. 68 
The irony is that Eliot is proposing the sciences of pragmatic method as aesthetic model - to 
engage with what one naturally does, practically and non-contemplatively by the person who is 
about to do something - at the same time as he is criticising William James. 
69 Eliot reveals his 
former philosophical allegiances at the very point he is fighting to exorcise himself from them. 
Literary Criticism and Scientific Rigour 
By 1917, Eliot had known Russell's work for quite a few years. As early as 1912, he came into 
contact with the realist movement as the book , 
New Realism, arrived at Harvard. In this book 
66 'Rcflections on Vers Libre, SP, p. 32. 
67 'The Spoon River Anthology is not material of the first intensity; it is reflective, not immediate; its author is a 
moralist, rather than an observer", 'Reflections on Vers Libre, SP, p. 35. 
68 'To Ezra Pound, 2 February [1915], Letters, pp. 86-87. 
69 For Eliot as a pragmatist see Richard Shusterman, TS. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism (London: 
Duckworth, 1988), Chapter 8: 'Pragmatism and Practical Wisdom', pp. 192-22 1. 
34 
the six co-authors stressed the pre-eminence of science broadly in agreement with Bertrand 
Russell and other Cambridge philosophers. Later in the spring of 1914, just before leaving for 
Germany and England, Eliot was taught symbolic logic by Russell who was at Harvard as a 
visiting professor. Eliot noted in 'A Commentary' for The Criterion in 1927 that "the Principia 
Mathematica is perhaps a greater contribution to our language than they are to mathematice'. 
This comment indicates that Eliot had a clear agenda about the uses he was putting science to, 
but which do not necessarily coincide with the scientific expectations of the neo-realists. By 
1935 Eliot retrospectively noted: 
The Six Realists were unteutoniscd and on the whole anti-religious which was refreshing; they were 
ascetically, even gloomily, scientific; and they professed considerable admiration for Russell and his 
Cambridge friends. All this was to the good; but it must be admitted that New Realism, like most pre-war 
philosophies, eems now as dcmodcd as ladies' hats of the same period. 70 
This statement downgrades the influence scientific philosophy had in Eliot's early criticism to 
one of transition and provisionality. Though it was perceived at the time as a fresh break from 
the dense philosophical writings of Kant, Hegel or Schopenhauer, Eliot clearly chose the latter 
by travelling to Germany in 1914. This is not to underestimate the impact of New Realism on 
Eliot's critical development. As Richard Shusterman points out, there is a definite scientific 
slant in the criticism of Eliot in the late 19 1 Os: he claims that since Eliot was 
seeking cognitive respectability and, believing then that science was the unquestioned paradigm of 
knowledge, he sometimes went so far as to link criticism to science. 
71 
Bertrand Russell appears to have fulfilled Eliot's need for linguistic rigour in criticism. 
Analytic philosophy was not only claiming to be a hard science, but to promote a critical 
concern with language. 72 In Logical Atomism Russell promotes an anti-monistic science where 
truth is revealed through logical analysis and the assumption of a referential theory of language; 
though - 
importantly as will become apparent below - not with reference to objects themselves, 
but to the atomic structure of the empirical world. Therefore, according to Shusterman, Eliot's 
interest in Russell during this period must be see in the light of his interest in science as a 
70 'Views and Reviews', The New English Weekly, 7, no 8 (6th June 1935), p. 15 1. 
71 Shusterman, Philosophy of Criticism, p. 204. 
72, 'Closely connected with logical atomism's doctrine of analysis as the major tool of philosophical inquiry stands 
the doctrine that a major obstacle to philosophical progress is the misleading nature of language and the 
philosopher's misunderstanding of it", Shusterman, Philosophy of Criticism, p. 24. 
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model of discourse to compensate for the metaphysical imprecision he had laboured with 
during the writing of his doctoral thesis. 
As we noted above, Eliot's 'Reflections on 'Vers Libre' appears to mimic Russell's 
logical analysis, but how far this mimicking is a stylistic experiment is what has to be made 
clear. Shusterman again gives a compelling account of Russell's method of analysis which he 
compares to Eliot's essay: 
Russell employed two different types of analysis. Reductive analysis aimed at getting to the metaphysically 
basic by reducing certain alleged entries to non-existence, for example, by showing them to be merely 
logical constructions or logical fictions [ ... 
] But there was also analysis which aimed simply at elucidating 
concepts and propositions into a more precise and less misleading form (as in Russell's theory of 
descriptions). Eliot used both these forms of analysis. His critique that "verse libre does not exisf' is based 
on an incisive reductive analysis which shows it to be an empty battlc-cry or logical f iction. 
73 
The comparison is fair, yet it overlooks Eliot's manipulation of the logical method which in the 
end, as we have noted, does not automatically reveal vers libre as empty battle-cry and logical 
fiction. Ibis view would be inconsistent with Eliot's critique of Russell's logical methods in his 
doctoral thesis. In his thesis Eliot is unhappy with the epistemological claims behind Russell's 
systematic philosophy; logic's claim to distinguish reality from fiction absolutely. In Chapter V 
of his doctoral thesis, The Epistemologist Theory of Knowledge (continued)', Eliot argues 
against Russell's theory of contradiction in order to undermine its latent linguistic 
referentiality: "The question is, in the words of Mr Russell, whether 'any grammatically correct 
denoting phrase stands for an object. -74 Eliot suspects that there is a simple relation between 
words and objects - i. e., "without words, no objects. -75 Yet he is not convinced that the truth of 
logical constructions alone distinguishes reality from fiction, because reality is not purely 
empirical: epistemology alone cannot solve ontological problems. 
In 'The Epistemologist Theory of Knowledge (continued)' Eliot tries to find a via 
media between the logical atomism of Russell and the latent idealism of the phenomenology of 
73 Richard Shusterman, 'Eliot as Philosopher' in The Cambridge Companion to T. S. Eliot, A. David Moody ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 36. Eliot's 'The Borderline of Prose', New Statesman, 9 (May 
19,1917), complains, not so much that Vers Libre does not exist but that "[Richard Aldington] has done 
interesting work in what is unfairly called vers libre 11, p, 158. 
74 Bertrand Russell, 'On Denoting', Mind, 14 (1905), p. 482. 
75 KE, p. 132. 
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Alexus Meinong who promotes, instead, the ontological autonomy of objects. For the latter, 
there was no absolute difference between real and unreal objects in the sense that unreal objects 
may be said to hold common properties. Eliot adds: 
The difficulty of Meinong's theory that there are unreal objects is, as Mr Russell points out, the fact that 
such objects violate the law of contradiction; and the difficulty of Mr Russell's theory is the contradiction of 
denoting phrases which yet denote nothing -a pure mystery. The position of Meinong is untenable, 
I think, 
only so long as we assume that although objects may exist in various ways, they can exist only in one 
degree. 76 
Eliot is attracted by Meinong's idea that objects are fundamentally intentional and that by virtue 
of being a complex of existing properties the unreal object can always claim ontological status. 
This view of the object world, Eliot objects, is not compatible with the idea that objects exist 
only in one degree, that is, Russell's strict logic which concludes that a denoting phrase may 
denote nothing. Eliot considers this position counter-intuitive: 
In logic, perhaps, but not in metaphysics, a denoting phrase may denote nothing. Somehow, obscurely, the 
object denoted is acknowledged existence. It is non-existent according to the practical standards which 
recognize no degrees between existence and non-existence; but for metaphysics, it cannot be denied 
practical reality without being admitted to some more attenuated but (if you like) equally real reality. 
77 
Without getting into the debate of science versus metaphysics just yet, it is worth noting that 
Eliot is here sensitive to both modes of expression, or styles. He is in fact attempting some form 
of reconciliation. Eliot is again referring to the theory of degrees of reality, where Bradley 
attempted to attenuate the idealism in his philosophy, and more radically expressed in this case 
by Meinong's theory of objects. It implies that the ontological status of an object may be 
satisfactorily settled by referring to the relation it establishes with the observer or its denotation. 
This relation need not be absolute. This uneasy compromise, which involves a re-definition of 
the referential theory of language, is cognitively accounted for by Eliot in the following terms: 
Objects exist for us in two ways: As we intend an object, the intended object is so far real, and as we 
experience anobject, it realises itself, and comes to require acertain degree of fullness of relations before it
can call itself an object. 78 
The autonomy of the objective world is dependent on the observer's intentionality - cognitive 
and linguistic -, yet remains autonomous nonetheless. Thus the solipsistic consequences of 
subjective idealism are controlled while the individual's participation in the world is assured. 
76 KE, p. 130. 
77 KE, p. 128. 
78 KE, p. 130. 
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Eliot's incorporation of Russell's logical method in 'Reflections on Vers Libre' 
transgresses, but does not overthrow its scientific method. Eliot applies the lesson he is trying 
to teach about vers libre to himself, as he had already pointed out in his thesis: "We may say, 
then, that the unreal object, although it exists, does not violate the law of contradiction. -79 The 
reluctance to overthrow the logical paradigm outright and his own insecurities about Bradley 
becomes apparent in the ambiguous wording. Why does he not say because it exists - rather 
than although - it does not violate the law of contradiction, or simply that its degree of 
existence disproves the efficacy of the law of contradiction? 
Vers Libre is a contradiction in terms. Yet there is a degree of reality about it, 
which, in turn, does not break the law of contradiction because, Eliot adds in a footnote: "I am 
tempted, by the way, to regard as a dead letter a law which cannot be violated.,, 
80 It is precisely 
this violation of a law which amounts to freedom and validates free verse as a legitimate verse 
form. So, by saying that vers libre does not exist, Eliot transgresses the law of contradiction 
which the term violates by using that law, not to condemn vers libre to non-existence, but, 
instead, to determine the degree of its existence. The result is a style - 
in Eliot's criticism - 
which has only the appearance of logic, yet retains the force of logic's inevitability while 
making none of the concession to its epistemological straight-jacket. 
Science as Style: Eliot and Hulme 
In 1920 Eliot brought together some of his early reviews and published them as The Sacred 
Wood. Of these 'The Perfect Critic' sets out the main thematic concern of the collection: "that 
familiar vague suggestion of the scientific vocabulary which is characteristic of modem 
writing"81. This statement holds a mirror to Eliot's own scientific project in The Sacred Wood 
and demands closer scrutiny. 
Eliot's point of departure in The Perfect Critic' is the recent affirmation of "a 
distinguished critic" that "poetry is the most highly organized form of intellectual activity". 
79 KE, p. 13 1. 
80 KE, p. 13 1. 
81 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 2. 
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Eliot wonders: "how is it, for instance, that poetry is more 'highly organized' than astronomy, 
physics and pure mathematics". He adds that if this phrase is "the highest organization of 
thought of which contemporary criticism in a distinguished representative, is capable, then, we 
conclude, modem criticism is degenerate.,, 
82 There is, however, a saving grace, for this type of 
criticism, however faulty, allows us to ask questions "which Coleridge and Arnold would not 
have permitted one to ask", yet it sometimes borders on meaninglessness. 
83 Eliot later identifies 
this style as "the abstract style in criticism 9984 , which 
he blames on the philosophic mind set. He 
adds, however: 
1, of course, do not imply any general condemnation of philosophy; I am, for the moment, using the word 
'philosophic' to cover the unscientific ingredients of philosophy. 
85 
Eliot is dissatisfied with the way philosophy has been appropriated by other disciplines, which 
has encouraged the loss of scientific exactitude in criticism, so that "if verbalism were confined 
to professional philosophers, no harm would be done. -86 Ibis practice involves, for Eliot, a 
deterioration of language: "words have changed their meanings. What they have lost is definite, 
and what they have gained is indefinite. -87 
As a way of setting up the boundaries of his approach Eliot turns to the philosophy 
of perception to redefine the proper relation of words to their objects - the nature of this 
relation is, in fact, the main theme of his doctoral thesis -, that "not only all knowledge, but all 
feeling is in perception. -88 Perception is, for Eliot, a crucial point of reference in the 
development of a theory of cognition used here to resolve the abstraction of the language of 
criticism and philosophy. For 
there are two ways in which a word may be "abstract". It may have (the word "activity, " for example) a 
meaning which cannot be grasped by appeal to any of the senses; its apprehension may require adeliberate 
suppression f analogies ofvisual or muscular experience. " 
82 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 2. 
84 "The phrases by which Arnold is best known may be inadequate, they may assemble more doubt than they 
dispel, but they usually have more meaning", The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 2. 
85 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 8. 
85 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 8. 
86 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 9. 
87 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 9. 
88 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 10. 
89 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 8. 
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In fact Eliot would prove true to his word by mining his subsequent criticism with these sort of 
analogies. The statement in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' that "it is in this 
depersonalisation that art may be said to approach the condition of science"90 is followed by the 
well-known analogy of the catalyst. This practice is followed by Eliot's talk of metal alloys, 
nervous systems and cerebral anaemia in 'Philip Massinger' in The Sacred Wood (whose two 
parts refer to an essay entitled 'Philip Massinger' for the Times Literary Supplement, 958 (May 
27,1920) and a review of Philip Massinger, by A. H. Cruickshank for Athenaeum, 4702 (June 
11,1920)) or digestive systems in 'The Metaphysical Poets' (1922). 
There is, however, a latent contradiction here. Just as Eliot warns us about the 
'verbal' or 'philosophic' abuse of science, Eliot risks that very linguistic collapse when he 
encourages the use of scientific language in the form of "analogies of visual or muscular 
experience" in criticism. Perception is, for Eliot, the scientific model against which one must 
test critical expression, but what is not so clear is how that perception is to be verbalized 
without becoming, once again, merely abstract; an analogy is potentially akin to abstraction, 
that is, the substitution of on thing for another, however visual or clear. He concludes in 'The 
Perfect Critic': 
The inventor of poetry as the most highly organized form of intellectual activity was not engaged in 
perceiving when he composed this definition. 91 
Part of the answer lies in what Eliot means by 'perception'; for not all perceptions may be 
scientifically valid. 92 Hence his criticism of the 'aesthetic' or 'impressionistic' critic. This type 
of critic may be more engaged in perception when he judges than the 'abstract' critic, yet his 
perception is of the wrong kind; it is more emotional than sensual, personal rather than critical, 
creative not analytic. Such is Arthur Symons'problem, whose Studies in Elizabethan Drama is 
reviewed in 'The Perfect Critic': 
90 'Tradition and the Individual Talent, SW, p. 53. 
91 'The Perfect Critic', SW, P. 10. 
92 That not all perception is scientifically valid lies at the heart of Eliot's attempt to distinguish between 'feelings' 
and 'emotions' in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent'. 
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The point is that you never rest at the pure feeeling; you react in one of two ways, or, as I believe Mr. 
Symons does, in a mixture of the two ways. The moment you try to put the impressions into words, you 
either begin to analyse or construct, to "6riger en lois", or you begin to construct something else. 
9' 
Symons is unable to transform his personal impressions into general laws. He is unable to fulfil 
Remy de Gourmont's epigram at the beginning of 'The Perfect Critic', which reads: "Eriger en 
lois ses impressions personelles, c'est le grand effort d'un homme sincere" (Lettres a 
'Amazone). Symons is not a sincere man, hence, he is a bad critic. 
Eliot's interest in science is shared by another important contemporary figure in the 
English literary scene: T. E. Hulme. It is against the critical practices of this other literary 
theorist and poet that it may be possible to untangle Eliot's simultaneous, and contradictory, 
promotion and dismissal of "that familiar vague suggestion of the scientific vocabulary which 
is characteristic of modem writing". Like Eliot, Hulme's critical thought is greatly influenced 
by his interest in philosophy. But, unlike Eliot, his knowledge of philosophy was mostly self- 
taught94. He is less academic and more impulsive in his encounter with the philosophical scene 
of the 1910s. Yet they both followed parallel intellectual developments: Bergson, the German 
phenomenologists (Husserl and Meinong) and the Anglo-Saxon systematic philosophy of 
Russell and Moore. Ronald Schuchard is of the opinion that their relationship has been 
undervalued and that most likely Eliot had met Hulme and derived many of his ideas from the 
latter. 95 The main link between the two lies not so much in politics as in their reaction to 
scientific philosophy and Bertrand Russell, which calls for a revision of the impact of Hulme's 
Classicism on Eliot's thought. 
Russell had known of Hulme's philosophical exploits at Cambridge - where he gave 
papers on Bergson, whose works he later translated into English -, but like Eliot, Hulme's 
93 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 5. 
94 Hulme excelled in mathematics at school and attended Cambridge in 1902. He was, however, sent down in 
1904 for reasons that still remain obscure and was consequently forced to take up a degree in biology and physics 
at University College London. He was to give that up too in 1906 and leave for Canada from which he returned in 
1908. It is from this point on that Hulme constructed his public persona as a man of letters in London, and where 
his involvement with Imagism and art theory begins. "Hulme seems to have been very much more interested in the 
theory of poetry than in poetry itself and probably wrote most of his poems as experiments to illustrate his 
theories", Alan R. Jones, The Life and Opinions of T. E. Hulme (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1960) p. 37. 
95 See Ronald Schuchard's 'Eliot and Hulme in 1916: Towards a Revaluation of Eliot's Critical and Spiritual 
Development', PML4,88, no5 (October 1973), pp. 1083-1094. 
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initial infatuation with Bergson is tempered by his coming into contact with the new scientific 
school of philosophy96. 'Ibis scientific interest has its foundations in Hulme's concern with the 
proper use of language and style. This linguistic concern is already present in his essays on 
Bergson. In 'Bergson's Theory of Art' Hulme notes: 
As I have said, I do not think that Bergson has invented a new theory ... 
but has simply created a much 
better vocabulary [ ... 
] The advantage of Bergson's account of the matter is that the expressions he uses are 
part of a definite conception of reality and not mere metaphors invented specially for the purpose of 
describing art. 97 
Hulme's praise for Bergson's creation of "a much better vocabulary" refers to the poetic power 
to resurrect the dead metaphors of prose language. It also parallels Eliot's own admiration for 
Bradley's 'perfect style'. The problem is that these perfect styles require a definite conception 
of reality, which both Eliot and Hulme supplement with scientific philosophy. This 
supplementation is complicated by the fact that the conception of reality that a philosophy 
promotes may not lend itself to the exactitude of scientific style. This scientific factor is what, 
ideally, reconciles art and philosophy. In 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', also in The Sacred 
Wood, Eliot notes that: 
Every work of imagination must have a philosophy; and every work of philosophy must be a work of art - 
how often we have heard that M. Bergson is an artist! It is a boast of his disciples. It is what the word 'art' 
means to them that is the disputable point: much of Aristotle and Plato, Spinoza, parts of Hume. Mr 
Bradley's Principles ofLogic, Mr Russell's essay'On Denoting: clear and beautifully formed thought. 
98 
Eliot's stress on the stylistic aspect of philosophy allows him to reconcile a number of 
philosophers whose conceptions of reality may not necessarily be complementary and of whose 
theories he was not uncritical. As we have already noted, Eliot was critical of Russell's 'On 
Denoting' in his doctoral thesis and suspicious of Bradley's inability to provide philosophical 
answers in his metaphysics. Style is Eliot's refuge from his philosophical impasse and from the 
need to articulate a definite conception of reality by enabling him to translate his disagreement 
96 "Curiously, however, side by side with his devotion to Bergson there grew up in Hulme a passionate interest in 
the more scientific and academic philosophies of Husserl, Brentano, Cohen and Moore. Bergson's anti- 
intellectualism seems to have appealed to his fundamental religious mind; while the philosophies of the new 
scientific school satisfied his love of mathematical orderlies and scientific objectivity", The Life and Opinions of T. 
E. Hulme, p. 57. 
97 'Bergson's Theory of Art' in T. E. Hulme, Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, 
Herbert Read ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1924) p. 157 & 169. 
98 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', SW, pp. 66-67. This essay was published simultaneously in Dial, 69, (5 
November 1920), 441-447. 
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with the content of philosophy into questions of form and logic, and which in themselves 
supply the required definite conception ofreality. 
For Hulme scientific philosophy opens the possibility of concentrating on the 
problems of style and postponing the debate over its consequences as a world-view, which, 
however, he does not reject outright. He believes it simply belongs to a different intellectual 
sphere of influence which should not be confused with its form as philosophical expression. In 
a 'Critique of Satisfaction' Hulme notes: 
While I entirely agree with what [Russell and Husserl] say as to the possibility of a purely scientific 
philosophy and the necessity for a clear separation between that and a Weltanschauung, yet [. . .]I must 
lay 
emphasis on a different aspect of this separation. They insist on a clear separation, because they wish to free 
the scientific element in philosophy from the bad influence of the other. They want the Weltanschauung 
separated from philosophy because they think it has often injuriously affected the scientific part of the 
subject. 
99 
Hulme's interest in this separation is a means of keeping the Weltanschauung as a separate 
subject to which one should pay individual attention, but not as a way of doing away with it. 
'Ibis is the main characteristic of his Classicism. It amounts to an absolute separation between 
science and metaphysics which in Eliot, and from a socio-political point of view, is expressed 
in his criticism of Arnold's disjunction between society and culture. Here culture is not 
actualized in society as a whole but paradoxically becomes a substitute for religion with non- 
metaphysical pretensions, Humanist at that. As Pamela MacCallurn puts it: 
Arnold's disjunction of culture from society allows it to usurp the function of religion, thereby disguising the 
distinction between ethics and religion [ ... 
] When Arnold relegated religion to ethical culture he collapsed 
the difference between the two: the vagueness and abstraction in his definition of culture facilitated its 
substitution for religion. "' 
Hulme is aware that scientific philosophy or empirical critical approaches do not always respect 
this separation, which too often stray onto the world of ethics unknowingly collapsing the 
difference between science and metaphysics. Hulme blames this transgression on Humanism, 
which, unnoticed, attaches its metaphysical leftovers onto scientific approaches. Hulme adds 
99 'A Critique of Satisfaction, Speculations, p. 29. 
100 Pamela McCallum, Literature and Metho& Towards a critique of L A. Richards, T S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis 
(Dublin: Gill and MacMillan Humanities Press, 1983), p. 113. MacCallum is very good at contextualizing the 
debate between metaphysics and science in the British philosophical tradition of utilitarianism where Eliot's 
criticism of Arnold - and Bradley's for that matter - must be contextualized. It is the link that latently politicizes 
the philosophical discourse of Eliot and Hulme of this early period. This latency becomes increasingly apparent in 
Eliot's critical development. 
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that pure philosophy should be a natural corrective to the confusing intermingling of science 
and metaphysics: 
Instead it is, as a matter of fact, an entirely uncritical acceptance of Humanist views of man's nature, and 
destiny [ 
... 
] The difficulty is exactly parallel to the difficulty the scientific materialists of the last century 
used to experience in realising that metaphysics was a real region of knowledge. 
101 
It is important to note that Hulme is not attacking metaphysics, but empiricism's inability to 
cope with it face on adopting instead a watered down ethical expression. 
Thus Hulme's attack on Russell's philosophy is on ethical grounds: that Russell 
unfairly deduces a theory of value which does not properly belong to the scientific realm of his 
philosophy. About Russell's 'A Freeman's Worship', Hulme notes, "you get something 
perfectly human and arbitrary cloaked in a scientific vocabulary. " 
102 It is Russell's ethics to 
which Hulme objects, and not so much to his empirical pursuits in which Hulme sees a model 
for linguistic exactitude, so that "pure philosophy ought to be, and may be, entirely objective 
and scientific. "103 In 1916 Eliot was promoting the same dissociation between ethics and 
scientific rigour, as be wrote in a review for the International Journal ofEthics: 
The fact is, no philosophy can render morality either more or less secure than we actually find it to be. A 
philosophy may advance one or another hypothesis as to the origin of values, it may attempt to show that the 
majority of mankind are mistaken in what they value. All it can do is to propose an impartial explanation, or 
to substitute one set of values for another; but show that nothing is valuable it cannot. 
104 
Like Hulme, Eliot finds that any attempt to overlook the ethical implications of philosophy is 
misguided in so far as any philosophy will inevitably involve qualitative discriminations; but 
that to "show that nothing is valuable it cannot". This is precisely the false premise which 
allows philosophy to fall into value judgements without admitting the relativist difficulties of so 
doing; thus passing morality for scientific exactitude. Balfour's pragmatism is for Eliot an 
example of the misguided attempt to overlook the ethical implications of any philosophy, 
however scientific. The paradox is that the separation between ethics and sciences can only be 
properly achieved by not failing to acknowledge this latent metaphysical dimension; it is only 
101 'A Critique of Satisfaction', Speculations, p. 18 & 21. 
102 'A Critique of Satisfaction', Speculations, p. 18. 
103 'A Critique of Satisfaction', Speculations, p. 18. 
104 T. S. Eliot's '[A review of] Theism and Humanism by the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M. P. The Gifford Lectures 
for 1914', RE, 26, no 2 (January, 1916), 284-9. 
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through acknowledgement that it can be kept at bay. This is precisely the difficulty of the 
project of Classicism, whose criticism, however scientific, becomes a self-conscious - if ironic 
- aesthetic posture impossible to maintain. This aestheticism is perhaps at the root of the 
scientific style Eliot insists on in The Sacred Wood, which artificially tries to keep away the 
very metaphysics he must ultimately take into account. Eliot is in these early days partaking of 
the Arnoldean malady more than he cares to admit with a straight face. 'Ibis is the ambiguity 
and latent irony of Eliot's apparent scientific rigour in 'Reflections on Vers Libre', and his 
proposal in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' "to halt at the frontier of metaphysics or 
mysticism.,, 105 
Ambivalence towards scientific method is also illustrated by Hulme's fierce 
criticism of the Humanist danger posed by the scientific philosophy of Russell. Hulme wants to 
enjoy the science without the ethics; but it is the possibility of the marriage between the two 
that he hopes for. Hulme later admitted in 'Neo-realism': 
When with entirely empirical and nominalist prejudices, I read Moore and Russell, there was no foothold for 
me; they dealt with logic and ethics, and holding as I did, entirely relativist views about both, I naturally 
found nothing familiar from which I might started to understand the rest. The Germans [Husserl and 
Meinong] I mentioned were useful in this way; they made the intellectualist non-empirical method 
comprehensible to me by enlarging its scope - applying it not only to logic and ethics but to things which at 
the time did interest me. 
106 
Here Hulme appears to be giving in to the very philosophy he was trying to resist in his earlier 
pieces on Humanism. Hulme sees an opening in Neo-realism that redeems it from the 
Humanist fallacy of letting ethics and metaphysics through the back door. This opening is 
embodied by logic's linguistic concerns. It offers Hulme a realm between nominalism and 
rationalism, empiricism and metaphysics, where ethics and science can co-exist. Thus the 
empiricist and nominalist limitation is that it 
cannot understand how the study of such an apparently relative and trivial thing as the nature of 
propositions, the study of the accidental characteristic s of human speech should be an indispensable 
preliminary to philosophy. 107 
105 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 59. 
106 'Neo-realism', Speculations, p. 4 1. 
107 'Neo-real ism', Speculations, p. 44. 
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Hulme adds that this linguistic treatment avoids the anthropomorphism of science when it deals 
with the human, as ethics or the Weltanschauung. And thus the romantic monster of personality 
is kept at bay. Hulme adds: 
One recalls Bolzano's 'Sentences in themselves'. Logic, then, does not deal with the laws of the human 
thought but with these quite objective sentences. In this way the anthropomorphism which underlies certain 
views of logic is got rid of. Similarly, ethics can be exhibited as an objective science, and is also purified of 
anthropomorphism. 108 
Despite Hulme's awareness of the shortcomings of scientific philosophy, he cannot help 
wishing it were the answer to all his problems. There is a similar temptation in Eliot's early 
criticism: a self-conscious attempt to root his literary approach in scientific method. Eliot is, 
however, more cautious about the problems of logic and Russell's empiricism. For him the 
problem is not simply about keeping worldviews separate from science but to determine how 
far science can go. 
Both in 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama' and 'The Perfect Critic', Eliot considers 
the relation of science to literature. His awareness of the problems is however superior to 
Hulme. Eliot's premise is summarized by the statement that 
permanent literature is always a presentation: either a presentation of thought, or a presentation of feeling by 
a statement ofevents in human action or objects in the external world. 
109 
Eliot's approach is more clearly cognitive where Hulme's bias is more strictly logical. The 
difference is in their respective understandings of the term 'external'. Eliot understands that the 
'external world' is a donný, not reducible to the empirical world alone, but one which includes 
human beings and objects participating in it. T11is admission potentially re-introduces the 
importance of the Weltanschauung, itself part of the events in human action where feeling 
refers to perception, in the philosophy of language. For Hulme this understanding contaminates 
the exactitude of philosophy as a science, and by default the precision of its literary correlative: 
the poetic analogy. For Eliot thought, feelings and human action are as much part of the 
external world as its physical make up and its essential atomistic structure. In short, Hulme is 
108 'Neo-realism', Speculations, pp. 44-5. 
109'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', SW, pp. 64-65. 
46 
more naively enthusiastic about the new sciences than Eliot, whose doctoral thesis gave him an 
invaluable understanding of the intermingling issues at stake. 
Cognition and Hulme's 'Notes on Language and Style' 
In 'Notes on Language and Style', Hulme is particularly concerned with the relation of 
language to its objects. Like Eliot, Hulme struggles to come to terms with a referential theory 
of language while still accepting the existence of an external reality: 
A man cannot write without seeing at the same time a visual signification before his eyes. It is this image 
which precedes the writing and makes it firm The art of literature consists exactly in this passage from 
the eye to the voice. 
I 10 
The key to the debate over logic as a stylistic model of language lies in cognition. Here, Eliot's 
thorough philosophical training gives him an edge over Hulme, an advantage over the latter's 
rudimentary critique of arithmetical language: 
Clumsiness of Prose - Relation of Language and the Idea Expressed: 
Analysis of a man reading an argument. 
We replace meaning (i. e. visions) by words. These words fall intd well-known patterns, i. e. into certain well- 
known phrases which we accept without thinking of their meaning, just as we do x in algebra. 
[ 
... 
] Habitually we may say that the reader takes words as x without the meaning attached. Aphra sees each 
word with an image sticking on to it, never a flat word passed over a board like a counter. 
[ 
... 
] The ideal of modem prose is to be all counters, i. e. to pass to conclusions without thinking. 
I 
Hulme overstates the problem of arithmetical language because he does not seems aware of the 
logician's own struggle to include cognitive referentialism in his own theory of language. In 
'Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits' (1948) Russell is, in fact, principally concerned 
with this link: 
Language would be impossible if the physical world did not in fact have certain characteristics and that he 
'theory' of language is at certain points dependent upon knowledge of the physical world [ ... 
] Logic and 
mathematics would not have prospered asthey have done if logicians and mathematicians had continually 
remembered that symbols should mean something. 112 
I 10 T. E. Hulme's 'Notes on Language and Style', Further Speculations, ed. Sam Hynes (Minnesota Press), p 79 
& 86. This particular essay is a collection of Hulme's notes on various themes published after his death, thus it is 
disjointed and abbreviated. 
III 'Notes on Language and Style', Further Speculations, pp. 77,78 &79. 
112 Bertrand Russell, 'Language' (from 'Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits' (1948)) in The Basic Writings 
of Bertrand Russell (1903-1959), Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn eds. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1961), p. 133 & p. 135. 
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Hulme's awareness of "the fallacy that language is logical, or that meaning is" cannot be 
properly offered an alternative because be does not seem clear enough about the full cognitive 
implications of logic in the first placel 
13. Hulme is offering a style as a solution to avoid "to 
pass to conclusions without thinking", but never departing from the arithmetical logic he is 
criticising. This style is based on what Hulme calls analogy. Analogy is the poetic expression 
of the synthesis between perception and language. He notes in 'Notes on Language and Style': 
The two tarts walking along Piccadilly on tiptoe, going home, with hat on back of head. Worry until could 
find the exact model analogy that will reproduce the extraordinary effect they produce [ ... 
] We may have 
evolved painfully from the clay, and be the last leaf on a tree. But now we have cut ourselves away from 
that. We are things-in-themselves. We exist out of time. 
114 
Hulme's concept of analogy gives away the latent idealism he criticizes in algebra. The aim of 
the analogy is to find a timeless absolute referent in the world for language. It amounts to 
arithmetical Platonism in literature. His insistence to see things, is rather a desire to see through 
them. 
Hulme's idealism is restricted to poetics. The referentiality of the analogy has to be 
distinguished from that of ordinary language. Hulme accepts that this is the status all language 
arrives at in the end, but sees in poetry the role of reawakening the link between the object and 
its denotation. In 'Bergson's Theory of Art' he affirms that 
every word in the language originates as a live metaphor, but gradually of course all visual meaning oes out 
of them and they become a kind of counters. Prose is in fact the museum where the dead metaphors of the 
poets arc preserved. 115 
Once they die, metaphors stop pointing to the world, and only to themselves. What Hulme 
means by 'visual meaning' is not an exercise in the perception of the ordinary world of objects. 
The possibility of refreshing the link between language and the world relies in the assumption 
of ideal essences for every object so that its link with language can be renewed. And, for 
Hulme, this is the role of poetic analogies. This idealism is, after all, not unlike Russell's 
concessions to Platonism. It is the necessary compensation for the impossibility of finalising 
the relationship between language and its objects. Russell's logical atomism attenuates this 
113 'Notes on Language and Style', Further Speculations, p. 83. 
114 'Notes on Language and Style', Further Speculations, p. 82. 
115 'Bergson's Theory of Art', Speculations, p. 15 2. 
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idealism by considering the world as a framework of atomic structures logically structured and 
which language can reflect; the referent is, thus, not ideal but real. 
There is, however, an important reason for Hulme's idealism, it compensates for his 
increasing awareness that the reality of the object cannot be perceived directly: "could reality 
come into direct contact with sense and consciousness, art would be useless, or rather we 
should all be artists. " 116 This confirms that Hulme's emphasis on seeing is ultimately 
metaphysical: it is not so much about perceiving as about having visions, as he half 
acknowledges above: "We replace meaning (i. e. visions) by words". For Hulme, poetry is the 
realm which can "hand you over the sensation as directly as possible, attempts to get it over 
bodily with all the qualities it possessed for you when you experienced it. -I 
17 Bodily 
perception is idealized as in Platonic essences which, in the continuous process of being 
forgotten, can be provisionally reawakened through art and the artist. Hulme notes in 
'Bergson's Theory of Art: 
The average person as distinct from the artist does not even perceive the individuality of their own emotions. 
Our faculties of perception are, as it were, crystallised out into certain moulds. Most of us, then, never see 
things as they are, but see only the stock types which are embodied in language [ ... 
] It is necessary before 
that he should be a person who is able to emancipate himself from the moulds which language and ordinary 
perception force on him and be able to see things as they really are. 
118 
Hulme implies that the perception of things as they really are is not ordinary. This amounts to a 
dissociation between language and its objects. It idealises artistic, as opposed to, ordinary 
cognition, but which Hulme is at pains to compensate for in 'A Preface to Modem Art and 
Neo-realism': 
Two statements are confused: (1) that the source of imagination must be from nature, and (2) the 
consequence illegitimally drawn from this, that the resulting work must be realistic, and based on natural 
forms. One can give an analogy in ordinary thought. The reasoning activity is quite different in character 
from any succession of images drawn from the senses, but yet thought itself would be impossible without 
this sensual stimulus. 
119 
116 'Bergson's Theory of Art', Speculations, p. 15 8. 
117 'Bergson's Theory of Art', Speculations, p. 164 
118 'Bergson's Theory of Art', Speculations, p. 166. Alan R. Jones makes Hulme's romanticism the subject of 
Chapter 3 of The Life and Opinions of T E. Hulme. He compares Hulme's theory of poetry to the Romantic 
philosophy of Coleridge and blames Bergson for it: "Through Bergson, Hulme has been led back to what amounts 
to a re-statement of the romantic theory of poetry and the re-affirmation of romantic Platonism", p. 46. 
119 'A Preface to Modern Art and Neo-real ism', Further Speculations, p. 127. 
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As the title of this essay indicates, Hulme is comparing his aesthetics to the philosophy of Neo- 
realism. It is at this point that he gets closest to the atomic idealism of Russell's materialism. 
He is clearly not talking about seeing objects, but seeing their atomic essence, although he 
admits to its mediation through perception. Hulme's explication fails to articulate this 
perceptual grounding of artistic cognition, it simply tell us that they do: that all perception 
originates in nature is offered as an unjustified explanation. This is the hollow materialism of 
Russell's logical atomism, which itself must resort to Platonism for referential validation. Thus 
Hulme develops a poetics whose logic paradoxically strays from direct empirical grounding 
into metaphysics, precisely because this empiricism is beyond direct perception. 
Eliot's own scientific predicament can be scrutinised in the light of Hulme. In his 
doctoral thesis, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, he is already 
making concessions to metaphysics in the absence of a definite way of resolving the cognitive 
problems arising out the relationship between language and its objects: 
Though we cannot say that we have either name or object ... until we 
have the complete object for that 
name or the complete name for that object, yet the point at which this mystic marriage occurs is not exactly 
determinable. 120 
His commitment to science in his early literary criticism is fuelled by this unsatisfactory 
concession in his philosophy, yet it is more consistent than Hulme's, Eliot is ultimately pre- 
informed by a clearer understanding of the limits of science as he also noted in his doctoral 
thesis: 
There is a sense in which any science is a priori: in that it satisfies the needs of a particular point of view, a 
point of view which may be said to be more original than any of the facts that are referred to in that 
science. 
121 
Like Hulme, his concern about seeing the object as it really is becomes a scientific imperative. 
But his certainty about attaining this goal is more tentative. There lies the difference. Eliot's 
early literary criticism exhibits a literal use of scientific language precisely to the point of 
rhetorical instability but compensated by Eliot's rhetorical palette: irony. As we shall see, all 
these recall Hulme's use of geometric analogies in his own criticism, yet Eliot, despite his own 
120 KE, p. 135. 
121 KE, p. 6 1. 
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admission, means his analogies quite literally as a way of training his eyes, and of testing 
scientific discourse and its usefulness as a critical tool in literature. It is this enforced literalness 
which characterizes the stylistic experiments Eliot initiates in The Sacred Wood. 
51 
Chapter 2 
Ghosts and the Cognitive Problem of Impersonality 
Richard Shustennan notes that: 
Eliot began his critical career in an environment of literary appreciation generally imbalanced towards the 
hedonistic and personal, in the wake of the anti-scicntistic, anti-moralistic wave of turn-of-the-century 
aestheticism. Against this perceived excess of self-centred, pleasure seeking impressionistic criticism, the 
young Eliot vigorously and successfully rebelled; reversing the emphasis on subject pleasure for a radical 
privileging of objective and impersonal knowledge, 'the sense of fact' and technical analysis. Seeing a need 
to establish the real cognitive worth and seriousness of criticism, to transform its self-image from that of 
salon chatter and the adulating twaddle of the Browning Study Circle, Eliot emphasized (indeed one could 
say profitably overemphasiscd) criticism's cognitive dimension. 
122 
The cognitive dimension Shusterman indicates in Eliot's criticism is thus contextualized as a 
reaction to the prevailing literary and philosophical climate of the early 20th-century. This 
climate can perhaps be more clearly understood as a battle between science and metaphysics 
properly fought over cognition and logic. Eliot takes part in this battle by experimenting with 
the logical models of F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell in his criticism and in doing so he 
rhetorically exploits their differences while developing an experimental critical style, which 
simultaneously feeds on the very philosophical discourses it exposes. The differences between 
realism and idealism in the first two decades of the twentieth-century are not absolute, and Eliot 
is particularly aware of this fine line. ' 23 Yet it is still significant to note the facility with which 
Eliot seems to reconcile their philosophical styles. 
124 This is, as we have seen, the strategy at 
work in 'Reflections on Vers Libre' (1917), which Eliot develops further throughout the later 
essays and reviews collected in The Sacred Wood and particularly in 'Hamlet and His 
Problems' (1919). 
122 Richard Shusterman, TS. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism (London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 204. 
123 In 'The Relation between Politics and Metaphysics' (1913) (MS), Eliot makes clear that, for him, there is an 
overlap between all apparently opposing philosophical doctrines. After reviewing the main philosophical currents, 
he concludes: "all anti-thetical philosophies tend to meet", p. 21. 
124 It is worth mentioning that it is figures such as Josiah Royce and his graduate seminars which, between 1913- 
14, encouraged Eliot towards a practical interdisciplinary reading of philosophy: "His [Royce's] most notable 
contribution to the teaching of the university was made through his seminar in logic, which became a veritable 
clearing house of science. Men of widely different training and technique - chemists, physiologists, statisticians, 
pathologists, mathematicians -, who could not understand one another, were here interpreted to one another by 
Royce, who understood them all" (Josiah Royce', Science, N. S. 44 (Dec. 1,1916), p. 773), quoted in Josiah 
Royce's Seminar, 1913-1914: as recorded in the books of Harry T Costello, Grover Smith ed. (New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 1963), p xi. Royce himself was a curious hybrid of idealism and pragmatism with 
analytical inclinations. 
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The main difference between 'Reflections on Vers Libre' and 'Hamlet and His 
Problems' is that in the earlier essay Eliot does not address the problem of cognition directly. 
The advantage of this limitation is that it avoids a premature complication of the logical models 
Eliot is utilizing in his critical discourse. 'Hamlet and his Problems' is a more revealing piece 
because the cognitive legitimization it seeks for its logic reveals more explicit faults in the 
method; Eliot's rhetorical compensations become more evident in the very enactment of logic. 
The logical inconsistencies exposed by Eliot's critical formulation of the objective correlative 
in 'Hamlet and His Problems' expose the difficulties of applying scientific methods to literary 
criticism. Even if literature can claim the scientific absoluteness preached by logic, the 
correlation is undercut by the impossibility of Eliot's critical discourse to achieve this 
exactitude in the first place. It simply will not fit. At worst, it renders the very role of criticism 
pointless because it suggests that art can best speak for itself, or that, at best, criticism becomes 
a parody of scientific discourse. 
Description and Interpretation 
The increasing importance of cognition in Eliot's criticism is evident in 'The Possibility of 
Poetic Drama' in The Sacred Wood, where he announces that: 
Permanent literature is always a presentation: either a presentation of thought, or a presentation of feeling by 
a statement of events in human action or objects in the external world. 
125 
It is not clear what sort of presentation is Eliot referring to. Philosophically one can either refer 
to a number of possibilities, of which Russell's knowledge by description in The Problems of 
Philosophy (1912) or Bradley's theory of immediate experience are the most likely. Perhaps the 
answer can be found in a set of notes entitled 'Description and Interpretation'126 written in 
1913-14, in which Eliot states that: 
125 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', SW, pp. 64-65. 
126 T. S. Eliot's Philosophical Essays and Notes (1913-4) are part of T. S Eliot Collection Bequeathed to King's 
College Cambridge by John Davy Hayward in 1965. They pre-empt most of the central philosophical themes Eliot 
was to explore in his thesis and his major philosophical articles: 'The Development of Leibnizs Monadism' and 
'Leibniz's Monadism and Bradley's Finite Centres'. 
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Take any simple object you will, give an account of it, and you will find that you have given an evaluation 
and an interpretation. If you really describe the thing as it really is, the whole truth about it, you would not 
be describing, you would be presenting; described and description would be identical. 
127 
Eliot's presentation, therefore, offers a middle way in the description and interpretation 
dialectic. It is in the synthesis of these two poles of cognitive expression where Eliot finds 
permanent literature exists. Even as Eliot appears to be seduced by the idea of literature 
resolving a problem of philosophical expression, one must note that in 'Description and 
Interpretation' presentation appears only as a theoretical hypothesis not fulfilled in practice. 
Eliot's point is that, in the act of explanation every state of a particular case subsumes a 
universal law. It is impossible to hold on to a single point of view in the interpretation of a 
particular case without implying its transcendental reduction; hence, all explanations are 
inherently metaphysical in their disposition to self-transcendence. For instance, statements like 
"the walls collapsed because of the weight of the roof, I took a cold because I sat in a draft", state not only a 
sequence but a general principle. 128 
Description, on the other hand, presents a development of the problem of explanation; it is the 
point when the case explained amounts to the law it subsumes. So, 
if the particular can be felt to have no other aspect than what the law covers, we have simply described it, for 
in stating the particular we have already stated the universal, and the independent statement of the universal 
does not give [way to] that transition to a higher degree of reality which is explanation. 
129 
Description, unlike explanation - or interpretation -, apparently involves no metaphysical 
transition to a "higher degree of reality", because in a way it is already there or here. But 
the hypothetical limiting case of description would be pure contemplation which does not alter its object, 
and that for a finite consciousness i  out of the question . 
130 
The first thing this does is blur the distinction between explanation and description. But it is the 
hue of the blur which is interesting. First, 'description' as pure contemplation of an object for 
finite consciousness is rendered impossible, then Eliot proposes that description always falls 
short of being identical with its object, that is, all descriptions are really explanations. In turn: 
127'Description 
and Interpretation', TS. Eliot's Philosophical Essays and Notes (1913-4), Hayward Bequest 
(1965), King's College Library, Cambridge, pp 5-6. 
128 'Description and Interpretation', p. 3. 
129 'Description and Interpretation', p. 4, 
130 'Description and Interpretation', pp. 4-5. 
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"Explanation through reference to a general principle must pass onto description"131. That is, 
explanation is the failure of description, and description is the secret metaphysical drive that 
brings explanation into being. In a way they are the same thing, only separated by their own 
hermeneutic expectations. 
One may argue that Eliot remains ambiguous about his position with respect to 
description and explanation. And given that he equates description with science and 
explanation with metaphysics, one may add that Eliot is already in the period 1913-14 
struggling to develop a middle way between Bradley and Russell. Given Russell's visit to 
Harvard at the time and the attention Josiah Royce's seminars - attended by Eliot - were 
paying to it, one can perhaps only deduce that these notes are more likely a reaction to Russell 
that to Bradley. Transcripts of the Seminar show the issue of description frequently being 
discussedl 32, and Eliot's paper of the 24th of February 1914 claims that "description is just as 
bad as explanation" 13 3, and the summary of the session notes that: 
The second paper, by Mr Eliot, said the difference between description and explanation was in the act rather 
than in the content. Explanation is more primitive, description more sophisticated [ ... 
] To sum up, 
explanation is an act which tries with indifferent success to bring the particular under the universal; 
description tries to stay in the particular as given, but in spite of itself transforms the given by the 
interpretation it gives to it. 134 
Eliot's evaluation of description parallels Bradley's dissatisfaction with Russell's 
analytical pretensions in the latter's account of knowledge by description135; that is, the 
problematisation of Russell's easy passage from knowledge by acquaintance to knowledge by 
description, and his inability to give a full account of universals by means of this analysis. 
'Mese assumptions are at the heart of the cognitive premises of Russell's logical materialism, 
131 'Description and Interpretation', p. 3. 
132 What is clear is that Eliot does not take definite sides within the philosophical debate itself, which refutes the 
argument by Jeffrey Perl and Andrew Tuck that Eliot preferred description to explanation. See Jeffrey Perl and 
Andrew Tuck's 'The Significance of T. S. Eliot's Philosophical Notebooks' in TS. Eliot: Essays from the 
Southern Review, James Olney ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 157-178, (p. 168). 
133 Grover Smith ed., Josiah Royce's Seminar, 1913-1914: As Recorded in the Books of Harry T Costello (New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1963), p. 119. 
134 Smith, Josiah Royce's Seminar, p. 120-121. 
135 For a sense of the general polemic between Russell and Bradley see: B. Russell, 'Some Explanations in Reply 
to Mr Bradley', Mind, New Series, Vol. 19, Issue 75 (July 1910), 373-378 and F. H. Bradley, 'Reply to Mr 
Russel I's Explanations', Mind, New Series, Vol. 20, Issue 77 (January 1911), 74-76. 
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which encourage a radical referentialism. Eliot's philosophical notes seem to imply a rejection 
of this philosophical position, yet in his emphasis on presentation in 'The Possibility of Poetic 
Drama' he appears to be changing his mind for the sake of rescuing discourse from the 
subjectivity of interpretation, at least with reference to literature. Yet there is an important 
difference with Russell. Eliot's presentation in 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama' does not refer 
to the world by description, but to thoughts and feelings through the medium of human action 
and external objects. In other words, Eliot has in mind a world with all its metaphysical 
consequences when he is thinking about the kinds of objects that should be presented to 
cognition. Eliot adopts a scientific discourse but simultaneously defies its empirical paradigms. 
Eliot's negotiations between description and interpretation parallel his meanderings 
between science and metaphysics. Eliot's 'middle way' is not in these early days a 
philosophical position; the originality of his move is that he envisions the reconciliation 
between metaphysics and science as a problem of style. Jeffrey Perl is sensitive to Eliot's 
approach when be says that: 
Human language is a poor medium in which to work the precisions of philosophy. The theorist's project is 
"largely one of oversimplification and it entails a reduction of the knots, echoes and vagaries that constitute 
alanguage"[ ... 
] Ideas are comprised by sentences, and so Eliot regarded philosophy as properly a genre of 
prose composition. 136 
Eliot imports this approach from the current philosophical inclination to resolve 
epistemological and cognitive problems through logic and the analysis of language, while he 
gradually stamps it with his own personal contribution. The exploitation of logic, in turn, enacts 
the application of his philosophical knowledge to his literary interests, so that he can develop - 
or simply take advantage of - some of the problems he encounters in his philosophical studies 
through his literary criticism. Thus The Sacred Wood does not amount to a definite backing of 
science despite its apparent call to do so but the recycling of his philosophy studies. 
136 Jeffrey Perl, 'The Language of Theory and the Language of Poetry: The Significance of T. S. Eliot's 
Philosophical Notebooks, Part Two', Southern Review, 21 (Winter 1985), 1012-1023 (p. 1017). 
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The 'Presentation' of Metaphysics 
In 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' we are warned that: "This essay proposes to 
halt at the 
frontier of metaphysics or mysticism"137. -Ibis statement is clear enough and appears to speak 
for the collection of essays as a whole. 
138 Eliot seems determined to follow the scientific way, 
or at least avoid metaphysics, thus, one assumes, privileging description over explanation. 
Yet 
Eliot's warning is in a sense inappropriate because over-cautious. It reveals a degree of self- 
consciousness about the metaphysical pitfalls he is implicitly trying to avoid by adopting 
science as a critical model. The statement assumes the reader's predisposition to over-step this 
frontier and fall into metaphysical considerations. A warning to the blind that there might be a 
hole in the pavement and that if there is one they will fall in it. Yet, this sentence tells us more. 
It tells us, not so much to leave metaphysics alone but encourages us to peer across just as we 
are to halt at the frontier and, in so doing, it controls our metaphysical deductions; that is, about 
the type of metaphysics which may share a sentence with mysticism. It is a wonderful, if 
muted, control of language. An unexpected dimension of the essay is revealed by precisely this 
gesture of closing that semantic avenue, which, in turn, results in the invitation to contemplate 
the terms which, having been taken for granted, are discarded. This interpretation owes 
something to A. D. Nuttall, who argues that: 
A phrase in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' strongly suggests that Eliot was aware of a continuum 
between the problem of literature and those of metaphysics, and stooped himself from passing from one to 
the other only by calling an abrupt halt But already in the essay he has more than once trembled on the 
edge. 
139 
For Nuttall, Eliot's halting at the frontier of metaphysics perhaps reflects his own difficulty in 
keeping philosophical and literary questions separate. Consequently, I think his account misses 
137 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 59 
138 Having said this, the reader must be aware that the items collected in The Sacred Wood cover a period of 
review and essay writing, mainly between 1919 to 1920. The first 'An American Critic' is published in New 
Statesman, VII. 168 (June 24,1916) but most of them are written in 1919 and 1920, the year The Sacred Wood is 
published. His reviews in particular were not always signed. Thus it is not clear whether we can speak of an 
explicit agenda in The Sacred Wood, not only because they were written separately and not necessarily thinking of 
each other, but because review writing is a contextual exercise. Thus it is perhaps better to keep in mind Eliot's 
agenda in the critical writing of this period as expressed implicitly in his critical style, which may be seen as a kind 
of signature writing. This itself fits with his reluctance to abide by particular points of views and take refuge in the 
form, rather than the content, as expression of opinion and personality. 
139 A. D. Nuttall, A Common SAy: Philosophy and the Literary Imagination (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), P. 
213. 
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the potential rhetorical control at work in Eliot's warning. The result is Eliot's presentation of 
metaphysics in the text as an object of contemplation; to make it self-evident in a way that it 
makes its explanation superfluous. Conversely, the explanation of a general concept, such as 
'metaphysics', would certainly not reach description. Ibis perverse logic is present in Bradley's 
Principles of Logic, because it implies that whether we affirm or deny judgement we always 
assume the existence of the idea it contains. As Bradley puts it: 
In all negative judgement, the ultimate subject is the reality that comes to us in presentation. We affirm in all 
alike that the quality of the real excludes an ideal content which is offered. And so everyjudgement, positive 
or negative, is in the end existential. 140 
This logic demands that the unknowability of the ideal must always determine the particularity 
of the real; just as description must always refer to a general law through explanation. This is 
precisely the scientific objection and the problem Russell encounters in general words - that is, 
words whose referent is not available to our knowledge through acquaintance - but which he 
has to concede must be universals as he admits in An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth 
(1914). 141 Eliot is engaging with the same problem; while committing himself to scientific 
method, Eliot is actively incorporating metaphysics into his discourse as an unknowable 
implied; even if to do so involves reducing metaphysics to a term without a referent. Ibis 
incorporation involves the gradual incarnation of the unknowability of universals into objects 
presentable to consciousness, which begins with the indirect attempt to determine the reality of 
metaphysics as a term. Eliot begins to describe metaphysics precisely at the point he refuses to 
describe it. The result is a kind of 'presentation' never totally complete. 
In 'Description and Interpretation' Eliot distinguishes between the use of language 
particular to science and that of metaphysics : 
In general one may say that description is the function of science, explanation (or interpretation) of 
metaphysics. 142 
140 Bradley, Chapter III: 'The Negative Judgement', Principles, I, p. 120. 
141 "1 conclude, therefore, though with hesitation, that there are universals and not merely general words", 
Russell, 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth' (1914) in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (1903-1959), 
Robert E. Egner and Lester E. Denonn eds. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961), p. 250. 
142 'Description and Interpretation', p. 6. 
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If Eliot sees explanation as a metaphysical enterprise, the best way to halt at its frontier is not to 
explain. To reduce 'metaphysics' to a mere term and discredit it by forcing it to share its space 
with 'mysticism' is, surely, the best exorcism of them all. It equates the universal status of 
metaphysics with esoteric unknowability. Yet, in the very process of doing this, Eliot is 
validating the term by determining its degree of reality even within the scientific discourse his 
criticism is adopting. In effect, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' explicitly encourages a 
scientific approach: the importance of description in criticism, and the impersonal approach that 
description entails. Take the following passage: 
It is in this depcrsonalisation that art may be said to approach t e condition of science. I shall, therefore, 
invite you to consider, as a suggestive analogy, the action which takes place when a bit of finely filiated 
platinum is introduced into a chamber containing oxygen and sulphur dioxide. 143 
This is the well-known analogy with which Eliot attempts to describe the impersonal role of the 
artist in the creative process. Yet it seems that Eliot is describing when he means to explain and 
explain when he means to describe. There is, however, a latent desire that the analogy may 
work literally, for it is not coincidence that the analogy is scientific, though we are forced to 
take his word for it. It is but an analogy which gives a philosophical argument when a scientific 
description is what is intended; science is misappropriated as an analogy and not as a 
correspondence. At a literal level, then, Eliot is clear: scientific method is his choice, and, 
accordingly, sets the boundaries of his essay at the frontier of metaphysics because, among 
other things, Eliot had stated in 'Description and Interpretation' : 
Metaphysics involves personality more than does science, and explanation is explanation comprehended by 
a point of view. 144 
Metaphysics becomes subjective because its judgement is not governed by an empirically 
determinable point of view; it is ineffable and the point of view it adopts inevitably involves a 
personal interpretation. Personal interpretation is for Eliot always pejoratively emotional. Yet, 
in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', he undermines the absolute distinction between 
interpretation and description by adding: "But, of course, only those who have personality and 
emotions knows what it means to want to escape from those things. "145 Similarly, only those 
143 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 53. 
144 'Description and Interpretation', p. 6. 
145 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 58. 
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that explain can possibly know what it is to want to describe. Eliot's choice between science 
and metaphysics is after all not any clearer in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' than in 
'Description and Interpretation'. Though Eliot appears to make a choice to escape'emotion, 
personality and metaphysics, he seems to settle for less, or for what is possible; that is, if only 
"to know what it means to escape from these things". Reality is not ultimately presentable in its 
completeness. 
'Presentation' and 'object of contemplation' are precisely the terms Eliot uses to 
refer to the impossibility of the scientific project in 'Description and Interpretation'. If my 
explanation of Eliot's statement is descriptive, I must conclude that Eliot is in fact describing 
explanation; to do so is the closest one can get to presenting an object to pure contemplation as 
absolute description. Thus explanation becomes an object of description, metaphysics the 
object of science. Yet, Eliot does not, cannot, expel metaphysics from 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent. Eliot's mistake, if it is a mistake, is to identify 'metaphysics' in 'Tradition 
and the Individual Talent', which, in a sense, takes him over its frontier. My concern is to note 
the extent to which Eliot is compelled to make this mistake - whether the metaphysical 
implications of science would inevitably become apparent in any case (hence the warning to 
halt at its frontier) so that naming metaphysics is not a fault but an strategy to control its 
inevitability; a conscious stylistic project, in other words, an experiment with the medium of 
literary criticism. 
John Paul Riquelme notes that: 
Eliot's claim that the essay 'proposes to halt at the frontier of metaphysics ormysticism, and confine itself 
to practical conclusions. But it does not halt at the frontier of what might be expected in the style and 
structure of a literary essay in the Amoldean tradition. 146 
My approach to 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' is not dissimilar from Riquelme's. He, 
too, stresses the importance of the stylistic strategies of the essay, yet he is more concerned to 
place it against the 19th-century essay tradition. Though Riquelme does not provide any 
146 John Paul Riquelme's 'The Modernist Essay: The Case of T. S. Eliot - Poet as Critic' in Southern 
Review, 21, 
no 4 (October 1985), p. 1027. For an alternative view of the relation of Eliot's critical writing and Arnold see 
Edward Lobb, T. S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981). Lobb 
argues that Eliot owes his critical style to the Romantic tradition of essay writing and specially to Arnold. 
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information as to Eliot's philosophical position within the debate between Russell and Bradley, 
he offers a glimpse of Eliot's stylistic alternative to this philosophical debate through his 
participation in the literary tradition of essay writing. This alternative context may prove 
essential if Eliot's criticism is not to be reduced to a simple re-writing of the philosophy 
problems he was trying to transcend. This is a problem Eliot is consciously fighting as be points 
out in 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', that literary practices should not embody a philosophy 
but they should replace it. 147 It is however difficult to determine the extent to which Eliot 
means this replacement to be understood simply in literary terms. This assumption can also be 
conceived as the typical romantic mistake of idealizing poetics to resolve what ordinary 
discourse may not attain. The understanding of Eliot's critical style as a poetics of essay 
writing, however, is reductive; it ignores the strength of his participation in the alternative 
discourses of philosophy: metaphysical and scientific. Participation is, after all, the only 
possible route to influence what is external to the individual. The apparent content of 'Tradition 
and the Individual Talent' - the scientific and impersonal approach of description - may be 
Russell's, but the rhetorical strategy - its use of metaphysics - is Bradley's. The result is not a 
literary embodiment, but a replacement through the rhetorical expansion of the philosophical 
discourse as a critical practice. 
Contradictions and Unreal Objects 
If we are to avoid concluding that Eliot's critical position is clearly pro-scientific and anti- 
metaphysical, the essays and reviews included in The Sacred Wood must be read in the context 
of the Bradley-Russell debate. In other words, the philosophical context not only gives us 
information about what Eliot is ultimately concerned with, but gives clear clues about the 
stylistic strategies he uses to overcome the philosophical problems he had encountered as a 
student of philosophy. This style is itself a philosophical borrowing in the form of logic; that 
Eliot denies 'metaphysics' - as explanation - does not necessarily imply its rejection but, 
rather, reveals itself as the affirmation of a double negation. Hence, if Eliot "raises the 
expectation of definitioe', he does so "only in order to defeat if', as Jeffrey Perl comments in 
147 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', STY, p. 66. 
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"Me Significance of T. S. Eliot's Philosophical Notebooks'148. Yet, this defeat is in itself a 
forni of definition; it is, for Bradley, the inevitable defeat of every scientific project which 
pretends to describe. 
For Bradley, all description fails because firstly it alters the object it analyses, and 
secondly, because there is no such thing as a conscious acquaintance with sense data which, in 
turn, cannot avoid being affected by the descriptive process of logical reconstruction after its 
analysis is complete. This attack on Bertrand Russell is confirmed by the latter's inability to 
provide an empirical account of general words - which he has to concede must be in line with 
universals -, that is, the nature of their encounter with our senses. The direct acquaintance of 
general words goes unaccounted for by Russell - unless, of course, one resorts to a theory of 
pre-cognition as in the Platonic forms. Bradley may agree with Russell that universals are not 
readily available, but in 'Some Problems in Connection with Mr Russell's Doctrine' he 
dismisses this necessity: "There is no such thing as a bare universal, nor for my consciousness 
of universality is such a thing wanted, nor could it serve. "149 Unlike Russell150, Bradley 
argues that universals come to us already available in our encounter with particulars. The 
relation of particulars to universals is accounted for through Bradley's own brand of idealist 
logic. For him the universal ground, always contaminated by the particular, subsists in the 
mixture as a negation: 
It is in a word negation which is implied in our awareness of universals and which makes that awareness 
possible [ ... 
] The universal idea cannot come before us as bare, but this universal on the other hand is used 
as the positive ground of a negation, and, as that, it can on reflection be affinned. 151 
148 TS. Eliot: Essays from the Southern Review, James Olney ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 172. 
Furthermore, it is this feature which is behind the general impression that Eliot's critical essays never seem to be 
quite about what their titles lead one to expect. 
149 F. H. Bradley, 'Some Problems in Connection with Mr Russell's Doctrine', Essays on Truth and Reality 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), p. 296. 
150 Russell relies on formal logic to account for those general propositions beyond empirical verification, thus 
attempting to separate the universal from the particular. This distinction is one Russell forces upon himself as a 
means of criticising both Hegelian idealism and old empiricism, but which is only able to sustain with difficulty in 
the face of the non-empirical nature of universals, general words and propositions. Pure logic is the closest Russell, 
inadvertently, gets to Idealist logic; this is an idealism he compensates for by encouraging a more radical 
separation of the empirical world from idealist predicative logic. See Bertrand Russell, 'Logic as the essence of 
philosophy' in Our Knowledge of the External World (London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1914). 
151 Bradley, 'Some Problems in Connection with Mr Russell's Doctrine', Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 296 & 
298. 
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Is this the negation inherent in the mystical metaphysics Russell is so suspicious of, where 
"logic is practically identical with metaphysics-1529 Bradley's negation is of the universal, not 
of the world; it is a denial which, instead, affirms, or presents the world. But, Bradley asks, 
"how can negation help me arrive at that from which it proceeds, and which presupposes as 
already there? "153 Eliot cannot answer this question either, but what he does do, by halting at 
the frontier of metaphysics and mysticism, is engage with the sort of stylistic negativity which 
Bradley suggests. This is a stylistic negativity that affirms as a way of determining the extent to 
which something is true; to determine - in Bradley's terms - the degree of its reality. If Russell 
complains that the logic of mysticism and idealism indulges in the negative way of attaining 
truth by denying the world of factsl54, then Eliot, like Bradley, is not of that particular brand 
of metaphysicians - or mystics. They attempt, instead, to detennine what exactly, 
if negatively, 
is true in the world without, like Russell, being forced to accept it all as empirically real or, 
else, illusory. In other words, to accept that the world is made of appearances is not to say that 
there is nothing real about it. In 'The Validity of Artificial Distinctions', one of Eliot's graduate 
essays, he sums up this point as follows: "The world is not [ ... 
I there, for metaphysics to play 
upon it; it is itself metaphysical. "' 
15 5 Thus, the admission of the metaphysicality of the world 
does not overrule a scientific approach. That the world is metaphysical is also to say that there 
is something about it that must be treated as real, and it is with this kind of world that science 
should concern itself. 
152 Russell, 'Logic as the Essence of Philosophy', Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 38. Also see 
Russell's 'Mysticism and Logic', The Hibbert Journal (London: Williams and Norgate, 1914)) where Russell 
struggles as he attempts to untangle the mystical from the logic. It mainly amounts to an attack on Bergsonian 
Intuitionism and Idealism and a defence of the scientific method. Yet, it is an ambiguous attack because it involves 
not so much a disproof of metaphysics as its scientific appropriation: "But direct acquaintance of this kind is given 
fully in sensation, and does not require, so far as I can see, any special faculty of intuition for its apprehension [. - 
.] 
Scientific philosophy thus represents, though as yet only in a nascent condition, a higher form of thought than 
any pre-scientific belief or imagination, and, like every approach to self-transcendence it brings with it a rich 
reward in increase of scope and breath and comprehension", pp. 791 & 803. 
153 Bradley, 'Some Problems in Connection with Mr Russell's Doctrine', Essays on Truth and Reality, p. 297. 
154 "This is the negative side of the mystic's initiation: the doubt concerning common knowledge, preparing the 
way for the reception of what it seems a higher wisdom. Many men to whom this negative experience is familiar 
do not pass beyond it, but for the mystic it is merely the gateway to an ampler world", Russell, 'Mysticism and 
Logic', The Hibbert Journal, p. 784. 
155 Jeffrey Perl, Skepticism and Modern Enmity: Before and . 
4j? er Eliot (London: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1989), p. 71. 
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The negative method of Bradley's logic has strong stylistic implications for E tot, 
but also important philosophical consequences, particularly in the realm of cognition and the 
classification of objects, just as Russell's own logic implies an empirical conception of reality. 
On the 5th of May 1914, Eliot delivered a paper at Royce's seminars on the classification of 
different types of objects (Gegenstnde hoherer Ordnung) in the philosophies of Alexus 
Meinong, Bradley and Russell. In Costello's notes of the seminar, Eliot argues against 
Russell's conception of objects as complexes of sense-data directly present to our acquaintance: 
An analysis of objects into complexes of sense-data does not give anything necessarily more real. Things - 
real things, including unreal (useless) - are normal objects. Do not begin with sensc-data. Atoms the 
ultimate, perhaps. Bundle of sense data will be only sense-data; a thing is made of other things. 
156 
This parallels Bradley's criticism in 'Some Problems in Connection with Mr Russell's 
Doctrine' which we have considered above. Yet despite the apparent Bradleyanism Eliot's 
conclusion seems dissatisfied: 
Any philosophy which tries to interpret one type of object in terms of others is metaphysics and not 
description. In description one type of object is just as real and self-depcndent as another. 
157 
The point is that if the perception of objects cannot be reducible to its component sense-data, 
then what is it reducible to? Other objects? The temptation is idealistic. To reduce the real 
object to its ideal counterpart appears as the only alternative, but that is an unhappy conclusion 
for Eliot. What Eliot does find useful is the linguistic debate encouraged by this problem: that 
is, the relation of signs to their referents as a parallel problem to that of the relation of the ideal 
to the real. As Costello notes in his summary of the discussion: "Much of the discussion turned 
on the distinction between ideas and things. A sign is a thing plus a meaning; an idea is only a 
meaning. "158 
Russell himself had strong views on the subject. These views revolve around the 
relation of denoting phrases to their objects, and the importance of description in detennining 
the truth or error of the object-in-the-world they are referring to. In 'On Denoting' Russell 
again insists on the referential relation between denotation and object. 
159 Here Russell seeks to 
156 Smith, Josiah Royce's Seminars, p. 173. 
157 Smith, Josiah Royce's Seminars, p. 175. 
158 Smith, Josiah Royce's Seminars, p. 177. 
159 Russell, 'on Denoting', Mind, 14 (1905), pp. 479-493. 
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justify his assumption of direct acquaintance as the foundation of all our object cognition in the 
face of objects not directly before us - general words and universals; logically to explain 
how a 
denoting phrase may determine truth or error when its referent is not immediately available. In 
doing so he is trying to avoid Meinong's admission that denoting phrases may denote unreal 
objects. For Meinong any grammatically correct denoting phrase stands for an object even if 
that object does not exist. Against this Russell insists that: "denoting phrases never have any 
meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a 
meaning. " 160 By 'meaning' Russell is referring to the 'real object referent' for each individual 
proposition. Russell asks: "But how can a non-identity be the subject of a proposition? " 
161 
Against this radical referentiality, Eliot - along with Meinong and Bradley - encourages what 
could be identified, at this stage, as linguistic arbitrariness; where idea and thing, signifier and 
signified, hold a degree of autonomy from each other. Thus Eliot's rejection of linguistic 
referentiality is embedded in a theory of cognition which makes no absolute distinction 
between real and unreal objects as linguistic referents. This conclusion comes from the 
assumption that ideas do not exist as empirically verifiable objects to which denoting phrases 
may be said to refer absolutely. Equally, all objects partake of a certain degree of unreality 
imbedded in both the intentionally of the object and the meaning of its properties - or 
propositions of the denoting phrase to use Russell's language. This is a subject which Eliot 
considered in more detail in his doctoral thesis. 
Chapter V of Eliot's thesis; 'The Epistemologist's Theory of Knowledge 
(continued)'; deals with the problem of the classification of objects other than ordinary objects. 
This classification includes hallucinations, imaginary and unreal objects. Eliot's point of 
departure, like his seminar paper and notes on the subject, are the respective theories on the 
logical status of unreal objects in Meinong and Russell, only Eliot offers the hallucination as 
his own way to approach the same subject: 
I wish to touch on the facts of visual hallucination first, because, while the problem is essentially the same as 
that dealt with by Russell and Meinong, it appears in a more readily apprehensible form, and because it has 
160 Russell, 'On Denoting', p. 480. 
161 Russell, 'On Denoting', p. 485. 
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by some been reduced to a different explanation from that of unreal objects in judgement, whereas I believe 
the hallucination to be in virtually the same position as the round-square; both arc non-existcnt and both are 
intended objects 162. 
This treatment of hallucinations becomes a debate on language as Eliot confirms the link 
between his interest in cognition and logical problems. 
The problem with unreal objects, as dealt with by Russell in 'On denoting', is that 
by virtue of the possibility of their denotation - for example, 'square circle', 'the present King 
of France' - one may erroneously give them ontological status. The danger Russell is 
highlighting is that of falling into subjective idealism where the subject's intention virtually 
creates the world without the possibility of telling error from truth. Despite Eliot's criticism of 
Russell, he is happy to identify this problem: 
The so-called hallucination is real and true when properly understood; when stating an error we really meant 
a truth [ ... ] The world as we are acquainted from this point of view is an artificial construction, and, our 
point of view not being large enough to grasp the whole, we consider the rest as simply the debris of our 
own slight structure. This is perhaps a doctrine of a certain idealism. 163 
Yet, error is the meaningful denotation of that which we cannot incorporate into our cognitive 
horizon at any one time, which is not to say that what is erroneous does not exists. Error is the 
reminder that perception is not merely immediate. This is too ambiguous for the 
philosophically rigorous Russell who insists that the laws of logic may be applied to create 
absolute distinctions between truth and error, reality and illusion, along the lines of his law of 
contradiction. This theory determines that no denoting phrase may both affirm and deny its 
meaning at the same time. Essenti ally Russell's concern is the logical absurdity implied by the 
denotation of unreal objects. He notes in 'On Denoting': 
Mr MacColl (Mind, N. S., No 54, and again No 55, p. 401) regards individuals as of two sorts, real and 
unreal; hence he defines the null-class as the class consisting of all unreal individuals. This assumes that 
such phrases as "the present King of France", which do not denote a real individual, do, nevertheless, denote 
an individual, but an unreal one. This is essentially Meinong's theory, which we have seen reason to reject 
because it conflicts with the law of contradiction. With our theory of dcrioting, we arc able to hold that there 
arc no unreal individuals; so that the null-class is the class containing no members, not the class containing 
as members all unreal individuals. 164 
For Russell there is no such thing as an unreal object, such a term being in itself meaningless. 
In turn, for Eliot, Russell's position holds a further absurdity: "In logic, perhaps, but not in 
162 KE, p. 113. 
163 KE, p. 118. 
164 Russell, 'On Denoting', p. 491. 
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metaphysics, a denoting phrase may denote nothing"165. Ibus Russell's logical account of 
cognition is, for Eliot, incomplete. 
Eliot argues that one can only hallucinate when one believes it possiblel66, that is, 
when one accepts that cognitive errors are possible and that it is this possibility that is behind 
the very possibility of recognising ourselves as sane. Hallucinations are real. This is because in 
his doctoral thesis Eliot sees no grounds to sustain that the real world is ultimately independent 
from our cognition: 
So far as [a hallucination] exists it has all the features of the real world, and it exists so far as it is believed 
. .] 
The apprehension f an object known to be imaginary does not differ essentially from the apprehension 
of any other object, unless we have hocus-pocusscd an external reality to which ideas are to 'conform'. 167 
Eliot reverses the existential status of an autonomous external world, to reveal that this 
assumption is ultimately more mystical than the idea of the world's dependence on cognitive 
intentionality. A hallucination is not an unreal object, in the sense that Russell understands 
unreal objects to be. For Eliot "an object is an object so far as it is believed to be so.,, 
168 An 
object, to be so must be intended, which is not to say that intentionality creates the world of 
objects. This is perhaps the main difficulty behind cognitive intentionality. What it comes down 
to for Eliot is that a denoting phrase - in so far as it intends an object, be 
it unreal, imaginary or 
ordinary object - already denotes something. This implies a reality which is not completely 
external, to which our ideas do not have to conform, it merely points out the limits of our 
perception and of what is possible. This is, in effect, the ultimate ontological affirmation of the 
world, not its subjective disintegration: 
The real world is not outside or inside; it is not present in our consciousness or to consciousness a a 
particular group of entities, for as presented it is not in or to consciousness at all: it simply is. 
169 
165 KE, p. 128. 
166 Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain (1924), H. T. Lowe-Porter trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1969) 
contains a short address about the misconception of the experience of hallucination which parallels Eliot's own. In 
'Operationcs Spirituales' Herr Settembrini notes the horror of sane people towards hallucinations: "If it did 
happen to any of them it would be a sure sign that they were not sound ... and 
they would react to the appearance 
with emotions of horror ..., 
but treat it as it were entirely in order, and begin a conversation with it - this being, 
in 
fact, the reaction of a person suffering from a hallucination" (p. 452). 
167 KE, pp. 115, p. 123. 
168 KE, p. I 19. 
169 KE, p. 13 9. 
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The existential status of objects is not dependent on its sensual particularity but on its eing, 
which is already acknowledged through its very denotation which tells us at the very least that 
there is something there. This leads Eliot to make an important distinction between thatness 
and whatness of objects 
We do not denote any qualities of the object, as such; we do not, that is, denote any definition which could 
be given of the object; we denote not its whatness but its thatness. 170 
However, this conclusion does not completely resolve the latent subjectivism of this theory of 
language; the implication that language creates the world. This problem is attenuated by 
substituting for the idea that some denoting phrases denote nothing, with the possibility of 
determining the degree of reality a denoting phrase achieves; the thatness implied in 
denotation: 
Somehow, obscurely, the object denoted is acknowledged existence. It is non-existent according to the 
practical standards which recognize no degrees between existence and non-existence; but for metaphysics, it 
cannot be denied practical reality without being admitted to some attenuated but (if you like) equally real 
reality. 171 
This allows a two-tier level of cognition in which the object is half-created half-perceived, and 
whose reality is not ultimately real or unreal. Eliot is here conditioning idealist accounts of 
reality, but conditioning it, if only to avoid the conclusion that it is cognitive intentionality 
alone which ultimately creates the world through language. 172 
The relation between an object and its denotation is not one of description as such, 
not a whatness but a thatness. If anything, this view encourages the autonomy of the object 
from its denotation and vice versa. Yet it stresses the level of reality already achieved in the 
denotation alone; that 
It is a mistake, I think, to treat he word as something which barely points to the object, a sign-post which 
you leave behind on the road. The word 'chimera' or the idea 'chimera' is the beginning of the reality 
chimera nd is absolutely continuous with it, and the 'present king of France' is already partially real. 
173 
170 KE, p. 134. 
171 KE, p. 128. 
172 "1 am very far from meaning that it is the act of naming which makes the object, for the activity does not 
proceed from one side more than from another", KE, p. 133. 
173 KE, p. 29. 
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But what exactly links an object to its denotation? On this matter Eliot struggles. On the one 
hand we have the world of objects simply being there, and on the other, we have denoting 
phrases which denote objects which may not be practically there at all: 
If we cannot say that we have that object until we have that name, since each name is a different way of 
organizing a set of experiences, so on the other hand we have not really got that name until we have the right 
object [ ... 
] As we may fancy, if we like, objects wandering waiting to be met with and be named (like the 
animals in the Garden of Eden), so we may fancy names wandering about in our heads waiting for 
objects. 
174 
Eliot may not be able to solve the nature of this, as be puts it, mystic marriage, but what he 
insists upon is that the problem may never be solved if we continue to insist "that there is one 
consistent world of the real and that the rest is illusory"175; that there is either an empirically 
consistent world of sense-data or an ideal dimension which the world only reflects through a 
glass darkly. We must think, Eliot argues, of the real and the unreal developing side by side. If 
we assume that the ordinary object is more real, it is simply due to the habit in common usage 
of taking the names of ordinary objects as referential: 
But we are accustomed to handle and use [ordinary objects] by symbols which merely denote them; we 
forget that their reality is as much in their meaning as in their denotation, and we take it for granted that they 
simply are. Nor is this belief an error - the matter is much more complicated than that! 
176 
No object, however ordinary, is just that. But equally Eliot is not rejecting this necessary 
referential practice, but presents it as only one side of the semiotic mirror. Ordinary and unreal 
objects are each aspects of the relation between signifier and signified. The former indicates the 
direction of continuity between the object and its denotation, the latter between the denotation 
and the object. This continuity is one of degrees, and their distinction not absolute. One must 
note, however, that Eliot is inconclusive and there is an underlying dissatisfaction in his 
argument. Part of this dissatisfaction is in Eliot's inability to make metaphysics validate his 
expansion of logical reality to include unreal objects. 
The heart of the problem lies in the denotation of 'metaphysics' in the first place. 
Metaphysics is after all an unreal object, which itself cannot be expected to resolve the problem 
174 KE, p. 135. 
175 KE, p. 135, 
176 KE, p. 13 1. 
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of degrees of reality on whose existence the very theory depends. It is in his literary criticism 
that Eliot commits himself to this project; a project which involves the development of a 
stylistic experimentation which may enable him to encompass the problem of the metaphysical 
grounding of reality, and which he does by stretching the frontiers of science. 
Imaginary Objects, Immediate Experience and the 'Correlative' 
As Eliot moves from philosophy to literary criticism he is keen to apply his findings to poetics. 
In fact, Eliot's concern with poetics is already pre-empted in his consideration of the status of 
imaginary objects in "Me Epistemologist's Theory of Knowledge (continued)' of his doctoral 
thesis: 
If the character in fiction is an imaginary object, it must be by virtue of something more than its being 
imaginary, i. e. merely intending a reality which is not The fiction is thus more that a fiction: it is a real 
fiction. 177 
The inclusion of poetics in Eliot's general theory of objects and language has familiar 
consequences in the realm of authorial intentionality and interpretation. Eliot continues: 
We thus analyse the intended object of fiction into its reference and its reality. The reality in its turn is not a 
simple object but an intended object, for it includes everything from the antecedents of the character in the 
author's mind, to the symbols which express the character on paper. We mean the characters as a 
presentation in the author's mind; but a figure in fiction may and often does have an existence for us distinct 
from what is merely our interpretation of what the author 'had in mind'. 
178 
So that as objects go, the object of authorial intention is not purely intentional from the point of 
view of the author, in so far as intentionality - however important - 
is only partly responsible 
for the existential status of the work. Thus, 
frequently we feel more confidence in our own interpretation of the character than in any account of the 
genesis and meaning which the author may give himself. This is not always mere accident; no really vital 
character in fiction is altogether a conscious construction of the author ... 
So that we come to feel that the 
point of view from which the author criticises is not wholly internal to the point of view from which he 
created the character. 
179 
The implication is that artistic creativity is not wholly different to the creative element in 
common perception, and like the latter, artistic creativity cannot be wholly conscious of the 
reasons for seeing what it sees precisely because intentionality is not complete as such. For this 
reason, the author may not necessarily give a better account of its vision than an outsider. Ilese 
177 KE, pp. 123-4. 
178 KE, p. 124. 
179 KE, p. 124. 
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problems are tackled by Eliot in his literary criticism through the impersonal theory of art and 
the objective correlative. 
In 'Hamlet and His Problems' (1919) Eliot asserts that: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other 
words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; 
such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is 
immediately evoked. 
180 
The 'objective correlative' appears as an uneasy via media between Bradley and Russell. 
181 
On the one hand the correlative appears to be a projection of Eliot's account of Bradley's 
philosophy about the relation between experience (or feeling) and its objects; an account which 
in Eliot's thesis becomes an inconclusive investigation of the relation between meanings and 
words, in which be "cannot see any priority of image over emotion, or viceversa. "182 Eliot 
struggles to untangle the nature of the dichotomy and is only able tenuously to suggest that 
"there is, if you like, a tendency for emotion to objectify itself. "I 
83 
In the objective correlative Eliot investigates just this tendency; a tendency which 
becomes of crucial importance in Hamlet (according to Eliot, this is what Hamlet - both the 
play and the character - does not manage to do). The correlative attempts to resolve this 
relation once and for all. In his thesis Eliot affirms that 
The implication is surely mutual, for feeling and image react upon one another inextricably, and the two 
aspects are so closely related, that you cannot say that the relation is causal. 
184 
The objective correlative of 'Hamlet and His Problems' appears to make the causal connection 
which seems to escape him in his thesis: assumes that the writer always starts with an emotion 
which has to be expressed, so that "when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory 
experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked"' in the reader. In a sense, there is 
more of Russell's referentialism in this, than Bradley. There is, in fact, an impetuosity about 
180 'Hamlet and His Problems', SW, p. 100. 
181 In Skepticism and Modern Enmity: Before and After Eliot, Jeffrey M. Pert notes that "Eliot surprised, 
confused, or alienated both sides in the disputes he entered by defending the conclusions of the one in terms 
appropriate to the other", p. 39. 
182 KE, p. 116. 
183 KE, p. 116. 
184 KE, p. 116. 
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this essay which expresses what is a fundamental philosophical uneasiness in Eliot's early 
literary criticism, and in particular with Bradley's theory of objects; that ultimately one cannot 
account for the exact relation of words to images, objects to feelings ftom the point of view of 
metaphysics. It is as if the very style of this essay falls victim of this linguistic insecurity. Eliot 
combats this insecurity, in 'Hamlet and His Problems', by attempting to concretise the problem 
in a neat equation. Or, more to the point, by producing his own critical objective correlative to 
alleviate his philosophical insecurity about Bradley's discourse. He produces an essay which 
attempts to do what he had to leave open-ended in his thesis. 
It is the inconclusiveness of immediate experience which, like a ghost, haunts 
Eliot's classification of objects in his thesis. Immediate experience is that idealist limbo which 
will not commit itself to a causal account of the genealogy of cognition. This problem is at the 
heart of Eliot's investigation of Bradley's concept of immediate experience at the beginning of 
his thesis - Chapter I: 'On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience'. Immediate experience 
appears in the philosophy of Bradley as the inferred origin of the perceived world of objects. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that this inference is unknowable. Eliot states that: 
Although there is no stage of life which is more nearly immediately experienced than another although 
we cannot know immediate experience directly as an object, we can yet arrive at it by inference, and even 
conclude that it is the starting point of our knowing, since it is only in immediate xperience that knowledge 
and its objects are one. 185 
Yet Eliot has to add that the fact that we use the concept of 'immediate experience' inevitably 
objectifies something which, by definition, is beyond or prior to conceptualization. The concept 
of 'immediate experience' itself assumes a referent which, by its very definition, is beyond 
verification. Immediate experience although explanatory is subject to the very problem it is 
trying to settle; it is like 'metaphysics' an unreal object. So that, Eliot is forced to admit, "this 
throws our explanation into the greatest embaffassment. "186 This concept remains an absolute 
185 KE, pp. 18-19. 
186 KE, p. 19. In Bradley's own words: "How immediate experience itself can become an object. For, if it 
becomes an object, it, so far, we may say, is transcended, and there is a doubt as how such transcendence is 
possible. On the one hand as to the fact of immediate experience being transcended we seem really certain. For we 
speak about it, and, if so, it has become for us an object. But we are thus led to the dilemma that, so far as I know 
of immediate experience, it does not exist, and that hence, whether it exists or not, I could in neither case know of 
it", F. H. Bradley, 'On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience' in Essays on Truth and Reality, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1904), p. 160. 
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- an idealist residue - whose persistence is proportional to the 
danger of subjective idealism it 
implies. Because what it implies is that ordinary objects do not exist which are not somehow 
implicated in what is referred to as hallucinations, imaginary and unreal objects. In short, that 
there may not be an absolute method of telling the difference between the experience of an 
object and the object itself, because the original experience of the object itself is irretrievable. 
The subjectivist implications of immediate experience are attenuated by providing 
an inferred origin in experience, which, by not being immediately available to the subject, 
cannot be merely a subjective projection. The pre-cognitive experience of Platonic forms is 
placed in worldly experience. It ensures that the world is, somehow, already there; it lowers the 
sky as it were. Though irretrievable, immediate experience offers an absolute point of contact 
between the object and the gaze; so that we may satisfy our demand for a complete object with 
which, we infer, we have, at some point, had direct contact. However, the correlative 
contradicts the unknowability of 'immediate experience'; it encourages the objective 
equivalence between the object and its felt experience which immediate experience makes 
impossible. This is because the unknowable nature of immediate experience implies that the 
consciousness of objects automatically dissociates its equivalence with our feelings, due to the 
fact that being aware of those feelings already reifies the object. Eliot makes this point in his 
thesis: 
The painting is in the room, and my 'feelings' about the picture are in my 'mind'. If this whole of feeling 
were complete and satisfactory it would not expand into object and subject with feeling about the object; 
there would, in fact, be no consciousness. But in order that it should be feeling at all, it must be conscious, 
but so far as it is conscious it ceases to be merely feeling. 187 
Furthermore, consciousness is, in fact, the result of this post-lapsarian dissociation between 
feelings and objects. For without this dissociation from the object world the subject would be 
unconscious of selfhood. 188 Thus conscious feelings cease to be mere feelings once 
contaminated by subjective awareness, yet without which one would not be aware of feelings 
187 KE, p. 20. 
188 "We go on to find that no actual experience could be merely immediate, for if it were, we should certainly 
know nothing about it", KE, p. 18. 
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in the first place. In the end the dissociation between thoughts and feelings is the price we pay 
for self-hood. 
According to Bradley's immediate experience, in the beginning there was not a 
word, but a feeling which, in turn, refers to an original moment of contact with the world of 
objects. Yet, as the world is fallen, this feeling may not have immediate reference to a 
recoverable objectl 89 which it can claim to have at its origin with complete certainty. This is a 
recovery partially achieved through words whose relation to objects is that of 
conceptualization. In fact, in his thesis, Eliot quotes Christopher Sigwart's Logic whose 
definition of concept - as opposed to ideal90- parallels the presumed autonomy of a work of 
art: "'it is the work of logic to help us to attain to the ideal state in which words represent such 
Concepts" (Logic, vol. I, p. 42)'. 
191 Yet, in his thesis, Eliot is reluctant to accept the concept's 
achievable correlation between words and objects, hence rejects the paralleling of its 
mechanism with that of the autonomous work of art, simply because he sees the conceptual 
project of logic as impossible: 
The goal of language is in this sense unattainable, for it is simply that of a complete vocabulary of concepts, 
each independent of the rest; and all of which, by their various combinations, would give complete and final 
knowledge - which would be, of course, knowledge without a knower. 
192 
Yet the 'correlative' is an attempt to resurrect this conceptual correlation of language with the 
world. Furthermore, a correlation which, to make matters worse, Eliot now wants to make the 
measure of art - the point of co-habitation of object and feeling in perfect synthesis. 
Armin Paul Frank summarises this cognitive process between feeling and object as 
two-way. The feeling is provoked by an object to which it must return in order for the feeling to 
be objectified. Armin notes: 
The projection takes the form of tagging something onto an object that already exists. But insofar as this 
projection actually and objectively modifies the object perceived, it may be said to be incipiently 
creative. 
193 
189 The complex relations between ideas, concepts and words are investigated in detail in Eliot's thesis Chapter 11 
'On the Distinction of Real and Ideal', KE, pp. 44-48. 
190-1 define concept as that which a word denotes, and idea as that which a word refers in reality, the reference 
being contingent", KE, p. 46. 
191 KE, p. 46. 
192 KE, p. 46. 
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Armin argues that Eliot's objective correlative is the attempt to see in art the possibility of a 
unified sensibilityl94 between feeling and its objects, and which Bradley could not ultimately 
reconcile. It is a cognitive-based method of judging art, so that, if this reconciliation is not 
apparent in Hamlet, then, one must conclude, the play is an artistic failure: 
The artistic inevitability lies in this complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely 
what is deficient in Hamlet. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an emotion which is inexpressible because it
is in excess of the facts as they appear. 
195 
Thus, according to Eliot, Hamlet is unable to correlate his disgust and jealousy for his mother's 
hasty marriage with the killer of his father - his uncle -, and thus unable to act, let alone react. 
Or as Armin puts it: 
A person (Hamlet) observes another (Gertrude) whose actions call up certain feelings in the observer which 
he, however, cannot understand. In order to understand them, he would have to objectify them into "objects 
of his knowlcdge. "196 
Eliot's correlative is his own - and not just Hamlet's or Shakespeare's - baffled search for a 
discourse, which finds its model in the idealized work of art, where thought and feeling 
coincide. 
197 
If Hamlet shows an emotion that exceeds the facts as they appear, Eliot should 
admit the unknowability of the facts that do not appear: that the immediate experience of the 
absent facts is "something which is by hypothesis irretrievable"; though it must also have, by 
the same logic, taken place. Eliot adds: 
We need a great many facts in [Shakespeare's] biography [ ... 
] We should have, finally, to know something 
which is by hypothesis unknowable, for we assume it to be an experience which, in the manner indicated, 
exceeded the facts. We should have to understand things which Shakespeare did not understand himself 
198 
This is, in essence, the paradox of immediate experience, and one which puts in evidence the 
deficiencies of the correlative as a critical tool and the essay itself. How can one consider an 
emotion to exceed the facts that appear if we are unable, by definition, to access the ones that 
193 Armin Paul Frank, 'T. S. Eliot's Objective Correlative and the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley', The Journal Of 
, 4esthetics and, 
4rt Criticism, 30, no 3 (Spring 1972), p. 316. 
194 In terms of T. S. Eliot 'The Metaphysical Poets', a sensibility prior to its dissociation as we shall see later. 
195 'Hamlet and His Problems', SW, p. 101. 
196 Armin Paul Frank, 'T. S. Eliot's Objective Correlative and the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley', p. 313. 
197 "Hamlet's bafflement at the absence of objective equivalence to his feelings is a prolongation of the 
bafflement of his creator in the face of his artistic problem", 'Hamlet and His Problems', SW, p. 101 
198 'Hamlet and His Problems', SW, p. 102-3. 
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do not in fact appear; facts which the author himself cannot be expected, in the end, to know 
himself. It is not simply a fault in Shakespeare's work, but an inevitable fault in every form of 
discourse; a fault, furthermore, to which Eliot himself falls prey precisely at the point when be 
is trying articulate its resolution. The correlative makes Hamlet's problems inevitable, because 
it places the stakes of artistic success beyond the reach of practical cognition, hence causing the 
inevitable failure of the correlative. Ibc correlative idealises art as much as it idealises critical 
theory's capacity to define it. 
Eliot's self-consciousness about the impossibility of the correlative is illustrated by 
Eliot's own admission that "we should have to understand things which Shakespeare did not 
understand himself'. Shakespeare, like any other knowing subject in a Bradleyan universe, is 
permanently severed from the immediate experience of knowing : "the I who saw the ghost is 
not the same as the I who had the attack of indigestion. " 
199 And Eliot's correlative is an 
expression of his own horror at this knowledge200; that there are areas of experience which 
cannot be subjected to the empirical scrutiny of last night's menu, though, by the same logic - if 
'logic' is the word -, one may find relief in the causal inference that 
it was the indigestion that 
caused the bad dream. 
Eliot's search for critical objectification may mirror the outraged Prince's own 
search for motives and motivation. Consider Eliot's inability to take revenge on Russell - the 
usurper analytic philosopher - for killing his philosophic father, Bradley, and sleeping with his 
mother-wife, Vivienne. The correlative is in a sense a submission to Russell's logical 
referentialism between words and objects, facts and their felt experience. This is a concession 
Eliot cannot avoid making simply because immediate experience - like the ghost of Hamlet's 
father- offers Eliot no stable ground on which to defend himself logically. It simply cannot 
survive empirical scrutiny. In a perverse way, Russell fulfils for Eliot a hidden desire to resolve 
the problem which immediate experience - the ghost - presents, a problem that 
is driving him 
199 KE, p. 12 1. 
200 "The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without an object or exceeding its object, is something which every 
person of sensibility has known", 'Hamlet and his Problems', SW, p. 102. 
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insane. Thus Eliot goes himself momentarily mad and falls into critical passivity. Eliot cannot 
bring himself to react to Bradley's (the ghost's) metaphysical warning against scientific 
analysis, not because he does not believe it, but because Russell's materialism questions its 
very existence - insofar as there is no room in Russell's epistemology 
for unreal objects. 
Ghosts are not worth considering because they simply do not exist. Madness and hallucinations 
are indeed the only explanatory routes open if you have indeed seen something which is 
logically inexplicable. 
Hamlet's Ghost 
The question now is whether Eliot's essay on Hanilet falls victim to its own philosophical 
uncertainties, or whether Eliot's submission to Russell is a clever tactic to expose the latter's 
own deficiencies. In other words, whether Eliot's philosophical madness - like Hamlet's - can 
be seen as a deliberate critical strategy. In order to attempt an answer I will offer a critique of 
Hamlet more consistent with the Eliot of Knowledge and Experience concerning the 
classification of objects. I would like to consider the ghost's questionable shape, rather than 
Gertrude's sexuality, as the immediate experience the objective correlative can not 
encompass. 
201 
The absent facts take two forms: the ghost's report of the assassination, and its re- 
enactment as a play within a play. These facts are indirect, and are aggravated by the nature of 
the teller: a ghost. Consequently we are dealing with two kinds of objects: the ghost, as an 
unreal object and the play within the play, as an imaginary object. 202 If the 'correlative' may 
be interpreted in terms of Eliot's classification of objects, unreal and imaginary, then Hamlet's 
201 1 am not rejecting psychoanalytic interpretations of the play. In fact, I feel there is an important parallel 
between Julia Kristeva's distinction between the Semiotic, Thetic and Symbolic and Bradley's Feeling, Immediate 
experience and Object. See Bradley's 'On the Knowledge of Immediate Experience', Essays on Truth and Reality 
(pp. 171-173), where he deals with the psychological nature of immediate experience in terms of the unconscious, 
and the role of feeling after its objectification. My point is that the semiotic is problematized principally in the 
Ghost, and not so much in Gertrude. Even if by doing so we lose the gendered symbolism, so important in later 
psychoanalytical interpretations, which have been dominating Gender Studies. 
202 We are back in the territory of Eliot's thesis, and particularly in Chapter V: 'The Epistemologist's Theory of 
Knowledge' (continued): "If the character in fiction is an imaginary object, it must be by virtue of something more 
than its being imaginary, i. e. merely intending a reality which is not The fiction is thus more that a fiction: it 
is a real fiction", KE, pp. 123-4. 
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problem may be said to be his inability to make sense, that is, of the degree of reality of the 
ghost's fiction; that is to say it does not offer an absolute source of certainty. Hamlet 
is unable 
to take the unreality of his father's ghost as real. He falls into the passive activity of testing that 
the ghost is really real, doubting what he, to a degree, already knows. 
203 In fact, to start with 
Hamlet does not doubt the ghost's message as such. Hamlet says: "Touching this vision here) 
It is an honest ghost, that let me tell you. -204 Hamlet becomes trapped in a cognitive decline, 
from the hypersensitive consciousness of unreal objects to downright distraction. This decline 
can be tested against the qualitative difference between the first ghost on the battlements and 
the second ghost in Gertrude's bedroom: the first is unreal but communally experienced, the 
second is an illusion engaging Hamlet's subjectivity alone in Gertrude's bedroom. Hamlet 
spirits away the world through his reluctance to face the metaphysics in the world. The emotion 
is in excess of the facts as they appear, insofar as Hamlet, in a state of emotional indulgence, 
eventually requires no referent for his emotional state, and when they do appear he rejects their 
suitability. He rejects them because they fail to be final - it is unreal, it 
is a ghost. 
The ghost aggravates the reliability of the message not because the message is 
difficult to believe, but because the ghostly form it takes accentuates the natural arbitrariness 
between the spectral signifier and the signified message. This can be contextualized in Chapter 
II 'On the Distinction of Real and Ideal' of Eliot's thesis. In it Eliot notes that ideas, unlike 
concepts, do not have stable referents in the world: 
I define concept as that which a word denotes, and idea as that which a word refers in reality, the reference 
being contingent. 205 
So that the conceptualising process where ideas can be said to refer to reality may be impeded 
by its natural discontinuity with it, by its contingency: 
The idea certainly has a sort of existence apart ftom the reality to which it refers, but the apartness is of a 
special sort and may easily be misunderstood. 
206 
203 One may say that Bradley's immediate experience involves the pre-cognitive encounter with an object with 
which we arc re-acquainted through conscious experience; that, as it were, cognition is the objectification of 
something we have already perceived. Thus the fulfilment of the object world - the compromise between 
feeling 
and object - is not so much our confirmed knowledge of its reality, as its being experienced as self-evidence. 
204 The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, 30, Hamlet, George Santayana intro. (New York: George D. 
Sproul, 1908), 1, v, 11137-38, p. 46. 
205 KE, p. 46. 
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Eliot's point is that this apartness should not entail the impossibility of contiguity between 
ideas and the world, which is undermined by the irretrievability of the immediate experience. 
Yet the ghost, as unreal object, makes this conceptualization more difficult. It is the concept 
which encompasses the correlating inertia without which the idea could not attenuate the 
contingency of its referents in the world. 
Not only is the ghost problematic as a present experience, but also involves the 
interpretation of past events - absent facts - about the murder of the king. Temporal chasms 
exemplify for Eliot another aspect of the contingency between meaning and reality: 
The contrast between meaning and reality is not so apparent when the reality intended is a present sense 
perception as in some other cases. In memory, for example, or anticipation, there may be the consciousness 
of an intended reality and of a present meaning which are not co-existent in time [ ... 
] To recall feeling we 
are often told, is merely to live it over; it cannot be known or remembered, but only felt. And to this 
objection we can retort that hallucination is not the satisfaction and consummation of memory, but its 
disease. 207 
Re-living the past is as alien as re-capturing immediate experience. Memory only gives the 
impression of correlation, but can only be invoked as a re-examination. Hamlet's obsession 
with the ghost's credibility leads him into forcing a continuity between it and its message to the 
point where he no longer engages with the event as an interpretation. Hamlet's certainty about 
the ghost's message increasingly insists on the identity between ghost and message. This 
insistence increases proportionally to his awareness that their correlation is far from perfect; 
this becomes an absolute cognitive doubt which encourages his increasing distraction and 
procrastination. 
In contrast, Horatio, does not appear to doubt the ghost., Yet he is the first one to 
describe it as the product of Marcellus and Bernardo's "fantasy" (1, i, 1.23) and as an "illusion" 
(1, i, 1.127) even in the act of perceiving it himself. When Hamlet returns from the meeting with 
the ghost, Horatio asks for the details of the encounter. After requesting secrecy Hamlet reveals 
that: 
Hamlet: There's ne'er a villain dwelling in Denmark 
But he's an arrant knave. 
206 KE, p. 48. 
207 KE, pp. 49 & 50. 
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Horatio : There needs no ghost, my lord, come from the grave 
To tell us this. 
208 
Horatio has no problem in relating to the ghost as an event, even if is to say that the ghost is 
superfluous because its message is self-evident. To admit that much is already to engage with 
the degree of reality the ghost offers: the ghost as a real fiction - even if Horatio does not 
strictly believe in ghosts. Self-evidence bridges over the gap between the ghost and the 
message. On the other hand, Hamlet's disposition to believe in this ghost entangles him in an 
obsessive search for scientific proof, of testing the ghost's message in order to gain absolute 
certainty; a certainty, which in a metaphysical world inhabited by ghosts, is impossible. 
Ilis process of turning the immediate experience, the absent facts offered by the 
ghost, into an objective correlative is bound to fail, particularly given the radical dislocation 
between the medium and the message which the ghost entails. 'Ibis testing is ultimately 
directed to the ghost's existence, so that the truth or error of the message is linked with the 
existential status of the ghost. Hamlet's questioning of the message inverts Horatio's response. 
Horatio may doubt the existence of ghosts but he has no problem believing the message, as the 
spectral medium legitimises itself verifying Horatio's suspicions that there is indeed something 
rotten in the state of Denmark. Hamlet denies the ghost its meaningfulness by attempting to pin 
it down. He treats it like a real object by attempting to equate the ghost with its message; by 
attempting, in other words, to treat it as an objective correlative. 
Hamlet's error is his resistance to the degree of reality the ghost's fiction offers, so 
that the more he tries to make it real the more it recedes into illusion; the more he insists on the 
correlation the wider the abyss gapes. Hamlet's problem is a self-imposed skepticism as to what 
he naturally knows. And it is a feature of radical skepticism secretly to yearn for the relief of 
absolutes and metaphysics; to believe, in other words, in the supernatural. The last chapter of 
Eliot's thesis on Bradley is entitled 'Solipsism'. This is symptomatic of Eliot's own existential 
insecurity as a result of engaging with Bradley's metaphysical philosophy about the 
208 Hamlet, 1, V, 11.124-27, p. 45. 
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impossibility of verifying the identity of our private perceptions with that of otherS209- the 
insecurity of the knowledge that philosophy cannot give all the answers. As Hamlet notes: 
There are more things in heaven an earth, Horatio, 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy. 
210 
The ghost is the metaphysical immediate experience which Eliot, like Hamlet, attempts to 
exorcise through the correlative. It is the attempt to arrive at an absolute correlation between 
meaning and reality, feeling and object. If Eliot parallels Hamlet's behaviour, we may also add 
that Eliot knows better than to chase empirical certainty. Why he attempted it at all is an 
insoluble puzzle; under compulsion of what experience he attempted to express the 
inexpressibly horrible, we cannot ever know. We may need a great many facts: Bradley's 
philosophical decline, Russell's affair with Vivienne and his philosophical assassination of 
Bradley may help but only up to a point. Shakespeare is presenting us with a classic cognitive 
problem. This is, in Bradley's terms, the struggle to achieve scientific certainty in a 
metaphysical world of appearances. Eliot's presentation of Hamlet's problem does not entail 
that the problem is Shakespeare's, but, more likely, Eliot's own. It is worth saying that the 
correlative is not so much the solution Hamlet fails to fulfil, but its inherent problem. 
If we now return to 'Hamlet and His Problems' as a whole one can detect Eliot's 
self-consciousness about the correlative and its problems; mainly the acknowledgement that the 
correlative depends on facts that remain beyond our critical accessibility. To blame 
Shakespeare for this lack is to escape the responsibility of acknowledging it as a general 
cognitive problem and to hope against hope that critical certainty can be found in works of art. 
The correlative suggests that the critic stay within what is immediately available - that is the 
work of art - while 'Hamlet and His Problems' hints that what is immediately available is not 
the whole story. This opens an alternative reading of the essay. Eliot seems to be admitting that 
the correlative's pretensions of conceptualising meaning prove to be unverifiable. It turns out 
that the strategy of Eliot's essay is to follow the logic of the correlative to the point where its 
209 "From a point of view completely detached, reality would contain nothing but finite centrcs and their several 
presentations; but from the point of view of each centre, there is an objective world upon which several points of 
view arc trained, and to which they all refer", KE, p. 142. 
2 10 Hamlet, 1, v, 11.166-67, p. 47. 
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deficiencies reveal themselves; where the inevitability of metaphysics becomes 
apparent. This manoeuvre may be said to exploit the dislocation between the essay's logical 
pretensions of the correlative as a formula, and its overall message. Their dislocated 
relationship is made simultaneously contiguous by revealing the metaphysical pretensions 
inherent in the conceptual project of logic. This is because any logical correlation between 
feelings and objects must ultimately appeal, for its verification, to empirical grounds, but which 
are, as we have seen, simply absent. 
Impersonality and the Frontier of Metaphysics 
Eliot's philosophical manoeuvres between science and metaphysics are not limited to 'Hamlet 
and his Problems', but are an implicit theme in his early critical writings. 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent', as we have already noted above, also appears to promote scientific 
description as against metaphysical interpretation. In 'Hamlet and His Problems' Eliot asserts 
that "Qua work of art, the work of art cannot be interpreted; there is nothing to interpret"211 
and in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' Eliot adds that "it is in this depersonalisation that 
art may be said to approach the condition of science. -212 And, like 'Hamlet and His 
Problems', 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' has another ghost to deal with. This ghost is 
literally 'metaphysics'. 213 Ultimately one can only see and make others see what one saw214 
because consciousness is consciousness of objects. 
This conclusion alters any smooth parallels between Eliot's engagement with 
scientific philosophy and that of Hulme. They both seem attracted by a cognitive based 
linguistics that are only fulfilled by art. Hulme notes that: 
[The artist] should be a person who is able to emancipate himself from the moulds which language and 
ordinary perception force on him and be able to see things as they really are. 
215 
211 'Hamlet and His Problems', SW, p. 96. 
212 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 5 3. 
213 See 'The 'Presentation of Metaphysics' above. 
214 "Dante's attempt is to make us see what he saw", T. S. Eliot, Dante (London: Faber & Faber, 1929), pp. 24. 
215 'Bergson's Theory of Art', Speculations, p. 166. 
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This is a statement which Eliot appears to echo in 'The Perfect Critic' first published in two 
parts in the Athenaeunt 
216 and then included in The Sacred Wood: 
The end of the enjoyment of poetry is pure contemplation from which all the accidents of personal emotion 
are removed; thus we aim to see the object as it really is. 
217 
But where Hulme sustains his idealization of art as the cognitive fulfilment of language in 
literature, which he contrasts with prose writing, Eliot's critical prose continuously undermines 
the absolute cognitive status he attributes to successful literature. This interaction between 
literature and Eliot's criticism itself acts as a reminder that literature cannot simply be an affair 
of a poetics acting as absolute scientific model, but of rhetoric, metaphysics and, as we shall see 
later, belief. This suggests that Eliot is already altering the meaning of seeing an object. 
Eliot's allusion to the difficulty of meaningfully relocating terms from their original 
context parallels one of the central concerns in his doctoral thesis: solipsism. Thus in 'The 
Perfect Critic' Eliot notes that: 
When there is so much to be known, when there are so many fields of knowledge in which the same words 
are used with different meanings, when every one knows a little about a great many things, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for anyone to know whether he knows what he is talking about or not. And when we 
do not know, or when we do not know enough, we tend always to substitute emotions for thoughts. 
218 
The problem here is that of the impossibility of justifying meaningful communication beyond 
the original context in which words are used. Ultimately this original context is subjectivity 
itself. To say "not only all knowledge, but all feeling, is in perceptioný, 
219 is one thing, but to 
account for the collective agreement about the words we use to communicate those experiences 
is quite another. How can we ensure the use of a common language when the origins of all our 
experiences are private feelings? How can we make sure we are all seeing and, hence, meaning 
the same thing? In Chapter VI, entitled 'Solipsism', of his doctoral thesis Eliot noted: 
Thus we confront the question: how do we yoke our divers worlds to draw together? How can we issue from 
the circle described about each point of view? And since I can know no point of view but my own, how can I 
know that there are other points of view, or admitting their existence, how can I take any account of 
them? 220 
216 'The Perfect Critic [1]', Athenaeum, 4706 (July 9,1920), 40-41 & 'The Perfect Critic 11', Athenaeum, 4708 
(July 23,1920), 102-104. 
217 'The Perfect Critic', SW, pp. 14-15. 
218 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 10. 
219 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 10. 
220 KE, p. 14 1. 
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The only way out of this conundrum for Eliot is to transcendentalize subjectivity to the point 
where all individual perception coheres in a common encounter with the world of objects; 
in 
other words, to radicalise subjectivity to the point where it becomes objective in its finitude. 
This is a possibility which involves stripping away layers of personality, namely moral and 
cultural, in order to get to the core of the subject's immediate experience; what Bradley calls 
the 'finite centre'. 
Eliot considered the problem of finite centres in an article he wrote for the Monist in 
1916, Teibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres', also published as the second appendix 
to his doctoral thesis in 1964. In this article Eliot questions the conclusiveness of the 'finite 
centre' as well as the impotence of the finite centre to reconcile its claims on finitude, while 
still claiming for itself objective validity: 
Like monads [finite centrcs] aim at being one; each expanded to completion, to the full reality latent within 
it, would be identical with the whole universe. But in doing so it would lose the actuality, the here and now, 
which is essential to the small reality which it actually achieves. 
221 
The problem is not only how the finite centre manages to acquire a monist universality, but 
how it does so without losing its particular relevance, its here and now. Eliot cannot see a 
solution to this problem other than Bradley's inconclusive suggestion that reality is socially 
constructed; in other words, if we cannot reconcile particular points of view with a universal 
point of view, then the possibility of agreement is limited to one which is socially imposed. 
Even in the case of accepting the idea of a socially constructed world, we still have to deal with 
the problem of solipsism. The individual does not simply experience publicly; his existence 
involves the constant reconciliation of the public with his private point of view: 
So, on the one hand, my experience is in principle ssentially public. My emotions may be understood better 
by other people than by myself; as my oculist knows my eyes. And on the other hand everything, the whole 
world is private to myself. Internal and external re thus not adjectives applied to different contents within 
the same world; they are different points of vicw. 222 
This idea finds echo in Eliot's 'The Waste Land': 
Dayadhvam: I have heard the key 
Turn in the door once and turn once only 
We think of the key, each in his prison 
221 'Leibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres', Appendix 11, KE, p. 202. 
222 Teibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres', Appendix 11, KE, p. 204. 
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Thinking of the key, each confirms a prison 223 
Eliot glosses these lines with a passage from Bradley's Appearance and Reality: 
My external sensations are no less private to myself than are my thoughts or my feelings. In either case my 
experience falls within my own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and, with all its elements alike, every 
sphere is opaque to the others which surround it [ ... 
] In brief re ardcd as an existence which appears in a 
soul, the whole world for each is private and peculiar for that Soul. 
24 
The apparent impossibility of overcoming this absolute privacy finds in Eliot's criticism a 
search for release by investigating the difficult dividing-line between the public and the private. 
Eliot thus concludes, that even if this duality is insoluble, one should not confuse the one with 
the other. That, 
the point of view from which each soul is a world in itself must not be confused with the point of view from 
which each soul is only the function of a physical organism, a unity perhaps only partial, capable of 
alteration, development, having a history and a structure, abeginning and apparently an end. And yet the 
two souls are the same. 225 
The problem is that the mortal body in being separate from the immortal soul, must at the same 
time claim an inter-relationship. Eliot sees the soul as the universal function, and the historical 
function as personality to which the soul is ineffably attached given the difficulty 
compromising between the finitude of the body and the universality of the soul. This is the 
ambiguous distinction upon which Eliot insists in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', namely 
in the statement that: "the point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the 
metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul. -226 For Eliot there is no easy synthesis 
out of the body and soul dualism. Instead Eliot finds a way out of the problem by positing a 
cognitive common ground in perceptual experience, which in its finitude may still claim a 
universal function claimed by the soul. Eliot calls it impersonality. This term attempts to find a 
universal function at the core of personal embodied experience which can be biologically 
dissected and scientifically described and thus dissociated from historical and personal 
subjectivism - i. e. personality and emotions. Impersonality does away with the idea of the soul, 
223 'The Waste Land' (1922), 11.411-414, T. S. Eliot: Collected Poems, 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 
1963), p. 79. 
224 'Notes on the Waste land, T S. Eliot: Collected Poems, 1909-1962, p 86. 
225 'Leibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres', Appendix 11, KE, pp. 205-206. 
226 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 56. 
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and opts for a psycho-physical alternative. 
227 The public soul is reconciled with the individual 
body recast as a nervous system in an attempt scientifically to account for a private world which 
can be agreed upon and be spoken about meaningfully in public. 
This premise underlies Eliot's criticism of Philip Massinger in The Sacred Wood. 
Massinger's problem is his cultural over-dependence, which numbs his feelings and turns them 
into indefinite emotions which fail to be properly communicated. They become historically 
subjective: 
[Philip Massinger] inherits the traditions of conduct, female chastity, hymeneal sanctity, the fashion of 
honour, without either criticizing or informing them from his own experience. In the earlier drama these 
conventions are merely a framework, or an alloy necessary for working the metal; the metal itself consisted 
of unique emotions resulting inevitably from the circumstances, resulting or inhering as inevitably as the 
properties of a chemical compound. 
228 
Eliot's scientific analogy in 'Philip Massinger' - Times Literary Supplement, 958 (May 
14,1920), 325-326 - continues the tone of that of the catalyst 
in 'Tradition and the Individual 
Talent', which appeared in the second part of the essay published in the Egoist, vi. 5 (Nov. /Dec. 
1919). This analogy is used by way of defining the cognitive qualities of the dramatists that 
came before Massinger, who were able to maintain their perceptual experience autonomous 
from the cultural world they inhabited. 
The subject stripped of culture is indeed reduced to a nervous system; a body in the 
act of perceiving the object world. The metal, on which the unadulterated finite (nervous) 
centre works, is the world of objects. Feelings constitute the experiential basis of this radical 
neural personality which, by emphasizing the perception of an external reality of objects, 
delivers an impersonality unclouded by the emotions which otherwise subjectivize feelings as 
experience is mediated, not through the eyes of the individual, but through those of one's age. 
Thus, Massinger "was not guided by direct communication through the nerves-229, indeed he 
"suffers from cerebral anaemia.,, 230 The ambiguous message is that Massinger's work is not 
227 This conclusion recalls Bradley's essay 'On the Supposed Uselessness of the Soul' in which Bradley considers 
the possible meanings of the term 'soul'. Bradley considers that "the soul is somehow an adjective which makes 
no difference to its substantive", Bradley, Collected Essays (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1935), p. 343. 
228 'Philip Massingcr', SW, p. 133. 
229 'Philip Massinger', SW, p. 136. 
230 'Philip Massinger', STV, p. 13 1. 
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impersonal in its cognitive encounter with the world because he is not personal enough; 
enough to see with his own eyes. Eliot pushes the contradiction to breaking point when he adds 
that Marlowe's and Jonson's comedies were 
as great literature is, the transformation of a personality into a personal work of art Massinger is not 
simply a personality: his personality hardly exists. 
231 
Massinger's style suffers from a deficiency in 'personality'; it is adulterated from within by 
borrowed views of the world for which he only compensates with personal observations based 
on his inherited culture. In other words, Massinger is being personal in the wrong way: he 
"looked at life through the eyes of his predecessors, and only at manners through his own', 
232. 
The link between language and perception is emphasized by the idea that Massinger's 
perceptual deficiency translates into a defect in style: "Had Massinger had a nervous system as 
refined as that of Middleton, Tourneur, Webster, or Ford, his style would be a triumph.,, 233 
Eliot does not quite offer a de-culturation of literature, he simply re-positions culture with 
respect to the cognitive act to ensure the production of artistic "statements of feeling which are 
unique and imperishable". He places culture outside as a feeling about an object, which goes 
hand in hand with making culture an expansive term unlike the reductive understanding 
Matthew Arnold insisted upon. 
234 This reduces culture's exacerbation of the temporal barriers 
of historical epochs separating finite centres which obstructs their spatio-temporal interpretative 
coherence. 
235 It reduces contextuality to a minimum, so that the transference of meaning from 
one context to another (be it individuals, intellectual disciplines, or historical periods) is 
facilitated without the loss of meaning. In the same manner as Massinger, George Wyndham 
represents the failure of not seeing life with his own eyes, but of embodying a historical period 
in his very self. Eliot writes in a review of Essays in Romantic Literature by George Wyndham 
('A Romantic Patrician', Athenaeum, 4644 (May 2,1919), 265-7) reprinted in The Sacred 
231 'Philip Massinger, SW, p. 139. 
232 'Philip Massinger', SW, p. 143. 
233 'Philip Massinger', SW, p. 13 1. 
234 As Pamela McCallum suggest in Literature and Method: Towards a Critique of L A. Richards, T. S. Eliot and 
F. R Leavis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, Humanities Press, 1983): Eliot uses "culture in a much wider sense than 
the original Arnoldcan formulation had implied", p. 113. 
235 Eliot addressed this problem as early as 1914 in 'The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual', a paper delivered at 
Josiah Royce's seminar (Hayward Bequest, King's College Library). 
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Wood as 'A Romantic Aristocrat': "Wyndham forgets, in short, that it is not, 
in the end, periods 
and traditions but individual men who write great poetry. For Wyndham 
is himself a period and 
,, 236 a tradition. But he is not an individual. And here are the makings of 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent', which he would publish the following September. The linking of the 
historical with the perceptual - the 
idea of impersonality - are also 
here pre-empted. This 
historical defect Eliot identifies in Wyndham is akin to a romantic defect in sensibility, so that 
Wyndham employed his curiosity romantically "not to penetrate the real world, but to 
complete the varied features of the world he made for himself. "237 
Like the correlative, impersonality idealises the existence of a scientific ground for 
meaning in cognition, avoiding the solipsistic implications of historical context and 
metaphysical explanations. 
238 Eliot's scientific bias in The Sacred Wood encourages 
depersonalisation as a way of transcending subjective barriers and promoting scientific method. 
Eliot is unhappy with the smooth combination of physically autonomous bodies - or as Eliot 
likes to refer in his literary criticism as 'nervous systems' - which yet partake of a universal 
soul. Eliot has a materialist bias which, in The Sacred Wood, insists on avoiding any strictly 
metaphysical resolutions to the problem of objectivity. The source of all experience is feeling, 
and, hence, "every vital development in language is a development of feeling as well". 
239 
'Feelings' are at the basis of Bradley's account of the experiential encounter with 
the world. Eliot imports much of Bradley's philosophical vocabulary on human cognition as he 
transfers the problem to his own examination of poetic and critical style. The theory of 
impersonality is a variation of Bradley's concept of finite centres which tries to compensate for 
' imperfect Critics: A Romantic Aristocrat', SW, p. 29. 
'imperfect Critics: A Romantic Aristocrat', SW, p. 3 1. 
238 It is worth noting that the exclusion of history from Eliot's essays and reviews included in The Sacred Wood is 
provisional in so far as it simultaneously struggles to incorporate it in a form which will not prove to be a cultural 
horizon blocking the view of seeing the object as it really is throughout the ages. This is the role of the idealized 
historical order of works of art Eliot refers to as 'tradition'. It amounts to an atemporal historical realm which can 
be impersonally accessed by shedding one's cultural and subjective trappings. In this sense 'tradition' does not 
mean 'culture' but a particular atemporal disposition to the past, nothing more. The difficulty of maintaining this 
position hints at Eliot's hidden wish to deal with history and all its cultural implications but of which he falls short 
as yet, thought it pre-cmpts the ground for its eventual inclusion in his later criticism. (Chapter 3 of this thesis will 
discuss this point further, specially 'The Historical Sense and the Aesthetics of Impersonal Cognition') 
239 'Philip Massinger', SW, p. 129. 
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its solipsism, or, that we are isolated egos never ultimately sure of the existence of others. That 
the individual is, as he puts it in 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock', "Like a patient 
etherised upon a table .,, 
240 Any thing else is overstepping our cognitive duty, which in this 
poem is also linked to the stifling boundaries of social manners. Thus Eliot notes in 'The 
Perfect Critic' that, 
Some writers are essentially of the type that reacts in excess of the stimulus, making something new out of 
the impressions, but suffcr from the defect of vitality or an obscure obstruction which prevents nature from 
taking its course. Their sensibility alters the object, but never transforms it. 
241 
Reacting in excess of the stimulus expands the theme developed in 'Hamlet and His Problems' 
which he published earlier in the Athenaeum 
242 also in The Sacred Wood. It is also an important 
point of reference for the second part of 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', published about 
one month later than 'Hamlet and His Problems. It is in part two that Eliot gives free rain to 
his scientific analogy of the catalyst, no doubt encouraged by the increasing confidence in the 
critical vocabulary he was developing. In the statement above Eliot's preoccupation is not so 
much that the perception of the world is already distorted, but how that distortion can be made 
coherent with that of others; that is, transformation not alteration. In itself Eliot's critical style, 
however much it may seek to depart from Bradley's metaphysics, is entrenched in a scientific 
version of his philosophy of cognition. In fact Hugh Kenner points to the latent Bradleyanism 
behind Eliot's critical vocabulary: "'Sensibility' is Eliot's term for scrupulous responsiveness 
to the Bradleyan 'Immediate experience. -243 
There is a clear cognitive bias in Eliot's literary criticism. It is a bias which remains 
unresolved in The Sacred Wood. Impersonality invokes the point of coherence of finite centres 
in the moment of immediate experience, just like the objective correlative is the poetic 
synthesis between thought and feeling. Eliot's criticism attempts to re-create that coherence 
through the use of a scientific style and analogies. Yet Eliot does no more than engage in a 
rhetorical balancing act. As a whole The Sacred Wood is an experiment in criticism, an attempt 
240 'The Love Song of J. Alfred PrufrocV (1917), T. S Eliot: Collected Poems, 1909-1962, p 13. 
241 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 6. 
242 'Hamlet and His Problems', Athenaeum, vi. 4 (Sept. 19,1919), 940-41. A review of The Problem of Hamlet, 
by the Right Hon. J. M. Robertson. 
243 The Invisible Poet (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959), p. 53. 
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to find the impersonal stylistic medium he promotes, to enact the transparency he advocates, 
and attempts to see it epitomized in the finite centre but which he cannot account for 
philosophically. The result is, however, far from transparent, and his critico-philosophical 
vocabulary only appears scientific at the expense of communicability. Eliot seems at times to 
fall into "that familiar vague suggestion of the scientific vocabulary which is characteristic of 
modem writing', 244 he himself condemns. The irony is that the success of the essays in The 
Sacred Wood lies in their evocative nature, rather than in their exactitude. Eliot makes a virtue 
out of necessity by submitting to a scientific style of which he is weary. The result is the 
reconstruction of a style which recreates the inevitable infiltration of metaphysics into discourse 
just as the scientific route proves self-sufficient. 
The Parody of Science as Critical Style 
As we have argued, the correlative is a desperate effort to re-affirin the power of description 
and avert the solipsistic horror of unverifiable personality and the absolute uncertainty of the 
knowledge that immediate experience is never merely immediate. It recalls Hamlet's pathetic, 
if heroic, exclamation: "It is I, /Hanilet the Dane', 245, a last resort to infuse conviction 
artificially into a discourse in which he cannot believe anymore. It is the death knell of the 
philosophical discourse as a purely scientific exercise. As if the attempt to resurrect it only 
finalises its death leaving us where we started, with the ghost of philosophy: metaphysics. 
One may concede that this process is the result of Eliot's deliberate stylistic 
manipulation of logic best seen, for example, in 'Hamlet and His Problems. The tactic of 
submitting to the philosophical style - Russell's - which it cannot avoid but which must 
inevitably parody, echoes Hamlet's behaviour as the means of subverting a court he must 
inhabit. Hence, Eliot aestheticises the discourse of philosophy by conceiving it as style and 
evaluating it artistically, as suggested in 'The Possibilities of Poetic Drama, another essay in 
The Sacred Wood: 
244 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 2. 
245 Hamlet, V, i, 11251-2, p. 185. 
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Certain works of philosophy can be called works of art: much of Aristotle and Plato, Spinoza, parts of 
Hume. Mr. Bradley's Principles of Logic, Mr. Russell's essay on 'Denoting': clear and beautifully formed 
thought. 246 
Yet, the relationship between philosophy and art remains undecided; whether philosophy is the 
stylistic model for art or philosophy is rescued as it reaches the poetic status of literary writing 
is not clearly stated. The failure of the correlative lies in this ambiguity; how is it that literature 
should not embody, but replace philosophy? 
247 As Eliot submits to logic in his early literary 
criticism, the correlative proves its own worst enemy. As it reveals its scientific shortcomings it 
becomes an inappropriate model for the evaluation of literature, just as it re-affirms the 
inescapability of metaphysics. 
There is in Eliot's doctoral thesis a yearning for this smooth cognitive inhabitation 
of the ordinary world where philosophical problems may not to matter: 
I conclude that we can never give an exact description or explanation of the relations of the real world to the 
unreal. For we have no difficulty with the matter at all till we begin to think (yet this thinking was forced 
upon us originally by the practical difficulties of illusion). 
248 
In theory we assume a dualism which is not felt in life. But if the unexamined life is not worth 
living we will have to start asking serious questions. And we find that perhaps the biggest 
obstacle in our path is not the answer, but the possibility of asking the meaningful questions. 
The correlative imposes on Eliot the task of a precise theoretical expression of artistic practice 
in 'Hamlet and His Problems', on the assumption that artistic practice can fulfil the conceptual 
project of science. Yet Eliot had insisted in his thesis that: 
For a theoretical ccount of the practical ttitude would be a description from an outside point of view; and 
the 'practical' account would give merely the theory of our practice. A theory of practice or a practice of 
theory would be equally beside the mark: the first inevitably would reduce verything to meaning and the 
second would reduce verything to denoting. So far as objects are objects, we always intend to denote them, 
of course; but in practice, they are only objects partially or occasionally, and we cannot decide to what 
extent. 249 
The most immediate symptom of Eliot's difficulty with his critical account of artistic practice is 
in his choice of an example which fails positively to illustrate it. Hamlet is a negative example, 
suggesting that, ultimately, Eliot's critical discourse leans, not on the positive logic of Russell, 
246 'The Possibility of a Poetic Drama', SW, p. 66. 
247 'The Possibility of a Poetic Drama', SW, p. 66. 
248 KE, p. 138. 
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but on the metaphysical negativity of Bradley. It indicates that Eliot's critical discourse 
ultimately appeals to rhetorical compensations to make his theory re-enact the absolute 
correlation one hopes to find in art. Poetics cannot, in the end, justify a logical method in 
criticism. Ultimately metaphysics cannot be exorcised, demanding instead the deployment of 
both poetics and logic as rhetorical props in the service of an obscure articulation as literary 
criticism, a medium then for metaphysical regeneration. In turn literature stops being the 
descriptive concern of absolute poetics and scientific criticism, but a metaphysical a priori at 
the mercy of a relative world of historical epochs and ineffable literary interpretations. Yet 
Eliot is not prepared to make this concession despite the problems of The Sacred Wood, instead 
be is already preparing the ground for the development of a discourse which can make 
subjectivity and metaphysics coexist with the possibility of accurate description. This involves 
the development of a particular kind of rhetoric poised on incarnating the negative presence of 
metaphysics as an object of contemplation in the historical world. If Metaphysics will not go 
away, Eliot gradually incorporates it as an object capable of description in historical and 
literary terms. 
The battle between science and metaphysics is never resolved in The Sacred Wood, 
and the role of philosophy never properly identified. In effect Eliot promotes what he calls the 
scientific mind as a means of rescuing philosophy as a model of critical exactitude and opposes 
it to impressionistic, or metaphysical, verbosity. Just as Eliot is redefining his preferred 
philosophical discourse as scientific, he remains conditionally pejorative about philosophy as a 
reminder of his disenchantment with its metaphysics. In fact, 'Science' embodies Eliot's 
ambivalence between a disenchantment with philosophy and a need to regenerate its discourse. 
'Philosophy' is, in The Sacred Wood, a by-word for 'metaphysics', and opposed to 'science'. It 
is not so much that Eliot discredits 'philosophy" as metaphysics, but that he is unable to 
articulate directly what this philosophy should be. Thus the 'philosophic' style he is 
condemning is itself the barrier he has to cross to redeem metaphysical philosophy, for it is this 
stylistic barrier that stops Eliot short of articulating metaphysics. It is not so much that 
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metaphysics does not exist, but that the impossibility of its articulation forces Eliot into leaving 
it out. He opts for absence rather than risk misrepresentation. 
Then, just when one thinks Eliot is promoting the concrete style of science, we are 
unable to find unqualified praise for scientific concreteness: 
If we are allowed to accept certain remarks of Pascal and Mr. Russell about mathematics, we believe that 
mathematics deals with objects - if he will permit us to call them objects - which directly affect his 
sensibility. And during a good part of history the philosopher endeavourcd to deal with objects which he 
believed to be of the same exactness as the mathematicians. 
250 
Eliot's account of the objective reference of mathematics is itself indefinite, conditioned by the 
tantalising "if we are allowed to accept ... 
" and "if he will permit us to call them objects". It 
also recalls Eliot's discussion of the classification of objects in his thesis, where he argued that 
the reality of objects lies not in their equivalence to an absolute referent, but to the degree to 
which they are perceived to be real. It is as if Eliot does not want to push the correlation of 
objects with mathematics too far; as if he is weary of its stability. The implication is that Eliot 
is both aware of the excesses of science at the same time that he attempts to promote its 
example. 
Eliot notes at the beginning of 'The Perfect Critic' that criticism may be negatively 
influenced by science. As Eliot refers to the statement hat "poetry is the most highly organized 
form of intellectual activity", he notices in it "that familiar vague suggestion of the scientific 
vocabulary which is characteristic of modem writing.,, 251 The incorporation of scientific 
vocabulary in criticism may be negative because: 
'Activity' will mean for the trained scientist, if he employ the term, either nothing at all or something still 
more xact than anything it suggests to us. 252 
The general inipression Eliot is evoking is that the negative influence of science in modem 
criticism reflects back onto the limits of the scientific style itself. Science either means 
something precisely or nothing at all. 'Me boundary between the two is a tenuous one indeed. 
Exactitude can indeed overshoot itself, precisely because it can easily break under the strain of 
250 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 9. 
251 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 2. 
252 'The Perfect Critic', SW, pp. 8-9. 
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its rigidity. Eliot is ultimately warning us of the impossibility of borrowing directly from 
science, that we should not take "for granted that words have definite meanings, overlooking 
the tendency of words to become indefinite emotions.,, 
253 He is also simultaneously 
encouraging scientific exactitude just as he re-defines what being scientific should be. Thus 
Aristotle's exemplary scientific mind is not exactly what we find in what are normally taken to 
be scientists: 
Aristotle had what is called the scientific mind -a mind which, as it is rarely found in scientists except in 
fragments, might be better called the intelligent mind. 
254 
We expect the scientist to be, not merely intelligent, but informed about the laws of physics, 
capable of objectively applying them through experiment, and reporting the results according to 
an exact language. Yet, Eliot never allows the reader to make a direct correlation of the 
scientific mind with empirical practice, and the philosophic mind with abstract verbalism. That 
is, Eliot never allows his style to be that scientifically exact. In the end good criticism is a 
matter of intelligence and "the development of sensibility. The bad criticism, on the other hand, 
is that which is nothing but an expression of emotion', 255. Yet after all that, Eliot may be said 
to be a little vague, for he is gradually introducing us to a vocabulary of his own, one which 
assumes a precise emphasis on emotions, feelings and sensibility. But the precision, alas, is but 
a mirage. One could even go as far as to suggest that Eliot's terminology fails to survive its 
relocation away from his own critical context. Is this not evidence that Eliot is falling into the 
very problem he identifies in science, that these terms mean "either nothing at all or something 
still more exact than anything it suggests to us"? Ultimately, the self-conscious treatment of 
these issues in the essay may justify the view that Eliot is parodying the scientific style he is 
promoting. Irony is after all the last line of defence of the non-believer before conceding to 
meaninglessness. 
Habib has argued that irony is Eliot's principal rhetorical device to reconcile 
opposing philosophical positions in his postgraduate papers and notes on philosophy: 
253 Me Perfect Critic', SIV, p. 9. 
254 'Ile Perfect Critic', SIV, p. 13. 
255 'The Perfect Critic', SIV, p. 15. 
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[The synthesis between the particular and the universal] had dissolved into a scientific atomism and 
disconnected particularism on the one side, and an abstract monistic unity on the other, whose mutual 
dislocation can be viewed as a condition of irony, the most comprehensive name for that impasse. 
256 
Habib is suggesting that Eliot was already, in his student days, seeking for alternative 
discourses to by-pass the problems he was encountering in philosophy: 
Indeed, it is arguable that the early Eliot withdrew the burden of philosophy wholly into the aesthetic realm 
having despaired of philosophy's potential, he turned to poetry and to literary criticism to establish models 
of tradition, myth and language which would reaffirm the contemporary world's last connection with past 
archetypes of unification. 
257 
Irony is, for Habib, the medium of reconciliation of discourse which culminates in "the 
unification of the experiential potential of poetry with the totalizing powers of philosophy', 258. 
Irony becomes a form of synthesis, which yet refuses a simple transcendent fusion because its 
mechanism is based precisely in the impossibility of the project it attempts to solve; it is 
alleviatory. It is a mode which, for Habib, amounts to a defence against "the bourgeois 
reduction of the world to an endless present, comprising a vast realm of unconnected particulars 
whose secrets would yield themselves up only to positivistic science.,, 
259 More importantly 
Habib adds that Eliot's irony is not philosophically neutral, but represents a metaphysical bias 
in the face of the onslaught of the sciences260; irony is "the index of a metaphysical 
attitude.,, 
261 It is perhaps this hidden point of resistance that is at work under the surface of 
Eliot's apparent concessions to the sciences in The Sacred Wood. His resistance is hidden 
precisely because it is metaphysical; because metaphysics refuses the articulation which could 
stand confrontation in open field. In a sense, this irony is a form of defeat prior to Eliot's 
further allegorization of metaphysics and rediscovery of philosophy via his ongoing literary 
criticism and specially his treatment of the Metaphysical poets as we shall see later. Habib 
gives some idea of this alternative avenue in terms of Eliot's model of 'metaphysical' poetry: 
256 M. R. A. Habib, The Early 7 S. Eliot and Western Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 13. 
257 Habib, p. 25. 
258 Habib, p. 31 
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irony which Eliot locates at the very basis of Bradley's 'common sense', which simultaneously offers two visions 
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Modem poetry must be metaphysical precisely to the extent that it may need to engage in a search for 
[unified philosophical systems]. It must confront the same chaos as modern philosophy, returning to the 
same experiential roots; but it must offer its insights not as the content of contemporary philosophy refracted 
through the verse but as sublimated into the formal texture itself of poetry. 
262 
This reminds us of Eliot's statement that a work of art should not embody philosophy, it 
44 should replace the philosophy. "263 What exactly Habib means by sublimating an empty 
philosophy into the formal texture of poetry is perhaps a little dangerous because it lends itself 
to be taken as an embodiment. Eliot's criticism is on far safer ground. This is the reason for my 
interest in criticism rather than poetry in this thesis. It is the critical replacement of philosophy 
which is the motive behind Eliot's project of developing an alternative discourse to voice 
metaphysics; that is, this project does not necessarily involve poetry alone but the development 
of a new kind of critical discourse which may make this transition possible in the first place. 
This is a project which adopts poetic expression in Eliot's verse, but is more clearly present in 
Eliot's struggle with the style of criticism. This struggle starts with the apparent rejection of 
metaphysics - and with 
it of philosophy as a whole -, 
but which also is subverted from the 
inside if only to begin to open a space for metaphysics through a new kind of critical discourse. 
262 Habib, p. 27. 
263 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', SW, p. 66. 
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Chapter 3 
Eternal History and the Cultural Self 
Eliot's scientific flirtations are modified by 'The Metaphysical Poets' (Times Literary 
Supplement, 1031 (Oct. 20,1921), [669]-670), where an increasing commitment to historical 
detail begins to take shape. This stage is marked by the articles written immediately after the 
publication of The Sacred Wood indicating an increasing interest in seventeenth-century 
Metaphysical poetry, such as 'The Second Order Mind' (Dial, 69, no 6 (Dec. 1920), 586-589) 
and 'Andrew Marvell' (Times Literary Supplement, 1002 (March 31,1921), [201]-202). Of 
these 'The Metaphysical Poets' is the clearest point of departure from the scientific historicism 
of 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' where Eliot had subjected history to his cognitive 
experiment of impersonality, in turn inspired by 'Hamlet and His problems'. 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent' fantasises about positing Bradley's immediate experience as a metaphysical 
inference firmly established in the world. It is an ideal historical realm of works of art, which 
he calls Tradition. Here meanings and words come together in an unadulterated object of 
contemplation, and selves cohere in their impersonal perception of the "emotion which has its 
life in the poem and not in the history of the poet. ', 264 This distinction between the object of 
contemplation and personal history illustrates Eliot's ongoing reluctance as yet to engage with 
the idea of cultural identity. That is, to work with subjectivity at a pure cognitive level of 
perception rather than get entangled in the problem of cultural variations and historical epochs 
which the selves inhabit. 
Eliot's statement that "historical sense involves a perception, not only of the 
pastness of the past, but of its presence"265 wilfully folds diachrony into synchrony. Eliot 
avoids any real engagement with history and his theory of tradition demands a historical 
simultaneity which leaves very little to what one normally understands by 'history'. Tberefore, 
it is not surprising that Eliot warns that: I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely 
264 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 59. 
265 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 49. 
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historical, criticism-266. Impersonality attempts to address the existence of an objective 
perceptive core in individual experience. This perceptual essence appears to be fulfilled by a 
particular type of experience: the aesthetic. The problem is that it entails a vision of history and 
the historical subject devoid of cultural barriers, so as to make possible an idea of objective 
finitude. 
Tradition does not amount to history, but its denial. For Eliot 'history' is a by-word 
for the barriers of space and time, which tradition projects into an eternal parallel dimension of 
works of art. Ibis chapter will argue that Eliot's literary criticism is not by-passing the 
problems of cognition in ordinary experience - to which he had devoted much of his doctoral 
thesis -, but that aesthetics simplifies the articulation of those philosophical problems by 
providing a stable historical ground of universal works of art. What is significant is that Eliot 
attempts a historicism in the first place given his misgivings about the relativity of time. This 
attempt is, however, symptomatic of a commitment to a historicism which gradually opens up 
to the problem of trans-historical meaning as a parallel case to the spatial isolation of the ego 
and the inaccessibility of immediate experience. This move transgresses the scientific 
paradigms with which Eliot attempts to re-create an absolute historical poetics in The Sacred 
Wood. 
The Historical Sense and the Aesthetics of Impersonal Cognition 
Eliot's grappling with the obstacle of temporality and the transmission of meaning across the 
ages does not really commit his literary criticism to the full implications of history. 'History' 
simply remains, in The Sacred Wood, a synonym for cognitive, rather than cultural, time, in a 
way that reflects the tone of his doctoral thesis: 
The contrast between meaning and reality is not so apparent when the reality intended is a present sense 
perception as in some other cases. In memory, for example, or anticipation, there may be the consciousness 
of an intended reality and of a present meaning which are not co-existent in time. The reality is there, and 
the 'mental state' here. And in as much as this present state may omit the greater part of what was present to 
the reality which is remembered [ ... 
] we are accustomed to form in the imagination the notion of a perfect 
idea of the past experience identical in content with the experience itself, and differing only in that it is 
present as a memory instead of past as an cxperience. 
267 
266 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 49. 
267 KE, pp. 49. 
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The only difference between this idea and Eliot's 'historical sense' in 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent' (1919) is that this pessimism about the recoverability of the past - the 
inevitable distortion of that immediate experience - is transformed into a historical possibility. 
What in the thesis is only an imaginary mental habit, becomes, in the 'historical sense', a real 
possibility. History is no longer the nightmare from which Eliot is trying to awake, but 
becomes, through an understanding of tradition, a coherent, if absolute, temporal realm. Here 
the present's interpretation of an immediate experience in the past need not be a distortion as 
much as a positive re-ordering: 
The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention f 
novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered [ ... ] and this is conformity between 
the old and the new the past should be altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the 
past. 268 
The individual writer is, as it were, empowered with the ability to participate in the pre-order of 
history and renews its universal appeal. Yet this individual talent is conditioned by the 
historical determinism of having as his materials that over which he has no choice: what he 
inherits from the past. Originality is thus subjected to the subtleties of theological free will, 
which like Eliot's article on vers libre, can only be meaningfully free when it is not absolutely 
so. 
269 This is the necessary limitation which provides an objective ground to perception. It 
ensures that the result is the creative re-ordering of the world and not a subjective distortion. 
This objective ground, however, is available at the expense of the real world. Tradition 
simplifies the problem of reconciling distortion with re-ordering by providing, instead of 
ordinary objects, works of art which already presume a simplified relation between their 
objective and subjective dimensions realized in their historical universality. Pamela McCallum 
traces this idea to Bradley's conception of reality, which it always understands in synchronic 
terms, leaving out diachronic considerations: 
Reality, as described in Knowledge and Experience, is synchronic: in Bradleyan terms everything is frozen 
into both the undifferentiated structurally identical unity of immediate experience and the unapproachable 
purity of the Absolute. It follows that such a notion will tend to nullify or overlook any particular social 
milieu, preferring instead a pseudo-totality which has been detached from temporal specificity. Moreover, if
268 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 50. 
269 "The ghost of some simple metre should lurk behind the arras in even the 'freest' verse; to advance 
menacingly as we doze, and withdraw as we rouse. Or, freedom is only truly freedom when it appears against the 
background of an artificial limitation", 'Reflections on Vers Libre'(1917), SP, pp. 34-35. 
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diachronic movement is disregarded, no genuine experience of partiality, fragmentation or alienation can 
270 
even be conceived . 
Tradition excludes history as culture because culture is relative to time and space. 
However, Eliot's Tradition does not merely ignore culture's impact over a synchronic vision of 
history, it also attempts to find a language where absolute critical statements are possible. Yet, 
while his criticism appears to illustrate a tight logic, it simultaneously offers ambiguities that 
expose the compromises he makes for the sake of critical exactitude. McCallum sees this 
critical dimension of ambiguity played out particularly by his poetry; through its vision of "a 
phenomenology of the fractured, disintegrating existential reality within the modem social 
271 
mileu" ,a 
fragmentation which also progresses towards compensation and coherence. Thus, 
The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers, 
Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends 
Or other testimony of summer nights. 272 
Note that the river is not full of rubbish, but the negation goes almost unnoticed invoking de 
facto the opposite effect. This poetic allusion to fragmented experience haunts the very 
possibility of the ideal historicism where the fragments have been put together, but also that 
there may be no fragments. Hence, there is no memory of summer nights, yet, simultaneously, 
a transcendent confidence that they have taken place; that the fragments have been there, even 
if, by now, they have been washed away to other shores. This is what the criticism wants to 
fulfil by going beyond the nature of these verses which can only evoke a half-realized and 
undecided wish between memory and forgetfulness. In Eliot's criticism Tradition attempts to 
positively articulate the re-ordering of experience. Tradition attempts, as much as it can, to deal 
with the workings of ordinary cognition - the limits of never being able to recall the original 
experience in the past - while it posits the possibility of controlling this distortion in some areas 
of experience, namely the aesthetic experience. For Eliot originality becomes the uneasy 
reconciliation between artistic universality and its necessary rooting in the world of fragmented 
experience. The suspicion is that Tradition reduces this world of experience to the aesthetic, 
270 Pamela McCallum, Literature and Metho& Towards a Critique of L A. Richards, T. S. Eliot and F. R Leavis 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, Humanities Press, 1983), p. 123. 
271 McCallum, p. 124. 
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whose historical dimension it fails to fulfil in his criticism and which McCallum identifies with 
the Classical moment of stasis: "Hence real lived experience and history are denied, imprisoned 
in the closed formal order of the metaphoric organiSM. ', 
273 This critical struggle, however, pre- 
empts his later statement in 1928 that "the poem which is absolutely original is absolutely bad; 
it is, in the bad sense 'subjective' with no relation to the world it appeals. ', 
274 The ambiguity 
lies in Eliot's inability to identify the world to which this poem is appealing. Is it the world of 
objects, a particular historical moment or simply the world of letters? 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent' bases the 'historical sense' on this ambiguity which postpones the decision, 
just as it opens up a place for further inclusions. 
The immediate difficulty with this position is that once we accept that being 
traditional amounts to the participation and re-ordering of a given world not immediately 
available, one cannot easily tell the difference between re-ordering and distortion. This 
distinction is proposed in Eliot's doctoral thesis as the difference between memory and 
hallucination: 
To recall feeling, we are often told, is merely to live it over; it cannot be known or remembered, but only 
fclt. And to this objection we can retort that hallucination is not the satisfaction and consummation of
memory, but its disease. 275 
Hallucination amounts to the unchecked belief in the complete recuperation of the past which 
bypasses the discriminating nature of memory. Hallucinations do not stress the presence of the 
past to us through memory, but the fantasy of by-passing temporality and accessing it just as it 
was. This inverse proportionality between memory and hallucination finds its literary 
expression in the fact that, as Eliot puts it in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', 
we shall often find that not only the best, but the most individual parts of [the poct's] work may be those in 
which the dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously. 276 
The more we try directly to recuperate the past experience, to copy past masters, the more we 
distort the artistic essence and the historical conformity. The universal value of the work of art 
is thus theoretically temporalized. Our relation to tradition should involve a resistance to its 
273 McCallum, p. 124. 
274 'Introduction', Ezra Pound, Selected Poems (1928) (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), p. 10. 
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inevitable influence which paradoxically delivers the proper participation to it by making 
evident the temporal barriers which separate us. Eliot articulates the distinction between these 
two attitudes with the famous aphorism that "immature poets imitate; mature poets steal.,, 
277 
Eliot's strategies are important because they gradually defy one's natural objections 
to being traditional understood as the impossibility of the new; they check the inference that we 
are condemned to repeat ourselves eternally in a hallucinated trance. Equally, Eliot's tradition 
controls the idea of history as a mere meaningless continuum which must end in subjectivism 
and solipsistic loneliness278. In other words, Eliot is not simply idealizing a tradition which 
synthesises all time into a meaningful order eternally present, but he is also struggling to leave 
room for the passing of time, without falling into the trap of either idealism or positivism. The 
cognitive historicism of the thesis is, after all, very like the aesthetic historicism of TIze Sacred 
Wood. The difference is that Eliot's doctoral thesis makes concessions to the irretrievability of 
the past which his literary criticism is attempting to attenuate. Tradition attempts to use the 
work of art as a ground for cognitive experience in history, yet he struggles to halt at the 
frontier of metaphysics to avoid implying a transcendental aesthetic order which would 
neutralize the little history Tradition has about it. Thus Eliot tries to turn the skepticism of his 
thesis into optimism in his literary criticism. 
Eliot's concept of Tradition is an attempt to articulate the intuition that objective 
historical judgement can only be clearly stated at the expense of a culturally thernatized history, 
in this case, partially idealized as a parallel aesthetic realm of works of art. This realm 
attenuates the clash between finite history and artistic universality; culture is, after all, the 
obvious enemy of universal meaning. Tradition homogenises the inevitable diversity of 
historical and personal contexts of meaning. It does not reject contextualization, it simply 
insists on an overarching one for everyone, a context which transcends the solipsistic finitude 
of particular cultural features and personality. For Eliot, the problem lies in avoiding making 
277 'Philip Massinger', SW, p. 125. 
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tradition function as Bradley's Absolute: in effect, a desperate attempt to appeal to metaphysics 
in the absence of an alternative way of reconciling different points of view. 'Mis is most 
apparent in Eliot's introduction to The Sacred Wood: 
It is part of the business of the critic to preserve tradition - where good tradition exists. It 
is part of his 
business to see literature steadily and to see it whole; and this is eminently to see it not as consecrated by 
time, but to see it beyond time; to see the best work of our time and the best work of twcnty-five hundred 
years ago with the same cyes. 
279 
For what is a better alternative to an absolute metaphysical context of history than the idealized 
coherence of individual perception which depends, not on cultural and personal identity, but on 
one9s eyes and nervous systems unhindered by the passing of time? Culture may change but the 
eyeballs remain physiologically the same. Historical finitude becomes perceptual and thus 
synchronic, if we choose to believe that aesthetic experience, unlike ordinary cognition, is less 
subject to cultural changes through time. Thus Eliot's Tradition does not seek an objective 
ground either in culture or metaphysics but, instead, in cognition modelled around the 
impersonal perception art fosters. Yet Tradition and Impersonality are not merely romantic 
idealization of aesthetic experience, but the contextualization of aesthetics in the very problems 
of cognition it is trying to solve - namely, subjectivity and objectivity. 
These are indeed 
Romantic concerns which Edward Lobb very much tries to make explicit. However, Eliot's 
attempt at their resolution is at the expense of appearing to by-pass them, by hiding behind 
scientific accounts of cognition. He is indeed working with Romanticism, but it is precisely his 
awareness of it that forces the more radical a break. Lobb is good in saying that "Eliot found 
within the Romantic poets themselves, then, most of the ideas which he used in his critique of 
280 Romanticism" 
, yet 
he seems to underestimate the critique he is pointing out because, it 
seems, he is not fully aware of subtle cognitive issues at work in Eliot's criticism. Lobb's 
statement is in fact a licence to interpret everything about Eliot in terms of Romanticism. 
279 'Introduction, SW, p. xv-xvi. 
280 Edward Lobb, T. S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition (London: Routlcdge and Kcgan Paul, 1981), P. 
74. 
103 
David Goldie argues that Eliot's theory of impersonality is the continuation of the 
symbolist concern with the 'natural sin of language, 
281, an attempt to recuperate the 
unadulterated medium of perception as the means to deliver a perfect style. R6my de 
Gourmont's ProWme du Style (1902) promotes this concern, and his example is taken up by 
the Eliot of The Sacred Wood. The 'problem' is the gradual deterioration of literary language as 
it passes from reader to reader, from epoch to epoch, which translates into a concern with the 
instability of the very language used in the criticism about literature. Goldie is aware of this 
critical instability which Eliot seeks to alleviate in his early criticism through Gourmont: 
For a writer like Eliot English critical writing on style had little to offer and for a certain time he clearly 
believed that continental writers - in particular the French poet and critic R6my de Gourmont - marked a
way out of a debilitating Anglocentric critical imprcssionism. 
282 
Eliot's impersonal theory of art promotes a radical personality rooted in sense perception. This 
radicalization aims at universalizing what would otherwise be private experiences. Eliot is not 
rejecting personality but he is redefining it. It is an exploration of Gourmont's stress on the 
importance of personality in style. However, in Gourmont personality leaves no room for 
tradition. The stress is purely on the uncontaminated cognitive act. According to Goldie: 
The idea of a formative literary tradition, for which Eliot was reaching, is untenable for Gourmont, for 
which it is axiomatic that what is taught by literature is posterior, and secondary, to what is learned through 
the senses, and for whom literary history is merely a collection of individual and frequently unrelated 
utterances ofpersonal feeling collected together and homogenised, as it were, after the fact. 
283 
Eliot is not unaware of the distorting element of history, and, like Gourmont, attempts to re- 
establish the primacy of the sense experience. The main difference between the two is Eliot's 
philosophical background, without which Gourmont's idealization of the pure cognitive act is 
naive. Thus, it is not that Eliot's historicism is limited that is significant, but that, in the context 
of Gounnont's rejection of literary tradition, he felt the need to develop a historical 
legitimization for cognition in the first place. That Eliot shies away from the relativism of its 
cultural implications - that statements of truth should be kept away from affirmations of 
281 David Goldie, A Critical Difference: T. S. Eliot and John Middleton Murry in English Literary Criticism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 73. 
282 Goldie, p. 69. 
283 Goldie, p. 78. 
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cultural dogma - in his early criticism is thus secondary to the greater project of up-dating 
the 
critical discourse to make that inclusion possible. 
284 
Eliot's introduction to The Sacred Wood is not a simple anti-cultural statement. In 
the introduction Eliot attacks Matthew Arnold's 'The Function of Criticism in the Present 
Time' and, in particular, its idealization of cultural epochs and its criticism of the present state 
of culture: the idea that the present does not measure up to the ideal cultural conditions which 
encourage good creative activity. Arnold states that: 
The exercise of the creative power in the production of great works of literature or art, however high this 
exercise of it may rank, is not at all epochs and under all conditions possible; and that therefore labour may 
be vainly spent in attempting it, which might with more fruit be used in preparing for it, in rendering it 
possible. 
285 
Eliot, however, does not to disagree with Arnold on all counts. Like Arnold, Eliot stresses the 
importance of criticism in the creative process: the idea that criticism, in Arnold's words, 
permeates society with "fresh thought, intelligent and alive. ', 
286 Where Eliot disagrees is in 
that this permeation is only rarely available, and that "this is why great creative epochs are so 
rare. " Eliot's dissent is not absolute, but he cannot assent to Arnold's moral high ground and 
cultural determinism. Arnold's message amounts to a condemnation of humanity to its lot, 
implying that there is no point trying to create when the conditions of one's present are not 
ready for great literature. Eliot would admit that the present situation is not ideal, as he pointed 
out to Sydney Schiff in January 1920: 
We have in modem society a huge journalistic organism the "critical" or Review press which must be fed - 
there is simply not enough, nowhere near enough, good creative work to feed the "critical" machine. 
287 
However there is a determined optimism to make the best of things when Eliot wrote the 
introduction to The Sacred Wood in the very same year: 
284 In A Critical Difference, Goldie goes on to shows how John Middleton Murry complained that Eliot was 
artificially separating aesthetics from culture, but argues that the debate was really about the very meaning of 
culture itself. See Goldie, pp. 60-68. 
285 Matthew Arnold, 'The Function of Criticism at the Present Time' (1969) in Essays by Matthew Arnold: 
Including 'Essays in Criticism' (1865), 'On Translating Homer' and Five Other Essays (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1925), 9-36 (p. 11). 
286 Arnold, 'The Function of Criticism at the Present Time', p. 14. 
287 To Sydney Schiff (12th January, 1920), Letters, pp. 355-356. 
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The periodical press [ ... 
] is an instrument of transport; and the literary periodical press is dependent upon 
the existence of a sufficient number of sccond-order [. ] minds to supply its material. These minds are 
necessary for that "current of ideas", that "society permeated by fresh thought, " of which Arnold spcaks. 
288 
For Arnold, literary criticism is not a practical pursuit and should be kept separate from 
practical life. For Eliot, Arnold's position amounts to creative passivity which becomes a 
waiting game for the right conditions to arrive from a critical position of moral aloofness. 
Arnold did not take the literary production of his time seriously; he was "not occupied so much 
99289 in establishing a criticism as in attacking the uncritical . 
Thus, Eliot concludes, Arnold 
preferred "to put literature in the comer until he cleaned the whole country firsf'. Eliot, instead, 
encourages participation in the 'current of ideas' through active criticism, whatever his 
opinions to Sydney Schiff might have been a few months earlier. The twist is that Eliot 
concedes the point to Arnold just as he expands what is meant by "current of ideas", of which 
Arnold speaks. 
The Sacred Wood is in fact a collection of reviews and essays which had already 
been published in the periodical press. The paradox is that its contents are only formally a 
concession to popular culture, given that, contextually, they tend to condition - and perhaps are 
even about - the extent to which cultural participation should be carried out. Just as, even then, 
Eliot is characterized by non-committal rhetoric about cultural participation exemplified by 
statements uch as "[Philip Massinger] looked at life through the eyes of his predecessors, and 
only at manners through his own.,, 290 Is he saying the reverse is true; that one should look at 
the manners of one's time in the frame of the Tradition and look with one's own eyes at life? 
What exactly is the difference between life and manners? The answer is enigmatic, but what is 
clear is that this distinction is inherently looking for an overlap between perceptive (look), 
ordinary (life) and cultural (manners) experiences, which also translates into the seeking for an, 
as yet undetermined, historical overlap between what is contemporary and what is universal. 
There is an Arnoldean withholding after all. The subtext to Eliot's introduction to The Sacred 
Wood amounts to a beckoning to an all-embracing culture which, however, is left waiting at the 
288 'Introduction', SW, p. xiv. 
289 'Introduction', SW, p. xiii. 
290 'Philip Massinger', SW, p. 143. 
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door; the caution is Arnoldean only up to a point. Eliot hesitates to offer high culture as a model 
for the Tradition he envisages. The kind of participation which, in the end, Vie Sacred Wood 
wants to encapsulate is both contemporary and universal, popular or highbrow. Eliot brings 
culture and society closer than Arnold would allow for, something McCallum sees as in tune 
with Bradley's critique of Arnold on this count. 
291 If Arnold's function of criticism ever acted 
as a model for Eliot as Lobb suggests, 
292 it begins to run thin once a comprehensive 
understanding of culture becomes an important factor for the understanding of history in Eliot's 
criticism. This is the point where culture begins to cry out for definition. 
If culture was left tentatively implied in the original edition ofThe Sacred Wood, it is 
openly acknowledged in its Preface to the revised 1928 version: 
At the time I was much stimulated and much helped by the critical writings of 116my de Gourmont. I 
acknowledge that influence and I am grateful for it; and I by no means disown it by having passed on to 
another problem not touched upon in this book: that of the relation of poetry to the spiritual and social life of 
its time and of other times. 
293 
Eliot exaggerates his "having passed onto another problem not touched upon in this book"; in 
fact The Sacred Wood is about the relation of poetry to the spiritual and social life of its time 
and other times from the start. That it offers no unproblematic solution is another matter. If the 
'second-order mind' holds the key to Eliot's re-definition of culture294 it is already partially 
incorporated into his early criticism. 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' keeps high culture at 
bay opting instead for a clean-cut emphasis on cultural impersonality and cognitive primacy. 
Philip Massinger's style is criticised for a cultural over-dependence because it undermines its 
universal cognitive appeal and thus restricts its participation in Tradition; yet it also suggests 
that this participation is dependent on one's relation to one's time. This is related to the cultural 
291 "There can be no doubt that Bradley has consigned the traditional metaphoric meaning of culture - cultivation 
or education - to latent qualities or tendencies to be developed", McCallum, p. 112. 
292 See Lobb, pp. 75-78. 
293 Preface to the 1928 Edition, SW, p. viii. 
294 This hidden motive is finally developed in Eliot's Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (1948) (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1962). The interest of this book resides not only on its subject matter, but on its methodology -
"My aim is to help to define a word, the word culture" (p. 13) - which recalls Eliot's interest in the 
limits of 
definition as a scientific pursuit illustrated in his post-graduate notes on 'Description and Interpretation' which we 
looked at in Chapter 2 of this thesis ('Description and Interpretation'). The aphorism at the top of the book's 
introduction reads: "I think our studies ought to be all but purposeless. They want to be pursued with chastity like 
mathematics (Acton)" (p. 13). Also see Edward Lobb's T S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition (Routlcdgc 
& Kegan Paul; London, 198 1), p 117. 
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primacy of the second-order mind which Eliot re-affirms in the 1928 Preface. e point is to 
make cultural specific literary expressions open up critically to a wider historical horizon. The 
scientific materialism, which prevails in the essays of The Sacred Wood, is gradually opened up 
from the inside, via the Introduction and Preface, to let both culture and metaphysics in - each 
of which stand for historical finitude and universality. The culmination of this process is 
allegorized in 'The Metaphysical Poets' only a year later. 
The Collective and the Individual in Critical History 
'The Metaphysical Poets' (1921) continues Eliot's momentum towards the incorporation of 
culture into his critical thought by subjecting the cognitive impersonality of Tradition to a 
historical epoch, in this case, the seventeenth-century. This shift is already prefigured in Eliot's 
1920 Introduction which concludes with an extended quotation from Dr Johnson's Life of 
Cowley, which was the centre piece of 'The Metaphysical Poets'. In this essay Eliot is not 
merely detailing the cognitive mechanisms of these poet's impersonal 'nervous systems', but 
contextualizing them within historical epochs. The 'dissociation of sensibility', which in 'The 
Metaphysical Poets' is a defining point in Eliot's critical shift, attempts to incorporate the 
vocabulary of cultural history into the prevailing scientific nomenclature of The Sacred Wood. 
'Ibis move towards cultural historicism is implied in the following statement in 'The 
Metaphysical Poets': "In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set in, from which 
we have never recovered. ', 
295 Dating is in itself an important step. It places the finite centre - 
the poet - in historical time. Yet this historical commitment is still undermined by the 
negativity of the formulation. It does not tell us when the association - whose components, 
thought and feeling, give away its cognitive nature - takes place but when 
it ceases to exist. 
Even then the dissociation of sensibility remains a suspended historical assumption. Although 
historically located through the implication previously in the article that "the poets of the 
seventeenth century (up to the Revolution) were the direct and normal development of the 
preceding age', 
296 
, one 
is left to correlate the bracketed 'up to the Revolution' with the exact 
295 T. S. Eliot, 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 64. 
296 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 63. 
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point at which the dissociation sets in the seventeenth-century, hence marking the end of 
Metaphysical poetry. Furthermore, one must assume that these seventeenth century poets (up to 
the Revolution) are indeed all Metaphysical - and none after. Given that Eliot 
is in fact 
attempting to find a way of defining these poets historically, these half assumptions gives away 
the deficiency of the method he is trying on: that the dissociation is anything but a fixed 
historicism. 
Yet, the dissociation of sensibility remains consistent with Eliot's scientific 
engagement in The Sacred Wood: the attempt to validate our perceptions by measuring them 
against their source in sense experience. Yet at the point in which this validation steps out of 
merely sensory experience it reveals its historical short-comings. The attempt to place in history 
the immediacy of perception encouraged by impersonality meets with an unacceptable idealism 
about a lost time which may never be recovered. Instead Eliot articulates this inference 
negatively and refuses to define it. The Metaphysical poets are not examples of ideal artistic 
success; they "were, at best, engaged in the task of trying to find the verbal equivalent for states 
of mind and feeling. ', 
297 This is a task that recalls the objective correlative, but which is no 
longer posited as an achievable event but as an ideal goal not immediately available in what is, 
ever since sometime in the seventeenth-century, a dissociated age of sensibility. 
For Goldie, the dissociation of sensibility is part of a collective post-war 
-manifestation of reconstructive disillusion', 298; or more importantly, a reconstruction focused 
on the past in the face of the uncertainty of the future. Goldie is, however, careful not to see 
Eliot's historicism simply as part of a Symbolist project, a project which, as Frank Kermode 
sees it, sought historically to legitimise the image as a trans-historical artistic feature. In The 
Romantic Image Kermode's argument is that the role of dissociation, encouraged by critics 
such as Eliot, was to 
show poets a specially appropriate way of nourishing themselves from the past the need was to bring 
literary history [ 
... 
] to the support of the image; to re-write the history of poetry in Symbolic terms. 
299 
297 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 65. 
298 Goldie, p. 49 
299 Frank Kermode, The Romantic Image (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 138. 
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Goldie concludes that Eliot's critico-literary development is underlined, not so much by 
Symbolism or traditionalism alone, but by his increasing concern with positing the cognitive 
subject in a cultural context, a community of interpretants. This is a move which is connected 
with a shift in Eliot's critical discourse; from the scientifically conceptual to the culturally 
thematized. It is the shift initiated by Eliot's abstracted sense of tradition, which now moves to 
the increasingly history-bound dissociation of sensibility in 'The Metaphysical Poets'. 
Eliot's concept of impersonality as it stands in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' 
cannot cater for the reconciliation between history and culture; a reconciliation that involves a 
definition of culture not available to Eliot at that time. Human experience is reducible to that of 
nervous systems only to the extent that there is an over-arching synchronic realm of works of 
art in which all these finite centres might cohere. The point is to offer a realm of works of art 
which are not culturally specific, or else this whole theory of coherence between finite centres 
falls down into the abyss of historical relativism and individual solipsism. This critical ellipsis, 
however, endangers the very practical utility of the theory. As Eliot puts it in his thesis: 
Beyond the objective worlds of a number of finite centres, each having its own objects, there is no objective 
world. Thus we confront the question: how do we yoke our divers worlds to draw together? how can we 
issue from the circle described about each point of view? and since I can know no point of view but my own, 
how can I know that there are other points of view, or admitting of their existence, how can I take any 
account of them? 300 
Eliot's reworking of Bradley's finite centre as a perceptual finitude, only works on the premise 
that it inhabits a world of accessible objects, unhindered by time or space. This premise is re- 
created by a tradition projected onto a realm of universal works of art. Ibus impersonality is 
hard-pushed to survive in the temporal world of history. As a consequence, Eliot gets caught 
between two irreconcilable axes: the historically general and the culturally particular. Goldie 
identifies them as, on the one hand "the idea of a common culture defined nationally, or by 
language, and on the other an aesthetic and humanistic sensibility that transcends narrow 
national and historical boundaries.,, 301 Eliot's concept of tradition lacks particular definition: 
is it Europe's, is it the world's or is it out of this world? And above all, who is a member? 
300 KE, p. 14 1. 
301 Goldie, p. 57. 
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These are all questions pertinent to Eliot's critique of Arnold, which can find only an 
incomplete articulation. 
Piers Gray sees a philosophical edge to Eliot's arrival at this historical 
crossroadS302; his 'historical sense', Gray observes, amounts to an engagement with Bradleyan 
historical critique. In 'The Presuppositions of Critical History' Bradley points out what he 
thinks are some common misconceptions about history: namely that it cannot be subjected to 
scientific scrutiny and that history is not simply there, directly available to our senses. Firstly, 
because history is in the past; secondly, because, even that which is present to the senses, 
cannot be said to be cognitively immediate. The distortion of past events by history becomes 
apparent through the critical function; that, as Bradley puts it, there is no absolute way of 
telling history from the historian: 
We do not question that history apart from the historian does exist; and contrariwise we must take it for 
granted that there is no such thing as history which is merely 'subjective', or, in other words, that whatever 
is 'created' by the historian is not in a proper sense history at all. 
303 
One must note that Bradley is not giving way to the temptation of doing away with history all 
together, but instead is trying to define in which shape this history is ever not subjective. Eliot's 
'historical sense' is an attempt to articulate this possibility, for which he paradoxically borrows 
the very scientific method Bradley repudiates in the form of the absolute historical poetics of 
Tradition. Bradley goes on to add that the historian's mission "is not and cannot be merely 
receptive, or barely reproductive"304, that his activity must inevitably involve the creation of a 
canon. The crux of the question is for Bradley the extent to which historical activity is not 
merely a personal projection, while admitting that "a history without so-called prejudications is 
a mere delusion.,, 
305 In the end Bradley does not seem able to rescue history in any form, at 
which point he turns to the cognitive status of facts. He notes that a historical fact may not be 
unveiled by appealing to "the nature of that which may be regarded as the minimum of fact in 
302 Piers Gray, T S. Eliot's Intellectual and Poetic Development 1909-1922 (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 
1982). See also Lewis Freed, 'The Dissociation of Sensibility' in T. S. Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher (Indiana: 
Purdue University Press, 1979), pp. 131-149. 
303 F. H. Bradley, 'The Presuppositions of Critical History' (1874) in Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1935), 1, p. 8. 
304 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 10. 
305 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 11. 
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general.,, 306 This is precisely what Eliot attempts with his theory of impersonality. The crucial 
point of Bradley's philosophical approach is that he is not concerned with the essence of the 
object world but with the essence of the perceiving subject; that is, his fascination lies in how 
the individual creates an impression of objectivity despite the critical certainty that the world is 
indeed a prejudication and that historical facts 
are recorded events, and that means that, though fleeing in themselves, they are yet made stable; though 
divisible in time, they are regarded as wholes; and though the offspring of the mind, they are still 
independent and real. 307 
Bradley's only answer is that perception is ultimately based in faith, which makes the 
objectivity of facts stable against the philosophical evidence to the contrary. However true, this 
is an unsatisfactory conclusion which Eliot is addressing in 'Tradition and the Individual 
Talent'. 
For Bradley faith in facts attenuates the isolation of the finite centre, which amounts 
to the collective agreement on a common world of objects. Faith artificially compensates for 
the ultimate isolation of the ego. Yet, there is a limit to this coherence: 
The experience of others has no meaning for us except so far as it becomes our own; the existence of others 
is no existence for us if it is not in our world that they live. 308 
Others, like historical testimonies, are subject to historical prejudication. This is the price to be 
paid for critical coherence. Coherence is dependent on spheres of influence; coherence with 
others depends on their living in our world. 'Ibis conclusion has important temporal 
implications, because it implies that the inevitable presupposition of the past is the present of 
the perceiving subject. Our world is not only our cognitive present but also its cultural 
presuppositions. That is, temporal distances imply a cultural gap only bridged over by the 
creation of canons. In short, one may not hope to understand another's culture or time if he 
does not live in one's sphere of influence. The startling conclusion is that finite centres can only 
cohere with themselves, or others like themselves. But in so far as that is the case, they are no 
longer finite centres, but cultural subjects. 
306 'The Presuppositions of Critical History,, Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 13. 
307 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 13. 
308 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 19. 
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This conclusion does away with the ideal presupposition of the finite centre, yet it 
does so as a means of avoiding its implied radical solipsism. We are no longer isolated egos 
alone; we are accompanied by the few with whom we manage to cohere. But, at what price? Is 
there such a thing, in a world of culturally organized subjects, as another? Perhaps this is 
expecting too much of Bradley, yet it is a latent danger Eliot himself identified in Bradley's 
Ethical Studies. His review of the second edition of the book originally published in 1876 
('Bradley's Ethical Studies, Times Literary Supplement, 1352 (December 29,1927) [981]-982, 
also included in For Lancelot Andrews) notes: 
There is one direction in which these words - and, indeed, Bradley's philosophy as a whole - might be 
pushed, which would be dangerous; the direction of diminishing the value and dignity of the individual, of 
sacrificing him to a Church or a State. 309 
Eliot is referring to a passage from 'Concluding Remarks' in Ethical Studies - which he 
quotes3 
10 
- where Bradley appears to encourage the renunciation of the individual will for the 
sake of a Divine Will. Closer inspection reveals a different conclusion. Ultimately, the 
underlying scepticism of Bradley's philosophy does not allow for a reassuring sense of cultural 
participation or terrifying imperative towards social subjugation for the isolated ego. There is 
no contradiction because, as Eliot tells us, "scepticism and disillusion are a useful equipment 
, 011 for religious understanding. Eliot in fact warns us that Bradley's position must, be 
distinguished from Arnold's idea of culture as a moral guiding-principle. If we return to 'The 
Presuppositions of Critical History' we find that 
any narrative of 'facts' which involves judgements proceeding from religious consciousness or a view of the 
world which, as a whole or in respect of the part in question differs from ours, cannot have such a force as to 
assure us of any event un-analogous to present experience. 
312 
309 'Francis Herbert Bradley', FLA, pp. 80-81. It must be noted that Eliot did not list - and may be had not read 
till this date - Ethical Studies for his doctoral thesis Knowledge and Experience. He is working Bradley's 
bibliography, as it were, chronologically backwards. 
310 "'How can the human-divine ideal ever be my will? The answer is, Your will it never can be as the will of 
your private self, so that your private self should become wholly good. To that self you must die, and by faith be 
made one with that ideal. You must resolve to give up your will, as the mcre will of this or that man, and you must 
put your whole self, your entire will, into the will of the divine. That must be your one self, as it is your true self, 
that you must hold to both with thuoght and will, and all other you must renounce"', 'Francis Herbert Bradley', 
FLA, pp. 80. [note: the reader should bear in mind that two different editions of 'Francis Herbert Bradley' are 
being used, one from FLA and another from SP]. 
311 'Francis Herbert Bradley', SP, p. 200. 
312 'The Presuppositions of Critical History, Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 3 1. 
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Bradley takes comfort for his concessions to cultural identity with the thought that given the 
option the individual would tend to believe his eyes before he believes somebody or something 
not immediately available - that is, events un-analogous to present experience. The 
individual 
is to this limited extent free to make up his mind and control his own critical judgement. Just as 
we are aware that history is implicitly a critical construction, we develop a skepticism that 
underpins any received historical or collective statement of fact. Bradley does not rule out the 
importance of religious consciousness as that subjugation to something other than ourselves, 
but he refuses to reduce it to a purely cultural phenomenon as does Arnold. Bradley does not 
allow for a simple synthesis out of the dialectic. As Eliot notes in 'Francis Herbert Bradley': 
"Bradley is careful, in indicating the process, not to exaggerate either will or intellect at the 
expense of the other. , 
313 
Bradley concludes that judgement can only function as a skeptical reaction to given 
truths, that "criticism from its very essence cannot be simply affirmative., '314 This critical 
negativity is crucial in Bradley. Negativity is his main tool of reconciliation between the 
acknowledgement that history is made and the affirmation that for the individual the world is 
real in the shape he sees it with his own eyes. So that 
It would indeed be strange if every record were authentic and trustworthy Not one at the present time 
would dare say that such is the case; and such is not the case, then criticism, if it is to be criticism, must 
necessarily be to a certain extent negative. 315 
The awareness of error demands the constant re-adjustment with the views of others. it is 
through the negative dimension of our beliefs that we approach anything resembling absolute 
judgement: "a negative criterion, if it exists at all, must be from its nature an absolute criterion, 
or be a self-contradictiolf, 
316. But Bradley's concept of coherence is not reassuring enough for 
Eliot to avoid a preoccupied chapter in his thesis on the impending solipsism of Bradley's 
313 'Francis Herbert Bradley', SP, p. 202. Pamela McCallum's comments on this debate are very enlightening: 
"Thus Arnold's own 'culture' [ ... 
] had left him inadequately prepared to recognise the profound philosophical 
distinction Bradley draws between morality and religion [. ] In much the same way, Eliot insists that the 
limitations Bradley placed on an imperfectly realizable morality ought to have been embodied in the concept of an 
ethical culture. Instead, Arnold had hypostatised culture as an ideal which is at once real, qualities that can be 
ascribed only to religion", McCallum, p. 114. 
314 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 47. 
315 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 47. 
316 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 47. 
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philosophy. Yet it is precisely this threat that may have encouraged Eliot to culturally thernatize 
his critical concerns in search of a cognitive faith which is not simply an absolute scepticism - 
as a kind of mystical consciousness - but which can be accounted for positively 
in the world. 
For in "Appearance and Reality [Bradley] assumes that our common everyday knowledge is on 
the whole true so far as it goes, but that we do not know how far it does go.,, 
317 
In a paper Eliot wrote for Josiah Royce's seminar in Logic between 1913-14 entitled 
'The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual', he turns an anthropological issue into a debate on the 
possibility of critical discourse. This paper is the most widely treated by Eliot scholars. Manju 
Jain and Piers Gray both point out Eliot's insistence in this paper that the interpretation of the 
past cannot claim to unveil historical facts. Eliot had in mind approaches that claimed in this 
respect scientific exactitude, particularly Behaviourism. He was suspicious, at this early stage, 
of approaches that refuse to take account of the religious, felt experience of the subject and 
concentrate, instead, on the public ritualised exercise of religion. Over a decade after he wrote 
'The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual', Eliot still maintains his criticism of what he then 
identified as Psychologism: the inability to admit of the interiority of felt experience in the 
account of human values. In 'John Bramhall' ('Archbishop Bramhall', Theology, 15, no 85 
(July 1927), 11-17, also included in For Lancelot Andrews), Eliot spends much time 
discrediting Hobbes's political philosophy for over-stressing the psychological aspect of the 
citizen's public behaviour at the expense of inherent value in the forrn of personal belieelg. 
According to Eliot, Hobbes confuses psychology with ethics. Furthermore, Eliot observes, 
The attitude of Hobbes toward moral philosophy has by no means disappeared from human thought; nor has 
the confusion between moral philosophy and mechanistic psychology. 
319 
Behaviourism, which Eliot identifies with the sociology of Durkheim in 'The Interpretation of 
Primitive Ritual', stresses externality as a way of making the primitive experience available as 
scientific facts to one's present. Behaviourism fails, in the terms of Eliot's early historicism, to 
317 'Francis Herbert Bradley', SP, p. 203. 
318 In 'Francis Herbert Bradley' also included in For Lancelot Andrews he notes: "The lack of [wisdom] produces 
those unbalanced philosophies, such as Behaviourism, of which we hear a great deal", 'Francis Herbert Bradley', 
FLA, p. 67. 
319 'John Bramhall', FLA, pp. 37-38. Crucially Eliot adds Bertrand Russell and 1. A. Richards to the list of guilty 
parties. 
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admit the pastness of the past as part of the personal experience of the individual at the time it 
took place; that, 
in many cases no interpretation of a rite could explain its origin. The meaning of the series of acts is to the 
performers themselves an interpretation; the same ritual remaining practically unchanged may assume 
different meanings for different generations of performers; and the rite may have originated before 
6meaning' meant anything at all. 
320 
The pastness of the past must involve personal experience, and as such it must remain 
unknowable as a scientific fact. This inaccessibility is aggravated by the impossibility of 
determining the self-awareness of the participant in primitive rituals; that there might not have 
been a 'meaning' in the first place. Ibis is the skeptical conclusion at which Manju Jain arrives. 
In contradistinction, Gray argues that although Eliot's scepticism in his paper is that of "Ibe 
Presuppositions of Critical History', it is subtly alleviated by the influence of Josiah Royce's 
idealist optimism which presupposes an ideal community of interpretants as opposed to a 
solipsistic - and Bradleyan - finite centre. 
This apparent contradiction between finite centres and the community is at the heart 
of Eliot's struggle with Bradleyan philosophy. What seems to perplex Eliot is that the finite 
centre in its isolation may still be said to participate in a community and have a common goal. 
For Eliot, the articulation of this simultaneity holds the key out of solipsism, just as it seems to 
confirm it. So that as soon as he makes concessions to knowledge as communal, that "in 
adjusting our behaviour to that of others and in co-operating with them we come to intend an 
identical world', 321, Eliot cannot help problematizing that very identity. Identity, he argues, 
involves a concept of ideality which cannot claim to apprehend a real world there for 
communal taking. In this Eliot stops short of the idealist pragmatism of Josiah Royce in his 
doctoral thesis. 322 But if Eliot refuses the ideal interpretative community, what alternative is 
320 Eliot's 'The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual' quoted in Manju Jain, T S. Eliot andAmerican Philosophy: 
The Harvard Years (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 145. 
321 KE, p. 143. 
322 Richard Shustcrman is more interested in seeing Eliot's development as an unchecked progress towards the 
ideal pragmatism of his postgraduate tutor Josiah Royce. See Shusterman comparison of Eliot's 'tradition' with 
Royce's 'community of intcrpretants' in chapter 7, part 111, of T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism (London: 
Duckworth, 1988), pp. 165-19 1. 
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there to ensure the coherence of finite centres other than Bradley's negative logic, which is 
increasingly identified with one akin to religious consciousness and mystical experience? 
In The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual', Eliot is rehearsing the problem he will 
develop in his thesis regarding the nature of our memory of past events: the impossibility of 
considering a past event in personal experience as an actuality which can be re-captured in its 
original form. As Bradley puts it in 'The Presuppositions of Critical History: 
The 'original fact' is primarily for history a fallacious inference, and if by the 'original fact' be meant again 
what that fact should have been, still for history this is an inference, the theory of a theory, whose result is a 
double-distilled theory. 323 
This is a statement which Eliot reformulates in his doctoral thesis in the following way: 
We must remember that no view is original or ultimate: when we inquire into the real world, however, we 
mean the world from the view point of finite centres as subjects only, we mean the real world for us now, 
not from the point of view of some further developed mind tracing its ancestors and the world they lived 
in. 324 
We do not understand our actions thinking of what the future would think of ourselves. As 
perceiving subjects, we are trapped in our present as much as events in the past are trapped in 
their own ultimately inaccessible experience of themselves: "my mind", Eliot admits, "is a 
point of view from which I cannot possibly escape (to which indeed I am bound so closely that 
the word escape is without meaning).,, 325 The problem of perception is ultimately a historical 
problem as Eliot makes clear in 'The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual'. But it is also a problem 
of discourse. 
The problem of f mite centres leads Eliot into a theoretical impasse and a 
disillusionment with the discourse of philosophy: "We may easily be overawed by language, 
and attribute to it more philosophic prestige than it really deserves. ', 
326 The paradox between 
individual and communal perception in the context of the interpretation of the past (as 
somebody else's experience) fails to achieve a coherent philosophical articulation. It fails 
323 "Me Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 49. 
324 KE, p. 145. 
325 KE, p. 145. 
326 KE, p. 159. 
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because it requires the impossible task of holding two points of view simultaneously; 
essentially that the world is both objective and subjective: 
The self, we find, seems to depend upon a world which in turn depends upon it; and nowhere, I repeat, can 
we find anything original or ultimate [ ... 
] From one point of view we know that the object exists; but from 
another point of view this is mcre hypothesis. 
327 
One point of view is practical, the other theoretical. Eliot's philosophical conclusions are 
ultimately based on the manipulation of philosophy's discourse rather than on its ideas 
themselves. Gray points out that Eliot's gradual reconciliation with J. G. Frazer's genealogy of 
primitive religions, for instance, lies in the latter's discourse alone; his emphasis on 
presentation rather than interpretation of anthropological facts. This parallels Eliot's insistence 
on a scientific model of style in 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama'328 (Dial, 69, no 5 (Nov. 
1920), [441]-447, also in The Sacred Wood). Elsewhere, Eliot had, in the philosophical paper 
entitled 'Description and Interpretation', contrasted the metaphysics of interpretation with the 
scientific model of description in which he states that the latter must always fall under the 
influence of the former. Gray refers to Eliot's introduction to his mother's Savonarola in 1926, 
where he insisted that "Frazer has withdrawn in more and more cautious abstention from the 
attempt to explain"; here explanation is a by-word for interpretation. Yet Gray is not unaware 
of the apparent contradiction between Eliot's philosophical position in 'Description and 
Interpretation' and this latter statement. How can Eliot show a preference for description over 
explanation, given his early insistence on the lack of an absolute distinction between the 
two? 329 For Gray the answer is simple, it is a deliberate choice to liberate himself from 
Bradley's philosophy whose inevitable solipsism must only find partial solution in a negative 
dialectic. Eliot must move from the negative to the positive method even at the expense of 
philosophical thoroughness. 
330 Gray is perhaps right, which might explain theforced scientific 
327 KE, p. 146 & 159. 
328 "Permanent literature is always a presentation: either a presentation of thought, or a presentation of feeling by 
a statement of events in human action or objects in the external world", 'The Possibility of Poetic Drama', SW, p. 
64-65. 
329 Eliot admitted in Royce's seminar that "description is just as bad as explanation", Josiah Royce's Seminar, 
1913-1914: As Recorded in the Notebooks ofHarry T Costello, Grover Smith ed. (New Brunswick & New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 1963), p. 119. 
330 "It may seem paradoxical, but it is because of Bradley's unrelenting questioning of all assumptions, his 
unremitting scepticism about all presuppositions of meaning and purpose that Eliot is in the end forced to accept 
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style of 77te Sacred Wood that never quite achieves complete conviction. Eliot's commitment to 
science is never very far from metaphysics and belief. As he stated in 'Description and 
Interpretation', the exercise of description can only be made from a position which is not 
merely analytical, but must itself appeal to a metaphysical conviction of its own. This 
conviction must in the end become an interpretation. Eliot's commitment to scientific analysis 
in his early literary criticism can be seen as a way of escape out of this metaphysical 
circularity. 
331 
However much Eliot tries to convince himself about the analytic method, he cannot 
quite stop hearing the echoes of his postgraduate philosophical papers. Costello recalls a 
session at Royce's seminar where Eliot delivered his paper 'The Interpretation of Primitive 
Ritual'. It was the 10h of December 1913: 
The great question is as to what is the status of a supposed fact which includes as part of itself a belief or a 
meaning? How can we be sure we are correctly interpreting the mental life of the savage when the savage 
could not verify our interpretation if we could present it to him, because he could not understand it? 
332 
This objection to the scientific method also ends up undermining Eliot's 'objective correlative' 
because as he put it some six years later in 'Hamlet and his Problems': "we should have to 
understand things which Shakespeare did not understand himself. "333 Eliot is here still pulling 
and tugging over the behaviourist fallacy. 'Ibis fallacy undermines a fundamental scientific 
presumption: that there are facts open to analysis. Eliot's commitment to the scientific approach 
in his early criticism is a desperate effort to overcome this solipsistic objection. 
But Eliot does more than that, he attempts to overcome the problem of scientific 
analysis by participating in the prevailing scientific climate of his time, by becoming, as it 
were, part of the problem. Brian Lee makes an interesting point about Eliot attempt to both 
participate and delimit his involvement in society by playing science and religion against each 
the limited conclusion's of Frazer's formal method and declare them to be a 'positive method"', Piers Gray, T. S. 
Eliot's Intellectual and Poetic Development 1909-1922 (Brighton: Tbc Harvester Press, 1982), p. 134. 
331 This strange contiguity of the sceptical Eliot and Eliot the Royalist, Classicist and Anglo-Catholic is 
vindicated by Jeffrey Perl. He insists that Eliot's preference for analysis "documents the easy passage from Eliot's 
earlier to his later viewpoint and show how the one could be said to fulfil the implication of the other", Skepticism 
and Modern Emnity: Before and After Eliot (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 89. 
332 'Summary of discussion: December 16,1913', Smith, Josiah Royce's Seminar, p. 85. 
333 'Hamlet and His Problems', SW, p. 103. 
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other. He notes that Eliot's 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' "takes its terms ftom modem 
science [. ] rather than religion. However, it is hard to imagine that any 'absolute' of 
'unmediated vision could be fundamentally at one with the final purposes of modem scientific 
method. 99334 Eliot's irony springs from this conflation; not to be confused with a fantastic sense 
of humour or wilful contradiction. Lee adds that Eliot was "at once fighting against and 
reflecting the tendencies of his time [. ] leading to the assumption of masking roles, or 
momentary ventriloquism" as a form of self-preservation that goes with the "failure of 
confidence or nerve even at moments of essential self assertion against the materialist-positivist 
trends of his time. ', 335 The limit of Eliot's faith lies in the scepticism about discourse he inherits 
from Bradley. My claim here is that by rejecting metaphysics, Eliot is ultimately engaging in 
the metaphysical act of sharing a collective faith, even if that faith is in science. It is not 
surprising that Eliot's favouring of Frazer's scientific approach in the introduction to 
Savonarold coincides with his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism in 1926. Eliot embraces his 
primitive consciousness - both explanatory and metaphysical - just as his scientific 
consciousness achieves its apotheosis; at the point where scientific scepticism meets belief. 
This entails reversing, as it were, the evolutionary process from explanation to description 
which he noted in Royce's seminar in 1913: 
The primitive mind has a native craving for explanation, luxuriates in the feeling of explanation. Casual 
explanations tend to go over to the form of relation of universal to particular, and, as the tendency to 
transcend the given continues to diminish, finally explanation is transformed into description. 336 
The difficulty for Eliot, unlike the consciousness of the savage, is that his commitment to his 
own present experience is undermined by critical self-consciousness and its consequent 
skepticism about personal experience as faith which makes a straightforward return to 
primitivism impossible. Edward Lobb would like to argue that this primitivism hides a yearning 
for the naivety, in a Romantic sense, which adopts the mythology of a lost Golden Age . 
337 This 
is to oversimplify the philosophical struggle Eliot is undertaking. He is far too conscious of the 
334 Brian Lee, Theory and Personality: The Significance of T. S. Eliot's Criticism (London: The Athlone Press, 
1979), p. 106. 
335 Lee, p. 108. 
336'Summary of discussion: December 16,1913', Smith, Josiah Royce's Seminar, p. 121. 
337 See Lobb, pp. 45-47. 
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theoretical pitfalls involved in thus articulating the problem. These themes continue in the 
doctoral thesis: 
A science is such because it is able to deal with objects which are all of one type; and the aim of science is to 
deduce reality [ ... 
] to one type of object, and the ultimate type of object I should suppose [ ... 
I to be points 
in a mathematical relation. But physical theories [ ... 
] are apt to end in mystery, inasmuch as the final object 
is often not an object at all [ ... 
] At this point a theory would become metaphysical, passing from one object 
to another; and two types can only be held together by an act of faith. 
338 
The anthropological and historical problem of the interpretation of primitive ritual is an 
extension of a cognitive problem; that of the perception of objects which - like the past and 
other people's minds - are not immediately experienced. Thus Eliot's resolution to the problem 
of the finite centre's solipsism is partly a turn towards the coherence of communities thorough 
outward behaviour, but also a simultaneous emphasis of the importance of personal experience 
- as faith - that holds finite centres together even as they engage in that collective behaviour. It 
confirms the inescapability of the metaphysics of primitive explanation as faith. Ibis 
primitivism needs not be recuperated or historically postulated, it is already here. Eliot exploits 
the metaphysical potential of his analytic training as means to condition the scientific 
paradigms which help him out of Bradley's metaphysical impasse, to arrive finally at faith, so 
that, as he was to note in 'Francis Herbert Bradley' (1927): "scepticism and disillusion are a 
useful equipment for religious understanding.,, 
339 Eliot paradoxically combats scepticism with 
faith in his early criticism, via the descriptive powers of science Eliot encourages himself to 
believe in. Science is, in the process, re-worked through his criticism and increasingly 
thernatized with history and culture which speak for the latent metaphysics which science 
cannot ultimately acknowledge. This is an important shift which has radical consequences for 
Eliot scholarship, as it may appear to legitimise the appearance of prejudice in Eliot's critical 
discourse. One should note, instead, that Eliot's adoption of cultural themes encourage a 
political dimension in his critical rhetoric. If Eliot has to admit increasingly that, whether 
scientific or not, every critical position must acknowledge a point of view, then, he must make 
this point of view explicit; state, to himself and others, where he stands rather than hide behind 
an unsustainable scientific skepticism - itself an ideological position in the end. As he admits 
in 
338KE, p. 162. 
339 'Francis Herbert Bradley', FL4, p. 76. 
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the introduction to The Neel of Fire (193 0): "In my previous skepticism I am quite ready to 
,, 340 
admit the presence of elements of pure prejudice. 
Pragmatism and Faith 
Eliot's central problem is his skeptical awareness that though thought-systems are contingent, 
they are also inescapable. It is what Christopher Ricks calls Eliot's justified skepticism. 
341 
However, I must insist that this justified skepticism, if pragmatic, 342 is insufficient for Eliot. 
In other words, the via media - and perhaps it is here that Eliot begins to leave his early 
fascination with Aristotle - seems a logical impossibility because one cannot hold two points of 
view at the same time. Eliot is clear on this point as he put it in 'Francis Herbert Bradley': 
The lack of [common sense] produces those unbalanced philosophies, such as Behaviourism, of which we 
hear a great deal. A purely 'scientific' philosophy ends by denying what we know to be true; and, on the 
other hand, the great weakness of Pragmatism is that it ends by being of no use to anybody. 
343 
it ends up being of no use to anybody because it is too inclusive to be meaningful to anyone in 
particular, and which, in turn, shows up 'scientific' philosophy. Shusterman overplays the 
influence of pragmatism over Eliot and sometimes seems to ignore Eliot's struggle with his 
teachers when at Harvard - and particularly Josiah Royce, himself not a thorough 
pragmatist344, in the seminar debates of 1913-14. To say, as Shusterman does, that 
340 T. S. Eliot's Introduction to Wilson Knight, The Wheel offire (1930) (London: Methuen, 1962), p. xiii. 
341 Christopher Ricks, T S. Eliot and Prejudice (London: Faber & Faber, 1994), p. 8 1. 
342 1 say this despite Richard Shusterman's conviction that Eliot is, fundamentally, a pragmatist: "Whatever the 
extent to which Eliot formally imbibed pragmatism, it was certainly a philosophy well-suited to his intellectual 
temperament - his characteristic blend of skepticism and belief, and his tough-minded, practical, yet deeply 
devoted attitude toward art, criticism, and even religion", (Richard Shusterman, T S. Eliot and the Philosophy of 
Criticism (London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 193. Shusterman has good reason to say this: he is himself a pragmatist. 
in a sense it is easy to see Eliot as a pragmatist, but to leave it at that is to miss a crucial dimension of his 
intellectual struggle. The problem with pragmatism is that it undermines any possibility of faith, However much 
one may be convinced that to believe is a natural and profitable project, how can one have faith in a system which 
one knows is culturally random? This is indeed a defeatist kind of conviction which is condemned to remain aloof 
from the experience of one's system of belief. 
343 'Francis Herbert Bradley', FLA, p. 84. 
344 Eliot's immediate influence at Harvard is Josiah Royce, who is not thoroughly a pragmatist, being more 
concerned with the idealist implications of pragmatism. This is something Piers Gray seems to suggest in T S. 
Eliot's Intellectual and Poetic Development. An idealism which is in the end counter-pragmatic if it encourages us 
to engage with faith as a felt experience. If one acts upon faith one is not being pragmatic - not consciously 
anyway. And if one is conscious, then everything is pragmatic which is to say "that it ends by being of no use to 
anybody", 'Francis Herbert Bradley', SP, p. 204. Note how Eliot's use of italics parodies Pragmatism's emphasis 
on the term 'use' as practice, which begs the question of the irony inherent in the title of Eliot's The Use ofPoetry 
and the Use of Criticism in 1933. 
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one reason for many of these shifts and one of the most constant and formative factors through his changing 
critical and theoretical pronouncements is the pragmatic impulse, 
345 
is to say not very much at all. 
It is true that Eliot's last paragraph of his thesis appears to open the door to 
Pragmatism: 
If I have insisted on the practical (pragmatic? ) in the constitution and meaning of objects, it is because the 
practical is a practical metaphysic. And this emphasis upon practice - upon the relativity and instrumentality 
of knowledge - is what impels us toward the absolute. 
346 
But if practice is all we can safely count on, Eliot admits, it is not merely as a mechanical or 
Behaviourist enterprise, but one legitimised by something outside itself It is, at least, a 
practical metaphysic. This is, however, still within the paradigms of pragmatism, which admits 
of the practical necessity to do precisely that. Yet it would be a mistake, in the light of the 
development of Eliot's criticism, to call him a pragmatist. Eliot is dissatisfied with the thought 
that there is only a practical need to believe, which in a sense is not believing at all, because the 
contents of our beliefs are not given the practical validity necessary to really believe. They are 
believed, rather, in a way that they are practical; a metaphysical practice rather than a practical 
metaphysics. This ambiguity is exploited at the end of 'The Epistemologist Theory of 
Knowledge (continued)' of Eliot's doctoral thesis in the following way: 
Practice, and this is the difficulty [ ... 
] is shot through with theory, and theory with practice In general 
we may say, nevertheless, that the sharper and more complete the lines, the more theoretical the account; 
and in this way, when we attempt to define practice we get a theory, and a theory may incorporate itself into 
a practice. Hence our theory will be found full of practical motives and practical consequences, and our 
practice will be found to be largely based upon speculation. 347 
Pragmatism is nothing more than a theory of a practice too general to be of any practical use to 
anyone. 
Metaphysics is, for Eliot in the mid-1920s, not just an figurative term for system 
building, but one deeply involved in a particular and literal version of the world of experience 
as expressed by dogma. Whereas scientific exactitude suffers the opposite fate, it becomes just 
a mirage of accurate description too universal to mean anything in particular. This is, for the 
345 Richard Shusterman, Philosophy of Criticism, p. 193. 
346 KE, p. 169. 
347 KE, pp. 137-138. 
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converted Eliot, the false worship of science. As a defence of Lancelot Andrewes's prose style 
Eliot wrote in 1928: 
To persons whose minds are habituated to feed on the vague jargon of our time, when we have a vocabulary 
for everything and exact ideas about nothing - when a word half understood, torn from its place in some 
alien or half-formed science, as of psychology, conceals from both writer and reader the utter 
meaninglessness of a statement, when all dogma is in doubt except the dogmas of sciences of which we have 
read in the newspapers, when the language of theology itself, under the influence of an undisciplined 
mysticism of popular philosophy, tends to become a language of tergiversation - Andrcwes may seem 
pedantic and vcrbal. 
348 
Ibis condemnation of science is already latent in the early criticism of The Sacred Wood, even 
as he seemed, at the time, to endorse it. As we have already noted, in one of his reviews from 
the Athenaeum there included, The Perfect Critic', Eliot was not simply encouraging scientific 
criticism, but re-defining science and showing suspicion of its exact terminology which may 
mean "either nothing at all or something still more exact than anything it suggests to us.,, 
349 In 
a sense the ground is ready from the beginning for the priority reversal between science and 
metaphysics. Philosophy gradually reappears as an inevitably thernatized - both prejudiced and 
metaphysical - language; thernatized, namely, by religion and, consequentially, by politics and 
culture. This thernatization is the inevitable extension of the process of cognition which never 
has its objects directly before consciousness like ideal mathematical equations. This extension 
involves the inclusion of the cultural and metaphysical conditions of belief, not just the purely 
cognitive perception of objects. This line of thought takes Eliot to reverse his allegiance with 
Russell, if there ever had been one. In 'A Commentary' for The Criterion in 1924 we find the 
following statement: 
One is immediately struck by the arrogance of the scientist. No literary man would pretend to sweep aside 
the whole of science of any century with the magnificence with which Mr Russell dismisses nineteenth- 
century literature and art. And the truth seems to us to be the reverse of Mr. Russell's implication. The man 
of letters or the man of 'culture' of the present time is far too easily impressed and overawed by scientific 
knowledge and ability; the aristocracy of culture has abdicated before the demagogy of science. 350 
Eliot may be retrospectively referring to himself as the man of culture of the present time who, 
in his early criticism, was too easily overawed by science. For Eliot, the problem with present 
culture lies in the popular faith in science, rather than in the arts. Although this statement re- 
348 'Lancelot Andrewcs', FLA, p. 24. 
349 'The Perfect Critic', SW, pp. 8-9. 
350 'A Commentary', The Criterion, 2, no 7 (April 1924), p. 233. 
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affirms Eliot's self-conscious cultural immersion in the very same science worshipping culture, 
it also qualifies his participation in it. There is, however, a touch of Arnoldean aloofness in 
Eliot's words; he reserves the responsibility of cultural productions to a literary elite, of which, 
we must assume, Eliot considers himself one as well. 
Just as Eliot moves away from the absolute science of a cognitive criticism of art 
objects, he sometimes appears to overcompensate by proposing an absolute cultural hierarchy. 
As he puts it in the preface to For Lancelot Andrews (1928): 
The general point of view may be described as classicist in literature, royalist in politics, and anglo-catholic 
in religion. 
351 
Once Eliot makes explicit his 'prejudices', he is in dangerous territory. Just like Bradley is 
when he admits that the only way to cohere with others is communally, but only with people 
like us. 
352 But Eliot has leamt his lesson from him. He is careful to condition the statement by 
admitting the presence of prejudice. This involves an attenuated negativity some readers have 
perceived as the rhetorical trademark of his criticism: the pride of excessive humbleness. But 
may be this rhetorical resourcefulness is not his but originates in Bradley: 
And many readers, having in mind Bradley's polemical irony and his obvious zest in using it, his habit of 
discomfiting an opponent with a sudden profession of ignorance, of inability to understand, or of incapacity 
for abstruse thought, have concluded that this is all a mere pose - and even a somewhat unscrupulous one. 
But deeper study of Bradley's mind convinces us that the modesty is real, and his irony the weapon of a 
modest and highly sensitive man. 353 
The question is whether this is a conscious methodology or simply philosophical insecurity; 
such ideological humility may lack the appropriate conviction to carry it through. Does not it 
simply leave him open to the accusation of a latent pragmatism? One is left wondering whether 
Eliot's act of faith ever finds closure, shedding its pyretic self-consciousness. Yet this self- 
consciousness is necessary if one is not to fall into pure prejudice, a conclusion which seems to 
place conviction and affirmation beyond discourse, and gets us into a philosophical vicious 
circle once again. Thus, can Eliot completely reconcile the metaphysics of personal experience 
351 'Preface', FLA, p. ix. 
352 Bradley, 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Collected Essays, 1, p. 19. 
353 'Francis Herbert Bradley', SP, p 196. 
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with the time-bound cultural and dogmatic expression which dictate it? In a sense he does not, 
as he notes in 'Lancelot Andrews': 
To the ordinary cultivated student of civilization the genesis of a Church is of little interest, and at all events 
we must not confound the history of a Church with its spiritual meaning. 
354 
The cultural expression of Church history appears to take second place to its metaphysical 
meaning. Yet he is quick to qualify this dualism, and adds: 
To the ordinary observer the English Church in history means Hooker and Jcr6my Taylor - and should mean 
Andrewcs also: it means George Herbert, and it means the churches of Christopher Wren. This is not an 
error: a Church must be judged by its intellectual fruits, and it must be made real to the eye by 
monuments of artistic merit. 
355 
The cultivated student and the ordinary observer place their emphasis differently - either on 
dogma or practice -, yet Eliot offers a reconciliation of the real and the ideal based on the 
cognitive encounter, where the cultural expression is made real to the eye. This is indeed no 
error, yet there is the whiff of pragmatism about it because of the critical point of view Eliot 
must take to make that very statement. And that is always the catch: that the very intellectual 
effort Eliot makes to reinstate belief in practice undermines that very leap of faith because he 
cannot but encourage it theoretically. This is important because it points to the real struggle in 
Eliot. This is not so much the favouring of one doctrine over another, but the possibility of its 
articulation without exacting the exclusivity which any doctrine must, if believed, carry with it. 
It must be really believed, for otherwise it is no doctrine, but pragmatic belief - where really 
believing means faith. Thus in the early twenties, Eliot's letting cultural themes permeate his 
discourse is tentative. Just as he can see no rhetorical truth that does not claim a culturally 
dogmatic justification, he is still haunted by the inevitable exclusivity it entails. The result is a 
constant balancing act in which Eliot's radical statements of doctrinal and political allegiance 
are counterbalanced by the admission of their relative dependence on cultural variations, taste 
or prejudice. 'Me absoluteness of metaphysics is continually checked by its political nature, yet 
this is something it cannot shed without risking the pragmatist alternative of making the 
political a tenuous allegiance to humanity as a whole. Eliot must once again turn to cognition to 
find a discriminating element to gauge the appropriate relation between the metaphysics and the 
354 'Lancelot Andrewes', FLA, p. 15. 
355 'Lancelot Andrewes', FLA, pp. 15-16. 
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politics. He does this by identifying the political wing of pragmatism with humanism, and the 
discriminating cognitive disposition with emotionalism. 
Metaphysical Politics 
One may compare the following statement from 'The Relationship Between Politics and 
Metaphysics' read before Harvard's Philosophical Club the 24h of October, 1913: 
But when we have dissociated [Lippman's] Bergsonian mctaphysic from his political enthusiasm, I think 
that we will find that the relation between the politics and the philosophy is only emotional, and at least in 
some sense illegitimate, 
356 
with Eliot's later essay 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt' (1928): 
But it is not clear that Mr Babbitt has any other enthusiasm to offer except the enthusiasm for being lifted 
out of one's merely rational self by some enthusiasm. 
357 
In other words, Eliot criticises in Babbitt the promotion of an enthusiasm for rationality which 
is itself irrational. He is not preoccupied as much by this irrationality, however, as by Babbitt's 
failure to acknowledge it. This irrationality is fundamentally an aspect of personal faith; in 
Bradley's terms, the instinct for finding a bad reason for what we believe upon instinct, 
conditioned by the acknowledgement that the finding of a reason is no less an instinct. The 
dualism between the bad reasons of politics and metaphysical instinct is never quite overcome 
by Eliot. And just like Lippman, Babbitt's humanism makes dogma irrational, because "he is 
unable to take the religious view - that is to say he cannot accept any dogma or revelation. 
-358 
The result of this rejection is not a release from the irrationality of dogma, instead - Eliot notes 
in 'The Relationship Between Philosophy and Metaphysics' - Lippman 
has "fallen into the 
most dangerous of all dogmas - the dogma that we must do without dogma', 
359; that is, it 
offers a worse kind of irrationality. Lippman's alliance with Bergson is abhorred by Eliot 
because they encourage in each other the absence of human experience other than personal 
emotions. It takes for granted the experience of the outside and its necessary collective 
organization. It takes it for granted because, for Eliot, these theories rely on the existence of the 
356 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', p. 4. 
357 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt', FL4, p. 137. 
358 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt', FLA, p. 128. 
359 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', p. 11. 
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very belief systems they are trying to do away with and without which they would not even 
reach formulation: 
There is no humanistic habit: humanism is, I think, merely the state of mind of a few persons in a few places 
at a few times. To exist at all, it is dependent upon some other attitude, for it is essentially critical -I would 
even say parasitical. 
360 
This contradiction is exploited further by Eliot in 'The Humanism of Irving 
Babbitt'. He reveals that Humanism and Pragmatism encourage an inner moral check as a 
substitute for external dogma. If dogma is external to the individual, they conclude, so are the 
reasons for holding it. Both the public persona and the external reasons are ruled out by the 
absolute belief in inner reason. Yet Eliot cannot dissociate inner reason from the bad reasons 
for existing according to an outside canon, anything else makes the very idea of society 
impossible: 
The sum of a population of individuals, all ideally and efficiently checking themselves, will never make a 
whole. And if you distinguish so sharply between 'outer' and 'inner' checks as Mr Babbitt does, then there 
is nothing left for the individual to check himself by but his own private notions and his judgement which is 
pretty precarious. 
361 
Eliot is here alluding to his pre-conversion debate with John Middleton Murry about the 
deficiencies of the 'inner voice' in 'The Function of Criticism' (1923): 
For those who obey the inner voice (perhaps 'obey' is not the word) nothing that I can say about criticism 
will have the slightest value. For they will not be interested in the attempt to find any common principles for 
the pursuit of criticism. Why have principles, when one has the inner voice? If I like a thing, that is all I want 
[. 
. .] 
And we can not only like whatever we like to like but we can like it for any reason we chose. We are 
not, in fact, concerned with literary perfection at all - the search for perfection is a sign of pettiness, for it 
shows that the writer has admitted the existence of an unquestioned spiritual authority outside himself, to 
which he has attempted to conform. We are not in fact interested in art. We will not worship Baal. 'The 
principle of classical leadership is that obeisance is made to the office or to the tradition, never to the man. ' 
And we want, not principles, but men. Thus speaks the Inner Voice. 362 
Babbitt's 'inner check' is Murry's 'Inner Voice'. The premise of Eliot's criticism can be found 
in Eliot's paper 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics' and its misgivings about 
pragmatism: "For pragmatism man is the measure of all things. The latter is a 'practical' 
philosophy. You choose a point of view because you like it. -363 Thus Eliot's criticism is 
philosophically aimed at Pragmatism, in politics at Whiggery, and in literature at Romanticism. 
360 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt', FL4, p. 130. 
361 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt', FLI, pp. 135-136. 
362 'The Function of Criticism' (1923), SP, pp. 72-73. 
363 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', p. 21. 
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Overall it is a condemnation of the emotional response as sole guide of judgement. For Eliot, 
without authority all one is left with is the appetites of the inner voice, which hinges on 
meaninglessness. The denial of outside principles inevitably undermines discourse and risks 
solipsism. 
In 'The Function of Criticism' Eliot politicises the cognitive literary criticism of The 
Sacred Wood as a result of his confrontation with Middleton Murry's romanticism. 
364 Eliot's 
classicism is the extension of the cognitive validation of judgement in terms, not only of the 
outside world of objects, but of social structures. Crucially, it initiates Eliot's journey towards 
his conversion in 1926 and his declaration in For Lancelot Andrews (1928) of his Royalism, 
Classicism and Anglo-Catholicism. It is a dramatic - almost intolerant - statement of belief; but 
only intolerant, as we have noted, because Eliot finds that that is the only way of putting it 
without relativizing his views and falling into pragmatism. According to Goldie, however, 
Eliot's dogmatic tone in 'The Function of Criticism' is contextually determined by his debate 
with Murry: 
Manoeuvred into making what amounted to a manifesto for his new classicism Eliot provided an essay 
which marked a major shift away from an emphasis on the free disinterested intelligence of an Aristotle or 
Gourmont delineated in 'The Perfect Critic', towards an espousal of the Hulmean belief that 'men cannot get 
on without giving allegiance to something outside themselves'. 365 
Yet this should not be seen as a major shift: 'The Function of Criticism' simply continues the 
rhetorical experiments Eliot had begun in The Sacred Wood, amounting to a critical shift, but 
only insofar as Eliot deliberately commits himself to putting his money where his criticism is, 
politely speaking. It articulates the cultural expression of Eliot's cognitive premises in The 
Sacred Wood. Eliot is still prioritising the outside world, against which we must measure our 
judgement and, thus, avoid subjective expressions of taste; only that this outside world is not 
just one of universal art objects, but of cultural expression as well. It must be noted, then, that 
Eliot is, in 'The Function of Criticism', still concerned with the impersonal analysis of the work 
of art: 
364 For a detailed account of this confrontation see David Goldie, A Critical Difference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998), pp. 69-127. 
365 Goldie, p. 103. 
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Butfact cannot corrupt taste; it can at worst gratify one taste -a taste for 
history, let us say, or antiques or 
biography 
- under the illusion that it is assisting another. The real corrupters are those who supply opinion 
or fancy-, and Goethe and Coleridge are not guiltless - 
for what is Coleridge's Hamlet: is it an honest inquiry 
as far as the data permit, or is it an attempt to present Coleridge in an attractive costume? 
366 
So if the external reasons for having a particular taste are illusory - are 
bad 
- 
it is better than 
deliberately trying to fulfil a narcissistic fantasy and pass it off for objective opinion. This 
passage echoes almost word for word Eliot's criticism of Coleridge in The Sacred Wood's 
'Hamlet'. 367 For Goldie the move of 'The Function of Criticism' is from critical sensibility to 
critical dogmatism; a shift, in other words, from science to politics. This is because Goldie 
tends to romanticise thefree disinterested intelligence of Eliot's scientific project in 7"he Sacred 
Wood. In a sense Eliot's scientific approach in 'The Perfect Critic' is already dogmatic because 
it seeks out the absolute critical statement through scientific exactitude. Although, one must 
add, it is a scientific approach whose dogmatism Eliot tries to attenuate by suppressing an 
unholy alliance between metaphysics and culture just as he was proposing in 'The Relationship 
Between Metaphysics and Politics'. And what is better to avoid this alliance than simply 
leaving them out? This suppression, by both condemning the cultural over-dependence and 
metaphysical postulation of the artist, characterizes Eliot's battle to stay free and disinterested 
in The Sacred Wood, but which in the end amounts to a pragmatic pose of detachment only the 
more cleverly disguised; a pose which is gradually weighed down and eventually dropped. 'The 
Function of Criticism' opens the flood-gates of the politics latent in The Sacred Wood by 
admitting that the cognitive priority of the external world of objects is itself a political 
statement about the importance of external authority. The latent politics within the cognitive 
criticism of Eliot's criticism of the late 1910s are, perhaps, more apparent in Eliot's review of 
George Wyndham's Essays in Romantic Literature ('A Romantic Patrician, Athenaeum, 4644 
(May 2,1919), 265-7, included in The Sacred Wood as 'A Romantic Aristocrat). Here Eliot is 
only with great pains separating the politics from his criticism of Romanticism: 
There may be a good deal to be said for Romanticism in life, there is no place for it in letters. Not that we 
need conclude that a man of George Wyndham's antecedents and traditions must inevitably be a Romanticist 
366 'The Function of Criticism', SP, p. 76. 
367 "rhese minds often find in Hamlet a vicarious existence for their own artistic realisation. Such a mind had 
Goethe, who made of Hamlet a Werther; and such had Coleridge, who made of Hamlet a Coleridge [ ... 
] The kind 
of criticism Goethe and Coleridge produced, in writing of Hamlet, is the most misleading kind possible, ' 'Hamlet 
and His Problems', SW, p. 95. 
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writer. But this is the case when such a man plants himself firmly in his awareness of caste, whcn he says 
The gentry must not abdicate. " In politics this may an admirable formula. It will not do in literature. 
368 
Here we have somebody who sounds like a Tory yet misspends his literature in fantastic flights 
of the imagination: as a romantic aristocrat Wyndham unhappily mixes his politics with his 
writing Eliot concludes. Yet a closer look reveals that it is not the complete separation between 
politics and literature that it is at stake. 'Me politics are not the problem, nor is Romantic 
literature, but the mismatch between the two. No guilty parties? Let's look closer. Though the 
tone of political aloofness is what wants to prevail in this review, the reader feels the 
underground tremor of a political voice waiting to explode. It sounds like the voice of the Tory 
party whip ironically telling an idiosyncratic member to get serious so as not to confuse the 
politics with his private pursuits, that if he likes to write he is sure it is in the best taste. Eliot 
ironically puts it the other way round - blames the politics for the bad writing - but the 
scolding has the same objective of singling out the Romantic writing rather than the Tory 
politics. This latent political allegiance of literature is spelt out in For Lancelot Andrews (1928) 
when romanticism and classicism become politically loaded literary terms. 'Me process starts 
earlier, though, in 'The Function of Criticism' (1923). 
'The Function of Criticism' makes concessions to dogma without attributing to the 
politics any as yet automatic metaphysical validation, which it is still resisting. This is the 
intention behind the conclusion of the essay: 
For the kinds of critical works which we have admitted, there is the possibility of co-operative activity, with 
the further possibility of arriving at something outside ourselves, which may provisionally be called truth. 
But if anyone complains that I have not defined truth, or fact, or reality, I can only say apologetically that it 
was no part of my purpose to do so, but only to find a scheme into which, whatever they are, they will fit, if 
they exist. 369 
This signalling automatically qualifies Eliot's dogmatism. Eliot is not saying that political co- 
operative activity automatically makes a truth; that would be a relative truth. Instead, he 
emphasizes the importance of collectively - implying politically - going about the business of 
metaphysical truth in a way that the isolated ego cannot be expected to, if, that is, there is such 
a thing as truth. For if it is anywhere metaphysics lies outside; the truth is out there. This final if 
they exist takes Eliot's conviction to the edge, by paradoxically suggesting that there may not 
368 'Imperfect Critics: A Romantic Aristocrat', SW, p. 32. 
369 'The Function of Criticism', SP, p. 76. 
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be metaphysical truths but that, if they exist, this would be the way to apprehend them. This 
doubt attenuates the dogmatism of 'The Function of Criticism' just as it makes his conviction 
almost impossible. Eliot's struggle at this point is about the ways of articulating this conviction 
without either sounding fanatical on the one hand or pragmatically undermining the possibility 
of the conviction - faith - on the other. 
Souls and Personality 
Eliot's critical shift in "The Function of Criticism' is one of commitment. It is the final assault 
on the pragmatic safety net of justified scepticism. Admittedly, there is much of the ideal 
pragmatism of Royce's community of interpretants in Eliot's stress on external authority, yet 
Eliot goes further, and against pragmatism, he hints at the necessity of absolute truth; that truth 
is not a social construct, but rather it is inevitably linked to its external expression: "if you find 
that you have to imagine it as outside, then it is outside,,, 370 he adds in The Function of 
Criticism'. Externality is a cognitive imperative that needs not be re-interpreted as a projection 
of the individual's inner reason, but acts, rather, as a natural corrective against subjectivism. 
There is still, then, a pragmatic self-consciousness just as Eliot attempts to reach that point of 
theoretical suspension of disbelief, which in practice amounts to faith. Yet that self- 
consciousness is increasingly kept to a minimum. In the end the problem lies in the fact that 
even if authority is external to the individual it has to be experienced personally, it is this 
personal experience which goes temporarily unaccounted for in 'The Function of Criticism'. 
In 'The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual', written between 1913 and 1914, Eliot 
had concluded that no account of human experience can be purely social - or Behaviourist. 
The 
significance of 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt' (1928) is that it begins to exploit the role of 
personal experience he had left open in the account of external authority in 'The Function of 
Criticism'. It is a return to the concerns of the earlier seminar paper. 'The Humanism of Irving 
Babbitt' not only sets the extent to which externality is the ground for meaning but admits that: 
370'The Function of Criticism', SP, p. 71. 
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Given the most highly organized and temporally powerful hierarchy, with all the powers of inquisition and 
punishment imaginable, still the idea of religion is the inner control - the appeal not to man's behaviour 
but 
to his soul. 
371 
Eliot's stress on the external does not over-ride personal experience, or the obliteration of 
personality. It implies a particular form of internal mechanism that avoids pure subjectivism 
and solipsism. These are the ultimate consequences of Babbitt's Humanism, Middleton Murry's 
Romanticism, and Pragmatism in general. This concern is already central to Eliot at the time of 
his thesis as he states in the chapter entitled 'Solipsism': 
The more of a personality [the soul is], the more harmonious and self contained, the more definitely it is said 
to possess a 'point of view', a point of view towards the social world. 
372 
Note that here personality stands for the individuation of the soul in-the-world - its political 
expression. This is statement which predates and conditions Eliot's attack on personality and 
the theory of the substantial theory of the soul in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' in 1919. 
In his thesis Eliot considers that if individual faith is the glue of collective coherence, 
personality is its inevitable expression. Also, in 'The Relationship Between Politics and 
Metaphysics', written while he was putting together his thesis, personality appears in a similar 
fashion as the connecting tissue between politics and metaphysics. Eliot concludes the paper 
thus: 
For our attitude in [Metaphysics and Politics] should lead to the expression of personality, and the greater 
the personality the closer will be the bond. 373 
In may seem contradictory to present Eliot's position in the first half of the 1910s, as one 
encouraging personality, given Eliot's later theory of impersonality. But, as we have argued 
above, in the light of Bradley's theory of finite centres, impersonality can be re-interpreted as a 
theory of radical personality: the personality of the non-political and non-cultural individual 
nervous system. 
374 
Impersonality does not so much encourage total self-effacement but a partial 
depersonalisation. What is left is an embodied existence which stresses the primacy of 
371 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt', FL4, p. 136. 
372 KE, p. 148. 
373 'Tbe Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', p. 23. 
374 See Chapter 2, 'Impersonality and the Frontier of Metaphysics'. 
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uncontaminated sense experience to be contrasted with the sort of personality he attacks in 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent': 
The point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the 
substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a "personality" to express, but a 
particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences 
combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. 
375 
In The Sacred Wood, personality approaches the same metaphysical concession to the existence 
of a universal content of the self which was traditionally claimed by the soul. Only with 
difficulty is this universal content reconciled with the embodied existence of the self in the 
world and with the empirical method of Eliot's early literary criticism. This attack is aimed at 
the unscrutinized legitimization of personal opinions, as if their objectivity could be assured 
through the transcendental presence of the soul in the body. Instead Eliot offers us an 
alternative: the objectivity of personal opinions relies on the uncontaminated passage of 
experiences through our physical bodies. What matters is that we are a body inhabiting a world 
of objects, and there our personal individuation begins and stops. This worldly habitation does 
not deny the personal experience of the self, but it radicalizes the primacy of its experiential 
embodied existence as a means to ensure its objectivity. This approach illustrates the scientific 
purism of The Sacred Wood, but which remains an incomplete expression of the sort of 
personal experience Eliot is struggling to articulate by the mid-1920s. The theory of 
impersonality implies a minimum common denominator in the personal experience of the 
world - which may mirror Bradley's historical call for the "minimum of fact in general.,, 
376 
Yet, Eliot does not allow it to speak for itself for fear that that denominator might not be so 
common after all. The first step is to give it as universal a name as possible before one can 
begin to use the dogma-laden term, soul, to refer to a non-subjective inner check and 
meaningfully apply it to, what is for Eliot, the real goal: access to the inner core of personal 
experience in order "to appeal not to man's behaviour but to his soul.,, 
377 The term Eliot seeks 
out is universal indeed; it is nietaphysics. The trick, as we shall see in the next chapter, is to 
375 'Tradition and the Individual talent', SW, p. 56. 
376 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, Collected Essays, p. 13. 
377 'The Humanism of Irving Babbitt', FL4, p. 136. 
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politicize the term without undermining its comprehensiveness; soul refers both to universality 
and individuation in personal experience, eternity and temporality in history. 
135 
Chapter 4: 
Towards the Articulation of Culture: Personal Experience and Metaphvsical Definitions 
The acknowledgement of culture and metaphysics in Eliot's literary criticism becomes 
imperative just as the theory of impersonality proves incomplete and science reductive as a 
critical tool. This chapter will focus on the critical shift from The Sacred Wood to the essays 
immediately following its publication, namely 'The Metaphysical Poets' and 'Andrew Marvell' 
in 1921. This shift involves the attempt to articulate impersonality as a personal experience; the 
awareness that impersonality amounts to a particular kind of experience within the subject. 
Impersonality is a negative critical expression that defies the scientific presentation of 
experience it promises; it illustrates precisely what personality is not. This negativity is 
symptomatic of a metaphysical problem Eliot is deferring; that however scientific our 
approach, there are aspects of cognition which are not empirically available for us. This 
shortcoming becomes apparent when we consider perception as both privately experienced and 
culturally mediated. Science mediates experience but cannot be said to account for experience 
as privately felt because people do not experience scientifically, we experience belief. 
This inherent parallelism between science and belief begins to re-define the personal 
cognitive experience promoted by the theory of impersonality. It implies that perception is not 
limited to ordinary objects alone, hence not strictly scientific, but it includes the worldview 
contained in the world of objects one inhabits. Science becomes the only adequate medium to 
substitute philosophy in an skeptical world where beliefs are no longer perceived, just as 
science becomes something else in Eliot's critical discourse, "something rarely found among 
scientists except in fragments.,, 
378 
Science cannot stay within the empirical paradigm because all presentation of facts 
involves mediation not pertaining to the facts alone, as Bradley noted in his theory of 
immediate experience; that the presentation of facts can only be grounded upon negativity. 
Seeing is already seeing more and beyond what is contained within our immediate perceptual 
378 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 13. 
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horizon. Given this conclusion Eliot explores the critical visualisation of that which remains the 
latent implied in all perception. He does this by exploring the personal experience implied in 
his theory of impersonality, particularly the importance and limits of its cultural mediation. 
Eliot expands his discourse to make this exploration possible; this expansion involves a gradual 
exorcism of Bradleyan negativity on which he relies, consciously or unconsciously, to maintain 
the scientific mirage of critical exactitude. I will argue that his interest in the Metaphysical 
poets amounts to the critical visualisation of metaphysics, evidenced in Eliot's indecision over 
the adequacy of the label 'Metaphysical' for these poets. 
Blake and the Personality of Impersonality 
Eliot's inability to reconcile tradition and the individual talent in The Sacred Wood is due 
mainly to his reluctance to state what exactly is personal experience; the extent to which artistic 
originality is impersonally inherited and personally created. Impersonality is, after all, a 
dynamic term whose meaning fluctuates between the affirmation of personality and its 
effacement; or, more interestingly, "neither personality nor impersonality is the fundamental 
,, 379 conception. The difficulty with these two terms is that they do not imply an antithesis. In 
'Blake' (first published as The Naked Man', a review of William Blake the Man by Charles 
Gardener, Athenaeum, 4685 (February 13,1920), 208-9, later included in The Sacred Wood) 
impersonality is something to be avoided when it represents the passive imitation of cultural 
ready-mades: 
It is important that the artist should be highly educated in his own art; but his education is one that is 
hindered rather than helped by the ordinary processes of society which constitute education for the ordinary 
man. For these processes consist largely in the acquisition of impersonal ideas which obscure what we really 
are and feel, what we really want, and what really excites our interest. 
380 
Ordinary culture is, in this last quotation, too impersonal for the poet to express himself. 
-[bough this may sound inconsistent with Eliot's use of the term in 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent', it helps to set the limits of what impersonality is; and it is about the 
continual self-sacrifice and extinction of personality, but, as Brian Lee notes, "for the sacrifice 
379 Brian Lee, Theory and Impersonality: The Significance of T. S. Eliot's Criticism (London: The Athlone Press, 
1972), P. 65. 
380 'Blake', SW, p. 154. 
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to continue the self must persiSt.,, 
381 
What this persistence of self or personality is, Eliot is 
unable to define positively. Instead Eliot plays personality and impersonality against each other 
to evoke a yet undefined quality of personal experience. 
Impersonality overcompensates when it refers to cultural over-dependence, and it 
fulfils itself when it acts as a check against the emotional over-indulgence of the individual 
personality; thus, personality is not itself bad. Rather, I would argue, it is, in Eliot's early 
criticism, involved in a process of redefinition for which its previous semantic dislocation is 
required: that is the role of impersonality. Lee notes, 
The idea of personality is semantically precedent even if, admittedly, the case is not quite the same as for 
good and bad, where the words, the 'concepts', arc cntirel y dependent, and therefore of equal weight (except 
insofar as good is valued more highly). You cannot have too much good, or too little bad. But we do say that 
someone has too much personality (as also cleverness) or is too impersonal: both conceptions contain the 
possibility of a negative, whereas good and bad don't. 
382 
The good and bad implications of impersonality and personality are not stated, yet are implied 
as a point of reference which is gradually defeated. Both options, in fact, fall into 
philosophically deficient positions, either a social construction of truth or subjective idealism. 
Yet the implication is that both are necessary, that, in the case of culture, "it is important that 
the artist should be highly educated in his own art' 'but not to the extent of being hindered by it. 
In The Sacred Wood, Eliot is more worried about solving the problem of subjectivism than that 
of culture, hence his theory of 
impersonality generally refers to the perceptions of objects - this 
had been, after all, one of the main subjects of his doctoral thesis - and sticks to a scientific 
tone. 
383 Culture, at this early stage, is simply left out of the cognitive equation; there lies if only 
provisionally, impersonality, which 
in effect implies the radicalization of personal perception at 
the expense of cultural contexts. To achieve this Eliot strips the cultural self to its bare 
physiological underwear. Thus 
Massinger fails because he "was not guided by direct 
381 Lee, p. 48. 
382 Lee, p. 66. 
383 "Extinction goes with 'depersonalization', process', 'define', 'digest', 'material', 'elements', 'added to', 'use, 
$obtained by', 'suspension', 'receptacle', 'unite', 'Compound', 'pressure, 'employs, and of course (the germ of it 
all) 'catalyst', and so on. In such a context words which come from, or can easily be used in other contexts take on 
a tinge from the whole - even 'use' becomes scientific use", Lee, p. 49. 
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communication through the nerves-384 and Tennyson "is a very fair example of a poet almost 
wholly encrusted with parasitic opinion, almost wholly merged into his environment.,, 
385 
But Eliot's Blake has the opposite problem, in that "he approached everything with 
a mind unclouded by current opinions.,, 
386 This is a step too far, so where Blake would seem 
the ideal illustration of cultural impersonality, Eliot has to defend him against the opposite 
problem: occultism as alleged by M. Berger in William Blake: Mysticisme et Poesie. 'Mus Eliot 
qualifies his defence of cultural impersonality; he finds Blake's automatic writing ultimately 
suspicious: 
The idea, of course, simply comes, but upon arrival it is subjected to prolonged manipulation. In the first 
phase Blake is concerned with verbal beauty-, in the second he becomes the apparent nalf, really the mature 
intelligence. It is only when the ideas become more automatic, come more freely and are less manipulated, 
that we begin to suspect their origin, to suspect that they spring from a shallower source. 
387 
The impersonal core of cognition must be "subjected to prolonged manipulation" with a little 
thought, which are inevitably linked to thought-systems which must have a cultural source. 
Blake's impersonality proves too personal in terms of the very cultural detachment it illustrates. 
Eliot must then argue that Blake requires a framework to allow for the ordering of his vision 
without saying, as far as he can, that this framework is provided by culture. Eliot conditionally 
adds that "we are not really so remote from the Continent, or from our own past, as to be 
deprived of the advantages of culture if we wish them.,, 
388 However, Eliot does not elaborate 
what this cultural advantages might be. In The Sacred Wood Eliot seems more 
interested in 
seeing how far he gets without it. 
Culture is problematic because a discussion of culture alters the scientific tone Eliot 
was trying to maintain in the 1910s: the proposition that there is an empirical ground on which 
to reconcile different points of view. 'Blake' makes this exclusion problematic precisely 
because what the poet requires is cultural compensations for his excessive subjectivism. 
Blake's ideas simply come through perception, yet, Eliot admits, they must be tampered with to 
384 'Philip Massinger', SW, p. 136. 
3 85 'Blake', SW, p. 154. 
386 'Blake', SW, p. 155. 
387 'Blake', SW, pp. 153-54. 
388 'Blake', SW, p. 156. 
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achieve intelligible articulation. 'Mis tampering is a cultural imperative that Eliot evokes 
through the more neutral concept of thought, meaning the 'educated' element which stops 
cognition from becoming merely "a hallucinated vision., '3 
89 
Just like Eliot offers thought instead of culture, it gradually finds a further synonym 
in 'philosophy', which, in due course, becomes an acceptable substitute for culture, and which 
attenuates the relativist connotations of the latter. For Eliot the strength of Dante's Trecento, as 
a historical epoch, lies precisely in the way philosophy is immersed in the culture. So much so 
that philosophy becomes part of the cognitive environment the self perceives; not as cultural 
identity, but as an additional object of contemplation among others which can be impersonally 
perceived. Without this cognitive check, Blake ends up "indulging in a philosophy of his 
own. ', 
390 His impersonality collapses into personal visions, as his perception lacks an 
organizing principle not provided by the world he is looking at. Eliot concludes: 
Had [Blake's gifts] been controlled by a respect for impersonal reason, for common sense, for the objectivity 
of science, it would have been better for him. 
391 
The implication is that in the absence of an integrated culture - as Eliot thinks it is the case in 
the early 20'h-century - one must rely on scientific philosophy instead to provide for a ground 
to frame one's cognitive encounter with the world. Science reveals itself as a presupposition ot 
reducible to the self-evidence of the empirical world, but a cultural variation on its own right. 
Eliot's temptation, however, is to measure the success of Dante's perceived 
philosophy in the impersonal terms of cognition and refuse its metaphysical implications. This 
is the subtext of Eliot's proposal in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', to "halt at the frontier 
of metaphysics or mysticism,, 
392. There is, however, the suspicion that in a culturally 
integrated world, such as Dante's, this halting would be unnecessary. He adds in 'Blake': 
We may speculate, for amusement, whether it would have been beneficial to the north of Europe generally, 
and to Britain in particular, to have had a more continuous religious history. The local divinities of Italy 
were not wholly exterminated by Christianity, and they were not reduced to the dwarfish fate which fell 
3 89 'Blake', SW, p. 15 7. 
390 'Blake', SW, p. 158. 
391 'Blake', SW, p. 157. 
392 'Tradition and Individual Talent', SW, p. 59. 
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upon our trolls and pixies. The latter, with the major Saxon deities, were perhaps no great loss in themselves, 
but they left an empty place; and one remarks about the Puritan mythology an historical thinness. 
393 
This amused speculation is very serious indeed, for Eliot cannot help himself fantasising about 
what could have been in the full knowledge that what matters is what is, whether we like it or 
not. It indicates that Blake would have been better off having been born into a cognitive habit 
of mind validated from the outside by a continuous religious history, instead of being left to 
develop his own private philosophy. This subjective turn is blamed squarely on the poverty of 
Puritan mythology, which fails to offer a collectively shared cultural vision. 
394 In its absence, 
Blake would have done better to let himself be controlled "by a respect for impersonal reason, 
for common sense, for the objectivity of science". Thus stated, however, science is a corrective, 
rather than a permanent solution. 
The Metaphysical Poets and Culture 
The importance of 'The Metaphysical Poets' (1921) is one of mediation between culture and 
objective criticism. It allows Eliot to let culture articulate his impersonal theory of art and, thus, 
gradually shed the scientific tone. 
The Metaphysical poets inhabit a historical epoch with which Eliot can identify 
because, like him, they are considered difficult poets and represent a break with the immediate 
literary past: Elizabethan pastoral stands for Victorian romanticism. The appeal becomes more 
poignant for Eliot if we consider H. J. C. Grierson's words on one of the biggest representatives 
of Metaphysical poetry: 
Donne, the most thoughtful and imaginative of them all, is more aware of disintegration than of 
comprehensive harmony, of the clash between the older physics and metaphysics onthe one hand and the 
new science of Copernicus and Galileo and Vesalius and Bacon on the other. "' 
There is, here, an uncanny resemblance to the picture of Eliot we have drawn so far. It is, 
besides, the perfect place to apply the historical sense of rejecting a simple surrender to 
393 'Blakc; SfY, p. 157. 
394 Eliot's view on English religious history manages to salvage more in 1927, after his conversion, than in 1920. 
The mythological lack can be compensated by alternative intellectual fruits open to collective perception. 
395 H. J. C. Gricrson's 'Metaphysical Poetry' in Seventeenth Century English Poetry, Modem Essays in Criticism, 
William R. Keast ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 4. Eliot had read and reviewed this book in his 
'The Metaphysical Poets' (Times Literary Supplement, 1031 (Oct. 20,1921), [669]-670). 
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previous history while still claiming a line of artistic ancestry as Eliot was doing in 'Tradition 
and the Individual Talent'. We can analyse them, as it were, because we can see the poetical 
and cultural stitching with a sense of relevance to our own present; that is, not so much to try to 
contextualize seventeenth-century poetry in its own historical present, but find a common 
struggle that brings the present and the past together. Eliot makes this distinction in 'Ben 
Jonson', where he tells us that. 
to see him as a contemporary does not require so much the power of putting ourselves in seventeenth- 
century London as it requires the power of setting Jonson in our London. 396 
This is helpful for Eliot because it brings forth the separation between the poetic universal 
function and the cultural setting of the poets, just as it problematizes their relation. 
The question about the currency of Metaphysical poetry, the question of who is a 
Metaphysical in seventeenth-century poetry, is the difficulty with this type of poetry, but it is 
precisely the sort of historical and poetic difficulty Eliot is interested in: "To what extent the 
so-called metaphysicals formed a school (in our own time we would say a 'movement'), and 
how far this so-called school or movement is a digression from the main current.,, 
397 As Eliot 
put it in 'Andrew Marvell', who Grierson lists as having written some Metaphysical poems: 
This virtue of wit is not a peculiar quality of minor poets, or of the minor poets of one age or one school; it is 
an intellectual quality which perhaps only becomes noticeable by itself, in the work of lesser poets. 398 
Eliot is wandering whether Marvell is a Metaphysical, and whether his use of wit makes him 
so. He is careful not to undermine the importance of reducing wit to a quality perceivable in 
'lesser' poets. The extract above recalls Eliot's introductory comments to The Sacred Wood, 
where he indirectly praises the 'second-order mind' for providing the current of cultural ideas 
necessary for the creation of major poetry. 
399 Eliot's preference for the incomplete work of art, 
the lesser poet, is already symptomatic of his awareness of the importance of ordinary cultural 
participation, as opposed to the atemporal idealization of great works of art whose mechanism 
396 'Ben Jonson', SW, p. 106. 
397 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 59. 
398 'Andrew Marvell', SP, p. 17 1. 
399 "1 do not say "second-rate", the word is too derogatory", 'Introduction', SW, p. xiv. 
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and exemplum are more difficult to discern. Eliot added in the introduction to 71e Sacred 
Wood: 
It is a perpetual heresy of English culture to believe that only the first-order mind, the Genius, the Great 
Man, matters; that he is solitary, and produced best in the least favourable environment, perhaps the Public 
School. 400 
It is perhaps worth considering whether the Metaphysicals were indeed lesser poets in the sense 
of being part of a popular literary front more culturally in touch or representative of their time. 
The point here is to wonder whether lesser means popular. They were popular, but among a 
minority for they were difficult to the ordinary reader and, on the whole, did not publish their 
work but passed it on through manuscript copies. J. B. Leishman notes: 
Contemporary allusions to [Donne's] poetry are few and far between, and even quite advanced men seem to 
have remained ignorant of it for an incredibly long time. In the various miscellanies published between 1640 
and 1660, whose contents seem to have been derived partly from printed texts and partly from manuscript 
commonplace books, and which may be regarded as reflecting fairly accurately the taste of the average 
cultivated gentleman of the time of Charles 1, both the number of Donne's poems included and any obvious 
traces of his influence arc remarkably small. 
401 
So, Donne belonged to a minority: it was coterie poetry. Yet, Leishman adds, "it is almost 
impossible to know just how far the coterie extended, whom it included, who, so to speak, were 
in the inner circle and who were merely on the fringe", furthermore, "the task of generalizing 
about seventeenth-century poetry, seventeenth-century taste, and seventeenth-century 
, A02 sensibility seems almost impossible. Grierson deals with this problem by referring to 
Metaphysical poetry, rather than poets; his anthology groups poems by genre - 'Love Poems, 
'Divine Poems' and 'Miscellanies' - not according to the identity of the poet, even if the poet's 
name appears as subheadings within each of the three sections. Eliot is more daring; though he 
accepts Grierson's anthology, he would like to justify the term 'metaphysical' in other ways 
than simply as a stylistic way of grouping poems from the seventeenth-century, to give to 
46nietaphysical", that is, a historical function. 
403 'The Metaphysical Poets' attempts to resolve 
400 'Introduction', SW, pp. xiv-xv. 
401 J. B. Leishman's 'Donne and Sevcnteenth-Century Poetry' in Seventeenth Century English Poetry, Modern 
Essays in Criticism, William R. Keast ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 91. 
402 Leishman, p. 92. 
403 In the Clark Lectures (1926) he noted that Metaphysical poetry must be understood in two senses: "as the 
subject of my definition - because we must assume that every term is susceptible of definition - and as the 
collective title of the group of poets in question, and whom I shall take for convenience and also because I give the 
selection my full assent, to be those poets represented in Professor Grierson's admirable and almost impeccable 
anthology", Lecture I [On the Definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 61. 
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the tension between the historically particular - the individual - and the universal poetic 
function - the Tradition -, where the latter concept begins to mean more, 
in his literary 
criticism, than an idealized literary realm as it begins to seek ordinary cultural legitimization. 
Richard Shusterman describes this development in Eliot's literary criticism as a turn 
towards Josiah Royce's consensual theory of truth: 
When Eliot first turned to literary criticism, and the pragmatic idealism of his doctoral thesis gave way to a 
more robustly critical stance, the idea of consensual objectivity was still operative in his themes of tradition 
and 'the common pursuit', though temporarily overshadowed by a realist correspondence model of 
objectivity. Eliot's subsequent literary theory displays an increasing and manifold dependence on the idea of 
consensus. Its community serves as a necessary precondition and, to some extent, also a measure or goal of 
good literature. 
404 
Shusterman is sensitive to Eliot's development, yet he is a little over-confident about Eliot's 
incorporation of the idea of a 'community of consensus' as the necessary precondition for the 
production of good literature. It is true that Eliot's idea of Tradition as an ideal order of objects 
of art is being modified, as the trans-historical realm of literary tradition is increasingly re- 
considered subject to the societal peculiarities of each time. Yet this is not to say that his 
interest in the individual talent has diminished. Eliot's cognitive concern persists through his 
unwillingness to concede that the world is purely a social construction; this concern translates 
into a continuing need to understand truth, however culturally dependent, as a personal 
experience and not just as a behaviourist straightjacket. 
There is a difference of quality between both 'Blake' and 'Philip Massinger' in The 
Sacred Wood (1920) in comparison to 'Andrew Marvell' (TLS, 1002 (March 31,1921), [201 ]- 
202) and 'The Metaphysical Poets' (TLS, 1031 (October 20,1021), [6691-670), though not so 
much in content as in style. Eliot is still struggling to articulate the historical transcendence of 
finite experience. In The Sacred Wood Eliot blames Philip Massinger for cultural over-dressing 
and Blake for indecency; now, in 'The Metaphysical Poets' and 'Andrew Marvell', Eliot does 
more than offer the transparency of the Emperor's new clothes. Instead of bearing the neural 
core of personality Eliot begins to dress it up with historical fashions. He is prepared to pin 
point the features which illustrate poetic success and he does this at the self-conscious risk of 
404 Richard Shusterman, T S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism (London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 172. 
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subjecting art to convention. But he is ready for this eventuality. 
Eliot's definition of 
Metaphysical poetry, after all, relies on a poetic device, the 'conceit, 
405, and a rhetorical 
feature, 'wit', which as yet defy historical location: 
it is more than a technical accomplishment, or the vocabulary and syntax of an cpoch; it is, what we have 
designed tentatively as wit, a tough reasonableness beneath the slight lyric grace. 
406 
This is hardly a definition. It refuses a particular cultural identity which is only vaguely evoked. 
Yet Eliot is prepared to go further: 'wit' has, in Marvell, an indefinite but clear cultural rooting: 
Wit is not a quality that we are accustomed to associate with 'Puritan' literature, with Milton and with 
Marvell [ ... 
] And, on the other hand, the sense in which a man like Marvell is a 'Puritan' is restricted [ ... 
] 
Being men of education and culture, even of travel, some of them were exposed to that spirit of the age 
which was coming to be the French spirit of the age [ ... 
] Marvell, therefore, more a man of the century than 
a Puritan, speaks more clearly and unequivocally with the voice of his literary age than does Milton. 
407 
'Wit' is not as particular as being 'Puritan' but definitely present in "men of education and 
culture". Here we see Eliot not so much dismissing the historical detail of the seventeenth- 
century but re-defining it. It is a conscious attempt at accessing the personal experience which 
is now hiding just beneath the surface of historical epochs. This personal experience refers to 
the cognitive immediacy of the poet to his historical surroundings, strengthened by a historical 
impersonality that ensures the impartiality of the cognitive act. The right combination of 
cognitive personality and historical impersonality is what Philip Massinger 
is lacking. In effect, 
in this poet these roles are inverted408. On the other hand Andrew Marvell's historical 
impersonality is evoked by Eliot's use of phrases such as spirit of the age and literary age, 
rather than the more reductive implications of the term 'Puritan', which, however, put a 
question mark about Marvell's being a clear cut Metaphysical poet. This use of terminology 
405 "Donne, and often Cowley, employ a device which is sometimes considered characteristically 'metaphysical'; 
the elaboration (contrasted with the condensation) of a figure of speech to the furthest stage to which ingenuity can 
carry if', 'The Metaphysical Poets, SP, p. 60. 
406 'Andrew Marvell', SP, p. 162. 
407 'Andrew Marvell', SP, pp. 162-3. 
408 This social locked-in syndrome is akin to Prufrock's. His etherised sense experience is symptomatic of his 
being a prisoner of salon manners in a somnambulist state on passive call to play the scene, no matter how 
insightful his social perception might be: 
"No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be 
Am an attendant lord, one that will do 
To swell a progress, start a scene or two, 
Advice the prince; no doubt an easy tool, 
Deferential, glad to be of use .. ." 
'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock', The Waste Land and Other Poems (London: Faber and Faber, 198 8), p. 14. 
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attempts to refer to a core characteristic of time, where time meets the timeless, where one 
place meets another - Britain meets France hence Europe, and perhaps the world. In short, that 
junction where the individual exists. Marvell is a man-of-his-time who has tapped into 
universality through the spirit of his cultural epoch. 'Ibus the poet's particular cultural identity 
(i. e. Puritanism), though present, is attenuated; it is universalised through its very historical 
finitude. Marvell is historically detached, not severed, yet cognitively engaged in his being 
there. 
From the point of view of criticism, Eliot had made some pertinent comments about 
this equilibrium between historical situatedness and objective detachment in his review of 
Literary Studies by Charles Whibley published as 'The Local Flavour' (Athenaeum, 4676 
(December 12,1919), 1332-3, later published in The Sacred Wood under the heading 
'Imperfect Critics'). Eliot praises Whibley's partial critical virtue of being able to offer the 
reader, not a selection of the best literature "by pointing out the most intense in various kinds 
and separating it from the accidents of environment", but "to communicate a taste for the period 
- and for the 
best of that period in so far as it is of that period. 'A09 Yet, having said this, for 
Eliot, Whibley remains an imperfect critic because he cannot synthesize these two dimensions: 
"For the critic needs to be able not only to saturate himself in the spirit and the fashion of a 
time - the local flavour - but also to separate 
himself suddenly from it in appreciation of the 
highest creative work. "410 It is ironic how easily Eliot's criticism here reflects his own latter 
predicament with the Metaphysical poets, who are not themselves examples of highest creative 
work, but are second order minds. It is only in the realm of imperfect art that he is able 
articulate his struggle of reconciling what is artistically universal with its necessary historical 
situatedness - its localflavour -, yet Eliot simultaneously condemns himself for not finding a 
perfect fit for his poetic theories. The question is always, not only what literature was to itself 
409 'Imperfect Critics: The Local Flavour', SW, p. 34. 
410 'Imperfect Critics: The Local Flavour', SW, p. 37. In 'What Dante Means to Me' (1950), Eliot noted that 
Dante "is the least provincial - and yet that statement must be immediately protected by saying that he did not 
become the 'least provincial' by ceasing to be local", To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings (London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 199 1), pp. 134-5. 
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in its own time, but what it means to us. This reflects the cognitive imperative which he simply 
cannot manage to shake off, that "to understand anything is to understand from a point of 
view. 99411 The principal intuition Eliot offers here, and develops later, is that a local flavour 
need not translate into cultural insularity. 
Unlike Massinger, Marvell's cultural participation is not held against him because 
sculture' remains vaguely the spirit of the age rather than a precise cultural expression. The key 
is to be cognitively immediate to one's surroundings without letting that perception become 
subject to those surroundings' cultural self-interpretation. The difficulty is that the autonomy of 
personal cognition must necessarily depend on the inherited demands of that cultural world's 
self-interpretation. This ambiguity forces Eliot to harness it rhetorically the best be can through 
contrast and re-definition, almost to the point where he must stress the literary at the expense of 
the personal as a means to invoke a synthesis which escapes positive cultural articulation: 
The fact that of all Marvell's verse, which is itself not a great quantity, the really valuable part consists of a 
very few poems indicates that the unknown quality of which we speak is a literary rather than a personal 
quality-, or, more truly, that it is a quality of civilization, of a traditional habit of lifc. 
412 
The quality which reconciles personal experience with cultural dependence remains an 
unknown quality, which, in turn, is vaguely referred to as a traditional habit of life. As a 
definition this is not as unsatisfactory as it may sound, because it invokes a re-definition of both 
the personal and historical factors. The resolution is already contained in Eliot's suggestion that 
the unknown quality is a traditional habit of life because this habit is, by implication, exercised 
personally and is never totally independent from the particularities of the historical time one 
inhabits. Equally, personality is historical in so far as its submission to a particular time is not 
complete. Even as Eliot seeks a historical expression in his criticism the abstract echoes of 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent' are apparent. 413 Thus, Marvell fails as an illustration of 
the successful synthesis of tradition and the individual talent, just as he gets as close to the 
synthesis as Eliot can possibly articulate through his criticism. Marvell, then, is not a 
411 'Imperfect Critics: The Local Flavour', SW, p. 38. 
412 'Andrew Marvell', SP, p. 16 1. 
413 "To conform merely would be for the new work not really to conform at all", 'Tradition and the Individual 
Talent', SW, p. 50. 
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Metaphysical poet. This conclusion begs the question whether the fault is in Marvell's or in 
Eliot's own inability to critically articulate the poetic virtue in question. 
Interestingly Marvell suffers from the cultural ovcr-dependence Eliot openly attacks 
in 'Philip Massinger' once the former is, in turn, compared to Donne, who, according to 
Grierson's anthology is a clear case of Metaphysical poetry. Only that this time this problem is 
not condemned outright: 
Donne is difficult to analyse: what appears at one time a curious personal point of view may at another time 
appear rather the precise concentration of a kind of feeling diffused in the air about him [ ... 
] But Donne 
would have been an individual at any time and place; Marvell's best verse is the product of European, that is 
to say Latin, culture. 
414 
Donne and Marvell are at the two extremes of the metaphysical condition. Donne verges on 
subjectivism yet is more historically permanent, while Marvell permeates his time more 
successfully but risks becoming anachronistic to other times. There lies their partial failure and 
their partial success, and that of Eliot's critical discourse which thus postpones the moment of 
definition of Metaphysical poetry. However, this definition becomes increasingly apparent just 
as Eliot reaches a critical point where he can be more particular about history, even if he still 
resorts to negative rhetorical strategies. These poets are certainly dissociated because their 
personal feelings and cultural thoughts counteract each other, but there is a feIL-C culpa sense 
about the dissociation of the Metaphysical poets, where, if we are indeed severed from a unified 
sensibility, it is the failing itself which delivers that endearing human condition called personal 
identity, even at the risk of subjectivity - cognitive or historical. Self-consciousness 
is both our 
punishment and our reward. 
'The Metaphysical Poets' marks a development in Eliot's criticism towards the 
definition of personal experience against a concrete historical back-drop. This shift does not 
ultimately disprove Eliot's theory of impersonality but expands the implications of the inherent 
type of personal experience he is promoting. 'Me need to define personality makes Eliot face 
the very limitation of his critical discourse; he cannot scientifically describe this personality but 
must collapse it into the rhetorical compensations of Bradley's negative method. Impersonality 
414 'Andrew Marvell', SP, p. 16 1. 
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is the negative evocation of personal experience. 77ze Sacred Wood is an elaborate scientific 
cover-up of this latent metaphysical concession. In this sense the physiological vocabulary 
thinly spread throughout these early essays and reviews refused to be mere metaphors. This 
vocabulary enacts the very impersonality The Sacred Wood promotes, by meaning the object 
literally and avoiding Massinger's verbalist fallacy: "whose feeling for language had 
outstripped his feeling for things". Eliot's 'cerebral cortex', 'nervous systems, 'cerebral 
anaemia' or 'digestive tracts' are not mere figures of speech. They enact the very cognitive 
impersonality the essays are promoting. Yet Eliot's clinical style is haunted by the 
incompleteness of the description it is providing, which undermines the very scientific style 
Eliot is adopting because it is haunted by what it cannot reveal; haunted, that is, by metaphor 
and metaphysics. As he put it in his thesis: 
On the one side the history of the world is the history of my experience, on the other my experience itself is 
largely ideal, and requires the existence of much which falls outside of itself. Experience is certainly more 
real than anything else, but any experience demands a reference to something real which lies outside of that 
experience everything from one point of view is subjective; and everything, from another point of 
415 
view, is objective; and there is no point of view from which a decision may be pronounced . 
On the one hand, Eliot empirically offers us the perceiving human body as an integrated core 
where thought and feeling cohere, on the other, he concedes the necessity of external 
presuppositions in the construction of selfhood. The question is whether Eliot controls this 
dissociated self-consciousness in The Sacred Wood; whether he reveals all precisely by leaving 
much of it up to our imagination turning victory into what is, after all, a scientific defeat. The 
answer is perhaps only available by contextualising The Sacred Wood with later essays. 
The Negative Style of the Dissociation: Dr Johnson's 'Life of Cowley' 
Faced with the impossibility of retrieving historical facts in Me Presuppositions of Critical 
History' Bradley encourages a re-definition of the critical effort. He introduces the negative 
method: "Criticism, to be criticism, must to a certain extent be negative. "416 This method is at 
the heart of Eliot's critical experiment beginning with 'Reflections on Vers Libre,. 
417 It 
415 KE, pp. 21-22. 
416 F. H. Bradley, 'The Presuppositions of Critical history' (1874) in Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1935), 1, p. 47. 
417 See Chapter I of this thesis, particularly 'Vers Libre and the Problem with Philosophy'. 
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underpins Eliot's critical self-consciousness; the awareness that there 
is always something 
which has to be excluded, something more which cannot be said to be seen with one's eyes, 
but 
which must be articulated. 'Tbe Metaphysical Poets' represents Eliot's 
final attempt to 
overcome this negativity, where "metaphysics" stands for an 
inferred philosophical ground. 
This essay culminates Eliot's journey towards the critical articulation of metaphysics. 
Part of 
this articulation depends on seeing metaphysics in the world, in history; that 
is subjecting this 
general word to a cognitive test. The mechanism of this critical rhetoric 
is perhaps best 
summed up by Eliot's later description of the poetic style of Donne in his Cambridge Clark 
Lectures on the Metaphysical Poetry of the Seventeenth Century of 1926: 
The point is, however, that Donne, instead of pursuing the idea, letting it flow into the usual sequence of 
thought, arrests it, in order to extract every possible ounce of the emotion suspended in it. To such ideas of 
Donne's, therefore, there is a certain opacity of feeling; they are not simple significances and directions. In 
thus arresting the idea Donne often succeeds in bringing to light curious aspects and connections which 
would not otherwise bd visible; he infuses, as it were, the dose of bismuth which makes the position of the 
intestine apparent on the X-ray screen. 
41 8 
The implication is that a full presentation of the object for analysis, however scientific, may 
paradoxically involve its arrestation to see it for what it really is. The latent irony lies in the 
medical image of the X-ray screen, which seems to defy the idea Eliot is expressing; that 
meaning is not empirically accessible. This image seems in line with the physiological tone of 
The Sacred Wood, but its is here devoid of the scientific literalness present in the 1920 
anthology of essays and reviews, it is now coexisting with its metaphoric dimension with far 
more ease. It paradoxically symbolises an alliance of powers between science and metaphysics, 
as if Eliot manages to rescue part of the scientific project he adopted in The Sacred Woodjust at 
the point when it is overcome as an autonomous literal and conceptual language. Eliot never 
gives up reaching out for a sensorial ground for judgement which science makes initially 
available to him but now accepts a metaphysical dimension alongside it. Rhetorically speaking 
seeing remains the goal of critical expression in Eliot's discourse; seeing, that is, like Dante and 
the mystic see philosophy, where the unknowability of metaphysics is incarnated through 
discourse. This amounts to a vision, which is not strictly perceptual but still carries cognitive 
validity; where metaphors acquire for themselves a substantiality - 
in the Aristotelian sense - 
418 The Clark Lectures, VMP, pp. 85-6. 
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that makes the error of taking them literally a constructive oneý19, if only evidencing the 
marriage of the natural tension between them: object and metaphor, science and metaphysics. 
It is thus not surprising that Eliot recurrently cites these lines from 'Purgatorio' 
(XXI, 11131-136): 
"Frate, 
non far, chý tu se' sombra, ed ornbra vedi" 
Ed ei surgendo: "Or puoi la quantitate 
compreder dell' amor ch'a te mi scalda, 
quando dismento nostra vanitate, 
trattando Vornbre come cosa salda. " 
Here Statius meets Virgil and apologizes for his taking Virgil's spiritual shadow for a solid 
thing. These lines first appear as an epigram in Eliot's early notebook of poems which have 
become known as 'Inventions of the March Hare' recently edited by Christopher Ricks. He 
argues that the epigram itself was probably a later addition made in 1922 - the poems there 
included dated from 1909 to 1917 - when Eliot sold the manuscript to John Quinn. 
420 The 
epigram had already been used under the title of Ara Vos Prec (1920). Later, the epigram 
appears again in the Clark Lectures shortly following Eliot's x-ray machine and bismuth image 
mentioned above. In The Clark Lectures the epigram indicates the contrast between Donne, 
whose questions are "a sort of Annahme; it implies something entertained but not precisely 
believed'-A21 
, and 
Dante who develops "in the direction of external reality which it intends; it is 
, A22 not a fancy, and it is not detached from the external facts. The context is philosophical 
hinted at by the use of the term Annahme which Schuchard glosses as relating to Meinong's 
object theory which Eliot dismisses in his dissertation in favour of Bradley's. The dismissal is 
made on the grounds that Meinong's theory puts the epistemological status of real and 
imaginary objects on a par . 
423 The dismissal finds its literary equivalent in Donne, whereas 
419 This marks a reconciliation with Eliot's early self-imposed suspicion of the metaphysical theory of the 
substantial unity of the soul as expressed in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 56. Also see Chapter 3, 
'Souls and Personality. 
420 T. S. Eliot, Inventions of the March Hare: poems 1909-1917, Christopher Ricks ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 
1997), pp. 34. 
421 The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 88. 
422 The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 89. 
423 See discussion of Meinong's theory of objects and Bradley's philosophy in Chapter 1, 'Literary Criticism and 
Scientific Rigour. 
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Dante addresses the substantiality of the spirits despite their own declarations to the contrary at 
which point they are no longer imaginary but, to a degree, real. It is precisely this declaration 
which posits their existence in Purgatory, forcing, as it were, the moment of defiance against 
their metaphoric existence as shadows. Forcing the metaphor - and 
here the reader should be 
alerted to a hint of the metaphysical conceit - is precisely what Eliot 
begins to do with the term 
'Metaphysical' in the Clark Lectures. This is a tactic which retroactively not only questions the 
linguistic status of the scientific images in his early literary criticism, but also the 
corresponding extreme formalism of his early poetry inspired by the Symbolists. 
Inventions of the March Hare reflects a sublime formalism haunted by Laforgue's 
idealism of emptiness. It inspires Eliot in 'Mandarins' - written in August 1910 - where a 
world of unreachable absolutes can only find refuge in the outline of a shadow as concrete 
referent. The outline is the only place left as a meeting point between objects and meaning in a 
world emptied of truth content. 'Mandarins' is full of outlines, shadows, translucence, and 
screens. With all its contemporary implications of pastiche and aestheticism, it suggests a 
reified Chinese scene, or at least, North European rococo appropriations of oriental themes: 
The eldest of the mandarins, 
A stoic in obese repose, 
With intellectual double chins, 
Regards the comer of his nose; 
The cranes that fly across ascreen 
Pert, alert, 
Observe him with frivolous mien - 
Indifferent idealist, 
World in fist, 
Screen and cranes. 
And what of all one has missed! 
And how life goes on different planes!.. 
The parody is implied in the indifferent and solemn self-regard of the fat individual who 
presides over the scene, and whose self-importance is revealed as empty. More importantly, it 
is empty even to himself, an "Indifferent idealist' 'who takes refuge in the idea that "life goes in 
different ways. " Form, here, is his way, though it appears increasingly self-defeating because it 
424 T S. Eliot, Inventions of the March Hare: Poems 1909-1917, Christopher Ricks ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 
1997), p. 21. 
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represents an objectless stoicism all the more passive because purposeless. The world is still 
present, but empties itself proportionally to its one-dimensionality, its flatness. The world is 
there, the problem is that this is all there is. There are objects in this world but their existence 
depends on their imperturbable formalism. This is too the parody of insubstantial social forms 
ever present in Eliot's poetry throughout the 1910s, something that he transforms into a more 
essential philosophical escape. Eliot x-rays this world, but, like Donne, can only reveal shapes 
anointed with philosophical inferences not quite believable or definite, but only vaguely 
metaphysical. Take the line, "And bow life goes on different planes! ", which Ricks glosses as 
referring to Bergson's Matiýre et mýmoire (1896) in which Eliot was interested at the time; the 
poem as a whole seems to already undermine this philosophical affiliation which was not to last 
much longer. However much his own language tries to flesh this world he can only find objects 
as synthetic substances in awe of their own meaninglessness as the only way into existential 
425 
self-affirmation. Negativity and utter night is the paradoxical handmaiden of a world where 
colour seems the only defining property: 
And so I say 
How life goes well in pink and green ! 426 
Colour being a property that, philosophically speaking, does not exist in the object but is a 
427 - secondary quality in the eye of the beholder. In these early days Eliot's poetic irony is not 
sufficient to neutralize the platonic sublime of the symbolists which underscores every attempt 
425 Also see 'Afternoon': 
The ladies who are interested in Assyrian art 
Gather in the hall of the British Museum. 
The faint perfume of last year's tailor suits 
And the steam from drying rubber overshoes 
And the green and purple feathers on their hats 
Vanish in the sombre Sunday afternoon 
As they fade beyond the Roman statuary 
Like amateur comedians across a lawn 
Inventions of the March Hare, p. 53. 
426 Inventions ofthe March Hare, p. 22. 
427 For Habib this irony is already philosophically loaded with Schopenhauer (via Laforgue) and involves the 
unavoidable participation of the observer in the scene the poetic voice is exposing: "Humour itself is structured as 
irony, embracing the 'accommodation' of at least two view points within subjectivity itself, as a defence against 
the world and an acknowledgement of one's unavoidable complicity with it [ ... 
] Hence the ironic genesis of 
laughter, as for Schopenhauer, lies in an incongruity between the real and the ideal", Habib, pp. 66-67. 
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to return to the world of objects; to make the shadow into a substantial image. This is more 
clearly Plato's Cave than the Aristotelian ghosts of Dante's 'Purgatorio'. 
428 
In "Ibe Metaphysical Poets' Eliot's tactics of absence and revelation betrays a 
historicism that plays with the philosophical and poetic - literal and metaphoric - meaning of 
the term metaphysical. Eliot develops this strategy as he takes on Dr Johnson's pejorative use 
of the term: 
If so shrewd and sensitive (though so limited) a critic as Johnson failed to define metaphysical poetry by its 
faults, it is worthwhile to inquire whether we would have more success adopting the opposite method: by 
assuming the poets of the seventeenth century (up to the Revolution) were the direct and normal 
development of the preceding age; and, without prejudicing their case by the adjective 'metaphysical', 
consider whether their virtue was not something permanently valuable, which subsequently disappeared, but 
ought not to have disappeared. Johnson has hit, perhaps by accident, on one of their peculiarities, when he 
observed that "their attempts were always analytic"; he would not agree that, after the dissociation, they put 
together the material together again in a new unity. 
429 
Eliot, however, does not in 1921 manage to avoid defining "metaphysical poetry by its faults". 
What he does instead is to transform the fault into a virtue. On the one hand Eliot admits at the 
end of the passage that the Metaphysical poets' strength is that of unifying the material "after 
the dissociation". But in doing so, Eliot reverses the historical positivism by which the 
metaphysical poets are "the direct and normal development of the preceding age". The 
dissociation implies a break with a previous association. So that at the end of the passage Eliot 
seems concerned, not with historical continuity, but with the poets' ability to rectify history, so 
that poetically the dissociation appears before the poet metaphysically unifies it. Thus Eliot 
does not offer a positive historical description given that being metaphysical entrenches itself in 
the form of a poetic quality that makes a virtue out of negativity. Being metaphysical vaguely 
remains something permanently "valuable" rather than a definite diachronic development, and 
428 Hclen Gardner makes an interesting point about Eliot's fascination with shadows, which she also considers a 
point of technique and development in his poetry: "Although all Mr Eliot's poetry is the expression of a certain 
kind of apprehension, the change in his rhythms and style, which has been discussed, and the change in his 
imagery, is the result of a profound change within this apprehension. In the earlier poetry the apprehension is a 
kind of glass through which he views the world; it is a dark glass through which life is seen with a strange clarity, 
but drained of colour and variety [ ... 
] The poet's own image of a shadow can be used to define what is constant 
and what changes. At the beginning one is aware of life seen in shadow, a grey monotony. The shadow deepens 
growing darker and darker, but up to The Waste Land the life it darkens is the subject. Now the shadow itself 
enters the poetry. Where before it was the shadow that was implied, and what we were given was its effect; now 
the shadow itself is the object of contemplation, and it is the light that casts it that is implied. Paradoxically the 
acceptance of the shadow lessens the darkness", The Art of T S. Eliot (London: Faber & Faber, 1985), p. 99. 
429 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 62-3. 
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that is precisely the strength of its universal scope. This historical negativity is confirmed by 
the fact that they defy positive poetic definition: 
The poets in question have, like other poets, various faults. But they were, at best, engaged in the task of 
trying to find the verbal equivalent for states of mind and feeling. 
430 
The metaphysical conceit, where according to Johnson in his Lives of the English Poets "the 
most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together", is precisely the associative poetic 
tool which gathers its power in the face of a strong dissociating statics of the elements it tries to 
yoke together. Yet it is the very yoking which makes evident the poetic stitching, which makes 
the conceit an incomplete poetic virtue. 
It becomes apparent that Eliot's negative description of Metaphysical poetry is that 
of Samuel Johnson in his Lives of the English Poets. But negative in so far as Johnson is 
implying indirect praise. These are Johnson's words: 
Yet great labour directed by great abilities is never wholly lost: if they frequently threw away their wit upon 
false conceits, they likewise sometimes struck out unexpected truth; if their conceits were farfetched they 
were often worth the carriage. 431 
Eliot exploits this negative praise as a vehicle to translate the poetic qualities of the 
Metaphysicals into a universal virtue, to "consider whether their virtue was not something 
permanently valuable". Furthermore, this involves the literal exploitation of the label 
$metaphysical', in so far as it literally refers to a quality that transcends historical epochs. The 
trans-historically of this poetic quality - the historical metaphysicality of the Metaphysical 
poets of the seventeenth century - is established through a negative logic, which still insists on 
a particular historical positioning and poetic features, even as it leaves these features ultimately 
undefined. Eliot is not shy of a full cultural engagement in his criticism, but is struggling to 
make that allowance without undermining the universality of the statement. In this context it is 
interesting to consider Eliot's own summary of 'The Metaphysical Poets' in a letter to Richard 
Aldington: 
I have just finished an article, unsatisfactory to myself, on the metaphysical poets. The only point made is 
that the metaphysicals, a  a group, are not metaphysical t all, but a perfectly direct and natural 
430 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 65. 
431 Samuel Johnson, Lives of the English Poets, George Birbeck Hill ed., 6 vols (Georg Olms 
Verlagsbuchhandlung Hildesheim, 1968) 1 (Cowley-Dryden), p. 21. 
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development, and that if English verse had not gone to pieces in the Eighteenth Century after Pope (with 
reservations) and never recovered the Seventeenth Century poets might be taken quite naturally and without 
quaintness. 
432 
Eliot's comments are interesting because they only tell half the story of what he meant to do in 
the essay on the Metaphysical poets. Eliot seems to cling to their being "a perfectly direct and 
natural development" cut short by 18'h-century verse. Eliot omits the historical ambiguities of 
the dissociation. Diachrony seems here perversely to take natural precedence over a synchronic 
(metaphysical) version of history, which these poets could inhabit without breaks while doing 
justice to their label. For, if "the metaphysicals are not metaphysical at all, " why keep the 
label?, just like if Eliot wants to halt at the frontier of metaphysics in 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent', why mention it? This kind of rhetorical pose works negatively, half way 
between provocation and false humility, on Richard Aldington, or Eliot himself, though it is not 
for that matter a bluff. It is, rather, a strategy for redefinition. 
Eliot expands Johnson's criticism of the Metaphysical poets into a tool of re- 
definition which involves the expansion of the term "metaphysics" into different levels of 
understanding: poetic, historical and philosophical. Eliot exploits the label, not only as a 
strategy to restore credit to a school of poets, but simultaneously to revise the scientific 
prejudice which led him to propose "to halt at the frontier of metaphysics and mysticisnf'. Not 
only is metaphysics re-introduced into the critical discourse, but the strategies of its re- 
introduction parallel the rhetorical articulation of the relation between the individual talent and 
tradition: the timeless and the time-bound, metaphysics and the Metaphysical poets. 
Evidence for the philosophical sub-plot to the rhetorical strategies implicit in 'The 
Metaphysical Poets' can be provided with reference to Eliot's philosophical notes 'Description 
and Interpretation. 'Tbe Metaphysical Poets' does not resolve the philosophical problem of 
description and interpretation, yet it is a deliberate experiment in applying critical discourse to 
what is a philosophical problem. In 'Experiment in Criticism' (1929), some eight years after the 
publication of 'The Metaphysical Poets', Eliot addresses the role of criticism as one of 
rhetorical responsibility: 
432'To Richard Aldington, 16 September, 1921', Letters, pp. 469-470. 
156 
Now there is an urgent need for experiment in criticism of a new kind, which will consist largely in a logical 
and dialectical study of the terms used. My own interest in these problems has been fostered partly by my 
dissatisfaction with the meaning of my own statements in criticism [. ] In literary criticism we are 
constantly using terms which we cannot define, and defining other things by them. 
433 
This rhetorical responsibility must be accompanied by logical rigour which yet cannot achieve 
completion as definitions. Eliot adds: 
I will take a very simple example with which I have been dealing myself. the possibility of defining 
$metaphysical poetry' [. . .] 
The term means on the one hand, a certain group of English poets in the 
seventeenth century. On the other hand, it must have an intensive meaning, must stand for a peculiar whole 
of qualities which is exemplified by the several poets [ ... 
] The odd thing is that by doing the sum, so to 
speak, in two different ways, you get two different results. 
434 
Eliot's negative style in "Ibe Metaphysical Poets' and 'Andrew Marvell' does much to deal 
with this dialectic but does not ultimately resolve it. 
The Clark Lectures and Metaphysical Definitions 
Eliot uses the Metaphysical poets as a way of re-addressing the problem of philosophical 
metaphysics. What it has to be noted is that the problem of metaphysics goes hand in hand with 
Eliot's apparent rejection of philosophy after the completion of his doctoral thesis. He rejects 
the philosophical discourse because of its metaphysical unknowability: 
Coleridge's metaphysical interest was quite genuine, and was, like most metaphysical interests, an affair of 
the emotions [ ... 
) In the derogatory sense he is more 'philosophic' than Aristotle. 435 
My point is that the problem of the derogatory sense of metaphysics here is not unlike that of 
Metaphysical in the 17 th_century poets in question, and their recovery, as far as it goes, 
simultaneous. The articulation of metaphysics paves the way for Eliot's gradual reconciliation 
with the philosophical discourse he appeared to have deserted when he chose not to go back to 
Harvard in 1915. Eliot has to make his peace with metaphysics before he can say in the 
introduction to The Neel of Fire that he preferred "poetry with a clear philosophical 
pattern. -436 I would like to argue that his reconciliation with metaphysics is mainly mediated 
by his criticism of Elizabethan and Jacobean poets. The most revealing piece in this respect is 
the set of Clark Lectures delivered in 1926 at Trinity College, Cambridge, which were entitled 
433 'Experiment in Criticism' in Tradition and Experiment in Present-Day Literature, Addresses delivered at the 
City Literary Institute (London: London University Press, 1929), p. 214. 
434 'Experiment in Criticism, Tradition and Experiment, p. 214. 
435 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 12-13. 
436 'Introduction', The Wheel offire, p. xvi. 
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'Lectures on the Metaphysical Poetry of the Seventeenth Century'. In the first lecture - 
'Introduction: On the Definition of Metaphysical Poetry' - Eliot considers, among other things, 
the appropriateness of the label Metaphysical for the poets of the seventeenth century. 
Interestingly, he does this by contrasting the label 'metaphysical' to 'philosophical': 
Why retain the title 'metaphysical'? why not say 'the lyric poets of the seventeenth century', or even the 
'psychological' poets? [ ... 
] And the reason for calling the seventeenth century still 'metaphysical', is that 
the term is consecrated by use. 'Philosophical' is accordingly amore pretentious term than 'metaphysical', 
which as employed in literary criticism of the last two hundred and fifty years, has a connotation of 
'fantastic', 'elaborated', which should not be suppressed. 437 
Eliot does here what he should have done in 'The Metaphysical Poets' but could not bring 
himself to do. That the term has been "consecrated by use" may be as good a reason as any to 
keep the label. But is it not those very consecrated connotations of the label 'metaphysical' 
which Eliot is questioning? Those pejorative connotations he now attributes to 'philosophical' 
poetry. Yet he does not challenge the term 'philosophical' but rules it out by virtue of its 
pretentiousness which also implies a certain deference. 
Yet, Eliot's acceptance of the consecrated connotations of the term 'metaphysical' 
once again quickly turn into re-definition which aims to tease out the literal meaning of the 
term of 'metaphysics'. He does so indirectly by referring to Professor Saintsbury's letter to the 
Times Literary Supplement (27th October, 192 1) about 'The Metaphysical Poets, 43 8: 
Mr Saintsbury not only accepted the term, but wished to give it, what seems to me almost ajeu de mots, a 
further and more exact significance based on its etymology. Metaphysics was, of course, originally only that 
work of Aristotle's which came after the Physics. But the metaphysical is, for Mr Saintsbury, that which 
comes after the natural (I am not sure that Aristotle would not wish to qualify this statement): the 
metaphysical poets are those who seek something beyond or after nature - refinements of thought and 
cmotion - ergo they are metaphysical. 
439 
Eliot does not fundamentally disagree with Saintsbury's definition, he only worries that this 
critic's definition is too general to justify its use as description of a particular type of poetry; 
general in that Aristotle may not completely agree that the etymology of the word sums up his 
own philosophical application. The same problem applies to poetry. "But it seems to me, " Eliot 
adds, "to have the usual difficulty of applying to other poetry which we should not call 
437 Lecture I [Introduction: On the Definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Clark Lectures, YMP, p. 6 1. 
438 Professor George Saintsbury had published the first volume of Minor Poets of the Caroline Period in 1905. 
439 Lecture I [Introduction: On the Definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 62. 
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metaphysical.,, 
440 The paradox of Eliot's hesitation over the label 'metaphysical' is that it 
wavers between its being either reductive or too general for poetic application. This is itself a 
metaphysical problem. Saintsbury ends up with a definition too general as a poetic label just as 
he is trying to find a "more exact significance based on its etymology. " Saintsbury's literal 
description of 'metaphysics' has the effect of undermining its practical application. Eliot is 
hypersensitive to this problem of definition: 'metaphysics' refuses to fit a definition because it 
will inevitably fall into interpretation which, in turn, undermines its intended usefulness as a 
description. Eliot counts his losses and finally opts for "a definition which is admittedly not 
comprehensive', 441 and which literally enacts the difficulties of reducing metaphysical 
concepts into precise definitions. This problem is perhaps illustrated by the dictionary 
definition of 'metaphysics': "from Greek meta physica, after the physics There is no 
general agreement as to how to define metaphysics-442. 
Metaphysics defies direct presentation because it properly refers to that which is 
beyond the presentable. Yet Eliot enforces its presentation by translating it into a term of 
critical description. As he pointed out in The Sacred Wood, presentation is, if at all possible, the 
business of successful literature, and by default of successful criticism. 
443 Presentation is the 
scientific pursuit promoted in "Me Perfect Critic' and exemplified by Aristotle who "looked 
solely and steadfastly to the object. ', 
444 Yet in Eliot's student notes on 'Description and 
Interpretation' presentation refers to the impossible stage of pure contemplation : 
The hypothetical imiting case of description would be [pure] contemplation which does not alter its object, 
and that for a finite consciousness is out of the question. To have significant description, you must arrange 
data in a new whole, in an order which was not [strictly] gijen in the data as data. Take any simple object 
you will, give an account of it, and you will find that you have given an evaluation and an interpretation. If 
you really describe the thing as it really is, the whole truth about it, you would not be describing, you would 
be presenting: described and description would be identical. 445 
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Peter A. Angeles, The Harper Collins Dictionary ofPhilosophy (Harper Perennial, 1992), p. 184. 
443 "Permanent literature is always a presentation; either a presentation of thought, or a presentation of feeling by 
statement of events in human action or objects in the external world", The possibility of Poetic Drama', SW, p. 64- 
65. 
444 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 11. 
445 'Description and Interpretation', pp. 5-6. 
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The cognitive distortion involved in all description - that "to have significant description, you 
must arrange data in a new whole, in an order which was not [strictly] gilen in the data as data" 
- also evokes the re-ordering of the 
individual talent of Tradition. But what becomes clear is 
that whenever Eliot refers to presenting the object as it really is, he means something less than 
the ideal object and something more than the re-creation of the given data as data. This insight 
underpins Eliot's so-called scientific project as a whole. 'The Metaphysical Poets' is, by 1921, 
symptomatic of a development of an alternative method of presentation to that of scientific 
description so far developed till the publication of The Sacred Wood in 1920. 
Eliot's problematisation of the poetic label 'metaphysical' goes some of the way 
towards presenting metaphysics as an object of contemplation; to be perceived like Dante sees 
philosophy; thus still remaining within the realm of scientific cognition he promotes in The 
Sacred Wood, if only as long as science is re-defined in the process. This cognitive vision is 
gradually shedding its perceptual sense-data grounding as it becomes apparent that literal 
presentations ignore the inevitable distortion in every perception. Eliot partly compensates for 
this shortcoming in 'Dante' as follows: 
But the true mystic is not satisfied merely by feeling, he must pretend at least that he sees, and the 
absorption into the divine is only the necessary, if paradoxical, limit of this contemplation. 446 
Perceptual validation of experience is thus present in the mystical experience at least as a self- 
conscious pretence. This self-consciousness, in the end, enables Eliot partially to rescue 
Saintsbury's literal definition of 'metaphysics' as an appropriate label: 
Mr Saintsbury's phrase should be kept in mind, because it implies an artificiality, perhaps a deliberate 
exploitation of the senses, which we shall have to examine. 447 
This "exploitation of the senses" transposes Eliot's perceptual interests - as explored 
particularly in The Sacred Wood's impersonal theory of art - into the now more historical 
concerns of the Metaphysical Poets. The Metaphysical poets' artificiality refers to a cognitive 
self-consciousness which may be taken as characteristic of 17 th -century poetry; deliberateness 
in their engagement with the objective re-construction of a metaphysical world that is not 
446 'Dante', SW, p. 170. 
447 Lecture I [Introduction: On the Definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 62. 
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immediately available and which they are trying to articulate. They are artificial not because 
they are fake, but because they force the presentation of objects to consciousness against the 
odds of their objective absence. Ergo, they are metaphysical. 
Eliot's project is only partially successful. It seems to arrive at some conclusion 
regarding the cognitive effort reflected by the poetry, but historically it is not apparent how this 
cognitive feature may apply to poetry from other times. Eliot can never fulfil the correlation of 
the term 'metaphysical' about some poets of the l7th-century with the permanence of that 
description as a universal label of poetic success; that is, to make the label Metaphysical itself 
metaphysical and remain meaningful. Even if Eliot goes some way towards legitimizing the 
label in terms of the etymological meaning of the word, its philosophical connotations do not 
survive the correlation. He admits as much in the second lecture of the Clark lectures: 
They were all too absorbed in controversy to have time for speculation. Politics cannot wait. It is in such an 
age that the legal mind, rather than the theoretical mind, flourishes in theology; such a mind, in fact, as that 
of Donne [. ] Religion and theology, abandoning the pursuit of metaphysical truth, develop in the 
seventeenth century in the direction of psychology. 
448 
The contradiction is that though Donne does not belong to the medieval tradition of 
'metaphysics', he clearly belongs to the Metaphysical poets of the seventeenth-century. A 
world, it must be added, whose increasing cultural, religious and national fragmentation leads, 
according to Eliot, to a shift from metaphysics to psychology (a distinction he makes later in 
the Clark Lectures in terms of Classicism and Romanticism449); in short, it leads to a 
dissociated world. Yet, and that is their virtue, the Metaphysical poets put it back "together 
again in a new unity. -450 They do that - and here lies the tautology - metaphysically, without 
for that matter being interested in metaphysics as a branch of philosophy or theology. Eliot, 
however, refuses to use the term solely as a figure of speech. If the label 'metaphysical' is to 
stand the test of definition it must show a literal link with philosophy, which Eliot does not find 
in Donne. Indeed, Eliot's critical exercise may strike one as a jeu de mots, just as Mr 
448 Lecture 11 [Donne and the Middle Ages], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 78. This lecture rehearses Eliot's 
earlier review of Mario Praz's Scentisimo e Marinismo in Inghilterra : 'An Italian Critic on Donne and Crashaw', 
TLS, 1248 (December 17,1925), p. 878. 
449 Lecture III [Donne and the Trecento], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 104. 
450 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 63. 
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Saintsbury's definition of 'metaphysical' had seemed to Eliot in the first place. Or is it, as Eliot 
describes Marvell's metaphysical thought, "a play with words which is a real play with 
thoughte,? 451 
Eliot's failure to publish the Clark Lectures illustrates his loss of interest with the 
critical project embodied by the Metaphysical poets. In the introduction to the publication of 
the Clark Lectures in 1993, Ronald Schuchard notes Eliot's successive attempts to publish the 
lectures and to produce an exhaustive work on the Metaphysical poets. Schuchard adds that 
Eliot wrote to Middleton Murry about his planning an Elizabethan volume, and that "when his 
'Four Elizabethan Dramatists' appeared in The Criterion in 1924, it was strategically subtitled 
'A Preface' in anticipation of the larger book to come. -452 This larger book was to be The 
School ofDonne, which is finally given up in 1931 with Eliot's 'Donne in our Time': 
I know that by 1926, when I gave some lectures on Donne, the subject was already popular, almost topical; 
and I know that by 1931 the subject had been so fully treated that there appears to me to be no possible 
justification of turning my lectures into a book. 453 
Eliot's metaphysical project finds its critical vehicle in the topical interest of the first few 
decades of the twentieth-century for these poets. 454 Yet Eliot appears not to be interested in 
the Metaphysical poets as much as in their critical possibilities. These possibilities dwindle 
because Eliot is weighted down by the negative discourse he cannot undo in order to resolve 
the problem of their definition. Edward Lobb, seems to get a similar feeling when he says: 
One gets the impression that Eliot is striving to express a point of view which is inexpressible or 
indemonstrable, and I believe that he did not publish the eight lectures for this reason. 455 
Metaphysics will not be defined unless it is mediated by philosophy. Not even the stylistic 
feature of Metaphysical poetry - the conceit - can be considered an unmistakable trade-mark of 
this type of verse: 
451 Lecture VII [Cowley and the Transition], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 199. 
452 'Editor's Introduction', VMP, p. 22. 
453 Quoted in 'Editor's Introduction', YMP, p. 23. 
454 This interest was sparked by H. J. C. Grierson's publication of his last volume on Metaphysical poets, 
Metaphysical Lyrics and Poems of the Seventeenth Century: Donne to Butler - which Eliot draws from 
in 'The 
Metaphysical Poets' in 1921 - and George Saintsbury's Minor Poets of the Caroline Period, also in 1921, and 
continued by Mario Praz's Scentisimo and Marinismo in Inghilterra: John Donne - Richard Crashaw in 1926. 
455 Lobb, p. 15. 
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Not until we have examined [the literary history of the sevcnteenth-ccntury] can we arrive at any conclusion 
which will enable us to distinguish the conceited clearly from the metaphysical, and to conclude how far the 
whole generation may be called metaphysical and how far merely conceited - how far, that is, the common 
ground is on tricks of language rather than habits of thought. 
456 
And for a minute we wonder whether the same applies to Eliot's critical approach to the 
Metaphysical poets. Is it just a trick of critical language or a coherent habit of thought? His 
suggestion that only a thorough examination of literary history will solve the problem is 
postponed and The School of Donne is never written. 
457 Thus Eliot's interest in the 
Metaphysical poets, while becoming his critical centrepiece, also threatens to turn into a 
rhetorical game gradually regressing into absurdity. It leads to the startling conclusion in the 
Clark lectures that: 
It is only by grasping the movement of the whole period, from Elizabeth to Cromwell, as an integrity, that 
one can form any conception of the conceit or of this type of metaphysical poetry. And as the fronticrs are 
nowhere, even in the work of one man, clearly defined, we must be content to examine some poetry which is 
not, on the face of it, mctaphysical. 
458 
This is perhaps the inevitable absurdity of the negative method, of only showing the object by 
contrasting it with what it is not. Is this a metaphysical method or merely conceited criticism? 
The answer is that we must do to Eliot what Eliot does to Metaphysical poetry, he turns to 
philosophy. Metaphysics will only suffer a historical, poetic or cognitive reduction, but it will 
be reduced to philosophy, which in turn will accept all the other reductions and still maintain 
the all-important metaphysical appeal. Eliot thus turns to Dante. 
About Cantos XVI and XVIII of Dante's 'Purgatorio ' in La Commedia, Eliot 
argues, 
We are not here studying the philosophy, we see it, as part of the ordered world. The aim of the poet is to 
state a vision, and no vision of life can be complete which does not include the articulate formulation of life 
which human minds make [. ] Dante, more than any other poet, has succeeded in dealing with his 
philosophy, not as a theory (in the modem not the Greek sense of the word) or as his own comment or 
reflection, but in terms of something perceived. 
459 
The ghost of Eliot's theory of impersonality is indeed present; we are not dealing with the 
poet's own comment or reflection but with something "perceived". The stress is on impersonal 
456 Lecture IV [The Conceit of Donne, The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 138. 
457 "Indeed a book of the length, scope and importance of Saint-Beuve's Port Royal might be written on this 
subject", Lecture VI [Crashaw], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 161. 
458 Lecture V [Donne's Longer Poems], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 140. 
459 'Dante', SW, p. 170-7 1. 
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cognition but Eliot is already allowing for the metaphysical contamination of the object world. 
We do not only see objects, we see them as part of a philosophical framework because "no 
vision of life can be completed which does not include the articulate formulation of life which 
human minds make". This is a metaphysical contamination of cognition (as a vision) that 
cannot properly separate itself from cultural expressions: as politics, religion or, simply, 
prejudice. Even so, it is still perceived because it is part of the vision that must include the 
formulation oflife which human minds make. 
In 'Dante' (first published as 'Dante as Spiritual Leader', a review of Dante by 
Henry Dwight Sidgwick, Athenaeum, 4692 (April 2,1920), 441-2, later included in The Sacred 
Wood with an introductory passage concerning Paul Valfty) Eliot begins by arguing against 
Valery's suspicion about the philosophical content of poetry, and preference for poetry that 
induces an emotional state in the reader. 'Ibis Eliot cannot allow, for emotions easily become 
subjective, one's "own comment or reflection". He is equally suspicious of William James's 
account of religious experience in The Varieties ofReligious Experience: 
M. Valfty's account is quite in harmony with pragmatic doctrine, and with the tendencies of such a work as 
William James' Varieties of Religious Experience. The mystical experience is supposed to be valuable 
because it is a pleasant state of unique intensity. 
460 
This psychologism falls in the opposite extreme of behaviourism: that personal experience is an 
ineffable psychological state, "a pleasant state of unique intensity", valuable in itself. Eliot 
encourages, instead, a cognitive philosophy, individually seen rather than privately felt. The 
vision is, however, not immediately available but must be mediated by a formulation of life. It 
is this formulation which paradoxically ensures the objectivity of perception and its collective 
coherence. For, how can one tell visions from mere psychological states? If one can, it must be 
according to an outside canon of judgement which automatically makes the purity of the 
perception a preception, as Ricks suggests in T S. Eliot and Prejudice: 
The forked root of the matter, as for many others, is the inseparability (not the indistinguishability) of 
perception from preception. 
461 
460 'Dante, SW, p. 170. 
461 Ricks, T S. Eliot and Prejudice, p. 108. Ricks is here referring to Dante (1929), rather than the essay 'Dante' 
included in SW. 
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Eliot is only too aware of preception. He admits that any attempt at perceiving the thing as it 
really is must always "include the articulate formulation of life which human minds make". But 
he also adds that "the true mystic is not satisfied merely by feeling, he must pretend at least that 
he sees". This qualification of Pretence is all-important, because it suggests that Eliot is aware 
of the contradictory viewpoints which he is trying to reconcile: the Bradleyan knowledge that 
we do not merely see, with the conviction that we do not doubt what we see when we see it. 
462 
This reconciliation is activated with the idea that it is not simply the world of objects that is 
seen, but the philosophy itself through which we articulate their perception. Making the 
philosophy itself subject to cognitive experience compensates for the effect the philosophical 
blinkers may have on our eyes in the first place. The received information as dogma can be part 
of the experience of individually seeing it. The philosophy itself partakes of cognitive status. 
And it is in its being seen against the world of objects that the influence of the cultural 
presuppositions over personal judgement is checked. Eliot further develops this idea of cultural 
cognition in terms of Christian faith and mystical experience in his Clark Lectures in 1926 and 
his 1929 book Dante - not to be confused with 'Dante' in The Sacred Wood. 
462 "Any narrative of 'facts' which involves judgements proceeding from religious consciousness or a view of the 
world which, as a whole or in respect of the part in question differs from ours, cannot have such a force as to 
assure us of any event un-analogous to present experience", 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Bradley, 
Collected Essays, p. 3 1. 
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Chapter 5 
Philosophv and Mvsticism 
This chapter will explore Eliot's attempt to overcome metaphysical negativity in his criticism 
as exemplified by his Clark Lectures. This critical turn involves a change in Eliot's 
terminology. His failed attempts to articulate metaphysics as a particular kind of poetic 
expression turns Eliot's attention towards philosophy just as he seeks political and religious 
identity; metaphysics must terminate in philosophical expression or else remain ineffable. This 
exploration of philosophical poetry also encourages the re-definition of personal experience, 
where the cognitive model of impersonality increasingly refers to a particular kind of mystical 
experience. Eliot uses the vehicle of mysticism to account for the cognitive experience which 
not only sees objects in the world but sees philosophy. This mysticism is of a type that Eliot 
calls ontological in contradistinction to the experiential ineffability claimed by the mysticism of 
the via negativa. Metaphysics is articulated philosophically, and as philosophy seen; its 
ineffability is resolved. This resolution, however, involves an additional problem. Dogmatism 
is the necessary threat of philosophical poetry, but poetic integrity is endangered by its 
becoming a mere illustration of a particular a system of thought. Eliot addresses this problem 
by considering the relationship between poetry and belief as a debate with I. A. Richards in the 
late 1920s. 
Philosophical Poetry 
If Eliot is still reluctant to consider philosophy as a term of critical description in the Clark 
Lectures, he is increasingly more prepared to do so after 1926. As metaphysics leads to 
philosophy, so Eliot's rhetorical negativity turns increasingly affirmative. This shift can most 
clearly be noticed in the Tumbull Lectures, which Eliot delivered in Baltimore at The John 
Hopkins University in 1933 after his appointment as Charles Eliot Norton Professor of Poetry 
at Harvard. In these lectures - which closely rework the Clark Lectures - his appeal to 
philosophy is explicit, as he is prepared to entertain the suitability of the term 'philosophical' at 
length. This is, as we have noted, something he had not brought himself to do in the original 
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Clark Lectures. This change is facilitated by Eliot's having written Dante as a contribution to 
Faber & Faber's Poets on Poets book series in 1929, and his re-acquaintance through the 
writing of this book with George Santayana's Three Philosophical Poets (1910). As we said, 
Eliot had attended two of Santayana's courses on philosophy - Philosophy B: 'History of 
Modem Philosophy' (1907-8) and Philosophy 10: 'Philosophy of History' (1909-10) - during 
his undergraduate years at Harvard University over the period Three Philosophical Poets was 
being prepared for publication. So, in his Turnbull Lectures of 1933 Eliot strengthens the link 
between Metaphysical poetry and philosophy: 
If we begin by assuming that 'metaphysical' ought to mean something akin to 'philosophical', then we must 
go to the poets - Lucretius, Dante and Goethc - discussed by Mr Santayana in his brilliant and admirable 
little book Three Philosophical Poets. It is clear that for Mr Santayana a philosophical poet is one with a 
scheme of the universe, who embodies that scheme in verse [ ... 
]I think that on the whole I accept Mr 
Santayana's definition of 'philosophical poetry' [. . .] 
We have both, I imagine, a prejudice in favour of the 
clear and distinct; we mean philosophy which is expressed, not one which is ineffabic. 
463 
The shift from metaphysical abstraction to its expression as a philosophy is done for the sake of 
clarity of style, a clarity which in the Tumbull Lectures parallels Eliot's search for positive 
critical articulation. It is not a rejection of metaphysics but a positive engagement with it; an 
engagement which must include its philosophical expression and its consideration as a branch 
of philosophy. 
Although the Tumbull Lectures follow quite closely the manuscript of the Clark 
lectures, there are subtle differences, mainly due to the necessity of summarizing his ideas in a 
shorter series of lectures - three instead of the original eight. Consequently, Eliot is more 
critically assertive and less allusive. Yet the text is still mined with phrases which arrest the 
possibility of grasping the relation between philosophy and metaphysics as a straightforward 
equation. For instance: 
So I shall assert roundly that while metaphysical poetry has indeed something to do with philosophy, the 
connection is not found through the term metaphysical. its claim to the term comes only through one of the 
secondary, even whimsical meanings of 'metaphysical', one which is 'oversubtle'. I do not think that any of 
464 us would be satisfied by meaning 'oversubtle' poetry when we speak of 'metaphysical poetry'. 
463 Lecture I [Toward a definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Turnbull Lectures, VMP, p. 25 1. 
464 Lecture I [Toward a Definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Turnbull Lectures, VMP, p. 253. 
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In this part of the Turnbull Lectures Eliot is referring to his discussion in the Clark Lectures of 
Mr Saintsbury's etymological attempt to dissect the term in order to judge its appropriateness 
as a label for the poets of the seventeenth century. The very versatility of the term proves 
its 
undoing as it refuses any particular philosophical articulation, but a mere evocation of subtlety. 
Eliot's increasing awareness is that he is sacrificing clarity for the sake of scope, that the term 
gmetaphysical' will not reveal the finite world it is universalizing. Philosophy is not just the 
concrete expression of metaphysics, as a particular theory, but is, in Eliot's mind, also 
permeated by culture and the worldview of an epoch. Metaphysics and culture are reconciled 
through a philosophy which is believed in. This idea is exemplified by Dante's integrated 
intellect, in which his perception of the object world was submerged in his philosophical 
thought, which in turn belonged to a medieval worldview. 
465 It is a positive expression. 
However, Eliot sacrifices his negative style at the risk of making his personal 
prejudices explicit. This sacrifice initiates a stage in which dogmatism becomes increasingly 
problematic in Eliot's criticism. This is a risk he is prepared to take for the sake of critical 
affirmation and clarity of expression and it has important consequences in Eliot's historicism. 
The 'dissociation of sensibility' attempted negatively to suggest a time-bound unified 
sensibility, which did not commit Eliot to any particular epoch but vaguely suggested a time 
prior to the dissociation. Now he is prepared to offer a model: the Italian Trecento. Yet he is 
still careful to qualify the statement: 
I have not in any way advocated a return to the thirteenth-century, whatever that may mean, but only the 
eternal utility, in a world of change, of any achievement ofperfection. 466 
He is not encouraging a return to an ideal age, something he would philosophically understand 
as a negligible hallucinated re-enactment. 
467 Eliot is consciously subverting the idea of a 
historical myth, and not simply failing to express it, as Lobb likes to suggest in what is at times 
a simple minded appropriation of Eliot within the Romantic critical tradition: 
As he realized, his view of history is not really arguable because, like the poetry it attempts to describe, it 
issues from a perception wider than that of reason alone: it is a poet's felt history, a myth in the non- 
465 See Chapter 4 of this thesis, specially 'The Perception of Culture and Metaphysics'. 
466 Lecture VIII [The Nineteenth Century: Summary and Comparison], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 222. 
467 See Chaper 3, 'The Historical Sense and the Aesthetics of Impersonal Cognition'. 
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reductive sense of the word. But as myth, Eliot's history is liable to attack on the narrow grounds of its 
failure to establish cause and effect, or even describe the effects with any great precision. 
468 
Even in the best case scenario, the Italian Trecento, Eliot shies away from positing it as a 
historical ideal of poetic and historical unity. Reducing the historical myth is precisely what 
Eliot is attempting to do. Felt history is precisely not an emotional or romantic idea in Eliot, 
and if it ever was he tries to provide it with a concrete cognitive ground which is not merely 
romantically affected. Eliot is suggesting a historicism based on the recurrence of a cognitive 
disposition of the individual towards his own age, not towards a past which lies beyond the 
horizon of our cognitive present and can thus be only dreamt about melancholically. The 
alternative cognitive disposition in history Eliot is suggesting is evidenced in both philosophy 
and mysticism: 
Now in all of the three periods with which I am concerned - 
Florcnce in the thirteenth century, London in 
the seventeenth and Paris in the nineteenth, and in the poets of these periods, whom I have most in mind, 
there is a background of philosophy and mysticism. 
469 
Eliot's historical sense is thus slightly altered. His suggestion that <<the historical sense involves 
a perception, not only of the pasteness of the past, but of its presence>>470 undergoes a gradual 
expansion of meaning. Historical perception becomes literally meaningful. It refers to the 
cognitive model first implied by the theory of impersonality in 'Tradition and the Individual 
Talent', which now reaches positive articulation as mystical experience. The past is past and 
irreparable, yet present in its own experience of presence to itself. This experience of presence 
is articulated through Dante's cognitive example; as someone who is able to see philosophy as 
a perceived presence in what Eliot identifies in 'Dante' as a mystical experience. 
471 
Philosophy becomes a by-word for the historical present and cultural presence, but which 
relinquishes its historical subjectivity by becoming a perceived object in one's shared historical 
present. The cognitive stress on perception established by the theory of impersonality remains, 
only altered in so far as it includes culture and philosophy. The finitude of every cultural 
present is respected just as it becomes trans-historically bridged over a common cognitive 
disposition of the individual to its own present. The past is diachronically past, yet present to 
468 Lobb, p. 37. 
469 Lecture I [Toward a definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Turnbull Lectures, VMP, p. 256. 
470 'Tradition and the individual Talent', SW, p. 49. 
471 'Dante', SW, p. 170-17 1. 
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other times through its presence to itself. Being present is the trans-historical 
function which 
Eliot identifies with mystical experience. Mysticism is the cognitive quality which universalises 
the personal experience of one's cultural present across the ages. 
Eliot is thus gradually transgressing the scientific purism of The Sacred Wood, 
inviting a re-reading of these essays and reviews in the light of the semantic expansion 
undertaken by later criticism, as in the Clark Lectures: 
But I must call attention, in closing, to the dilemma which every honest literary critic, now and in the future, 
will have to face. On the one hand you cannot treat literary criticism as a subject isolated from every other 
subject of study-, you must take account of general history, of philosophy, theology, economics, psychology, 
into all of which literary criticism merges. And on the other hand you cannot hope to embrace all the various 
points of view implied by these various studies. 
472 
There is a ring of profound disenchantment with literary criticism in these words. Eliot adds: 
<<You cannot know your frontiers unless you have some notion of what is beyond them>> and 
one is instantly thrown back six years to The Sacred Wood where he had proposed oto halt at 
the frontier of metaphysics or mysticism. )>473 Yet, even now, to ohalt>> he tries: 
So far, therefore, as I have trespassed on the territory of history, social or political, of theology and religion, 
of psychology, my criticism of metaphysical poetry has been seriously at fault. 
474 
The fault is not his but lies in the poetic label 'metaphysical' itself, whose adequacy Eliot 
cannot make self-evident; it proves an empty allegory of a transhistorical poetic quality. The 
apology itself is empty given that Eliot is aware of the inevitability of the transgression. Eliot 
makes no such apology in the later Turnbull Lectures (1933). Between both set of lectures, in 
'Experiment in Criticism' (1929), he had deliberately embraced the link between philosophy 
and literary criticism, 
I am aware of the danger that he type of criticism in which I am interested may become too professional and 
technical. What I hope for is the collaboration f critics of various pecial training, and perhaps the pooling 
and sorting of their contributions by men who will be neither specialists nor amatcurs. 475 
These contributors who inhabit the space between theory and creative writing are literary 
critics. 
472 Lecture VIII [The Nineteenth Century: Summary and Comparison], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 226. 
473 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 59. 
474 Lecture VIII [The Nineteenth Century: Summary and Comparison), The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 227. 
475 'Experiment in Criticism' in Tradition and Experiment: In Present-day Literature, Addresses delivered at the 
City Literary Institute (London: London University Press, 1929), p. 215. 
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In 'Dante' (1920) Eliot was already seeing in philosophy the means to combat 
emotionalism and obscurity in poetry. He is, in this essay, responding to Paul Valery's 
dismissal of philosophic poetry: 
And if M. Val6ry is in error in his complete exorcism of 'philosophy', perhaps the basis of that error is his 
apparent commendatory interpretation of the modem poet, namely, that the latter endeavours 'to produce in 
us a state,. 476 
Though Eliot was in The Sacred Wood more interested in encouraging philosophy as science, in 
'Dante' he is already suggesting that the thoughtful ordering of emotion has something to do 
with a philosophical system of thought and not just with a particular cognitive disposition. Yet, 
Eliot is in this early essay still unsure as to what the relation between poetry and philosophy 
amounts to: 
Without a doubt, the effort of the philosopher proper, the man who is trying to deal with ideas in themselves, 
and the effort of the poet, who may be trying to realize ideas, cannot be carried on at the same time. But this 
is not to deny that poetry can in some sense be philosophic [ ... 
] The original form of a philosophy cannot be 
poetic. But poetry can be penetrated by a philosophic idea, it can deal with this idea when it has reached the 
point of immediate acceptance, when it has become almost a physical modification. 
477 
Eliot is suggesting that the penetration of poetry by philosophy becomes a process of 
incarnation which, in turn, indicates a cognitive realisation of the ideas themselves into things. 
This statement in 'Dante' refers to the introduction of Three Philosophical Poets, where 
Santayana considers at length whether poetry is the highest form of poetic expression: 
Even if we grant that the philosopher, in his best moments, is a poet, we may suspect that the poet has his 
worst moments when he tries to be a philosopher, or rather, when he succeeds in being one. 
478 
The poet must not confuse his role with that of philosophy as an intellectual pursuit. 
Santayana's reasoning is that the poet only succeeds in flashes of inspiration and would 
naturally fail in the sustained reasoning of an idea, yet he admits philosophy naturally benefits 
from the poetic expression. Santayana adds: 
When we feel the poetic thrill, is it not that we find sweep in the concise and depth in the clear, as we find 
all the lights of the sea in the water of a jewel. And what is a philosophical thought but such an cpitome? 479 
476 'Dante', SW, p. 160. 
477 'Dante', ST, p. 162-163. 
478 George Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante and Goethe (Cambridge: Harvard University, 
1910), P. I I. 
479 Santayana, Three Philosophical Poets, p. 13. 
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Poetry complements philosophy stylistically because it encourages the concentration of 
meaning and clarity of discourse. Equally, philosophy increases the scope of what 
is, for 
Santayana, an essentially ephemeral instant of poetic revelation. They are, after all, separate 
activities just as they complement each other. 
In 'Blake' Eliot had made exactly this point when he pointed out that Blake's longer 
poems are particularly deficient because they lack a philosophical structure to sustain their 
length: oThe fault is most evident, of course, in the longer poems - or rather, the poems in 
which structure is important. >>480 Just before this statement Eliot refers to Dante and Lucretius 
as models of proper poetic borrowing of philosophy. Furthermore, Eliot suggests that the 
presence of philosophy in their poetry is made possible by the former's cultural availability. 
Eliot goes further than Santayana. The point in which poetry is philosophical is not when it is 
conscious of being so, but the point when philosophy is not identified as a discipline by having 
truly permeated the lived-world literally becoming part of its objects; when it is itself an object 
of contemplation, owhen it has reached the point of immediate acceptance, when it has become 
almost a physical modification. >>481 Thus Eliot makes the relationship between philosophy and 
poetry one pertaining to a particular cognitive encounter where philosophical ideas are seen in 
the poetry. On referring to Eliot's Four Quartets Paul Murray, in T S. Eliot and Mysticism, 
makes a similar point about the relation of philosophical ideas to the poetry: 
But one is also aware that 'the ideas' within the poem are not proposed as abstract theories. They are present 
rather as facts of experience, elements which go together with all the other elements ofthe poet's experience 
to make up the basic materials and the substance of his art. 
482 
Already in 'Dante' Eliot identifies this cognitive exercise as one akin to mysticism, although 
Murray is unable to see this connection because he seems unaware of Eliot's doctoral thesis. 
Mysticism and Self-consciousness 
In T S. Eliot, Mystic, Son and Lover, Donald J. Childs notes that oby 1913-14, [Eliot] had, 
begun extensive research on more traditional religious mysticism, particularly Christian 
480'Blake', SW, p. 156. 
481 'Dante', SW, pp. 162-163. 
482 Paul Murray, T S. Eliot and Mysticism (London: The MacMillan Press, 1991), p. 38. 
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mysticism. ýý483 This interest paralleled his early studies in Hinduism and Buddhism, 
484 in 
which religious experience become a point of reference within philosophical explorations of 
language. As he put it his doctoral thesis: 
Though we cannot say that we have either name or object [ ... 
I until we have the complete object for that 
name or the complete name for that object, yet the point at which this mystic marriage occurs is not exactly 
determinable. 485 
This is a typical metaphysical cul-de-sac which Eliot must leave unsolved in his doctoral thesis. 
Eliot is associating his philosophical method with religious interpretations. This association is 
an early symptom of the limits of philosophical discourse to articulate thoroughly the workings 
of cognition. Tbus, faith becomes the uninvited guest of philosophy. 'Mis concession to 
ineffable metaphysics initially haunts Eliot as a philosophical defeat which he attempts to 
compensate for through the scientific aesthetics of The Sacred Wood, as this thesis has argued 
so far. It is as if Eliot wants to believe that the poetic medium may allow for a better 
philosophic expression which can quite simply by-pass the damaging stylistic obstacles of 
metaphysical ineffability. 
486 Here lies the importance of the relationship between philosophy 
and poetry to which Eliot keeps returning. Yet 'Dante' gives away Eliot's ongoing 
metaphysical interests. The significance of 'Dante' is that, here, philosophy is not offered as 
science, but in the metaphysical context of mystical experience; although it simultaneously 
attempts to recapture this metaphysics in terms of the scientific models of cognition developed 
in the rest of the essays and reviews included in The Sacred Wood. Dante perceives 
scientifically; only what he sees are not objects in the ordinary sense but philosophy. So just as 
the scientific premise of impersonal perception remains, metaphysics is acknowledged as 
something that can potentially be experienced impersonally. If science is concerned with the 
perception of objects as they really are, Eliot provides it with objects; it's just that the objects 
483 
oSurviving notes in the form of index cards indicate close attention to a number of books: Studies in Mystical 
Religions, by R. F. Jones; Etudes dHistorie et du Psychologie du Mysticisme, by H. Delacroix; Chritian Mysticism 
and Studies of English Mystics, by W. R. Inge; Essai sur lesfondements de la Connaissance Mystiques, by E. 
R6c6jac; Mysticism, by Evelyn Underhilb>, Donald J. Childs, T. S. Eliot, Mystic, Son and Lover (London: The 
Athlonc Press, 1997), p. 33. 
484 Eliot registered for the following courses between 1911 and 1913: Indic Philology la, Indic Philology lb, 
Indic Philology 4, Indic Philology 5, Indic Philology 9. 
485 KE, p. 135. 
486 This stylistic ineffability refers to the emotionalism of philosophies, such as Hegcl's, as he points out in 'The 
Perfect Critic', SW, p. 9. 
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he offers alter the essential empirical expectations of science. The world is itself metaphysical 
and the reality of its objects is one of degrees. 
487 
'Dante', unlike most of The Sacred Wood, is haunted by the suspicion that scientific 
claims of describing the object are not absolutely different from those of metaphysics. 
This is a 
suspicion Eliot had already considered in his thesis: 
Physical theories [ ... 
], are apt to end in mystery, in as much as the final object is often not an object at all 
. .] 
At this point a theory would become metaphysical passing from one object to another; and two types can 
only be held together by an act of faith. 
488 
Ultimately, science spirits the object away as much as metaphysics, only that in science we are 
more capable of exercising the mystical leap of faith; we can precisely because science, in so 
far as it permeates the cultural experience of the early 20th -century, is taken for granted. As 
Eliot noted in 'A Commentary' for The Criterion in 1924: <<The man of letters or the man of 
cculture' of the present time is far too easily impressed and overawed by scientific knowledge 
and ability. >>489 Eliot infiltrates this scientific naivete and subverts 
it from the inside. If the 
scientist can pretend to describe the world of objects, so can the mystic: 
the true mystic is not satisfied merely by feeling, he must pretend at least hat he sees, and the absorption 
into the divine is only the necessary, if paradoxical, limit of this contemplation. 
490 
This 'pretence' is crucial for Eliot at the time of writing The Sacred Wood. It qualifies the 
temptation to correlate perception with reality within an idealized mystical context. It also 
reveals Eliot's persistent scepticism during and in the years 
immediately following the 
completion of his thesis491; a self-conscious scepticism, perhaps, inevitable in any critical 
account of belief, for such self-consciousness anticipates the critical act. Faith, it would seem, is 
incompatible with self-consciousness, given that the critical awareness of faith already involves 
a distancing from the object of contemplation. It is a theoretical account of practice. Eliot 
487 For a discussion of the classification of objects in Eliot's doctoral thesis and Bradley's degrees of reality see 
'Contraditictions and Unreal Objects' in Chapter 2. 
488 KE, p. 162. 
489 'A Commentary, The Criterion, 2, no 7 (April 1924), p. 233. 
490 'Dante', SW, p. 170. 
491 See Chapter 4 of this thesis, especially 'Pragmatism and Faith' for an account of Eliot's reconciliation of 
skepticism and faith. 
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partially comes to terms with the problem of self-consciousness in faith by historicizing its 
development. It is not a personal but a historical problem. 
Eliot sees a change in the seventeenth century, as he states in the Clark Lectures, 
in the direction of a certain self-consciousness which had not been conspicuous in the world before [ ... 
] 
Instead of ideas as meanings, as references to an outside world, you have suddenly a new world coming into 
existence, inside your own mind and therefore by the usual implication inside your own head. 
492 
Eliot is referring to the changing fortunes of faith in the seventeenth-century. He considers that 
there is a tendency for ontology to become psychology in the history of ideas, symptomatic of 
increasing self-consciousness. It is this self-consciousness which becomes Eliot's main obstacle 
in his attempt to articulate faith. This difficulty appears as a rhetorical awkwardness which in 
'Dante' results in Eliot's statement that the true mystic must at least pretend to be absorbed by 
the divine. 493 The conditional 'at least pretend' of Eliot's statement projects a theoretical self- 
consciousness in the mystical act itself. 'Ibis self-consciousness becomes paradoxical in so far 
as the aim of the mystical experience would be to lose that self-consciousness. Yet self- 
consciousness in effect makes the vision available to oneself; without self-consciousness, this is 
the implication, there would be no knowledge of perception. Thus the very notion of an 
ineffable union with the divine is put into question, so that othe absorption into the divine is 
only the necessary, if paradoxical, limit of this contemplation>>. It may be necessary but it is 
paradoxical if the experience is to remain within the realm of language. The limit, thus, must 
mean the end of the contemplation not the beginning. This paradox begs the question of 
whether Eliot can talk about mysticism as self-conscious and still retain the metaphysical 
dimension of the mystical experience. The paradox of Eliot's mystical self-consciousness in 
'Dante' is best understood against another type of self-consciousness in the context of the 
relation of language to cognition, namely the psychologism of pragmatism. 
494 Pragmatism 
epitomises, for Eliot, the impotence of language to make a definite statement about the world 
because it refuses to take a point of view other than the emotions. The result is an over- 
492 Lecture 11 [Donne and the Middle Ages), The Clark lectures, VMP, p. 80. 
493 'Dante', SW, p. 170. 
494 'Dante', SW, p. 170. Eliot's receipt for the purchase of James' The Varieties of Religious Experience can be 
found at Houghton Library among the miscellaneous material relating to T. S. Eliot begun by his brother Henry W. 
Eliot Jr. The receipt is from the Harvard Co-operative Society, Book Department and dated June 1913. 
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emotional and undifferentiated discourse which refuses itself a referent in the world but relies 
instead, on the emotional reality of mental states: oinstead of ideas as meanings, as references 
to an outside world, >> the world is oinside your own head. >>495 And thus, as psychology 
replaces metaphysics, faith becomes a word without content; the truth of perception depends on 
the reality of the experience as oa pleasant state of unique intensity>>. This is a subject Eliot had 
considered at length in his doctoral thesis. In the chapter entitled 'The Psychologist's Treatment 
of Knowledge', he considered whether there are such things as psychological objects: 
The questions involved are these: in the act of apprehension is there a part which is strictly mental and a part 
which is strictly external? And even if the distinction can be made, can it be made sharply enough to give us 
a class of objects which can form a separate science, psychology? 496 
Eliot wonders whether psychology is a legitimate science. Eliot is convinced that experience is 
not purely psychological, that experience is experience of objects; but equally, that the outward 
appearance of experience - as behaviour - does not exhaust the totality of the experience. The 
sort of mysticism Eliot is pursuing is the experience that is both personal - without being 
merely psychological - yet seeks confirmation in something outside itself - be it an object or a 
philosophy. In 'Dante' the mystical vision is experienced over the scaffold of a metaphysics 
philosophically experienced, a philosophy which is seen, and not only that, but seen as outside. 
'Dante' is already re-writing Eliot's imperative to halt at the frontier of metaphysics and 
mysticism of 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' - both included 
in The Sacred Wood -, 
namely because mysticism activates the philosophical articulation of metaphysics as something 
perceived. 
In the Clark Lectures Eliot notes that Donne ois in a sense a psychologist)) because 
his self-consciousness stops the poetic thought short of belief. 
if you like you may call the thought 'insincere', because it does not reach belief; but his feeling of the 
thought is perfectly sincere. 497 
'Ibis statement marks Eliot's growing dissatisfaction with Donne's poetry just as his critical 
. 
498 inds enthusiasm with the Metaphysical poets comes into crisis Yet the fact that Eliot still f 
495 Lecture 11 [Donne and the Middle Ages], The Clark lectures, VMP, p. 80. 
496 KE, p. 58. 
497 Lecture IV [The Conceit in Donne], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 133. 
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room for sincerity in Donne's disbelief avoids a despairing vision of a historical slippery slope 
towards intellectual disintegration. We can ultimately only do what we can with the world 
made available to us, and Donne's world is, we are told, philosophically ftagmented499 
something for which he is not personally responsible. Donne, unlike Dante, did not live oin an 
age in which men still saw visions>>500; as self-consciousness undermines belief, so it erodes 
the cognitive range of perception. Yet Eliot stops short of either condemning humanity to a 
self-conscious disintegration, or implying a positivistic vision of history as he points out in The 
Use ofPoetry and the Use of Crificisni (193 3): 
1 have not wished to exhibit this 'progress in self-consciousness' a  being necessarily progress with an 
association ofhigher value. 501 
Self-consciousness is quite simply part of the changing cognitive climate to which we must 
adapt; by developing, as in the case of Donne, sincerity to compensate for self- 
consciousness. 
502 Thus Donne's shortcomings are partly redeemed. The possibility of this 
compensation is placed firmly in the present, nor as a hallucinatory past or an imaginary future. 
Eliot is prepared to admit of varieties of Metaphysical poetry other than that belonging to the 
seventeenth century poets, as historical peaks which have developed their own ways to make up 
for the disintegration of intellect depending on the particularities of their own historical 
present. 
503 The strategies to compensate for self-consciousness are identified as those of a 
mystical experience which must at least pretend; one not corroborated by a total absorption 
into the divine - even if that presumption is necessary, yet paradoxical 
because that 
corroboration is theoretically impossible. This ability to compensate for self-consciousness is 
historically identified by recurrent Metaphysical periods, which, for Eliot, are characterized by 
498 As we have seen, some five years after 'The Metaphysical Poets', Eliot is giving up on the Metaphysical poets 
as way of thus recuperating the term 'metaphysics'. And in this sense The Clark Lectures, illustrate his critical 
transition back to Dante. 
499 Lecture 11 [Donne and the Middle Ages], The Clark lectures, VMP, pp. 76-79. 
500 Dante (London: Faber & Faber, 1929), p. 23. 
501 TUPUC, p. 122. 
502 The question of 'sincerity' will be explored further in Chapter 8, specially in 'The Sincerity of Self- 
consciousness'. 
503 This is the kind of historicism Frank Kermode finds objectionable in The Romantic Image where he considers 
Eliot's 'dissociation of sensibility': <<Tbere are certain qualifications for poetry described as operative now though 
possessed by the poets of the seventeenth century and none since (until now? ) [ ... 
]A once-for-all event cannot 
happen every few years>>, The Romantic Image (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 140 &146. 
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a background of philosophy and mysticism. Yet the adjective 'metaphysical' becomes 
increasingly misleading as it implies ineffability rather than philosophical concreteness as Eliot 
is unable to legitimize its contiguity with metaphysics, unless one turns metaphysics into a faith 
collectively shared, a philosophy. And just as Eliot drops his interest in the term Metaphysical, 
the dissociation of sensibility's negative historicism is replaced by a more positive - not 
positivistic - historicism partaining to the disintegration of the intellect which refuses to 
idealise either impersonality, as the scientific correlation between thought and feeling in 
cognition, or Metaphysical, as its poetic fulfilment. So just as the terms Metaphysical and 
'impersonality' fail to articulate the cognitive intricacies of the personal experience of 
collective faith because it dares not speak its name, Eliot recuperates a term which invites the 
possibility of a definition: mysticism. 
The Mystical Via Positiva and Rhetorical Incarnation 
Eliot's change of terminology invites an increase in the possibilities of positive definition of 
metaphysics in terms of mysticism and philosophy. This is the impact of Eliot's exploration of 
mysticism in the Clark Lectures. Just as Eliot identifies a trans-historical recurrence of 
Metaphysical periods, he also includes the presence in them of oa background of philosophy 
and mysticism. )>504 Just as he does so Eliot is immediately aware of the need for a definition of 
the tenns: 
But the characteristic of the type of poetry I am trying to define is that it elevates sense for a moment to 
regions ordinarily attainable only by abstract thought, or on the other hand clothes the abstract, for a 
moment, with all the painful delights of the flesh. To call it mystical is facile, and I hasten to discountenance 
the use of this word; for there are many kinds of qualities of mysticism. 
505 
Eliot shows his characteristic reluctance to show confidence in his terminology, just as he 
endeavours to set them in stone. Definition involves this time a crucial distinction between 
types of mysticism, of which there are two main strands: the incarnate poetics of positive 
mysticism and the ineffable poetics of the via negativa506. In 1926 mysticism offers Eliot a 
504 Lecture I [Toward a definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Turnbull Lectures, VMP, p. 256. 
505 Lecture I [Introduction: On the Definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 55. 
506 Among the list of authors Eliot was reading at Harvard in relation to religious experience, Childs points out 
the enormous influence of Eliot's reading of Underhill, and in particular her distinction between otranscendental 
and immanentalo mysticisms. More importantly Childs links Underhill's treatment of the transcendence of 
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way to articulate personal experience positively without the ambiguous negative strategies of 
his theory of impersonality. 
According to Childs, Eliot only annotated the chapter on mysticism in William 
James's The Varieties of Religious Experience (Gifford Lectures, 1901-2). In the chapter 
entitled 'Mysticism' James states that othe mystic has no right to claim that we ought to accept 
the deliverance of their particular experience. >>507 This shows James's preference for the 
mystical negative way characterized by emotional ineffability: 
This incommunicableness of the transport is the keynote of all mysticism. Mystical truth exists for the 
individual who has the transport, but for no one else. In this, as I have said, it resembles the knowledge 
given to us in sensations more than that given by intellectual thought. 508 
James interprets the mechanism of the mystical via negativa in terms of the negative dialectics 
of Hegel. Ibis is interesting because it parallels Bradley's negative method and the negative 
tone of Eliot's criticism as a means of dealing with metaphysical ineffability. Bradley was 
considered a Neo-Hegelian and Eliot was not only a student of Bradley but had read and 
heavily annotated Hegel's Philosophy of History 509 as a student. And just as Eliot denies in 
order to present - typified by his early essay 'Reflections on Vers Libre' or the negative 
historicism of the <<dissociation of sensibility>> -, James notes that it is characteristic of the type 
of mystical experience he is describing to affirm through the absolute negativity of the 
experience: 
Their very denial of every adjective you may propose as application to the ultimate truth [. ] though it 
seems on the surface to be a no function, is a denial made on behalf of a deeper yes. Who so calls the 
Absolute anything in particular, or says that it is this, seems implicitly to shut it off from being that - it is as 
if he lessened it. So that we deny the 'this', negating the negation which it seems to us to imply, in the 
interest of the higher affirmativc attitude by which we are possessed [ ... 
] Like Hegel in his logic, Mystics 
journey towards the positive pole of truth only bythe'Methode derAbsoluten Negativildt. '510 
mystical experience as personal experience with Eliot's theory of impersonality in 'Tradition and the Individual 
Talent', Childs, p. 37. 
507 William James, The Varieties ofReligious Experience (Glasgow: Collins Fount Paperbacks, 1981), p. 409. 
508 James, Varieties, p. 391. 
509 Eliot's copy of Georg Hegel's Philosophy offfistory is at Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
510 James, Varieties, pp. 401402. 
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Eliot had been influenced by the negative dialectics of Bradley, as in Me Presupposition of 
Critical History., 511 Yet Eliot's early criticism is typified by an struggle against this 
philosophical heritage. As he notes in 'The Perfect Critic': 
Finally Hegel arrived, and if not perhaps the first, he was certainly the most prodigious exponent of 
emotional systernatisation, dealing with his emotions as if they were definite objects which had aroused 
those emotions. 512 
For Eliot, Hegel's stylistic problem is of the psychological type; that of dealing with emotions 
as objects in themselves. James's choice of Hegel gives his agenda away in the very terms that 
Eliot criticizes both Hegel and psychologism. The affirmation inherent in absolute negativity is 
for Eliot purely cosmetic; it is the error of a style which relies too heavily on abstractions. Yet 
this is a philosophical tradition Eliot inherits, and there lies the limit of his participation in it. 
While for James the truth of the mystical experience is only relevant as a truth for 
the mystic, Eliot insists on finding the truth of mystical experience as a public statement. For 
James, mystical experiences are useful because they throw light on the essential pathological 
mechanisms of the human psyche; for Eliot, they are interesting because, in some varieties, 
they illustrate the workings of ordinary cognition. Pragmatism simply does not answer the 
question of the origin of the cognitive experience in the world, it merely states that, for reasons 
of practical utility, people believe. Or, as James puts it in his first Gifford Lecture with 
reference to H. M. Maudsley's Natural Causes and Supernatural Seemings. 
In other words, not its origin, but the way it works as a whole, is Dr Maudsley's final test of belief. This is 
our own empiricist criterion; and this criterion the stoutest insistcrs on supernatural origin have also been 
forced to use in the end. 513 
This sort of approach fails to address the reality of the personal experience to the individual and 
becomes a behaviourism of mental states. It may tell us how they work in relation to human 
behaviour, but does not tell us how individuals relate to those emotions aside from their 
practical cash value, which amounts to an epistemology of immediate returns for our cognitive 
511 
(<Then criticism, if it is to be criticism, must necessarily be to a certain extent negative [ ... 
] That a negative 
criterion, if it exist at all, must be from its nature an absolute criterion, or be self-contradiction)), 'The 
Presupposition of Critical History' in F. H. Bradley, Collected Essays, 2 vols (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1935), 1, p. 47. 
512 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 9. 
513 James, Varieties, p. 40. 
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investment in the world. James is happy to keep up the mystery of mystical experience - its 
ineffability - because he would like to think that there is simply no great mystery to solve. 
Ile 
goes as far as noting that there is no logical reason why human beings have developed the need 
to construct theological frameworks around the metaphysical drive of religious experiences: 
When I call theological formulas secondary products, I mean that in a world in which no religious feeling 
had ever existed, I doubt whether any philosophic theology would have been framed ... 
These speculations 
must, it seems to me, be classed as over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the intellect into directions of 
which feeling originally supplied the hint. 514 
For James, the mystical experience is a radical manifestation of both inevitable human 
pathology and the natural compensation mechanism to control those pathologies. Mental states 
are thus autonomous from the world, and theology turns out to be their objective over- 
elaboration. There is no reason, in other words, to visualize this psychic realm theologically 
because in the end, for James, there is nothing to see, but a number of mental states to deal 
with. For Eliot, this primacy of feeling is in doubt from the start given Bradley's speculation on 
the inaccessibility of immediate experiences; the conjecture that it is only through the 
objectification of feeling that we can become aware of feeling in the first place. Eliot states in 
his doctoral thesis: 
Sensation-in-itself is the language of Bradley's 'feeling' or experience as more original than consciousness; 
but sensation in itself is not capable of being an object of attention. Sensation and perception arc different; 
the moment we speak of 'having sensations' we have stepped into the theory of knowledge, having posited a 
self and consequently an external world. 
515 
In fact, when James calls theologicalformulas secondary products or over-beliefs he is already 
assuming a causality - where the feeling is prior - only available because the theological 
articulation of the belief makes it possible in thefirst place. 
71bus James's approach amounts to an internal behaviourism based on religious 
experience as variations on psychological pathology. James illustrates the opposite excesses of 
the sociological interpretations of religious experiences Eliot criticized in 'The Interpretation of 
Primitive Ritual'. In both extremes the meaning of the internal experience of religious 
experience remains ineffable, either taking a pseudo-scientific expression, as social behaviour - 
514 James, Varieties, p. 415. 
515 KE, p. 67. 
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for the sociologist - or as a neurological account - for the psychologist. Thus James's approach 
results in an uneasy materialism516. James's chapter entitled 'Religion and Neurology' in The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, is mainly an apology for scientific reductionism. He warns 
that he is not interested in the common believer but oin the original experiences which were the 
pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct>>517. He is referring to 
the mystic and adds: 
Invariably they have been creatures of exalted emotional sensibility. Often they have led a discordant inner 
life, and had melancholy during a part of their career. They have known no measure, been liable to 
obsessions and fixed ideas and presented all sorts of peculiarities which are ordinarily classed as 
pathological. 
518 
James attempts to dissociate biology from psychology as a way of neutralizing the temptation 
of referring emotional states to physical experience, and fall into a cheap causal materialism; 
but also, in the opposite direction, to avoid the inevitable gaps in materialist accounts which by 
his own admission let metaphysical explanations in by the back door. So he adds: o[Medical 
materialists] are effective with their talk of pathological origin only so long as supernatural 
origin is pleaded from the other side. >>519 James's difficulty is perhaps to stay this side of the 
supernatural as much as he shows a tendency to opt for a biological essentialism looking for 
compensation520. 
Eliot is not in absolute disagreement with James. It is worth noting that James's 
physiological psychologism is an option Eliot plays with through his impersonal theory of art 
as a way of resolving the solipsism of Bradley's Finite Centres. This influence is illustrated by 
Eliot's use of physiological language in his accounts of poetic cognition in The Sacred Wood: 
oDonne looked into a great deal more than the heart. One must look into the cerebral cortex, the 
516 See Israel Scheffler, Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 117-122. 
517 James, Varieties, p. 29. 
518 James, Varieties, p. 29. 
519 James, Varieties, p. 40. 
520 In Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey, Israel Scheffler writes: On 
the earlier Principles [of Psychology], however, [James] accepts the working hypothesis of physiological 
psychology that all mental states are effects of the brain. Accordingly, he continues to speak of mental states as 
special distinguishable entities, although he strives to connect them causally with bodily states [. . .] 
Mental states 
are for James, however, not casual off-shoots of bodily states, without significance for the organism's life 
problems [. .j 
For consciousness has, after all, evolved, hence it probably has utility, and James locates this utility 
in the process of choice)), p. 120. 
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nervous system, and the digestive tracts. >>521 This physiological vocabulary 
develops in Eliot's 
criticism figurative dimensions which co-exist with its literal meaning as a means of 
overcoming the dualism between science and metaphysics with which James struggles. It 
involves a hermeneutic shift towards a point where language is not tom between literal 
scientific meaning and metaphysical figurative signification. This shift parallels the mystical 
and philosophical hermeneutics of Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle. 
522 The identity of these 
authors helps Eliot to define mysticism within a particular philosophical tradition and to 
endorse and identify the particular form of cognition he is interested in as a particular form of 
mysticism. 
523 
James identifies with the romantic American tradition of transcendentalism - 
namely, as he puts it, Whitmanism - and the Spanish mystics: St Theresa and St John of the 
Cross. 524 In all these points James's account of the personal experience of the mystic is in 
sharp contrast to Eliot's preferences in the Clark Lectures: 
I wish to draw as sharply as possible the difference between the mysticism of Richard of St-Victor, which is 
also the mysticism of St Thomas Aquinas and of Dante, and the mysticism of the Spaniards which [ ... 
] is 
the mysticism of Crashaw and the Society of Jesus. The Aristotelian-Victorine-Dantesque mysticism is 
ontological; the Spanish mysticism is psychological. The first is what I call classical, the second 
romantic. 525 
This amounts to an absolute rejection of James' pragmatism and with it the mystical via 
negativa it indulges in. 
526 Yet it is a rejection conditioned by the fact that Eliot's rhetoric is 
clearly tinged, if not fully coloured in his earlier literary criticism, by negativity. His interest in 
521 'The Metaphysical Poets', SP, p. 66. 
522 
<ýAquinas] declares himself at one with Aristotle - and with experience - in affirming that, 
in this life, we can 
form no concept unless first we have received a sense impression, nor even return later to this concept without 
turning to the images that sense has lcft in the imagination. There is therefore a natural relation, an essential 
proportion, between the human intellect and the nature of material things>>, E. Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval 
Philosophy (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 249. See also n36. 
523 Donald J. Childs suggests that owhat we must bear in mind is that Eliot's mystical project is not so much to 
renounce or denounce mysticism as to define it. [It is] evidence of a developing knowledge and experience on 
Eliot's part that leads him, on the one hand, to allow fewer and fewer experiences to be properly labelled mystical 
and, on the other, to accord to experiences that might properly be so labelled more and more importance>>, Childs, 
p. 6. 
524 James, Varieties, pp. 381 &392. 
525 Lecture III [Donne and the Trecento], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 104. 
526 Childs provides a detailed account of Eliot's reaction against pragmatism in the context of the modernist anti- 
religious mood and its attraction towards immariental mysticism. See Chapter 3: 'Modernism and Pragmatism', 
Childs, pp. 53-83. 
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personal experience - despite his declaration in favour of dogma and outside authority 
in 'The 
Function of Criticism' - is a concession to immanence. These concessions are more clearly 
spelt out in The Use ofPoetry and the Use of Dificism (1933) where psychological approaches 
to mysticism are not completely ruled out: 
That there is an analogy between mystical experience and some of the ways in which poetry is written I dý 
not deny [ ... 
]; though, as I have said, whether the analogy is of significance for the student of religion, or 
only for the psychologist, I do not know. 
527 
If anything Eliot is clearly unable to draw a sharp line between ontology and psychology. He 
goes on to admit that automatic writing may be reached under conditions of ill health, as the 
expression of its pathological by-products. This is, however, something he showed a suspicion 
for in 'Blake'528. But one must remember that this review was written in the years previous to 
Eliot's breakdown and consequent completion of The Waste Land in a sanatorium in 
Switzerland. Eliot concludes in The Use ofPoetry and the Use of Criticism, and referring to the 
writing of poetry, that ((what happens is something negative>>; negative in the sense of its 
passivity and ineffability, clearly derived from the language of James's 77te Varieties of 
Religious Experience. This is an important concession to psychologism for Eliot in 1933, who 
is no longer prepared to put up a battle where there is none to fight. There is no battle, in other 
words, where there is conviction, and that is something Eliot is beginning to achieve. This 
conviction involves supplementing pragmatism with ((a theory of the relation of human life to 
the world. And with this completion it would [ ... 
] cease to be pragmatism>>529 as he is already 
prefiguring in his 1913 paper for the Philosophical Club: 'The Relationship Between 
Metaphysics and Politics'. By the time Eliot writes The Uses of Poetry and the Uses of 
Criticism, he is taking on pragmatism from the inside. 
The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism gives away its pragmatism in the very 
wording of the title. Eliot appears, like James, to limit his interest in concepts of poetry and 
527 TUpUC, p. 144. 
528 
vIt is only when the ideas become more automatic, come more freely and are less manipulated, that we begin 
to suspect their origin, to suspect hat they spring form a shallower source>>, 'Blake', SW, p. 153-154. 
529 'The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', p. 2 1. 
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criticism to their definition as a useful practice. The starting point must always be the object 
regardless of its origin because 
the experience of poetry, like any other experience, is only partially translatable in words; to begin with, as 
Mr Richards says, 'it is never what a poem says that matters, but what it is., 
530 
Yet, on the other hand, Eliot is not so sure by 1933 that this objective critical position can be 
maintained, and that critical dogma can be so easily avoided as 1. A. Richards - from whose 
Principles of Literary Criticism he quotes as above - intended. In effect what Eliot and 
Richards mean by taking into account what an object is is not the same thing. Because in the 
end to be concerned with what the poem is already involves a critical engagement which does 
more than simply tell us that the poem is an object: 
It would appear that criticism, like any other philosophical ctivity, is inevitable and requires no 
justification. To ask 'What is poetryT is to posit he critical function. 531 
'Mat is, the practice of poetry cannot take for granted what poetry is, anymore than it can avoid 
trying to answer this question in what is the critical practice of finding a theory for poetry. The 
critical function is the inevitable philosophical activity which informs both the creation and 
interpretation of a poem. 
532 There is a double battle between the self-consciousness about the 
beliefs operating in our experience and our necessity to validate these beliefs by self- 
consciously putting them into practice. In the end we might be tempted to by-pass this 
circularity and stick to the uses of criticism and poetry, stick, that is, to pure praxis. Yet this 
pragmatist alternative is only cosmetic because it merely appears to overcome self- 
consciousness by taking the aboutness out of it; that is, pure praxis is not about belief in this or 
that philosophical doctrine, but a belief about practice itself. 
533 This is the worst self- 
consciousness of them all because it only accounts for half of the experience, which in 
psychological terms take us back to Behaviourism once again. The development of critical self- 
530 TUpUC, p. 17 
531 TUPUC, pp. 19-20. 
532 
<(You cannot deplore criticism unless you deprecate the philosophy>>, TUPUC, p. 21. 
533 Donald Childs informs us that ((modernism relied heavily on pragmatism as the philosophical underpinning of 
its reforming agendw), Childs, p. 55. This is the philosophical slant on modernism Eliot criticises in his 
philosophical paper 'The Relationship Between Metaphysics and Politics' which falls (dnto the most dangerous of 
all dogma that we must do without dogma)), ( p. 11). 
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consciousness is indeed a major preoccupation in The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticisn?, 
as Eliot becomes aware of the self-conscious inescapability of the world he lives in: 
The important moment for the appearance of criticism seems to be the time when poetry ceases to be the 
expression of the mind of a whole pcople. 
534 
'Mis statement does not stand as a criticism but as a call towards a cultural sense of critical 
responsibility. It is not meant in the Amoldean sense of an elitist moral responsibility that 
wishes to clean the whole country before any good art can be created, something he had 
explicitly criticised in The Sacred Wood over a decade earlier. Eliot is making criticism - be it 
elitist or of a second order mind - as onecessary for that 'current of ideas, ' that 'society 
permeated with fresh thought, ' of which Arnold speaks>> 
535 
, as 
Eliot put it in the introduction of 
The Sacred Mood. Yet Eliot's words in The Use ofPoetry and the Use of Criticism above seem 
to waver towards making a concession to the possibility of a time where no criticism might 
have been needed, yet there is no romantic nostalgia here but the dealing with a necessary 
myth. At the other extreme, Pragmatism makes criticism - of any kind - redundant, in what is 
an expression of radical historical positivism. For Eliot, pragmatism is not confined to the 
philosophy of William James, it approximates the Weltanschauung of the modem world and 
ethically it is a by-word for Humanism. Pragmatism is the manifesto which may be seen behind 
the excesses performed in the name of Modernist experiment: the dogma in disguise to fight off 
dogma; or as Eliot puts it in 'Second Thoughts about Humanism' (1929), the point where: othe 
humanist Credo is the Dubito. )>536 This is the Cartesian battle-cry which takes for granted 
belief by affirming the absoluteness of self-consciousness. 
Eliot alludes to the problem of self-consciousness and belief in his criticism of the 
'inner voice' of Middleton Murry and Irving Babbitt and underpins Eliot's distinction between 
romanticism and classicism. In 1926, Eliot is still trying to argue for this distinction, but more 
and more reluctantly. In the Clark Lectures Eliot describes positive and negative mysticism 
saying othe first is what I call classical, the second romantic>>537 never to use this terminology 
534 TUPUC, p. 22. 
535 'Introduction', SW, p. xiv. 
536 'Second Thoughts about Humanism', SE, p. 484. 
537 Lecture III [Donne and the Trecento], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 104. 
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again if only apologetically. 
538 The use of the terms in this last statement has the purpose of 
referring back to Eliot's debate with Middleton Murry. He is here specifically 
defending 
himself against Middleton Murry's claims that Eliot belongs to the school of St John of the 
Cross' Dark Night of the Sou1539 -a classic example of the mystical via negativa. 
The editor 
of the Clark Lectures, Ronald Schuchard540, points out that much of this debate went on out of 
print, so that in the lectures Eliot is responding to private conversations between the two. 
Murry 
had, in fact, not only preceded Eliot as Clark Lecturer the previous year, but had recommended 
him as successor. Murry's position is summed up in his Adelphi articles of March and February 
after Eliot's lectures were in progress. 
Murry claims in 'The <<Classicalo Revival' that The Waste Land reveals Eliot as a 
crypto-romantic unable to sustain his longing for classicism. This is a crucial accusation given 
Eliot's stylistic dependence on rhetorical negativity, which then appears embodied in the 
romantic mysticism of St John of the Cross and St Theresa. It is interesting because it demands 
a closer look at Eliot's strategies which both adopt and subvert the medium he inherits. In a 
sense, Murry's accusations create a problem where there is none to solve. Habib notes that Eliot 
<<acknowledged that he lived in a 'romantic' agej>541 For him, such an acknowledgment lies at 
the heart of an ironic relationship with his romantic heritage, which he plays against his classic 
pretensions: 
538 1 think Romanticism and Classicism are words Eliot uses purely for political purposes. They reflect the 
political expression of cognitive dispositions of inwardness versus external worldviews. These terms are literary 
only insofar as literature is here used as a useful exemplary medium to express positions that go beyond the merely 
literary. I find any discussion about Eliot and Romantic poetry useless if only to illustrate this point. Romanticism 
as a useful term for literary criticism has wasted away, and Eliot does much to encourage this demise. 
539 For an extended analysis of Eliot's interest in the Spanish mystic see Pablo Zamorano, La Mistica de la Noche 
0scura: San Juan de la Cruz and T. S. Eliot (Servicio dc Publicaciones, Univcrsidad de Huelva, 1996) in which 
the author argues Eliot's participation in John of the Cross's negative mysticism. In Paul Murray's T. S. Eliot and 
Mysticism, Eliot's engagement with this mystical tradition goes unchallenged. Of course Murray is referring to 
Eliot's sources in Four Quartets, and it is true that this poem contains parts of Dark Night of the Soul (see Murray, 
Chapter 6: 'The Influence of St John of the Cross', pp. 88-100), but it is never established the extent to which Eliot 
fully adopts the via negativa, as poet's sources neither proves or disproves allegiances. 
540 See 'Editor's Introduction', VMP, 75n & 104n. 
541 M. A. R. Habib, The Early T S. Eliot and Western Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 60. 
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The task of literature is precisely to achieve that unity between the subjective and the objective which has 
suffered dissolution in real life. And it must do this by an ironic process: by incorporating the romantic 
emphasis on subjectivity within a larger equivalence which reinstates a classical emphasis on the object. 
542 
For Habib, irony is Eliot's principal rhetorical weapon in the reconciliation of opposites; the 
last line of effective defence in an age of ideological poverty, and which also implies one's 
inevitable participation in the terms one is re-defining. Hence, Eliot's ironic relationship with 
romanticism can deliver no resolution, in so far as irony offers no definitive alternative to a 
problem. It can only make evident a dissatisfaction, and suggest a resolution which it fails to 
openly define. This dissatisfaction translates into the demise of the method itself. Thus, in the 
end, the distinction between romanticism and classicism tends towards meaninglessness as the 
circularity of irony goes on ad infinitum. 
543 Irony collapses into the very metaphysical 
ineffability and negativity Eliot is trying to over-come. So in The Use of Poetry and the Use of 
Criticism he concludes: 
That is one of the dangers of expressing one's meaning in terms of 'Romanticism': it is a term which is 
constantly changing in different contexts, and which is now limited to what appear to be purely literary and 
purely local problems, now expanding to cover almost the whole of the life of a time and of nearly the whole 
world. 
544 
Typically Eliot is complaining about the lack of dcfinition of his terms. More importantly the 
dichotomy of romanticism and classicism forces Eliot into accepting the subjective-objective 
dualism from which he wants to escape. The 'outside voice' in classicism, overcome with the 
weight of external authority and dogma, fails to capture his interest in personal experience as 
belief; belief, moreover, to be distinguished from the 'inner voice' of romanticism. Let us 
remember that impersonality does not imply, for Eliot, the end of personality but attempts to 
articulate an as yet indefinite personal experience. Habib quite rightly points out that 
Impersonality is not opposed to personal experience but rather obtains an ironic relationship with it, 
extending and completing it. 
545 
Yet, one wonders if irony can ever be expected to complete the relations it sustains. It is 
negative in so far as it relies for meaning, not on definition, but on connotation. Thus, it must, 
in the end, give way to allow for a positive definition of personal experience, which 
542 Habib, p. 182. 
543 Habib notes that the metaphysical resolution of subjectivity and objectivity must in the end depend <<on our 
ability to overcome irony>>, Habib, p. 145. 
544 TUPUC, p. 128. 
545 Habib, p. 180. 
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'impersonality' fails to provide. The critical shift in the Clark Lectures can be seen as yet a 
further experiment in criticism and critical terminology. Mysticism enables Eliot to articulate 
personal experience just as part of his critical vocabulary - romanticism and classicism, 
personality and impersonality - was expiring. 
Furthermore, mysticism allows Eliot to distinguish between the metaphysics at 
whose frontier he wanted to halt in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', and the 'metaphysics' 
he wanted to promote in 'The Metaphysical Poets'. In 'Dante' this distinction is 
experimentally projected into types of mysticism which take the form of two forms of 
cognition; the mysticism that perceives and the mysticism thatfeels. In the Clark Lectures the 
distinction is concretised philosophically in terms of ontology (or metaphysics) as opposed to 
psychologism. And this philosophical concretization is only possible as a result of Eliot's 
construction of a critical frame where this tenninology can fit and be understood, not as 
philosophical abstractions, but with reference to concrete cognitive exercises, which he can 
now correlate to varieties of mystical experience. The question is perhaps whether one can 
argue that Eliot's overcoming of the negativity of critical self-consciousness - the inability to 
describe and affirrn absolutely - is not itself a Wethode der Absoluten Negativitat'. And that in 
his search to achieve the positive function of belief he is only arriving at absolute doubt. 
Because, if self-consciousness must undermine the act of faith, then is it not a temptation to 
make that self-consciousness the absolute measure itself? In other words, does Eliot's negative 
way ever truly turn positive? Or is the negative pull too strong to be turned around? Part of the 
problem I am raising involves the fact that positive affirmation must inevitably establish an 
exclusivity against that not included in its definition. This struggle with affirmation is 
evidenced in Eliot's attempt to resolve the relationship between belief and dogma. 
Mysticism allows Eliot to describe the relation between belief (here as the act of 
believing) and dogma (that which is believed) in ways that classicism would not do by virtue of 
its stress on behaviour rather than experience. While James wonders doubtfully: oDo mystical 
states establish the truth of those theological affections in which the saintly life has its 
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root? ))546, Eliot cannot dismiss the metaphysical claims of belief as mere emotions, ultimately 
unrelated to a belief system, be it philosophy or theology. He is quite clear, though, that one 
cannot opreserve emotions without the beliefs with which their history has been involved. >>547 
Claims about the truth of our experiences are real and involve referents in-the-world; they must 
be problematized, precisely in order to get them right. This, according to Eliot, requires a 
positive theory of the relation of humans to the world: a dogma. The drawback is that, the 
moment one's belief is concretised in dogma, one cannot expect to communicate to people who 
do not share that dogma. We return to the Bradleyan problem of the cognitive privacy of the 
finite centre, now at a cultural level. No matter how many people are included within one's 
realm of intelligibility, there always seem to be people falling off the edges. Eliot's requirement 
of a positive theory of the relation of the human being to the world can easily encourage the 
exclusion of the uninitiated through the ineffability of one's dogma to others: ergo negativity. 
Richards and the Theory of Belief 
The role of I. A. Richards in this new critical stage is pertinent. Richards, a young Cambridge 
don at the School of English, had met Eliot in 1920. Having read and been impressed by 
Eliot's 4ra Vos Prec, he tried and failed to lure Eliot into academic life. 
548 In 1926 Richards 
was present at the Clark Lectures among a number of young academics increasingly holding 
Eliot as their mentor in the new age of English Studies. Among these Ronald Schuchard 
mentions: E. M. W. Tillyard, Basil Willey, H. S. Bennet, Mansfield Forbes, Aubrey Attwater 
and F. R. Leavis. 
549 Richards's criticism of The Waste Land parallels Murry's attack, namely 
in that, despite the objectivist classicism of his criticism, his poetry indulges in ineffability of 
emotion. 
550 In Richards's words - which Eliot quotes in Dante (1929) - it amounts to a 
546 James, Varieties, p. 401. 
547 TUpUC, p. 135. 
548 Peter Ackroyd, T S. Eliot (London: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 99-100. 
549 'Editor's Introduction', YMP, pp. II- 17. 
550 Perhaps Paul Murray, in T. S. Eliot and Mysticism, could do better to address more clearly the role of Eliot's 
poetic expression against that of his criticism before he uses the former as sufficient ground to determine Eliot's 
mystical allegiances. It is worth considering that Eliot's poetry is a place where he allows himself to push the 
tensions between his personal experience and his credo much further than he does in his criticism; but that without 
the orthodoxy of his criticism his poetic expression would find no way of putting his personal experience into 
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complete severance between poetry and all beliefs. 
551 There is, however, an important 
difference between the comments of Murry and Richards. Murry holds Eliot back to a 
defensive classicism which perpetuates the simplified dualism between the inner and the outer 
he wants to leave behind. On the other hand, Richards encourages the new critical voice Eliot is 
pursuing; one which demands a new terminology and which Eliot obliges by borrowing from 
the contemporary academic debate about the relationship between poetry and belief. 
552 
Eliot takes up Richards's challenge in Dante - in the notes to chapter two on the 
Taradiso'. Eliot has no difficulty in admitting a degree of separation between poetry and belief 
so that: 
If there is 'literature, if there is 'poetry', then it must be possible to have full literary or poetic appreciation 
without sharing the beliefs of the poet I deny, in short, that the reader must share the beliefs of the poet 
in order to enjoy the poetry fully. 
553 
Eliot provisionally concedes the point and he does so for two reasons. On the one hand he is 
aware that not to admit this point is to fall into radical dogmatism. On the other hand it allows 
him to maintain a premise to which he can add modifications; modify to express more precisely 
what he means by the relation between poetry and belief without falling into defending a 
position he does not support as such. Thus, no sooner, has he conceded the theoretical point that 
there is no need to share the belief of the poet to understand the poetry, that he adds: we can 
understand each other despite our beliefs, but we have, at the same time, to admit that 
understanding must terminate in belief. This is how Eliot puts it: 
words in the first place. Criticism is, for Eliot, the construction-site of orthodoxy whereas poetry is the place of 
heresy. 
551 Dante, p. 58. 
552 It is worth reading Part Two 'Empiricism and Idealism in the Cultural Theory of 1. A. Richards' in Pamela 
McCallum's Literature and Metho& Towards a Critique of LA Richards, T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis, specially 
the section entitled 'The initial formulation of Consciousness: The Challenge of Bchaviourism'. Here Richards is 
described as actively participating in the debate about the nature of human consciousness incited by the growing 
science of psychology. Richards was, McCallum tells us, specially worried about the problem posed by the 
Behaviourist challenge in the face of the creative function of the human mind: (df all human action, including 
thought, can be circumscribed within a mechanistic and determinist stimulus-response model, then the possibility 
of a creative and active consciousness is put into question>> (McCallum, p. 43). Eliot was not thinking so much 
about the creative function as much as the very possibility of personal experience in the context of religious 
orthodoxy as in his graduate paper 'The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual'. This is also a problem, as we saw 
above, which tinges William James' attempt to account for mystical experiences without either giving in to 
metaphysical presumptions nor to neurological accounts, which encourages the pragmatic method Eliot criticizes. 
553 Dante, p. 57. 
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But if you yourself are convinced of a certain view of life, then irresistibly and inevitably believe that if 
anyone else comes to 'understand' it fully, his understanding must terminate in belief [ ... 
] So I can only 
conclude that I cannot, in practice, wholly separate my poetic appreciation from my personal beliefs. 
554 
In short, Eliot is making a point about sincerity555; that it is naive to think that in practice 
understanding is achievable apart from the beliefs that lead us to that understanding. That is not 
to say that we have to share the beliefs of the poet to understand him, but that any 
understanding inevitably terminates in something akin to the sharing the belief of the 
interlocutor. It is insincere to deny this, in so far as it is insincere for people to pretend that they 
lead their lives apart from beliefs or dogmas. Eliot goes on to identify a latent dogmatism in 
Richards' Practical Criticism: <<We may observe, in passing, the intense religious seriousness 
of Mr Richards's attitude towards poetry. >>556 
Richards shares James' predilection for separating thoughts from feelings. In James 
this position transpires into the condemnation that religious feeling should ever adopt 
theological or philosophical expression, and in Richards, the less drastic solution, that one 
should distinguish the emotional response from the objective response to poetry, that is, 
between what he calls critical and technical literary criticism: 
in a full critical statement which states not only that an experience is valuable in certain ways, but also that it 
is caused by certain features in the contemplated object, the part which describes the value of an experience 
we shall call the critical part. That which describes the object we shall call the technical part. 
557 
Richards is promoting a critical dualism where the emotive element contained in the critical is 
further devoid of any metaphysical value by being explained psychologically. Richards adds: 
We shall endcavour in what follows to show that the critical remarks are merely a branch of psychological 
remarks, and that no special ethical or metaphysical ideas need be introduced to explain value. 558 
Thus Richards encourages the severance of poetry from all beliefs, a view he erroneously 
projects, as far as Eliot is concerned, onto The Waste Land. The parallel with James extends to 
554 Dante, p. 58-59. 
555 Although Donne ois in a sense a psychologist>>, Eliot develops the idea of sincerity as a means to rescue the 
latency of belief as a sensual intuition in Donne's poetry: oif you like you may call the thought 'insinccre', because 
it does not reach belief; but his feeling of the thought is perfectly sinccre>>, Lecture IV [The Conceit in Donne', 
The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 133). Sincerity is thus for Eliot the last line of defence of belief in a self-conscious 
age where faith is no longer possible. 
556 TUpUC, p. 132. 
557 1. A. Richards, Principles ofLiterary Criticism (London: Kcgan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1926), p. 23. 
558 principles ofLiterary Criticism , p. 
23. 
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the admission that emotions may be objectless and that they should be recognized as such 
rather than be misinterpreted by providing them with an unholy objective alliance of a 
metaphysical kind: 
That an objectless belief is a ridiculous or incomplete thing is a prejudice derived only from confusion 
When they are kept from tampering with the development of reference such emotional attitudes may be, as 
revelation doctrines in such strange forms maintain, among the most important and valuable ffects 
which the arts can produce-559 
The worship of emotional ineffability, together with a latent romanticism lurking under the 
objective veil of science is here - like in James's Varieties of Religious Experience - clear to 
Eliot. In Yhe Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism Eliot compares Richards's latent 
psychologism in terms of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius560, who along with St John 
and St Teresa Eliot are considered as romantic mystics in the Clark Lectures. 
561 
In Dante (1930), Eliot not only shrugs off Richards's dualist claims, but insists on 
the cognitive link between emotions to objects in all perception. This link is exercised by belief. 
Eliot adds: 
When I speak of understanding, I do not mean merely knowledge of books or words, any more than I mean 
belief. I mean a state of mind in which one sees certain beliefs. 
562 
For Eliot the belief involved in our perception of the world and the belief in a particular dogma 
overlap. One sees the one as one sees the other. More importantly, the inference is that 
philosophical belief is directly involved in perception insofar as it contributes to organize 
human emotions arising from our encounter with the world. In a sense, what one believes is 
only relevant for the person who holds that belief, yet the reader of poetry must acknowledge 
this fact and try to understand the extent to which it makes a difference to the poet: 
My point is that you cannot afford to ignore Dante's philosophical and theological beliefs, or to skip the 
passages which express them most clearly-, but that on the other hand you are not called upon to believe 
559 Principles ofLiterary Criticism, pp. 280-8 1. 
560 
((Now for the points. 
1. Alan's Loneliness (the isolation ofthe human situation). 
H. Thefacts of birth and ofdeath, in their inexplicable oddity. 
I 11. The inconceivable immensity of the Universe. 
IV. Alan's place in the perspective oftime. 
V. The Enormity (sc. enormousness) ofman's ignorance)), TOPUC, pp. 132-133. 
561 Lecture 11 [Donne and the Middle Ages], Ile Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 84. 
562 Dante, p. 44. 
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them yourself [ ... 
) If you can read the poetry as poetry, you will 'believe' in Dante's theology exactly as 
you believe in the physical realityof hisjoumey-, that is, you suspend both belief and disbelief. 
563 
Ile ambiguity Eliot creates is in the suggestion that, though the reader is not called upon 
believing, he is neither in a position to disbelieve the belief which shapes the vision of others. 
The reader is ultimately called upon seeing. And seeing is precisely what the poet does through 
his belief. So that seeing is in a way already sharing the poet's understanding and his faith 
beyond the particularities of his dogma which, in turn, undoubtedly makes the vision possible. 
Once belief permeates the cognitive act of seeing the detailing of that particular dogma is 
secondary. Thus Dante's oprivate belief becomes a different thing in becoming poetry>>, as he 
makes us see what he saw. 
564 In a sense we do not have to share the poet's beliefs to 
understand the poetry, for the vision, once achieved, is not a mere illustration of dogma but a 
vision for which we only need our eyes to understand. 
The parallel difficulty for Eliot is modem self-conscious psychologism because it 
prioritises the critical function over faith -a faith which Eliot 
insists on linking with the 
workings of ordinary cognition. In fact it is the increasing separation of philosophy from 
theology which Eliot blames for the rise in critical self-consciousness; without faith philosophy 
ceases to be an object which can be seen and spirits itself away as a meTe feeling. This 
argument is very similar to Etienne Gilson565 in The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy on the 
medieval debate between Augustinians and Thomists on the relation of faith and philosophy: 
Just as certain Augustinians regard Thomism as false, because not a Christian philosophy, so certain 
Thomists reply that it is true but not in the least because it is Christian. They are forced, in fact, into this 
position; because, once reason, as regards its exercise, has been divorced from faith, all intrinsic relations 
between Christianity and philosophy become a contradiction. 566 
Eliot has to deal with a similar situation by being forced into a position in which he has to choose between dogma 
or mcre poctic (or religious) emotions; he is engaged in choosing the former without attempting to be dogmatic. 
563 Dante, pp. 42-43. 
564 Dante, P. 43. 
565 Schuchard notes Eliot's reading for the Clark Lectures: Gilson's 'St Thomas' in Les Moralisttes Chritiens 
(1925) and La Philosophie au moyen dge (1922), the latter particularly in relation to Eliot's review of Maurice de 
Wulf's History ofAledieval Philosophy in the Times Literary Review (I 6th December, 1926), VMP, p. 77, n33. 
566 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit ofNfedieval Philosophy (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 7. 
Eliot refers directly to Gilson's La Philosophie au moyen fige in which the author encourages the idea of a 
continuous philosophical tradition from the Middle Ages to modem times. See Lecture 11 [Donne and the Middle 
Ages], The Clark Lectures, VAIP, p. 77. 
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This is particularly illustrated by Eliot's strategies in Dante (1929) of arguing for the importance of dogma in 
poetry without saying that poetry has to be dogmatic. This problem is resolved by Eliot's critical turn from 
Metaphysical poetry to 'philosophical' poetry. In the latter case, a poetry not practiced by poets who illustrate a 
philosophy or philosophers who write poetry, but by poets who see through a philosophy because they believe it as 
theology. It implies a philosophy which is itself a separate object of cognitive intelligibility from poetry and 
which, by virtue of being a separate object, can be seen, and not merely privately felt. It is this cognitive dimension 
of belief which attenuates the privacy of one's experience. If we are able see our beliefs, we can make other see 
more successfully than we can make others feel what we feel. Thus metaphysics is concretised through 
philosophical belief without falling into dogmatism. This approach finally revises the classicism of 'The Function 
of Criticism' by making apparent the link between ordinary cognition and the operations of external dogma in 
human experience. 
567 
567 See'Metaphysical Politics' in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Eliot's Allep-orical Rhetoric 
As Eliot reaches 1930 he begins to make closer references to philosophy. Yet he falls short of 
embracing its discourse explicitly. This is symptomatic of Eliot's on-going wariness about 
dogmatism. The closest he gets to philosophical explanations is when he proposes their 
impracticability within his criticism, as in 'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca' (1927): 
What I have said could be expressed more exactly, but at much greater length, in philosophical language: it 
would enter into the department of philosophy which might be called the Theory of Belief (which is not 
psychology but philosophy proper) - the department i  which Meinong and Husserl have made some 
pioneer investigation. 568 
This statement has two functions: it reveals the philosophical background underpinning Eliot's 
criticism, but it also delimits the role philosophy is still playing in his Criticism. Eliot is 
explicitly indicating that his critical discourse is an alternative discourse. He is not interested in 
describing the role of philosophical belief through criticism because that is a philosophical 
pursuit. Eliot still refuses to be merely philosophical, as if he wanted to go further, to see these 
philosophies even at the expense of the exactitude promised by philosophical discourse. Thus 
Eliot's critical discourse reveals a poetic objective, that Of replacing, not embodying 
philosophy. 
It is worth noting Eliot's choice of philosophers above: they are phenomenologists 
concerned with the foundation of human cognition in the world of objects; something, Eliot 
tells"us, parallels a theory of belief. Eliot had read Husserl's Logical Investigations the summer 
he spent at Marburg in 1914 and studied it at Harvard where he had audited H. T. Costello's 
Philosophy 8a on current logical theories in October of the previous year. 
569 He had also dealt 
568 T. S. Eliot's 'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca', SE, p. 138. 
569 Eliot's notes for the course are at the Houghton Library. Lacking permission to look at these I have consulted 
E. W. Friend's notes on the same course at the Pusey Library, Harvard Archives: Husserl's logic and 
phenomenology was the subject set for 24th November 1913. Eliot's annotated copy of Edmund Husserl's Logical 
Investigations is at the London Library, which he read in the summer of 1914. His influence has been traced to 
'Hamlet and His Problems' and the objective correlative by John M. Steadman in 'Eliot and Husserl: The Origin 
of the Objective Correlative', Notes and Queries, 203 (June, 1958): (<As early as 1900 and 1901 Edmund Husser, 
had employed the terms 'gegenstandliches Korrelat' and 'objectives Korrelat' in Logische Untersuchungen (Third 
Edition, Halle a. d. S, 1922,1,245,248-249; 11,25). Distinguishing sharply between categories of meaning ('die 
Bedeutungskategorien') on the one hand and objective categories ('diegegenstandlichen Kategorien') on the other, 
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with Alexus von Meinong's theory of objects in detail in his doctoral thesis. 
570 Eliot's 
doctrinal interests in belief are still very much seeking an overlap with the problems of 
cognition he had studied as a philosophy post-graduate. Yet he now refrains from rehearsing 
their philosophical arguments. Instead, Eliot recovers philosophy by contextualising it in 
theological hermeneutics. The aim of the recovery becomes a rhetorical exercise which aims to 
end up seeing philosophy through his criticism. The aim of this chapter is to investigate how 
Eliot seeks an expression for the sort of philosophical problems he is interested in without 
falling into the private and exclusive language of philosophy. He does this by stressing the 
cognitive dimension of belief as illustrated by the allegorical hermeneutics of Dante's 
mysticism. I will argue that Eliot projects these allegorical strategies onto a renewed 
understanding of rhetoric. 
Allegory as a Rhetorical Strategy 
John Paul Riquelme has suggested a method of interpreting allegory in te context of Eliot's 
criticism; he appropriates the terrn to evoke what he sees as Eliot rhetorical strategies of 
deferral: 
The allegorical procedures of Eliot's critical writing, which go unannounced, are more diffuse [ ... 
] This sort 
of allegorical method relies in continual deferrals of meaning in response to multiple, interlocking issues and 
to unanswered, unanswerable questions. The method involves shifting always to another provisional 
perspective and another context of interpretation as a recognition that many such contexts and perspectives 
are possible. Such an allegory, which leads to potentially endless shifting among contexts of meaning, is a 
modem development, to be distinguished from its medieval precursors. 
571 
Riquelme is right to distinguish the allegory he is talking about from oits medieval precursors>>, 
but he is wrong to assume that Eliot is not working within this paradigm as it is clearly the case 
in Dante. In effect, deferral belongs properly to the allegorical hermeneutics of figural 
prophecy where every fulfilment precludes a new beginning. This hermeneutic postponement, 
he regarded the latter as the objective correlates of the former. In Ideen zu einer reinen Ph4nomenologie und 
phdnomenologischen Philosophie (1913) this doctrine of the 'Korrelat-gegenstand' or 'intcntionales Objekt' 
underwent further developmenbý (p. 262). This hypothetical link between Eliot's criticism and Husserl's 
philosophy reveals an interesting subtext to the objective correlative's scientific pretensions, and overshadows its 
logical insecurities in relation to Russell as I pointed out in Chapter 2 of this thesis, especially 'Imaginary Objects, 
immediate Experience and the 'Correlative". 
570 See the discussion in chapter 2 of Russell's 'On Denoting' and Meinong's classification of objects in relation 
to Eliot's objective correlative and his doctoral thesis, particularly 'The Epistemologist's Theory of Knowledge 
(continued)'. 
571 John Paul Riquclmc, Harmony of Dissonances: T S. Eliot, Romanticism, and Imagination (London: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 199 1), p. 112. 
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however, depends on the provisional closure of achievable fulfilments; deferral is in this sense 
not absolute. Allegory is the background over which one should interpret Eliot's criticism, both 
as a cognitive model of language and historicism, for allegory reconciles these two 
dimensions. 572 Where Riquelme's approach is adequate, is perhaps limited to Eliot's early 
rhetorical tactics of postponement in addressing metaphysics in his criticism, but which the 
allegorical model helps to resolve, not, that is, to perpetuate. 
If Eliot rebuffs metaphysics in his early critical writings it is not as part of an 
explicit hermeneutics of absence, but as a struggle to content himself with what he could 
present via the medium of a scientific style. Science limits itself to presenting what is 
presentable in its own terms. Eliot's rhetorical development involves an expansion of what he 
can present by virtue of stretching the frontiers of his critical discourse and, by implication, that 
of science. It is not a matter of choice but of necessity. Eliot's preference for ontology - in the 
form of the ontological mysticism discussed in the Clark Lectures - is conditioned by his 
awareness that its recuperation can only be achieved under certain conditions, conditions which 
by the twentieth-century have disappeared. For Eliot we can no longer pretend to see like Dante 
saw the transcendental in the finite: 
Dante's is a visual imagination. It is a visual imagination in a different sense from the modern painter of a 
still life: it is visual in the sense that he lived in an age in which men still saw visions. It was a psychological 
habit, the trick of which we have forgotten, but as good as any of our own. 
573 
This vision amounts to an ontology which is metaphysical but which can, nonetheless, be seen. 
It is not ineffable although it has by now been contaminated with psychology. This is the 
psychologism that encourages an object-less consciousness with which Eliot is concerned in the 
Clark lectures, and which he identifies with the romantic mysticism of St Theresa and St John. 
Eliot's phenomenology is one in which consciousness is still one of external objects in the 
tradition of Edmund Husserl. Eliot's apparent defeatist admission that Dante's ontological 
vision is, in the present age, beyond our reach transforms itself into a radical conformism, 
which actively seeks its recuperation through the alternative medium the rhetorical subversion 
572 This point will be investigated further in 'Figures and Prophecy' of this thesis, Chapter 6. 
573 Dante, p. 23. 
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of scientific discourse. Metaphysics makes a gradual comeback into the world of the visible 
throughout Eliot's criticism as it is articulated both through his interest in allegory, and his 
attempt to upgrade rhetoric as an allegorical strategy. 
The Allegory of the Poets and of the Theologians 
Allegory may be commonly taken to be a mere poetic device of personification, but it is, more 
importantly, also a hermeneutic tool in the interpretation of the Scriptures, otherwise known as 
the Four Levels of Scripture which include the literal, allegorical, philosophical and anagogic. 
'Me allegory within the Four Levels is the Allegory of Poets as opposed to the Four Levels 
collectively referred to as the Allegory of 'Ibeologians. 
574 The Allegory of the Theologians 
makes a point of articulating the simultaneous co-existence of the literal and the anagogic; it 
reconciles physics and metaphysics without altering the reality of the typological event under 
scrutiny. The facts of scripture are taken as literally true and, typologically, pre-figuring the 
spiritual event of the coming of Christ. 
575 The Allegory of Poets, instead, is concerned with 
veiled moral messages, not literally true, with particular reference to the interpretation of 
Classical literature. It was a method of recuperating pagan works of literature for a Christian 
world. Dante's novelty lies in the introduction of theological allegory into a discussion of the 
meaning of secular poetry. It amounts to the reconciliation between the fiction of the poets and 
the truth of the theologians576, which implies the exploitation of the latent poetic function - 
the allegorical level - within the Four Levels of Scripture. A. J. 
Minnis notes the impossibility 
of categorising Dante's allegory as either strictly theological or poetical, but as seeming, 
to be exploring the common ground which medieval literary theory was defining between poetic fiction 
which is in some sense true and scriptural truth which can on occasion be expressed through figures, 
fictions, and enigmas. 
577 
This concern is basically Eliot's own and it illustrates the relationship between poetry and 
belief he was trying to untangle. 
574 See Chapter IX: 'The Transformation of the Critical Tradition: Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio' in Medieval 
Literary Theory and Criticism (c. I 100-c. 1375), A. J. Minnis and A. B. Scott cd. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 
pp. 373-394. 
575 See Erich Auerbach, 'Figura' in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, Theory and History of 
Literature Vol. 9 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
576 Minnis, pp. 386-387. 
577 Minnis, p. 387. 
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Dante is the founder of a tradition that claims truth for secular poetry, and not a 
mere medium for moral exemplum through literary personification. Ile suggests that the 
Allegory of the Theologians may be applied to texts other than sacred. This is a problematic 
shift because it involves deducing that either the Scriptures are poetry, or that poetry can claim 
sacred truth for itself. Minnis sees this sacred elevation of poetry exemplified by Boccaccio and 
Petrarch: 
But such appropriation of the theological tradition must surely reach its climax in the somewhat startling 
proposition that theology is poetry and poetry is theology. Poetry declares Petrarch [Letters on Familiar 
Matters, x: 4] is not inimical to theology, and he uses a Dionysian argument to prove it: <<When Christ is 
called, now a lion, now a lamb, and again a worm, what is that if not poetic? >>578 
What Petrarch seems to be claiming is that the Bible's imagery has an arbitrary relation to its 
referent, in this case Christ, without losing its truth-value. This is because theologically this 
referent carries the full ontological responsibility of Being confirmed by the absolute otherness 
of the poetic image. It amounts to discarding the phenomenal typology of the Scriptures, and 
reducing its Word to a objectless image by inspiration revealed. This rejection of a referential 
cognitive grounding is in line, as Minnis suggests, with the negative mysticism of pseudo- 
Dionysus. Yet, it is the intelligibility of the Bible with its appeal to events in the world that 
interests Eliot, rather than the self-legitimizing ineffable poetic of the theological hermeneutics 
of the via negativa, which ultimately poeticises the Scriptures. Here lies the connection 
between Eliot's preference for oa philosophy which is expressed, not one which is 
inexpressibleýý579 and the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures which does not reduce the 
Bible to poetry but stresses its literal concreteness. 
It is the logic of the allegory of the theologians, in line with Dante's own 
position, 
580 which leads Eliot to insist that the Bible is not literature in an unpublished address 
'The Bible as Scripture and as Literature' read before the Women's Alliance at Boston King's 
578 Minnis, p. 388. 
579 Lecture I [Introduction: On the Definition of Metaphysical Poetry], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 49. 
580 Dante's most explicit allegiance to theological allegory can be found in his 'Epistle to Can Grande della 
Scala', though his authorship has never been confirmed. Dante states: vFor the elucidation therefore, of what we 
have to say, it must be understood that the meaning of [the Divine Comedy] is not of one kind only; rather the 
work may be described as 'polysemous', that is, having several meanings; for the first meaning is that conveyed by 
what the letter signifies; the former of which is called literal, while the latter is called allegorical, or mysticalo, 
Minnis, p. 459. 
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Chapel in 1932 while visiting Harvard as the new Eliot Norton Professor of Poetry. It is not that 
the Bible has no literary relevance, but that its literary influence depends on its not being itself 
considered literature: 
But as I have explained I cannot treat the Bible as literature, or as poetry the parts of it which are regarded as 
poetry [ ... 
] so long as the Bible is read as the Bible, so long will it exert an influence upon English poetry, 
and when it ceases to be read as the Bible, then I do not believe we need worry about poetry, for in those 
days I doubt whether anything will be written which would seem in the least like poetry, to us or to our 
forebears. 581 
The stuff of literature is not itself a fiction but the real world of objects, among which the Word 
of God is the most important and thus literally true in a pseudo-empirical sense. All literature 
worth the name is theological in a cognitive sense. So that if cognition is an act of faith, then 
the reality of the world of objects must be dependent on the truth of faith's ultimate referent: 
God. This is relative to an idea which Eliot would elaborate further in After Strange Gods two 
years later: 
The Bible has had a literary influence upon English literature not because it has been considered as 
literature, but because it has been considered as the report of the Word of God. And the fact that men of 
letters now discuss it as 'literature' probably indicates the end of its 'literary' influence. 
582 
One must be clear that Eliot is not insinuating that literary activity is about illustrating dogma; 
hence the insistence on an active separation between theology and poetry. The difficulty is to 
show the overlap between the two without making all literary activity dogmatic; how far, in 
other words, dogma is an object of cognition as faith and not simply an articulation of personal 
belief. 'Mis cognitive overlap is precisely the one Dante was trying to articulate by subjecting 
secular allegory to theological hermeneutics, without, unlike Petrarch, obscuring the difference 
between theology and poetry. 
Eliot, it must be remembered, had a good grounding in medieval hermeneutics. 
Between 1909-10, he had taken English 1: 'Chaucer' and Comparative Literature 18: 'Studies 
on the History of Allegory', both under Allan Neilson as part of his A. M. in English literature 
581 'The Bible as Scripture and as Literature' (MS), read before the Women's Alliance at Boston's King Chapel 
on the I st of December, 1932, T. S. Eliot's Family Papers at Houghton Library. 
582 'After Strange Gods', SPh, p. 34. 
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at Harvard. 
583 This background is evident in Dante (1929) where he shows a detailed 
knowledge of the conflicting scholarly approaches to 'allegory': 
What is important for my purpose is the fact that the allegorical method was a definite method not confined 
to Italy, and the fact that, apparently paradoxical, the allegorical method makes for simplicity and 
intelligibility. We incline to think of allegory as a tiresome cross-word puzzle [ ... 
] What we ignore is, in a 
case like Dantc's, its particular effect towards lucidity of style [. . .] 
We have to consider the type of mind 
which by nature and practice tended to express itself in allegory: and for a competent poet, allegory means 
clear visual images. 
584 
This clarification has a dual effect. It shows Eliot's awareness of allegory as a poetic model, 
which shuns ineffability and promotes clear visual images. It also widens the realm of allegory 
from the merely poetic to the more inclusive rhetorical mode of style, which in fact parallels the 
sort of writing style Eliot attempts to enact in the very place where he is encouraging it: his 
literary criticism. Allegory replaces the scientific model Eliot starts off with in the 1910s, but 
which does not fundamentally alter his early empiricism only now understood in the context of 
cognition and faith. 
There is an interesting contemporary context to Eliot's interest in allegory. In a 
contribution to The Criterion, Benedetto Croce had written 'On the Nature of Allegory' some 
four years before Eliot wrote Dante and one year before the Clark Lectures. In this article 
Croce attacks the idea of allegory as a writing practice, reducing its scope to that of a 
superfluous hermeneutic tool. <<Allegory is not a form of expressiowý585, Croce warns us as he 
severs the links between allegory and rhetoric: 
There is no necessity to seek the tradition of allegory, properly so called, in the history of rhetoric, but in that 
of philosophy. 
586 
This is an important distinction. By placing allegory purely within a philosophical tradition he 
is able to undermine its claims over poetic immediacy. Rhetoric is, on the other had, a more 
difficult obstacle to overcome if what Croce is looking for is to discredit allegory as a 
legitimate form of poetic expression. He is presenting allegory in a form which he is happy to 
583 William Allan Neilson had completed his Ph. D. in 1912 on The Origins and Sources of the Court of Love: A 
Study in Medieval Allegory, Harvard Archives Depository. 
584 Dante, p. 22. 
585 Benedetto Croce, 'On the Nature of Allegory', The Criterion, 3, no II (April 1925), p. 406. 
586 Croce, 'On the Nature of Allegory', p. 407. 
202 
attack. Hence, he prefers to perpetuate the stereotype of allegory as a Wiresome cross-word 
puzzle)). He continues: 
I thus defined allegory (and I believe I was the first to do so) as a practical act, a form of writing (for writing 
is practical), a cryptography, if the term can be applied to the uses of images spoken or figured, instead of 
letters and numerals [ ... 
] the task of deciphering allegories is altogether desperate, perpetually conjectural, 
and capable of the most of laying claim to a greater or lesser degree of probability. 
5 87 
For Croce allegory is an obscure writing method which should be reduced to being an 
interpretative pattern ultimately external to the writing itself. oa system of hermeneutics, rather 
than an inventing process. >>588 Croce reduces the scope of allegory to philosophical figuration 
concluding that oallegory is almost always external to the poetry. >>589 Philosophy, as the 
inevitable hermeneutic baggage of allegory, is thus discarded and made external to the creative 
process; a hindrance to the immediate experience of poetry. Philosophical poetry is thus, for 
him, a contradiction in terms; a position which finds an echo in Valfty as attacked by Eliot in 
'Dante' in The Sacred Wood. 590 Interestingly Edward Lobb calls for the same type of 
distinction in Eliot's criticism; to see it not in terrns of philosophy but as rhetoric: oCriticism 
itself was, for Eliot, a branch of rhetoric rather than philosophy. >>591 It is as interesting as it is 
strange to take for granted that philosophy and rhetoric are mutually exclusive. This approach 
unveils a prejudice towards philosophical discourse and a hidden desire to appropriate rhetoric 
by poetics. 
Croce's comments are in sharp contrast to Eliot who sees allegory not as a decoding 
system, but as a canvas on which literary expression is possible, and from which it is 
indistinguishable. Decoding is not what allegory is about; it does not involve cryptography, but 
the cognitive fulfilment of the worldview we all inevitably inhabit -a view which can happily 
be understood in philosophical terms. The philosophy, in the theological sense of allegory, does 
not get in the way because what it preaches is a cognitive act; to see it is to understand it though 
not necessarily to believe it; but once we see it may prove difficult not to believe it. Allegory 
587 Croce, 'On the Nature of Allegory', pp. 408-409. 
588 Croce, 'On the Nature of Allegory', p. 409. 
589 Croce, 'On the Nature of Allegory', p. 411. 
590 See 'The Perception of Culture and Metaphysics' in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
591 Edward Lobb, T S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition (London: Routledge Keegan & Paul, 1981), 
p. 158. 
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hence offers a common canvas where our perceptions may be collectively visualised rather than 
hallucinate. It encourages us to see as a means to understanding, at the point where seeing is 
revealed as an act of faith in the first place; where epistemology is a cognitive problem. 
592 
Already in the 'Dante' of The Sacred Wood Eliot is hinting that allegory is not reducible to a 
philosophy which one needs to bear in mind to understand the poem: 
Dante had the benefit of a mythology and a theology which had undergone a more complete absorption into 
life than those of Lucretius. It is curious that not only Dante's detractors, like the Pctrarch of Landor's 
Pentameron f. . -] 
but some of his admirers, insist on the separation of Dante's 'poetry' and Dante's 
'tcaching'. Sometimes the philosophy is confused with the allegory. The philosophy is an ingredient, it is a 
part of Dante's world just as it is a part of life; the allegory is the scaffold on which the poem is built. 
593 
Allegory is not, for Eliot, a philosophical decoding system, but an incarnating method which 
transfers worldviews into the public realm of the phenomenal world. As philosophy is seen it 
becomes a legitimate element of poetic expression, if by poetic one means an experience which 
is open to understanding. The cognitive grounding of philosophy on experience is equivalent to 
the 'literal level' of the four levels of Scripture. Allegory allows Eliot to reintroduce the 
philosophy he had exorcised in his early literary criticism in favour of science. Philosophy finds 
a place in the cognitive scaffold of allegory because it ensures the former's clarity of expression 
and universal appeal. Science, for Eliot, no longer holds a monopoly over the meaning of 
objective perception and hence is no longer the ideal model for the writing and critical practice 
he is seeking. It is from this allegorical point of view that Eliot's philosophical background may 
not be seen as an obstacle to the understanding of his criticism. 
594 Lobb refuses to take Eliot's 
philosophical dimension seriously. He notes that he has <<suggested at various points that 
fontology', and other philosophical terms were primarily metaphors for the general problem of 
592 Dante quotes Aristotle's Metaphysics in the 'Epistle to Can Grande della Scala': vAs the philosopher says in 
the second book of the Metaphysics, as a thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth'; the reason for 
which is, that the truth concerning a thing, which consists in the truth as in its subject, is the perfect likeness of the 
thing as it is>>, Minnis, pp. 458-459. 
593 'Dante', SW, p. 163. 
594 Seeking out this allegorical pattern in Eliot's own criticism must be the acid test of the relevance of the sort of 
study undertaken here. This approach may make futile the very endeavour of this thesis to use Eliot's 
philosophical writings as a way to understand the criticism. My only defence is that I do so only to reveal that what 
we are looking at is not the study of philosophy, but the development of a deliberate writing practice in Eliot's 
criticism. I am not asking the reader to share or sympathise with Eliot's philosophical thinking, theological beliefs 
or ideological principles, but to read his criticism beyond these frames, to see it. Although seeing it may awaken 
the importance of knowing about Eliot's intellectual background in the first place. 
204 
subject and object in poetry. >>595 He would rather neutralize the philosophy in Eliot's criticism 
by understanding it as a figure of speech and be done with it. Yet, it is not as simple as that. 
Eliot's use of the term 'metaphysics' in his literary criticism, as we have seen, is tested against 
its being a mere figure of speech before it can be taken for granted. Part of the failure of the 
Metaphysical poets as a critical project is Eliot's inability to justify the use of the term 
philosophically; since the Metaphysical poets were not themselves metaphysicians. Lobb's 
approach is reductive. As he would have it, Eliot's <<aesthetics is comprehensible purely in 
literary terms without recourse to the 'minutiae' of any philosophical system. >>596 That would 
be true if Eliot made an absolute distinction between aesthetics and philosophy, or his rhetoric 
was reducible to literary readings; but that is not the case. The most one could say is that Eliot's 
critical rhetoric is philosophically engaged if figuratively open to literary readings. 
Allegory controls the tendency of philosophical expression towards emotional 
ineffability privately felt. The four levels of the allegorical mode become the complete and 
inclusive expression of cognition's full range, from emotion and perception, to understanding 
and interpretation. Eliot adds: 
The structure of emotions, for which the allegory is the necessary scaffold, is complete from the most 
sensuous to the most intellectual and the most spiritual. 597 
Eliot's interpretation of allegory breaks down the barrier between philosophy and rhetoric as 
allegory becomes, not just a decoding system determined by philosophical premises, but the 
literary substitution of a philosophy by subjecting it to the cognitive writing practice - rhetoric 
- on which allegory 
insists. Thus the problem of distinguishing the teaching from the poetry 
can be overlooked, because, as belief is seen, it is not strictly necessary consciously to share the 
poet's philosophical premises to understand the poetry. Yet, since ordinary cognition is not 
merely an act of pure contemplation, one should expect that, as Eliot put in Dante (1929), 
ounderstanding must terminate in belie&. Belief thus becomes dissociated from the mere 
expression of a doctrine, but becomes, in the widest sense of the word, that necessary element 
595 Lobb, p 158. 
596 Lobb, p. 159. 
5 97 'Dante', SW, P. 169. 
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in ordinary cognition which supplements that ever receding semantic - or experiential - 
immediacy which must be the goal of all understanding: 
It is possible, and sometimes necessary, to argue that full understanding must identify itself with full belief. 
A good deal, it thus turns out, hangs on the meaning, if any, for this short wordfull. 598 
The ambiguity of this statement lies in the impossibility of determining what understanding 
amounts to. That we understand by partaking in the act of belief which makes others 
understand does not necessarily tells us how much we end up understanding or whether we 
understand exactly in the same way. Belief, in this sense, already amounts to a critical self- 
consciousness which makes itsfullness out of reach and its vision not merely immediate. 
Croce's interpretation of allegory parallels Petrarch's criticism of Dante: that it 
involves a philosophical backdrop without which it is impossible to understand the poem; that 
one must, then, separate the poetry from the teaching, the rhetoric from the philosophy. Croce 
does this by first dissociating rhetoric from allegory so that he can isolate allegory as 
discardable philosophic paraphernalia, so that paradoxically poetry can supplant philosophy by 
overlooking the former's dependency on thought systems. For Croce poetry must aim for the 
sort of cognitive immediacy which can only be obstructed by having to bear philosophy in 
mind. This is the sort of cognitive immediacy which Eliot cannot allow for, particularly when it 
involves the elevation of the poetic vision to realms unattainable in ordinary cognition. In fact, 
Croce's views parallel those of Petrarch and Boccaccio, to equate theological with poetic 
revelation as I noted above. This is a battle about the status of poetry, which becomes a jostling 
for position within the Trivium (Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric) and particularly against its 
millstone, rhetoric. 
599 It translates into an upgrading of poetry within the hierarchy of 
knowledge. The poetics of revelation thus attempts to supplant the mediated artificiality of 
rhetoric. 
598 Dante, p. 58. 
599 See Minnis, 'Placing the Poetics: Hermann the German; An Anonymous Question on the Nature of Poetry', 
pp. 277-281. The discussion relates to the placing of poetry within the triviurn and, more specifically, about its 
subordination, along rhetoric, to logic. 
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Eliot emphasizes all the aspects of allegory Croce leaves out: the phenomenal 
typology of the Allegory of the Theologians, the rhetoric and the philosophy. So much so that, 
shortly after Croce's article, in the Clark lectures Eliot insists that: 
The change of style from provengal to early Italian is the change from the lyrical to the philosophical; the 
change from Elizabethan toJacobean is the change from lyrical to rhetorical. I am using the term 'rhetorical' 
as exactly as I can, and, be it well noted, without any implication whatever of eulogy or defamation. 
600 
In this passage Eliot is recalling 'oRhetoric)> and Poetic Drama' (first published as a review of 
Edmond Rostand's Le Vol de la Marseillaise, 'Whether Rostand had Something About Him', 
Athenaeum, 4656 (July 25,1919), 665-6, and later included with revisions in The Sacred 
Wood). Here Eliot sees rhetoric as a philosophical development, and thus destroys Croce's 
alleged incompatibility between the two. Furthermore, this rhetoric becomes the meeting point 
between literature and philosophy. This is how Eliot puts it: 
Some years ago, I wrote a short note on 'rhetoric' which was included in my volume The Sacred Wood, 
which in the main I still approve. But it was written in a different context than this, and I was thinking 
chiefly of so-called 'dramatic' rhetoric. But I said even then, that I could not admit any antithesis between 
the 'rhetorical' and the 'conversational'. Rhetoric may be merely a development of conversation: Cicero 
talked his discourses; the actors of the Elizabethan dramatists shouted them. Any literary mode is a 
development out of speech; sometimes it gets too far away from speech: in philosophy, Professor Husserl or 
Professor Cohen is a good deal farther away from speech, it seems to me, than Berkeley or Leibnitz or even 
Kant; Adam Smith is a good deal nearer to the conversational style than most of our modern economists. 
601 
Eliot's short note on rhetoric is, of course, ")>Rhetoric' and Poetic Drama', which now 
becomes the basis for a radical development of his original poetic theory in The Sacred Wood. 
That oany literary mode is a development of speech>> places poetry automatically within the 
realm of rhetoric, in so far as othey all have the same relation to conversation. )>602 In 
Metaphysical poetry, rhetoric acts as a substitute for the allegorical development of Dante; the 
meeting point between philosophy and literature. This is a substitution which Eliot is now 
prepared to accept and generalise about. It contrasts with the melancholic frustration with 
philosophical discourse we find in Eliot's letter to Norbert Wiener on the 6th of January 1915: 
For me, as for Santayana, philosophy is chiefly literary criticism and conversation about life; and you have 
the logic, which seems to me of great value. 603 
600 The Clark Lectures, Lecture IV [The Conceit in Donne], VMP, pp. 128-129. 
601 The Clark Lectures, Lecture IV [The Conceit in Donne], VMP, p. 129. 
602 The Clark Lectures, Lecture IV [The Conceit in Donne], VMP, p. 130. 
603 'To Robert Wiener, 6 January, 1915], Letters, p. 81. 
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Eliot was at the time mourning the end of philosophy, and half-heartedly promoting its 
replacement with logic, which becomes the stylistic premise of his early criticism. In fact, 
in 
those early days Eliot's consolation is logic - the queen of the Trivium - but which also sees 
the subliminal upgrading of rhetoric as a viable stylistic model. The reality is that Eliot's 
literary criticism gradually parts company with logic as the latter is appropriated by 
rhetoric. 
604 Poetics follows a similar fate at the beginning of Eliot's literary career, as the 
formalism of the image sheds the logical stylistic pretensions of Symbolism. It is gradually de- 
idealised, as his dabbling with logic deliberately fail to sustain the absoluteness of his early 
scientific criticism which he compensates for with force of argument which must ultimately be 
rhetorical - literary criticism and conversation about 
life. This process delivers the practical 
recuperation of philosophy as a form of expression which in literature becomes a shift from the 
poetics of lyricism to rhetoric. But how does allegory help us to understand this rhetorical shift 
apart from underscoring its mediating role between philosophy and literature? 
Rhetoric and the Sound of the Sense of the Word 
in the Clark Lectures, rhetoric (conversation or literary criticism) is concretely upgraded; 
included, that is, in the Four Senses of allegorical interpretation as an aspect of its cognitive 
phenomenology of language. This is something Eliot vaguely referred to in '(<Rhetoric>> and 
Poetic Drama' some years earlier. In this essay he is attempting to find a place for rhetoric in 
literary criticism: oLet us avoid the assumption that rhetoric is a vice of manner, and endeavour 
to find a rhetoric of substance also, which is right because it issues from what it has to 
express. ý>605 Yet in this earlier essay Eliot is unable to provide a direct definition of the sort of 
rhetoric he is promoting or where it fits in literary criticism. His suggestion that it is right 
because it is of substance, leaves us wondering whether it is meant in the Aristotelian sense. 
This interpretation would fit quite nicely with the allegorical context of Dante where I am 
trying to place Eliot's reinterpretation of rhetoric. He adds: 
604 See Ters Libre and the Problem with Philosophy', Chapter 1. 
605 '((Rhetoric>) and Poetic Drama', SW, p. 79. 
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We may apply the term 'rhetoric' to the type of dramatic speech which I have instanced, and then we must 
admit that it covers good as well as bad. Or we may choose to except this type of speech from rhctoric. 
606 
The dramatic speech Eliot has been talking about is blank verse which Eliot is undecided 
whether to consider rhetorical. This ambivalence is then rhetorically tilted by Eliot's final 
comment: ((We cannot allow [rhetoric] to cover all bad writing>>. 'Mis is a rhetoric which 
manipulates the logic of double negatives to create an impression of definite ambiguity. The 
consideration that, though rhetoric may imply bad writing, not all bad writing is rhetorical, is 
exploited logically to imply that not all rhetoric is bad writing. Eliot is evoking rhetoric as a 
legitimate mode of expression without fully embracing it in the essay; perhaps because Eliot 
refuses to admit that he is being rhetorical but logical. But by the time Eliot writes the Clark 
Lectures Eliot is prepared to go further. Rhetoric is implicitly shown to partake of allegorical 
characteristics. For him the switch from Elizabethan lyricism to Jacobean rhetoric is one which 
re-captures the objects of meaning in an effort that parallels the sensual (or should we say 
substantiao allegory of the poetry of Dante, only that the visual imagination of allegory is now 
mediated by sound; a sound however that sheds the musical implications of the lyric: 
it is a variation of focus: the focus is shifted, even if ever so little, from sound, to sense; from the sound of 
the word to the sound of the sense of the word, if you like; the sense of the sound or the sound of the sense; 
to the consciousness of the meaning of the word and a pleasure in that sound having that meaning. 
607 
The music of lyricism is altered sensually to invoke the meaning of the word rather than the 
subjecting the word to a mere musical sound-pattern. Eliot sees this switch as a rhetorical 
development which rescues the phenomenality of language from mere phonetics, grounding it 
instead in the thought patterns of speech; it reconciles thought and feeling. 
Yet by this stage, the language of thought and feeling begins to run thin, just as 
Eliot's admiration of Donne comes to an end. It does, because, in the end, he cannot find a 
definition for metaphysical poetry. Eliot's interest in Crashaw is interesting in this sense. In the 
Clark Lectures Crashaw appears as the other half of the metaphysical dialectic: where Donne is 
thought, Crashaw is feeling. It parallels Eliot's earlier efforts to complete the metaphysical 
historicism arround the 'dissociation of sensibility' between Donne and Marvell: where the 
606 '<<Rhetoric>> and Poetic Drama', SW, pp. 84-85. 
607 Lecture IV [The Conceit in Donne], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 130. 
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former's anticipation to it is understood in terms of Marvell's later arrival and questionable yet 
potential metaphysicality. Yet, Donne can never quite fulfil the role of exemplary Metaphysical 
608 
poet, but must always be offered a compensatory point of reference. Crashaw, however, fares 
better than Marvell; he even threatens to take over Donne's role in Eliot's criticism insofar as 
he can develop his rhetorical approach and change of terminology better with Donne and leave 
the ambiguous historicism of the 'dissociation' behind. 
Even if Eliot only devotes one of the Clark Lectures to Crashaw, while Donne 
occupies four of the total eight, it is the former which two years later champions the critical turn 
towards rhetoric. In 'A Note on Richard Crashaw' (first published as 'The Poems English, 
Latin and Greek of Richard Crashaw', Dial, lxxxiv. 3 (March 1928), pp. 246-50, and later 
include in For Lancelot Andrewes) Eliot objects to the drawing of similarities between 
Crashaw's 'The Weeper' and Shelley's 'The Skylark'. The interest of the objection lies in the 
words he uses to express it: 4 doubt whether the sound of two poems can be very similar, when 
the sense is entirely different>>. He continues referring to 'The Skylark': (Tor the first time 
perhaps in verse of such eminence, sound exists without sense. >> 
609 Crashaw must then be 
considered the poetic hinge on which Eliot's criticism turns at the time of his conversion to 
Anglicanism, the rhetorical point in which the metaphysical period in his criticism comes to an 
end, and where the allegorical begins. In 'A Note on Richard Crashaw', the latency of Dante's 
allegory in the interaction between sound and sense is made explicit 
just as Eliot qualifies the 
religious factor in this critical transition: 
I call Crashaw a 'devotional' poet, because the word 'religious' is so abused Devotional poetry is 
religious poetry which falls within an exact faith, and has precise objects for contemplation. 
610 
Crashaw becomes a sort of minor Dante for Eliot. He is now understood in terms closer to the 
ones he uses to refer to the Italian poet in the Clark Lectures, where he notes: oln Dante, as I 
have said again and again, you get a system of thought and feeling; every part of the system felt 
608 <dn Donne you get a sequence of thoughts which are felt; in Crashaw you might say, by slightly straining an 
antithesis, that you have a sequence of feelings which are thought. In neither do you find a perfect balance)), 
Lecture VI [Crashaw], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 183. 
609 'A Note on Richard Crashaw', For Lancelot A ndrewes: Essays on Style and Order (London: Faber & Faber, 
1970), pp. 95 & 96. 
6 10 'A Note on Richard Crashaw', p. 97. 
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and thought in its place, and the whole system felt and thought. >> 
611 In 1928 Crashaw is praised 
in these very terms, if only within a narrower cultural spectrum, that of oan exact faith>> which, 
by implication may not be as universal as the Trecento's. 'Me similitude, and the difference, is 
perhaps best expressed by Eliot much later in 'What Dante Means to Me', a talk given at the 
Italian Institute, London, on July 4th, 1950: 
We have for instance in English literature great religious pocts, but they are, by comparison with Dante, 
specialists. That is all they can do. And Dante, because he could do everything else, is for that reason the 
greatest 'religious' poet, though to call him a 'religious poet' would be to abate his universality. 
612 
In any case, the patchwork of thought and feeling that is the conceit - the poetic salvaging 
technique of shoring fragments against one's ruins, if you like -, is dropped as the defining 
point of Crashaw. 'Me alternative is a rhetorical account which uses, instead, the terrns of the 
sense of the sound to take it closer to the allegorical mode of Dante, which finds a better, if 
imperfect, expression in the adjectives 'devotional' or 'religious'. Thus Crashaw becomes a 
useful point of reference in Eliot's own poetic struggle - and, after his conversion in 1927, he 
must have felt 'devotional' poetry was a real possibility for himself. 'Devotional' poetry offers 
the possibility of alleviating the anxiety of influence Eliot feels about the impossibility of 
overcoming the great poetic masters, other than fashioning inferior copies or stealing lines from 
them. 
This poetic resignation was the organising principle of The Waste Land in 1922, 
precisely where Eliot offers, among others, a fragment from Dante's Inferno: 
I had not thought death had undone so man 
Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhale .M 
These lines refer to Cantos III (lines 55-7: osi lunga tratta/di gente, ch'io non avrei mai 
credutoj que morte tanta Wavesse disfatta>>) and IV (lines 25-7: <<Quivi, secondo che per 
ascoltarejnon avea pianto, ma' che di sospirij che Faura cterna facevan tremare>>). Yet the 
611 Lecture VI [Crashaw), The Clark Lectures, VMP, pp. 182-3. 
612 T. S. Eliot, 'What Dante Means to Me', To Criticize the Critic and Other Writings (London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1991), p. 134. 
613 'The Waste Land', T. S. Eliot, Collected Poems, 1909-1962 (London: Faber & Faber, 1986), 11.63-64, p. 65. 
In 'What Dante Means to Me', Eliot notes that after The Waste Land he tried to use Dante again, obut the method 
is different: here I was debarred from quoting or adapting at length -I borrowed and adapted only a few phrases - 
because I was imitating>>, p. 128. 
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resignation goes deeper. Helen Gardner notes that The Waste Land represents the culmination 
of a period of metrical virtuosity, 
whose basic measure is the heroic line, which it handles in almost every possible way. One could indecd 
give a demonstration of the varied music of which this line is capable from The Waste Land alone, giving 
parallels from the work of the most astonishingly diverse poets. We bear the voice of the Jacobean 
dramatists again in the voice of the thunder at the end. The Shakespearean echoes, apart from direct 
adaptation are everywhere. 
614 
The metrical form, is for Gardner, deeply entangled with Eliot's dependence on other poets to 
articulate his poetry. But there is a change from 1927 which culminates in Ash Wednesday: 
From now on he will try to speak in his own voice, which will express himself with all his limitations, and 
not try to escape those limitations by imitating other poets. The heroic line is a hindrance in this attempt, 
because it has so long and glorious history that when it is used as the metre of a long poem it is almost 
615 impossible not to echo one or other of its great masters. 
The crucial poems of this transition are for Helen Gardner the Ariel Poems, which where 
written simultaneously with the composition of Ash Wednesday (1930). The urgency of this 
transition is dramatically evidenced by Eliot himself who noted in The New York Times on the 
29th November, 1953: 4 thought my poetry was over after 'The Hollow Men' [ ... 
] writing the 
Ariel poems released the stream and led directly to Ash Wednesday. >> Gardner goes further, she 
suggests that o'Marina' is the bridge between Ash Wednesday and Four QuartetS. >> 
616 These 
poems with their themes of crisis, death and rebirth allegorize Eliot's poetic regeneration, and 
place him firmly in a devotional tradition which sheds literary intertextuality, subjugation to the 
great masters and the Tradition as the only strategy for individual poetic expression. He seeks 
conversational and personal intimacy with the reader as the poetic medium, but with its point of 
reference firmly set in the universal, even if this universality has to narrow itself to Christian 
tradition. 
'The Journey of the Magi' and 'A Song for Simeon' are explicitly biblical, 
presenting the birth of Jesus mediated through the personal experience of the collective voice of 
614 Helen Gardner, The Art of T. S. Eliot (London: Faber & Faber, 1985), p. 19. Gardner is thinking of Eliot's 
'What Dante Means to Me', where he talks about the greater influence of minor poets, rather than great masters, in 
his earlier poetry, noting that othe latter are to exalted and too remote. They are like distant ancestors who have 
almost been deificd; whereas the smaller poet, who has directed one's first steps, is more like an admired cider 
brothero, p. 126. 
615 Gardner, p. 20. 
616 Gardner, p. 126. 
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the Magi, on their trip to Bethlehem, and that of Simeon, an old Jew who must witness the birth 
of Jesus before he dies. Yet Eliot's turn can not be reduced to the adjective 'religious', just as 
he warns us not to fall into the same mistake with Crashaw; it is, more importantly, a new mode 
of expression. It seeks to combine the personal and the universal through images which become 
significant because they are spoken and experienced by an individual, and not only because of 
the reified symbolic significance of Christianity or Symbolism on its own: 
Then at dawn we came down to a temperate valley, 
Wet, below the snow line, smelling of vegetation, 
With a running stream and a water-mill beating the darkness, 
And three trees on the low sky. 
An old white horse galloped away in the meadow. 
Then we came to a tavern with vine-leaves over the lintel, 
Six hands at an open door dicing for pieces of silver, 
And feet kicking the empty winc-skins. 
But there was no information, and so we continued 
And arrived at evening, not a moment too soon 
Finding the place; it was (you may say) satisfactory. 
617 
The significance of this passage is that, though personal, it is not intentional. Its strong religious 
symbolism refuses to be self-conscious in that it initially places no demands on the reader to 
apprehended its objects as other than ordinary everyday experiences. Here the speaker narrates 
events present to him, which as yet have no religious or personal significance, firstly, because 
the former interpretation is not available to the world - which is yet to see the development of 
Christianity - and, secondly, because he has had not time to reflect on 
his own experience. 
There is a sense that they are unknowingly making history. They are seeing the Old Testament 
being fulfilled by the New, but they only notice the smell of vegetation, an old horse, taverns, 
men betting at cards, three trees: oBut there was no information, and so we continued>>. We feel 
like children watching a 'Punch and Judy' show, wanting to cry obehind youb>, yet still 
wandering that in their ignorance there might be a knowledge that escapes us. It is the 
knowledge of being there, of experience, transmitted through a conversational narrative which 
it is still looking for the right words to express itself, or to pass judgement: <(Finding the place; 
it was (you may say) satisfactory. )> It is the opposite of religious didacticism, but which finds 
its sources in the preaching of Lancelot Andrewes and the Bible, but also in the personal 
experience of the poetic personae and the poet. The synthesis of the personal and the universal, 
617 T. S. Eliot, 'Tbe Joumey of the Magi', Collected Poems, 1909-1962,11.21-3 1,pp. 109.110, 
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the actual and the symbolic affords Eliot a new poetic voice, but which finds its possibility 
in 
his critical writings and can be best understood thorough the terms allegory and rhetoric there 
found. In the period between 1928 and 1930, Eliot's criticism and the Ariel Poems follow and 
intimate parallelism: 'The Journey of the Magi' and 'A song for Simeon' closely precede 
For 
Lancelot Andrewes, Dante appears almost simultaneously with 'Animula', (itself an interesting 
allegorical poem), and Anabasis: A Poem of St. -J. Perse with 'Marina'. The 
last of the Ariel 
Poems, 'The Cultivation of Christmas Trees', offers an exegesis of these poems by suggesting 
to the reader how to understand their images and narrative. Essentially Eliot is encouraging the 
childish innocence of the Magi as a poetic premise: 
- which is not that of the child 
For whom the candle is a star, and the gilded angel 
Spreading its wings at the summit of the tree 
618 Is not only a decoration but an angel. 
Here the actual personal and universal mingle in what must be seen as an allegorical moment, 
and about which Eliot wants to tell us explicitly, if only rhetorically. The new critical 
terminology finds an equivalent release in the poetry, and this newly found strength translates 
into an increasing confidence to take on the great masters; to shrug off Milton and to reach out 
to Dante. 
Eliot's attack on Milton is interesting because it helps to define the scope and limits 
of rhetoric as understood in his criticism. Rhetoric falls short of the allegorical vision of Dante, 
yet it implies a partial recovery of the former's cognitive mode which avoids ineffability and 
abstraction, or, what Eliot later calls in 'Milton 1', the Auditory Imagination. For Eliot, Milton's 
blindness becomes a literal visual absence in the poetry which makes evident an overall 
cognitive deficiency in the poet: 
I do not mean that to go blind in the middle life is itself enough to undermine the whole nature of the man's 
poetry [ ... 
] Had Milton been a man of very keen senses -I mean of all five senses - his blindness would 
not have mattered much. 
619 
Milton's blindness does not necessarily amount to a cognitive deficiency had not he been 
cognitively impaired before going blind. This position remains coherent with the dissociation of 
618 T. S. Eliot, 'The Cultivation of Christmas Trees', Collected Poems, 1909-1962,11.5.8, p. 117. 
619 'Milton F, SPh, p. 124. 
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perception and cognition in Bradley's theory of immediate experience, also 
implied in the 
'dissociation of sensibility' between feeling and thought. Cognition is not equivalent to 
perception. 
620 Thus Eliot's stress on visuality in Dante's allegory must be revised not to imply 
merely seeing with one's eyes, but rather understood as a cognitive vision in the context of 
mystical experience. 
Though the appearance of rhetoric is symptomatic of a dissociated relation between 
cognition and perception, it also offers a potential to redress the balance. This is essentially the 
same problem of the Dissociation of Sensibility and the Metaphysical Poets, which in the Clark 
Lectures seeks new terms of definition besides wit or the conceit. It seeks a more open 
application not reducible to the 17 th -century alone. On the one hand Eliot links Milton's 
cognitive deficiency with rhetoric, that othe result with Milton is, in one sense of the word, 
rhetoric>> But in which sense exactly? Eliot still insists that othe term is not intended to be 
derogatory))621. On the one hand rhetoric represents a cognitive deficiency which stresses 
sound at the expense of meaning - i. e. listening to the sound of one's voice -, on the other, 
it 
represents the phenomenal dimension of a meaning rooted in thought that comes into being 
through speech. In the Clark Lectures Eliot is interested in rhetoric in this last sense, where 
sound is recaptured by meaning, perception subsumed into cognition. Sound is fine as long as it 
is the sound of the sense of the word; the sound of the word is cognitively experienced as sense 
when it is governed by thought patterns recreated by a conversational style. In Milton, instead, 
othe syntax is determined by the musical significance, by the auditory imagination, rather than 
by the attempt to follow actual speech or thought. )>622 The result is, Eliot adds, 
at the expense of the visual and tactile, so that the inner meaning is separated from the surface, and tends to 
become something occult, or at least without effect upon the reader until fully understood. 
623 
The result is psychological or, what is the same for Eliot, emotionally ineffable and occult. 
Meaning refuses to be cognitively and literally available. Instead the word legitimises itself by 
adopting a self-referential sensual existence which fails to point to the world of meaningful 
620 See Chapter 2, specially 'Imaginary Objects, Immediate Experience and the 'Correlative". 
621 'Milton F, SPh, p. 128. 
622 'Milton F, SPh, p. 128. 
623 'Milton 1', SPh, p. 129. 
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objects. It is as if, for Eliot, Milton's blindness exacerbates his need to recreate a sensual 
experience in the sound of words at the expense of the whole cognitive experience of the world 
he can no longer see. Milton confuses perception and cognition, exalts the senses at the expense 
of the vision; yet he is in one sense of the word rhetorical, and to this extent Eliot embraces 
Milton's problem as our own. Just as the Metaphysical poets are in one sense of the word 
dissociated, even if to a greater or lesser extent they represent a redemptive poetic 
development. Milton is perhaps more on the side of the problem than of the solution. 
Eliot sees the possibility of recovering the allegorical function through an 
exploitation of rhetoric, and thus of recovering a coherent sensibility by renewing the proper 
link between cognition and perception. Milton's impaired vision is symptomatic of an 
increasingly self-conscious cognition as opposed to Dante who <<is visual in the sense that he 
lived in an age in which men still saw visions [ ... 
] the trick of which we have forgotten. )>624 
What Eliot is pointing out is that increasing self-consciousness implies a deficiency in cognitive 
faith rather than impairment of vision. Rhetoric, as well as criticism625, appears when 
philosophical belief becomes self-conscious and one cannot simply see without reflection. Yet 
rhetoric can be made to perform the very phenomenal function it undermines. In fact, the sort of 
seventeenth-century rhetoric Eliot defended in 'oRhetoric>> and Poetic Drama' achieves a 
phenomenological dimension through self-consciousness, thus making a virtue out of a vice: 
The really fine rhetoric in Shakespeare occurs in situations where the character in the play sees himsetf in a 
dramatic light. 626 
This is a poetry which is increasingly more involved in rhetoric than lyricism; in other words, a 
rhetorical poetics, which Eliot sees as partaking of the phenomenological dimension of 
allegory: a rhetoric which still sees despite self-consciousness; which sees even if it is only to 
see itself. Thus rhetoric is, however precariously, shown to retain the residue of a phenomenal 
grounding that can be exploited. 
624 Dante, p. 23. 
625 The critical function <<seems to be the time when poetry ceases to be the expression of the mind of a whole 
people>>, TUPUC, p. 22. 
626 
(<Rhetoric)) and Poetic Drama', SW, p. 81. 
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For Eliot allegory is not a poetic figure, and he makes this clear by distinguishing 
between allegory and metaphor. This is how he describes the allegorical style of Richard of St 
Victor's De Gratia Contemplationis (Book I, Chapter III) in the Clark Lectures: 
Richard is very sparing of tropes and figures; there is only the main allegory running through the treatise, the 
comparison of the stages of the mind to the parts of the ark of the covenant - an allegory which causes no 
confusion. It is prose which seems to me to satisfy the primary dcmands of writing, that is, to write what you 
think in the words in which you think it, adding no embellishment; to avoid metaphors and figures of 
speech, and to keep your emotions out of it. 
627 
To write what one thinks in the way one thinks it is the allegorical imperative of all good 
rhetoric. For Eliot the literal emphasis of the real object or event in scriptural allegory parallels 
the importance of rooting the conversational style of rhetoric in the literal experience of 
thinking. Rhetorical expression can evoke the cognitive experience of the thought, just as 
Dante's visual allegory parallels the sensory immediacy of the image. This strategy encourages 
the concrete articulation of emotion instead of the falsification of the emotion through the use 
of figures and tropes. In Dante Eliot adds: 
Dante's attempt is to makes us see what he saw. He therefore employs very simple language and very few 
metaphors, for allegory and metaphor do not get on well togethcr. 628 
Metaphor and allegory do not get on well together because they stress different aspects of 
cognition. Metaphor's claims on likeness demands an understanding of meaning external to the 
experience of the image it evokes. Dante's genius is to makes us see what he saw, and this 
seeing contains a meaning internal to its cognitive experience though not reducible to its visual 
content. Cognitively speaking seeing allegorically is already to see more; it is seeing a meaning 
as an experience. 
This difficult relation between perception and cognition is perhaps latent in Ezra 
Pound's 'A Retrospect' (1918) where he notes: 
I believe that the proper and perfect symbol is the natural object, that if a man use 'symbols' he must so use 
them that their symbolic function does not obtrude; so that a sense, and the poetic quality of the passage, is 
not lost to those who do not understand the symbol as such, to whom for instance, a hawk is a hawk. 
629 
627 Lecture 11 [Donne and the Trecento], The Clark Lectures, VMP, p. 103. 
628 Dante, pp. 23-24. 
629 Ezra Pound, 'A Retrospect' (1918) in Modernism: An Anthology of Sources and Documents, Vassiliki 
Kolocotroni, Jane Goldman and Olga Taxidou eds. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp. 373-377 
(p. 377). 
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There is something akin to allegory in Pound's advice on the use of symbol; an awareness that 
the ideal content is ultimately contained in the real meaning. Yet allegory amounts for Eliot to 
something more complex than Pound's views on language. For Eliot allegory is informed with 
the difficulty of assuming a correlation between the real and the ideal. 'Me relationship between 
real and ideal is asymmetrical. The ambiguity 
lies in the fact that a real object may be a sign for 
an idea, yet an idea may not be said to be a sign of a particular reality. Ibis is problematic 
because it defies the possibility of any easy correlation between the real and the ideal. This is 
how Eliot put it in his doctoral thesis: 
A flower may become the sign or symbol of an emotion; the fox is the symbol of cunning Now does an 
idea refer to reality as a fox refers to cunning? The quality to which the fox or the flower refers is something 
known or knowable otherwise than through the fox or the flower [ ... 
]A flower may be the sign of an idea, 
but how can an idea be a sign of a reality? Such a view would surely lead us to a representational theory of 
knowledge. 630 
The real and the ideal are connected through a sign which cannot claim any legitimate 
allegiance with either; their relation is not one of identity. 
631 The idea may be known by 
means other than the chosen sign, and a real object may equally be misunderstood as a sign for 
an idea to which it has no absolute claim. Ibus Eliot struggles in his doctoral thesis to articulate 
the arbitrariness as a contiguity. He can only come to a vague conclusion: oThe idea certainly 
has a sort of existence apart from the reality to which it refers, but the apartness is of a special 
sort and may be easily misunderstood. ))632 The apartness does not, for Eliot, imply 
arbitrariness. Tbus, though he encourages a style rooted in the phenomenological dimension of 
cognitive experience, Eliot is not promoting a representational theory of knowledge. 
Allegory, Eliot goes on to say, is figurative in respect to the world, but it is literal to 
itself. This is the subtext of- 
But as the whole poem of Dante is, if you like, one vast metaphor, there is hardly any place for metaphor in 
the detail of it. 
633 
630 KE, p. 48. 
631 
<(A sign has its existence besides its content, and it is just this separate existence - the fact that the sign might 
be misrepresented or simply not recognized as a sign at all, which makes it a sign and not an identity>), KE, p. 48. 
632 KE, p. 48. 
633 Dante, p. 25. 
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This vastness makes the significance of the metaphor not one of identity or likeness, 
but 
stresses its allegorical self-sufficiency; it makes 
it a world unto itself. Allegory's visuality is not 
representational but cognitive. The apartness of the real and the ideal is only mediated 
by their 
own literal demands on ourselves. 
634 Literalness to themselves is the point of contiguity 
between each other, which falls short of mutual likeness in the representational sense. 
635 Eliot 
imports this strategy into his criticism as a means to rescue rhetoric from semantic obscurity. 
'Mus, as we write the way we think, the closer one gets to what one is thinking of without 
seeking a phonetic correlation between what we mean and how we say what we mean; it is, 
rather, how we experience what we mean as we think about it. Just as allegory's visuality 
is not 
merely metaphoric, rhetoric's speech act is not merely onomatopoeic. Speech - as sound - is 
naturally figurative in so far as it is not the object world itself, yet it incarnates itself in the 
world as the sound becomes a meanineul object which, once created, provokes an experience 
which is not merely auditory; not, that is, the sound of the word but the sound of the sense of 
the word. (The sound here very much not meaning music. ) This phenomenology of language 
stresses the literalness of figurative language to itself, as it incarnates the literalness - not the 
identity - of the object world 
it is uttering. Thus, without saying that all language is simply 
figurative, Eliot attempts to reconcile this (ideal) figurative aspect of language with the 
objectifying inertia of cognition which must always assume a (real) literal world. 
In his doctoral thesis Eliot was already indicating that the literal and the figurative 
are not absolutely different aspects of linguistic denotation: 
We are accustomed to handle and use [ordinary objects] by symbols which merely denote them; we forget 
that their reality is as much in their meaning as in their denotation, and we take it for granted that they 
simply are. Nor is this belief an crror. 
636 
Eliot is not saying that taking for granted that the objects denoted by language merely are is 
wrong, because assuming a literal referent in the world is a natural cognitive inference. Yet we 
634 Minnis refers to the development of this twofold literal sense in his exposition of the allegorical developments 
of Scholasticism. See Minnis, 'Scriptural science and signification: From Alexander's Sum of Theology to 
Nicholas Lyre, specially pp. 203-209. 
635 of course the alternative resolution is that of making their relation absolute by relying on absolute unlikeness 
as in the hermeneutics of the via negativa. 
636 KE, p. 13 1. 
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must not forget that the reality of the object depends for its existence on its denotation; a 
denotation which itself maintains a degree of autonomy from that which it denotes. This is not 
to say that reality is purely figurative, in so far as, inversely, figuration ultimately aims to 
mimic a world whose literalness it is trying to encompass to become meaningful. In the end 
denotations hold a degree of reality which is not merely dependent on their denoting a thing 
because the denotation is already something. This is the necessary apartness which 
paradoxically glues the real and the ideal. Eliot had touched on this problem when he 
considered the extent to which unreal objects partake of the status of real objects. 
637 Figures, 
like unreal objects, may be taken as literal to themselves in the autonomy of their denotation. 
Eliot had concluded that while logic is unable to make theoretical sense of this type of objects, 
it presents no contradiction for metaphysical discourse - here rhetoric: Oor metaphysics, 
[unreal objects] cannot be denied practical reality without being admitted to some more 
attenuated but (if you like) equally real reality. >>638 
The link between metaphysics and rhetoric is implicit in Hugh Kenner's repudiation 
of the metaphysics implied in logocentrism in 'The Possum in the Cave: 
Metaphysics might then be redefined from the point of view of the trivium, as an inevitable rhetorical or 
tropological effect. It would not be the cause but a phantom generated within the house of language by the 
play of language. 
639 
Eliot is actively dealing with this unshakeable metaphysical implied in rhetoric by including 
metaphysics within the framework of ordinary cognition. For him this translation is made 
apparent in allegory. His early scientific discourse and proposal oto halt at the frontier of 
MetaphysicsýfiO fails to leave metaphysics behind by conceding to its presence just as it is 
denied, in what is a concession to Bradley's negative reasoning. 11is negative reasoning 
becomes properly positive through a renewed rhetoric contextualized in the allegorical model. 
Allegory offers a model in which to articulate the degree of reality of unreal objects or referent- 
less denotations, by contextualising existence in cognition rather than perception. It is not as 
637 See 'Contradictions and Unreal Objects' in Chapter 2. 
63 8 KE, p. 129. 
639 Hugh Kenner, 'The Possum inthe Cave' in Allegory and Representation, Stephen J.Greenblatt ed. (London: 
The John Hopkins University Press, 1981), 128-144 (p. 142). 
640 SW, p. 59 
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simple as Kenner's claim: <(Not the metaphysical then but the physical seems worth 
affirming. )fi4l For Eliot this dualism is useless. The real is not physical as such, 
it is literal. It 
is in this literalness that ideal (metaphysical) and the real (physical) can be reconciled. 
Figures and Prophecy 
A central problem of allegorical approaches to scriptural typology is 
in determining the extent 
to which figuration is literal to itself paralleling the literalness of the object world. This overlap 
amounts to admitting that one cannot make a complete distinction between the allegory of the 
Poets - with 
its stress on metaphor - and that of the Tbeologians - with 
its concern with the 
spiritual interpretations of the literal. The admission of the interaction between poetic allegory 
and scriptural exegesis delivers the overall attempt not to stress the literal at the expense of 
interpretation and vice versa. The allegory of the Poets, A. J. Minnis argues, was gradually 
imported into the interpretation of scripture as oan attack on those theologians who had well- 
nigh suffocated the literal sense with their excessive proliferation of mystical 
interpretations. >>642 This suffocation of the literal sense was combated with a strategy which 
involved making a distinction between the human auctores of scripture and the divine auctor. 
This translated into the Augustinian distinction between owords which signify and things which 
signify. >>643 It involves the radical admission that the Scriptures are not the unadulterated 
Word of God, but can be, in various degrees, mediated by earthly authors. But, to what extent is 
the authorial intention of the earthly author relevant to the divine meaning of scripture? Minnis 
suggests that this problem was dealt with via the typological - or prophetic - exegesis of the 
Scriptures. He puts it thus: 
But to what extent did the authors of words know what the author of things was doing? This matter came to 
a head in the late medieval analysis of prophecy: did the prophets speak with any knowledge of the 
significance of what they were saying. In marked contrast with earlier attitudes which tcnded to regard 
prophets and inspired writers as the passive mouthpieces for mysterious divine messages, everal thirteenth- 
century theologians poke up on behalf of the human beings whom God had selected. 644 
641 Hugh Kenner, 'The Possum in the Cave', p. 143. 
642 Minnis, p. 204. 
643 Minnis, p. 203. 
644 Minnis, p. 205. 
221 
The relation of the figurative meaning of language to the divine meaning of things is a blueprint 
for the phenomenal relation of language to the world and its acquisition of meaning. The 
question is how the figures of the human author can be liberalised to correlate in phenomenal 
status to the divine meaning: how the arbitrariness of the human choice of figures is connected 
to the definiteness of the divine meaning. In Eliot this concern about the boundaries between 
factuality and allegory is present in his interpretation of Dante's Vita Nuova, where he states 
that: <dt appears likely, to anyone who reads the Vita Nuova without prejudice, that it is a 
mixture of biography and allegory. >>645 The prejudice Eliot is referring to is the view of 
allegory as an obscure and mystically occult mode of literary expression. The biographical 
element refers to human agency and the rooting of allegorical meaning in the world of 
experience even as it acquires further meanings. 
In his essay 'Figura', Erich Auerbach notices a hermeneutic turn away from strict 
symbolic interpretations of the Scriptures. He feels this turn is illustrated by the practices of 
phenomenal prophecy of the Old and New Testament in the tradition of St Augustine, St Paul 
or Tertullian: 
The aim of this sort of interpretation was to show that the persons and events of the Old Testament were 
prefigurations of the New Testament and its history of salvation. Here it should be noted that Tertullian 
expressly denied that the literal and historical validity of the Old Testament was diminished by the figural 
interpretation. He was definitely hostile to spiritualism and refused to consider the Old Testament as mere 
allegory [. . . 
]The prophetic figure, he believed, is a concrete historical fact, and it is fulfilled by concrete 
historical facts. 646 
Auerbach argues that the phenomenal prophecy of the Bible encouraged a practice of ofigural 
interpretation)>, which he distinguishes from <<mere allegory>> or what we have been referring to 
as the Allegory of the Poets. In figural interpretation events relate to each other in time, and 
historically in terms of a prefiguring event and its fulfilment. The model for such an 
interpretation of the Scriptures lies in the prophecy and birth of Christ: oFigural meaning in the 
strict sense, in the Old Testament is the prefiguration of the coming of Christ. >>647 Auerbach's 
suspicion of the term allegory is due to its symbolic implications; the symbolic tendency to 
645 Dante, p. 62. 
646 Auerbach, 'Figura', p. 30. 
647 Auerbach, 'Figura', p. 42. 
222 
spiritualize the facticity of the prefiguring event. This is mainly why Auerbach goes to great 
lengths to substitute the term 'allegory' for 'figura'. He is consciously combating prejudices 
against allegory. His reference to omere allegory>> shows a defensive awareness of anti- 
allegorical prejudice, just as it is attempting to resurrect its proper application. In the end figural 
prophecy belongs to the allegorical exegesis of the Scriptures. Hence Auerbach has to add: 
Since in figural interpretation one thing stands for another [ ... 
] figural interpretation is 'allegorical' in the 
widest sense. But it differs from most of the allegorical forms known to us by both the historicity of the sign 
and what it signifes. 
648 
He offers 'figura' as a means of reactivating the theological tradition behind the term allegory; 
a tradition which aims (do preserve the full historicity of the Scriptures along with the deeper 
meaning. ýfi49 In the Clark Lectures, Eliot shows this same concern about allegorical readings 
of Dante's Vita Nuova: 
When we read the book in question, we may receive the impression that the Vita Nuova is a dry a lifeless 
allegory. (The word 'allegory' is enough to condemn anything, to many people! ) No such thing. The Vita 
Nuova is to my thinking a record of actual experiences reshaped into a particular form [ ... 
]I do not reject 
the part of allegory. Allegory itself may be only a mode of expression of a mind passionately eager to find 
order and significance in the world -though it may find order or set order in ways which we have come to 
neglect. 
650 
Not only is Eliot encouraging allegorical readings, but also an alternative tradition which is not 
strictly literary: oDante, in his place and time, was following something more essential than 
merely a 'literary' tradition. ))651 This amounts to a rejection of contemporary approaches as 
illustrated by Benedetto Croce's 'On the Nature of Allegory' and Remy de Gourmont's Dante 
(1929) to which Eliot refers in his own Dante. His comment implies that allegory is more than 
a literary device, but it is a scaffold on which to order experience simultaneously informed by a 
whole cultural worldview, including philosophy and theology. This view of tradition amounts 
to an important variation from the one be proposed in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent'. 
Through allegory Eliot is able to further historicize the 'historical sense' otherwise showing all 
the symptoms of an inert transcendence. Tradition becomes now more than an ordering and re- 
648 Auerbach, 'Figura', p. 54. 
649 Auerbach', 'Figura', p. 36. 
650 The Clark Lectures, Lecture III [Donne and the Trecento], pp. 97-98. 
651 Dante, p. 65. 
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ordering of works of art, but a reference to the historicism implied in all cognitive constructions 
of meaning. 
Walter Benjamin points out that allegory oestablishes itself most permanently where 
provisionality and eternity confront each other most closely>>. He is also aware of the important 
historical dimension of allegory; it inhabits the centre of the temporal cross of figural prophecy. 
Though he is happy to stick to the term 'allegory' Benjamin idcalises the possibility of the sort 
of temporal inhabitation he attributes to it and which appears indistinguishable from the 
symbol: 
The measure oftime for the experience of the symbol is the mystical instant in which the symbol assumes 
the meaning into its hidden and, if one might say so, wooded interior. 652 
The difference between allegory and symbol becomes clearer later, when Benjamin addresses 
the sort of deferral involved in allegory. The problem of allegory is not so much that of linking 
two events in time, but in renewing the process as the link proves provisional. This is the 
inevitable allegorical deferral of symbolic closure which Walter Benjamin regards as mourning. 
Mourning is the mode of allegory always at the borderline between loss and ecstasy: it is the 
point of loss as it is fulfilled - Christ's incarnation and death - and the ecstasy 
in the promise of 
recuperation - in the Second Coming and the resurrection of the body. 
653 This promise is made 
tangible as it is pre-figured by Christ's own resurrection after his death. This deferral is, as a 
critic puts it, where <<an anticipation is substituted for fulfilment. >>654 We find a similar idea in 
Julia Kristeva's analysis of the sign; she identifies grief as the moment when the sign brings the 
symbolic down to earth but <<retain[s] only a tenuous relationship with the transcendental 
idea. >>655 However she fails to identify in this grief the temporality, both of loss and 
652 Walter Benjamin, The Origins of German Tragic Drama (1928), John Osborne trans. (London: Vcrso, 1996), 
p. 165. 
653 Mourning is at the heart of Eliot's Ariel Poems. In these poems expectation is undercut by disappointment, yet 
it is governed by the prophetic hermeneutics of allegory which encourage hope and further understanding. This 
role is carried out principally by the last of the Ariel Poems, 'The Cultivation of Christmas Trees', which asks us to 
reread the poems with a sense of forward, if recurrent, progress. It concludes with the words: 
((Because the beginning shall remind us of the end 
And the first coming of the second coming>>, (11.33-4, p. It 8). 
654 A. C. Charity, Events and Their After-Life: Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and Dante 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 230. 
655 Julia Kristcva, 'From Symbol to Sign' in The Kristeva Reader, Toril Moi ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 
p. 67. 
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expectation, we find in Benjamin's mourning which parallels more closely figural prophecy. To 
illustrate this point we should turn to Dante Alighieri's own allegorical work, Vita Nuova, 
which turns the debate about allegorical time into a consideration of the relationship between 
the real and the ideal. 
The Failure of Discourse: Vita Nuova and 'Paradisol 
In Dante's Vita Nuova we are presented with a deliberate juxtaposition of diachronic and 
synchronic time, in the form of prose and lyric time. In this work Dante presents retrospective 
episodes from his youth illustrated by poems he wrote at the time, presumably as the events 
took place. It is an account of adolescent experience: Dante's discovery of love, as he falls in 
love with Beatrice, and its loss, as she dies. The narrative moves linearly from their meeting 
untill Beatrice's death and its aftermath; however, this linearity is challenged. The account is 
retrospective and the narrative time exploits that foreknowledge. It does this both by 
introducing prose commentaries of the poems and by prefiguring the events before they 
actually happen in the linear time of the work. That is the case of the central event - the death 
of Beatrice - which is prefigured by other deaths within the narrative: her father's and that of a 
female friend. The temporal paradox is that the death of Beatrice culminates the narrative time 
just as it fulfils its foreknowledge, yet it struggles to project that foreknowledge towards a new 
recovery. 
The scholarly debates around Vita Nuova - as with The Divine Comedy - tend to 
concentrate on the importance of perceiving Beatrice as a real historical person, or, else, on 
seeing her as a mere allegory of Love. Eliot participates in this debate with a clear concern 
about avoiding any mere poetic allegorization of the events described in the poem. He states in 
Dante: 
A great deal of scholarship has been directed upon examination of the early life of Dante, in connection with 
the Vita Nuova. Critics may be roughly divided into those who regard it as primarily biographical, and those 
who regard it as primarily allegorical. 
656 
656 Dante, p. 61. 
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Although Eliot admits that <<it is easy to make out a case for its being an entire allegory: for 
asserting, that is, that Beatrice is merely a personification of an abstract virtue, intellectual or 
moral, ýfi57 he adds that: 
I find it an account of a particular kind of experience: that is, of something which had actual experience (the 
experience of the 'confession' in the modem sense) and intellectual and imaginative xperience (the 
experience of thought and the experience of dream) as its materials; and which became a third kind. 
658 
Eliot's reference to experience stresses a cognitive hold on the serniotics of allegory. 'Me 
subtext to this quotation is the problem of personality. Eliot gets closer to defining the sort of 
personal experience which is only implied in his theory of impersonality; an experience he 
sometimes expresses as a sort of mysticism. 
659 'Mis experience is of two kinds - actual and 
intellectual or imaginative -, which parallels the real-ideal dichotomy. Allegory by-passes this 
to produce an experience of a third kind which is not simply actual or intellectual: o[it] is 
neither a 'confession' nor an 'indiscretion' in the modem sense, nor is it a piece of Pre- 
Raphaelite tapestry. ýfiW This allusion to a third kind of experience recalls mystical experience 
in terms of Eliot's Clark Lectures and the relation of faith to experience in Dante discussed 
above. 
661 He proposes that the sort of experience Dante's poetry offers is mediated by the 
intellect, but operates on us as an actuality. In this sense the sort of experience evoked by 
allegory is beyond belief and disbelief, it simply is. It is an ontological fulfilment where Being 
relates both to being down here and being up there: 
If you can read the poetry as poetry, you will 'believe' in Dante's theology exactly as you believe in the 
physical reality of his journey-, that is, you suspend both belief and disbclief. 
662 
Questions of intellectual empathy are relegated to the actuality of the experience. The theology 
and the poetry reconcile to make a greater whole which is presented to the senses beyond 
questions of truth or error: 
If you have the sense of intellectual and spiritual realities that Dante had, then a form of expression like the 
Vita Nuova cannot be classified as 'truth' or 'f iction'. 663 
657 Dante, p. 62. 
658 Dante, p. 63. 
659 See 'Mysticism and Self-consciousness', Chapter 5. 
660 Dante, p. 63. 
661 See 'I. A. Richards and the Theory of Belief, Chapter 5. 
662 Dante, pp. 42-43. 
663 Dante, p. 63. 
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Thus Eliot by-passes any commitment to either mere allegorical or literal readings of the Vita 
Nuova by offering an experiential thirdness beyond Good and Evil. This transition 
is enabled 
by Eliot's awareness of the phenomenal prophecy at work in Vita Nuova. 
664 The figurative 
medium of the allegory acts as a retrospective prophecy of the events 
in Dante's life avoiding 
mere allegory, on the one hand, or personal 
history - biography -, on the other. 
The events are 
reorganized just as they become meaningful which 
in no way alters the literal reality of Dante's 
experience as reported in Vita Nuova. 
665 Dante's love for Beatrice acquires a religious 
meaning which is not transcendent because it is permeated by the literalness of the earthly 
events of Dante's youth, just as his life becomes, in turn, more than a succession of events. 
Ibis 
bridging of the literal and the spiritual enacts the doctrine of the Incarnation, itself the source of 
figural interpretation. However, the resolution of the relationship between Beatrice's 
personality and its allegorical signification does not achieve completion in Vita Nuova. 
In Vita Nuova Dante's adolescent love for Beatrice becomes a literal encounter with 
Love's personification who advises Dante to disguise his emotions by pretending to love ladies 
other than Beatrice. This advice radicalizes Dante's ideal pursuit of Love as an end 
in itself in 
the Provengal courtly love tradition; a pursuit which amounts to the depersonalized idealization 
of the object of love. However, Dante's progress in Vita Nuova defies this idealization 
ultimately rejecting the abstract personification of Love, thus enabling a particular exercise of 
his emotions for a real person, but without undermining the universality of his emotions. As 
this process gets underway, the allegorical personification of Love is rendered useless by 
Beatrice. Dante warns us: 
it may be that at this point some person, worthy of having any doubt cleared up, could be puzzled at my 
speaking of Love as if it were a thing in itself, as if it were not only an intellectual substance but also a 
664 it is worth reading A. D. Nuttall's Two Concepts of Allegory (pp. 15-48) where he argues against figural 
interpretations of allegory in The Divine Comedy. 
665 Eliot referred to the meaningful alteration of past events through recollection in his doctoral thesis in the 
following way: <(We are attempting to recall, let us say, a public address which we have heard. If memory were 
simply a restoration of the past, we might expect to recall first the fragments of the sentences which the speaker 
uttered, rather than the sense which we extracted therefrom. For these sounds which he uttered take precedence 
in 
time of the meaning; [ ... 
] the fact that we recall the meaning, in most cases, before we recall the actual words, 
would imply that the past presents itself in a different time-order than that of the objective time in which the events 
are held to have taken place>), KE, p. 50. 
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bodily substance. This in all truth is false, for Love does not exist in itself as a substance, but rather it is an 
accident in substance [ ... 
] it appears that I assume Love to be a body. 
666 
In Dante, the actual experience of the real is actively bridging over the intellectual experience 
of the ideal. This initiates the process by which Love as a personification is exorcised yet re- 
incarnated in Beatrice. Thus, as Robert Pogue Harrison notes in Vie Body of Beatrice, 
((transcendence ... 
is externalised and embodied. Love traverses the boundaries of psychic 
interiority and enters the arena of existential facticity>>667 of real persons in real time. This 
incarnation is enabled by the poem's figural prophecy, which operates as the retrospective 
foreknowledge of the events as they are recollected in time. The incarnation is made operative 
precisely at the point of achieving the fulfilment of the foreknown and preannounced death of 
Beatrice. Death is the end, yet it is a temporal fulfilment that precludes a new beginning as it 
initiates the process of mouming for the living, and the after-life for the dead. By making the 
end into the start of a new fulfilment the spiritual release is re-captured by the world in the 
promise of a renewed worldly fulfilment. So Love's incarnation in Beatrice requires her death 
by way of subjecting her body to the reverse process of becoming spirit, but which, in so doing, 
awakens the intimate link with its corporeal existence now melancholically seeking restoration 
in the hope of resurrection. 
Paradoxically, it is Beatrice's end which affirms her corporeal existence as a real 
loved person. The theme of death and mourning recalls Walter Benjamin's approach to allegory 
in The Origins of German Tragic Dramal, where he adds: 
And if it is in death that the spirit becomes free, in the manner of spirits, it is not until then that the body too 
comes properly into its own. For this much is self-evident: the allegorization of the physis can only be 
carried through in all its vigour in respect of the corpse [... ] it is only thus as corpses, that they can enter into 
the homeland of allegory. 
668 
Vita Nuova's figural prophecy, transforms the mourning of loss into mourning as beginning. 
Prophetic anticipation makes the fulfilment meaningful, so that the loss - the end or death's 
temporal boundary as it is crossed - does not mean the end of time but a renewed anticipation. 
Whatever transcendentality there is about meaning, is swiftly re-captured for and by the world; 
666 Dante Alighieri, Vita Nuova, Mark Musa trans., The World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992), Canto XXV, p. 53. 
667 Robert Pogue Harrison, The Body ofBeatrice (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 52. 
668 Benjamin, p. 217. 
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it is the kind of transcendentality, as Benjamin notes, through which othe body comes properly 
into its own>>, and with the body all things historical and temporal. That we do not know what 
we have got till is gone, is in itself a kind of meaningful recovery. A recovery which, though 
definite, as we noted above, is provisional because no matter how Dante looks at it, Beatrice 
has, at least for the moment, gone. 
The provisionality of the temporal fulfilment of death is the problem Dante fails to 
solve in Vita Nuova. Death takes place in the middle of the work, while the ending of the book 
reverts back to personification as Dante proves unable to deal with death. In effect Dante takes 
comfort in the permanence of death as a form of consolation; fulfilment is mistaken as an 
ending forgoing the challenge of invoking a new beginning. The result is a personification 
relapse as Beatrice finds a substitute which endangers her endurance as a real person. This is 
illustrated by the scholarly debate over the identity of the Lady of the Window who appears at 
the end of Vita Nuova to console Dante. It can be argued that the Lady of the Window 
represents the return of personification and, with it, of symbolism; that the Lady of the window 
is the sober comfort provided by Philosophy - Minerva. Dante admits defeat as the 
provisionality of Beatrice's death becomes final and the hope of anticipating a renewed point of 
contact seems lost - for there is a fine line between hope and melancholy. Thus the link between 
semiotics and temporality becomes most apparent as Dante's effort fails to sustain the 
expectations of figural prophecy turn into a symbolic relapse - or niere allegory. 
One could argue that the failure of the Vita Nuova is precisely what attracts Eliot to 
this work. He is particularly curious about minor poetry, what he calls of the 'second order' in 
The Sacred TV00d. 669 This preference lies in the transparency that the imperfect work offers, as 
he suggests in Dante: 
All of Dante's 'minor works' are important, because they are works of Dante; but the Vita Nuova has a 
special importance, because it does more than any of the others to help us to a fuller understanding of the 
Divine Comedy [
... 
] But the Vita Nuova is a youthful work, in which some of the methods and design, and 
explicitly the intention, of the Divine Comedy are shown. 
670 
669 'Introduction', SW, p. xiv. 
670 Dante, p. 6 1. 
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Ibis is the feature Eliot exploits in the Metaphysical poets too, as if the real poetic revelation 
appears most clearly in the imperfect edges of the structure. Eliot finds consolation in this 
imperfection as it parallels his own struggle with the realisation of discourse, no doubt spurred 
on by his fallen vision of human life reflected by the Original Sin. Like Dante Eliot must fight 
off the temptation of personification. In the absence of a perfect formula of reconciliation 
between the carnal and the metaphysical he must, at times, content himself with struggling 
against the false consolation of the Lady of the Window, as his ambivalent trust of science 
made evident in his early criticism. It is an attempt to regain faith in a discourse which fails to 
offers definite meaning, yet only offers meaning if we believe that it will make sense in the elld 
even if the end is not final. If Eliot turned to science in his early literary criticism having failed 
to articulate the metaphysics of Bradley, Dante turned to philosophical discourse - following 
the advice of the Lady at the Window - by writing the Convivio after the problems of Vita 
Nuova. Both these attempts - Dante's and Eliot's - reach out for the cold comfort of 
personification in the form of reified philosophical absolutes, whether logical or scientific 
formulas. 671 However misguided, these attempts are comforting in a way that perfection is not; 
and there is a sense that Eliot is aware of the hopelessness of the scientific project from the 
start. 
672 All of the rhetorical strategies with which Eliot experiments share this motif. that of 
offering an incarnation which struggles to avoid reifying itself in the process of its articulation. 
This mistrust of perfection can be used to understand Eliot's early literary criticism as a 
deliberate sabotage of the possibility of saying what he means even as he earnestly attempts to 
follow his projected scientific method in The Sacred Wood. 
Lyndall Gordon notes Eliot's ambivalence towards perfection, not only in his 
discourse but in his life. She insists upon a parallel between Dante's Beatrice and Eliot's Emily 
Hale, and according to Gordon, Eliot's identification with the Dante of the Vita Nuova 
671 These become equivalent concessions in science to personification in which osymbolic presentation becomes 
a permanent displacement of the authentic presentation; only the signs remain while the object vanishes 
completely from our attention in mathematical practiceo (p. 82), as Newton Graver and Scung-Chong Lee suggest 
in Derrida and Wittgenstein (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994) with reference to Husserl's struggle to 
make sense of the authentic presentation of the ideal content of numbers. 
672 1 have suggested in Chapter 2 that Eliot's objective correlative fails to achieve definition precisely at the point 
where its fulfilmcnt triggers the awareness of its impossibility. See 'The Parody of Science as Critical Style'. 
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illustrates his own loss and disillusion with earthly love which culminated in his conversion and 
vows of celibacy in 1926; a loss which seemed, for Eliot, irreparable in this life. Gordon notes 
that Emily Hale re-established contact with Eliot in 1927 after thirteen years of silence. She was 
asking him for advice on a lecture on modem poetry she was about to give. As Gordon puts it: 
Their eventual reunion was propelled by a dream that took the space of a long separation to take hold. To 
dream of meeting an old love, after many years, was a replay of Dante's reunion with Beatrice on the verge 
of Paradise, as Eliot saw it the recrudescence of old passions in a new emotion, in a new situation which 
ocomprehends, enlarges and gives meaning to it'. Like Beatrice, Eliot's Lady forgives the poet his 
defection. 673 
The 'disaffection' tangentially refers to Dantes's false consolation in the Lady of the Window. 
After the loss, however, it is the recuperation which proves the more problematic. For, as 
Gordon stresses, it is the comfort of asceticism which proves the real temptation for the ascetic. 
She sees Eliot, not as an untroubled convert to the peace of transcendence, but constantly 
haunted by the thought of escapism. Gordon continues: 
It is easy to justify a solitary religious position in the case of monks and nuns which have incurred no other 
obligation; less easy where the solitary path cuts through human obligation. It has then to be self-serving, 
and the denial of other obligations implies a belief in the exclusiveness of the soul's superior instants. 
674 
Eliot suspects that the way to divine love must be attained through natural love. But Gordon 
over-stresses the synthesis between Eliot's biography and his poetry. That is a strong 
temptation, and one which Eliot himself addresses in his approach to the Vita Nuova in his 
Dante (1929) when he considers the relation of allegory to biography. Though Eliot praises 
Dante's capacity to make these two experiences of a third kind, it is not a perfect synthesis that 
he is implying. The separation of the man who suffers from the mind that creates is not an 
imperative, but an inevitability which Eliot encourages us to embrace. Such separation is 
clearer in Eliot's criticism. The rhetoric of his critical writing - if a more imperfect vehicle - 
affords that vision. The Vita Nuova is after all a ocurious medley of verse and proseýfi75, an 
exercise of a new kind of criticism rather than a perfect poetic expression. 
676 
673 Lyndall Gordon, Eliot's New Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. I 1- 12. 
674 Gordon, p. 12. 
675 Dante, p. 6 1. 
676 With reference to Eliot's critical style Lewis Freed notes that othe style is normally condensed, concentrated, 
and suggestive, in the way that Eliot thinks poetry should be written. In effect, the prose does what the poetry is 
supposed to do - replace the philosophy>>, TS Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 
1979), p. 207. 
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Eliot's rhetorical strategies in his criticism follow this pattern of postponement, 
more afraid of getting it right than getting it wrong. Perhaps that is why Eliot takes his time 
before fully addressing Dante in his Literary Criticism, giving priority to the less perfect poetic 
model afforded by the Metaphysical poets. In Dante this postponement - or deliberate falling 
short of fulfilment - is more clearly illustrated by Vita Nuova than by the Divine Coniedy. 
However, there is an important case to be made about the latter. The paradox of 'Paradiso' is 
that - insofar as it 
is the completion of the journey - it is the least visual, if the most perfect, of 
the three stages of the Commedia, and the most philosophical. In Dante, Eliot hints at his 
preference for the visual damnation of 'Inferno' instead of the innocuous transparency of the 
'Paradiso': 
The Comedy initiates us into the world of medieval imagery, in the Inferno most apprehensible, in the 
Paradiso most rarefied. 
677 
The fact remains that Dante seems unable to escape the consolation of philosophy, even and 
particularly in the perfection of 'Paradiso'. Words are more prone to fail us in the face of 
perfection. It paradoxically puts into question the hope of a final arrival, which promises the 
meaningful conclusion of our every earthly postponement. It questions perfection because just 
as we arrive its articulation proves none the easier. These are Dante's own words: 
I was in the heaven that most receives His light and I saw things which he who descends from it has not the 
knowledge or the power to tell again; for our intellect, drawing near to its desire, sinks so deep that memory 
cannot follow it. 
678 
Ironically Dante has to resort to philosophical discourse just at the point when one would have 
expected it was safe to leave it behind. The various planetary spheres which make up heaven 
are inhabited by a number of philosophers, theologians, Saints and evangelists, including St 
Thomas Aquinas, St Bernard, St Bonaventure and St John. The danger is that as ordinary 
discourse fails, one inevitably imposes a doctrinal account - theological or philosophical - of 
events which may remain occult to those who do not share the belief The very point of allegory 
- to by-pass doctrinal differences by appealing to the experience of ordinary cognition - seems 
thus lost. Yet Eliot insists that this is not strictly the case: 
677 Dante, p. 68. 
678 Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, John Sinclair ed., 3 vols., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 
III, 'Paradiso>), Canto 1, p. 19. 
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My point is that you cannot afford to ignore Dante's philosophical and theological 
beliefs, or to skip the 
passages which express them most clearly-, 
but that on the other hand you arc not callcd upon to bclicvc 
them yourself. 
679 
For Eliot, explicit philosophical and theological 
discourse legitimise their inhabitations of the 
cognitive scaffold of allegory, not only 
because cognition in not being immediate is already 
mediated by doctrine, 
but because doctrine in this environment becomes itself a matter of 
cognitive experience. Taradiso' most 
dramatically exploits the ambiguity between memory and 
re-enactment. Eliot adds: 
When I speak of understanding, I do not mean merely knowledge of books or words, any more than I mcan 
belief. I mean a state of mind in which one sees certain beliefs. 
680 
in allegory one sees beliefs like one sees objects. Just like material space and events 
in time 
acquire meaning through a particular worldview, so the worldview becomes a concrete 
experience in allegory; it is really viewing a world As far as Eliot's critical discourse 
is 
concerned, allegory enables the re-incorporation of the rejected metaphysics of 
his early literary 
criticism. Ibis allegorical strategy is at work in Eliot's debate over the simultaneous 
historicity 
and universality of Metaphysical poetry, as he plays with the term 'metaphysical' and the 
possibility of its definition as both a branch of philosophy and as an event 
in the seventeenth 
century. 
681 It is an attempt to incarnate metaphysics through his critical discourse, and rescue 
it from a negative existence just as he attempts to rescue his critical discourse from the 
vagueness and negative reasoning epitomized by 'Reflections on Vers Libre'. It involves the 
positing of metaphysics as a particular philosophical expression without becoming exclusive 
because it is not simply an intellectual experience but retains the element of dream inherent in 
ordinary cognition. This formula refers once again to the mystical experience present on 
Dante's poetry. In T S. Eliot and Mysticism, Murray notes that: 
Other mystical poets o poets of vision may indeed have recorded experiences just as far 'beyond the range of 
ordinary men', but none of them has kept such a firm hold at the same time on the immediate, visible world 
[ 
... 
] It is true, of course, that everything we see and experience now is somehow deepened and expanded 
679 Dante, p. 42. In T S. Eliot and Mysticism: The Secret History of the Four Quartets(London: MacMilla, 1994), 
Paul Murray seconds Eliot's words with reference to Four Quartets: oThose readers who bring to the Quartets a 
certain 'theological equipment' do not necessarily therefore have an advantage over the less endowedo, Murray, 
p38. 
680 Dante, p. 44. 
681 See 'The Clark Lectures and Metaphysical Definitions', in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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through the alchemy of Dante's vision; but the old visible world that is familiar to us is ncvcr compictcly 
lost to sight. 
682 
The test in Eliot's criticism is to wonder whether the reader needs to know the philosophy that 
informs it to understand its meaning. Murray feels that this is certainly not the case in Four 
Quartets: oThose readers who bring to the Quartets a certain 'theological equipment' do not 
necessarily therefore have advantage over the less endowed. ý> 
683 
Taradiso' effectively enacts this rescue precisely because it risks philosophical 
exclusivity. Dante's arrival at Taradiso' is far from simple. The dramatic edge of Beatrice's 
rebuke of Dante as she first meets him in Heaven stresses her human nature just at the point of 
her transfiguration into divinity; a transformation which risks a literalness which could easily 
be confused with mere personification and occult meaning. Dante in the Divine Comedy risks 
the confusion of Beatrice with Divine Love. Not even in Heaven is poetic perfection as divine 
vision available, and the dualism between criticism and poetry - prose and lyric time - of the 
Vita Nuova is not completely overcome; it demands a greater leap of faith over the explicit 
doctrinal artifice behind the ordering of Heaven which defies earthly perception. Thus 
Beatrice's rebuke to Dante is: 
'Thou makest thyself dull with false fancies so that thou canst not see as thou wouldst if thou hadst cast 
them off; thou art not on earth as thou thinkst'. 
684 
Dante warns us against the possibility of meaningfully using discourse in Heaven by stating in 
Canto I: <(Me passing beyond humanity cannot be set forth in wordsýfi85, yet he goes on to 
write twenty-two more cantos. This is enabled by explicit theological mediation. Instead of the 
Lady of the Window, Dante offers the testimony of philosophers and theologians who literally 
appear before our eyes in the divine spheres. Philosophy is not impersonally personified but 
incarnated and historically thernatized even as the vision is not of this world. This effect pushes 
suspension of disbelief to breaking point. Just as we were captured by the meaningful vividness 
of the images of Inferno we are now prepared to reverse the process and be captured by a 
meaning that becomes vivid, as the sound of the words demand a meaning and defy their 
682 Murray, p. 240-1. 
683 Murray, p. 38. 
684 Dante, 'Paradiso', Canto 1, p. 23. 
685 Dante, 'Paradiso', Canto 1, p. 23 
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figurative status. It is at this point that one sees philosophy. The philosophy does not fall on 
deaf ears, as its words do not prove empty for the initiated. This reversal is at work in 
Beatrice's words as she tries to explain to Dante his ascension through the heavenly bodies: 
'If I am right, though shouldst no more wonder at thy ascent than at a stream falling from a mountain-height 
to foot; it would be a wonder in thee if, freed from hindrance, thou hadst remained below, as on earth would 
be stillness in living flamc'. 686 
This is not a mere metaphor. Beatrice's argument relies precisely on taking the metaphor 
literally, even as it remains a figure of speech. She is not so much saying that heaven is like the 
earth, but encourages a point of identity in their difference. Human cognition is thus validated 
in Heaven as it is on earth, not for its ordinariness, but for its being already extraordinary. 
Allegory is a process which, I have been arguing, Eliot uses as a model for the re- 
invention of rhetoric as a legitimate writing practice, and which holds the key for understanding 
the reconciliation and use of philosophy in his criticism. <<Such figures>>, Eliot tells us in Dante, 
oare not merely antiquated rhetorical devices, but serious and practical means of making the 
spiritual visible. >>687 This is an issue which Lewis Freed addresses in T S. Eliot: The Critic as 
Philosopher where he notes: 
The problem we set out to define is roughly this: we cannot, as a rule, find meaning for Eliot's language in 
the context of popular thought; and what is more, owing to the style of the critical prosc and the character of 
the philosophy, it is not easy to find a meaning in the context of the philosophy - or at least to state it in an 
intelligible way. 
688 
Freed does not seem to see a way out of this problem, though ironically his own book 
frequently collapses into the very philosophical difficulties he is trying to combat. This 
obscurity results from his attempts to subject Eliot's critical philosophy to a systematic 
philosophical scrutiny which it does not offer. This is precisely what this thesis is trying not to 
do. It is, instead, through the understanding of the allegorical blue-print of Eliot's rhetorical 
strategies that one can deduce the extent to which Eliot manages to see and makes us see 
philosophy even if we do not live, like Dante, oin an age in which men still saw visions. ýfi89 
The sound of the sense of the word becomes the contemporary medium of achieving the 
686 Dante, 'Paradiso', Canto 1, p. 25. 
687 Dante. p. 54. 
688 Freed, p. 188. 
689 Dante, p. 23. 
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cognitive immediacy of allegory; which, however, falls short of the point of faith which Eliot 
ultimately strives for. His prose remains rhetorically difficult and self-conscious, yet this is the 
price he embraces as a means to overcome its would be philosophical obscurity. Yet it seeks 
through this rhetoric a literal apprehension - allegory does not get on well with metaphors - in 
ways that the language of science could only parody in The Sacred Wood. 'Literal' does not 
mean one-dimensional, but intelligible, where in rhetorical terms it refers to the sound of the 
sense of the word. 
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Chapter 7 
Historicism and Style as ProphUy 
Just as Eliot develops a rhetoric based on the 
figurative strategies of allegory which allow him 
to reconcile philosophy with the cognitive 
immediacy his early literary criticism seeks, his 
historicism can also be understood in terms of the phenomenal prophecy of allegorical 
hermeneutics. 'Ibis chapter will argue that allegory not only enables Eliot to resolve his critical 
negativity by offering him a cognitive model 
for a new kind of rhetoric, but simultaneously 
allows him to articulate a definite historicism of the present, which redefines what 
is to be 
understood by 'modernity'. The importance of this historicism 
is that it allows Eliot to release 
the finitude of the present from its Bradleyan solipsistic implications, opening it up both to the 
past and the future. The finite experience of the present 
in history acts as the cognitive 
immediacy of the literal in allegory and rescues Eliot's negative discourse transforming it into a 
rhetoric of presence. 'Ibis is a model which can, and should 
be applied to Eliot's own critical 
development, as a way of determining the coherence of his thought just as he seems to revise 
his opinions in later criticism. Ibis approach has particular importance 
in relation to Eliot's 
often disliked dogmatic tone because it opens up further readings which check the apparent 
inflexibility of his discourse. 
Prejudice and the Metaphysical Perspective 
Prejudice is something that could be seen to be inherent in the subjectivity of Bradley's finite 
centres. The claustrophobia of the finite centre can only be transcended, as Bradley implies in 
'Tbe Presuppositions of Critical History', by a community of like-minded interpretants which 
in turn checks its exclusivity through skepticism and the inherent negativity of discourse of not 
stating directly what one thinks. The skeptical check of absolute prejudice is apparent to Eliot 
who notes in his introduction to Wilson Knight's The 
Wheel offire (1930) that 
without pursuing that curious and obscure problem of the meaning of interpretation farther, it occurs to me 
as possible that there may be an essential part of error in all interpretation, without which it would not be 
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interpretation at all: but this line of thought may be persevered in by students of [Bradley's] Appearance and 
Reality. 690 
Any critical engagement is 
inherently erroneous given that interpretation can never claim to 
grasp the thing itself, hence the consolidation of 
interpretation as conviction may be arrived at 
through what can only be prejudice. 
Eliot adds: 
it has taken me a long time to recognize the justification of what Mr Wilson Knight calls 'interpretation'. In 
my previous skepticism I am quite ready to admit the presence of elements of pure prejudice, as well as 
some which I defend. 
691 
This is an ambiguous introductory sentence. One is not quite sure whether Eliot sees the 'pure 
prejudice' in all 'interpretation' or only in his 'previous skepticism. The ambiguity reaches its 
climax with the admission that there are some elements of prejudice he had then which he still 
defends now. If Eliot is suggesting that skepticism is a forin of prejudice, one is forced to 
reconcile two apparently exclusive modes of thought. Skepticism could be seen as the least 
prejudiced of any possible form of judgement because it involves a constant dissatisfaction with 
given truths. Eliot may be suggesting that prejudice, even in the safest form of jugement, is 
inescapable. If he has prejudices now, Eliot implies that he must have had them then. This is the 
necessary historical prejudice of reading the past in terms of the present, which Eliot attenuates 
through the ambiguity of the statement. The implication being that he had prejudices 
unconsciously - lack of self-consciousness is perhaps the nature of 'pure' prejudice - which he 
now embraces consciously. Through this admission he is revising the philosophical discourse 
of his previous skepticism. The philosophical skepticism which then identified prejudice in 
every critical discourse that involves interpretation, is now seen as itself prejudiced. As Eliot 
recognizes this limitation, he does not shed those hidden prejudices but exorcises them by 
naming them. 
Eliot's early philosophical scepticism was, by his own admission in 1930, 
inescapably metaphysical and prejudiced. His consequent turn to science in the late 1910s 
resulted from a philosophical skepticism that attempted to revise metaphysical inference with a 
discourse which, as it turns out, is no less prejudiced regardless of its explicit rejection of 
690 Wilson Knight, The Wheel ofFire (1930), T. S. Eliot intro. (London: Mcthuen, 1962), p. xx. 
691 'Introduction', The Wheel ofFire, p. xiii. 
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metaphysics. Yet, the acknowledgement of prejudice invokes a conscious return to the 
discourse of philosophy in the 1920s. This philosophical come back, however, follows 
significant rhetorical strategies which aim to avoid going as far as asserting it as ideology, but 
rather take the form of preferences of taste. Thus, in the introduction to The Wheel of Fire, 
Eliot's philosophical bias takes the form, not of particular philosophical principles, but of the 
particular type of literature he likes. He states that he has 
always maintained, not only that Shakespeare was not a philosophical poet in the sense of Dante and 
Lucretius; but also, what may be more easily overlooked, that 'philosophical poets' like Dante and Lucretius 
are not really philosophers atall. 
692 
Philosophy re-appears in Eliot's criticism undefined, simply as 'philosophy' in literature. That 
Dante is and Shakespeare is not a philosophical poet invokes the need of definition which 
Eliot's introduction to The neel ofFire does not meet 'Philosophy' is thus presented in a way 
that promises a gradual re-definition. 
693 Bradley's negativity is latent in Eliot's critical logic 
even in 1930, yet this time he goes further towards revealing his own personal philosophical 
taste: 
Now it is only a personal prejudice of mine, that I prefer poetry with a clear philosophical pattern but 
this preference means merely a satisfaction of more of my own needs, not a judgement of superiority or even 
statement that I enjoy it more as poetry. I like a definite and dogmatic philosophy, preferably aChristian and 
Catholic one, but alternatively that of Epicurus or of the Forest philosophers of India. 694 
Eliot is still trying hard to stay this side of reductive dogmatism by embracing dogmatism in 
general - not just Christian. This statement is enabled by the previous quotation, in which the 
term 'philosophical' is offered as a general word rather than as an expression of particular 
ideology, so that being 'philosophical' does not necessarily imply a dogmatic tie with particular 
a philosophical school. 
Eliot revises his early engagement with solipsistic skepticism in philosophy - which 
finds its own impossibility in the difficulty of providing a scientific description of the world - 
by developing a criticism which challenges the negativity of philosophical discourse in which 
692 'Introduction, The Wheel offire, p. xiii. 
693 This is a rhetorical device he had already used in The Sacred Wood in an attempt to qualify his apparent 
scientific allegiance: ((Aristotle had what is called the scientific mind -a mind which, as it is rarely found among 
scientists except in fragments, might better be called the intelligent mind)>, 'The Perfect Critic', SW, p. 13. 
694 'Introduction, The Wheel offire, p. xvi. 
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he finds himself hiding. If what turns him away from metaphysics is its ineffability lie must 
then try its positive articulation rather than leave it out of the question, because metaphysics 
simply will not go away. The impact of the philosophical articulation of metaphysics 
is clear in 
the literary criticism promoted in Eliot's introduction to 77ze Wheel ofFire: 
Finally, the skeptical practitioner of verse tends to limit his criticism to the appreciation of vocabulary and 
syntax, the analysis of line, metric and cadence; to stick as closely to the more trustworthy scnscs as possible 
[ 
... 
] Or rather, tends to try to do this. For this exact and humble appreciation is only one ideal never quitc 
arrived at or even so far as approximated consistently maintained. The restless demon in us drivcs us also to 
'interpret' whether we will or not. 
695 
And just as the objectivity of scientific description must give in to the restless demon of 
metaphysics and interpretation, philosophy re-appears triumphally in all its metaphysical glory: 
Our impulse to interpret a work of art [. I is exactly as imperative and fundamental as our impulse to 
interpret the universe by metaphysics. 
696 
Furthermore, to attempt to avoid metaphysics like those who would label the universe 
meaningless is, for Eliot, 
to fall more flat than the flimsiest construction of metaphysics. And Bradley's apothegm that 'metaphysics is 
the finding of a bad reason for what we believe upon instinct; but to find the reason is no less an instinct', 
applies as precisely to the interpretation of poctry. 
697 
This 'bad reason' is the adoption of particular prejudice that, in general, may give identity to 
the metaphysical drive, but whose contiguity with it may be questionable. Philosophy is being 
re-defined in metaphysical terms, as belief-systems, and, as the shift takes place, philosophy 
paradoxically opens up to cultural identity and different historical epochs. 
The Sincerity of Self-consciousness 
The latent metaphysical historicism in Eliot's early literary criticism can be exposed with 
reference to Hans-Georg Gadamer's historical horizons, which for Harriet Davidson are 
unproblematic. In her rendering, 
The horizon of our world is not limited to our physical experience, but includes the awareness brought o us 
by the structures of our language [ ... 
]'Mus our horizon extends far beyond our physical limits into the past 
695 'Introduction, The Wheel ofFire, p. xvi-xvii. 
696 'Introduction', The Wheel ofFire, p. xvii. 
697 'Introduction', The Wheel ofFire, p. xvi i. 
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and sometimes into other cultures, but our present situation is always included in our horizon. Our horizon is 
largely a common one; Gadamer is not speaking of a subjective, relative horizon. 
698 
The crucial point is that Davidson takes for granted that the finitude of Gadamcr's horizon is 
largely a common one. This unproblematic reconciliation of finitude and the transcendence of a 
common horizon contrasts with Richard Shusterman's alternative critique of Gadamer's 
horizons, who is less ready to correlate Gadamer's historicism with Eliot. There are parallels, 
and Shusterman is particularly clear in pointing them out, but there are also important 
differences: 
Eliot's account of how understanding merges perspectives not only prefigures Gadamer's idea of the fusion 
of horizons but seems superior to it. For Eliot avoids Gadamer's dubious transcendental device for fusion [. . 
.] 
This all-cmbracing horizon (which may recall Bradley's Absolute, for they both perform the same 
explanatory function of unifying divergent and narrower points of view) is not only a very questionable 
existence, but seems to contradict the very notion of an horizon, which implies finitude and limitation, i. c. 
that there is something beyond and not embraced by the horizon. 699 
This all-embracing horizon parallels Eliot's deculturized tradition in his early criticism. For 
Eliot, tradition is in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' a radical attempt to by-pass the 
isolated ego by positing historical universality as a literary realm which, however, is accessible 
only to those who are themselves artists. However, historical exclusivity remains a given which 
Eliot cannot ultimately resolve, if only in the attenuated version of art as universal culture. This 
is not to say that Eliot is not in fact deeply aware of the problem as much as Bradley waS700; 
yet Eliot's historicism as articulated in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' fails to be an all- 
embracing horizon. Finitude and universality remain ultimately irreconcilable for witaletiled 
individuals, those who, it appears, must always be left out for the sake of intelligibility. Eliot's 
attempt to compensate for the artistic exclusivity of historical universality is deliberate. Ile does 
so through the impersonal theory of art which provides the makings for the articulation of the 
idea of a common cognitive ground which can be shared by all. Yet this attempt falls short of 
complete success. Eliot's impersonal theory of art attempts to provide this ground, although it 
698 Harriet Davidson, TS Eliot and Hermeneutics: Absence and Interpretation in 'The Waste Land' (London: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1985), p. 50. 
699 Richard Shusterman, T. S. Eliot and the Philosophy of Criticism (London: Duckworth, 1988), p. 113-114. 
700 As Bradley puts it in 'The Presuppositions of Critical History': oThe experience of others has no meaning for 
us except so far as it becomes our own; the existence of others is no existence for us if it is not in our world that 
they live)), 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', F. H. Bradley, 'The Presuppositions of Critical History' 
(1874) in Collected Essays, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), 1, p. 19. Sce 'The Collective and the 
Individual in Critical History' in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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can only do so at the expense of overlooking the cultural variations of history Impersonality 
involves a theory of a radical finitude based on what verges on physiological materialism which 
ignores the subject's inhabitation of the horizon of a cultural present. Eliot's suspicion of 
culture as a common realm of experience 
is Arnoldean in origin, and which must find 
compensation in a literary tradition modelled 
in aesthetic experience as universal cognitive act. 
Just as Eliot encourages the allegorical model to include the full consequences of 
history and enlarge the reductive aesthetics of impersonality, he is also aware that our habits of 
mind are different from those of Dante. We live in a world in which what we believe to be 
literally true may no longer be asserted with thefull conviction which Eliot sees in Dante. This 
is the consequence of self-consciousness. it is not an ontological world of vision, beyond belief 
and disbelief that we live in, where transcendentality is never complete in its finitude. Ontology 
must be mediated epistemologically; presence is not immediately available. We are, in Eliot's 
words, dissociated, yet not beyond redemption; as he notes in 'Donne in Our Time' (193 1), we 
can bridge over the chasm even if we no longer enjoy the medieval worldview: 
in Donne there is a manifest fissure between thought and sensibility, a chasm which in his poetry he bridged 
in his own way, which was not the way of medieval poetry. 701 
Donne is cognitively dissociated but he overcomes it through the exercise of a form of belief 
which Eliot describes as 'sincerity'; Donne was neither a believer in the medieval sense nor a 
sceptic in the modem. Eliot adds: 
He was a sincere churchman ot because he had passed through the doubt which his type of mind finds 
congenial (I say his type of mind), but because in theology he had not yet arrived thcre. In short, this kind of 
religious belief differs both from that of the thirteenth century and that of the nineteenth and twenticth 
century-, it was sincere. 
702 
Donne represents a middle-way between unproblematic faith and the self-conscious faith of the 
cogito. Donne's belief is sincere, not for that matter untrue, yet not literally so. For Eliot, the 
key to this sincerity lies not in an interest in the truth of ideas, but in the ideas themselves 
which he contemplates as objects: 
701 T. S. Eliot, 'Donne in Our Time' in A Garland for John Donne (1631-1931), ed. Theodore Spencer 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 193 1), p. 8. 
702 'Donne in Our Time', A Garlandfor John Donne, p. 9. 
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[Donne] is interested in and amused by ideas in themselves, and interestcd in the way in which hcfeels an 
idea; almost as it were something that he could touch and strokc. 
703 
This amounts to an ontological recovery through the reduction of ideas to finite forms which 
are cognitively felt. In this sense Eliot is reverting to the idea of philosophical poetry where 
philosophy becomes oalmost a physical modif ication>>704 as he stated in 'Dante'. 
One may wonder whether to keep the idea for itself amounts to an intellectual 
aestheticism which must only formally pass for faith; a reified personification. However, Eliot 
insists that it is not the idea itself in its symbolic existence that is felt by Donne, but the 
phenomenal thought that contains the idea: the thought itselffelt as the sound of the meaning of 
the word. This interpretation compensates for the shortcomings of Donne's cognition, namely 
his lack of faith in the medieval sense. Eliot's interpretation gives way to his interest in the 
allegorical latency of rhetoric. This parallels his emphasis of Donne's conversational style as 
the bottom phenomenal line on which the idea rests in the poetry. As we have seen in the Clark 
lectures - from which 'Donne and Our Time' borrows heavily -, Eliot makes a distinction 
between the sound of the word from the sound of the sense of the word. 705 This linguistic 
dimension is represented, not so much by poetics, as by rhetoric. 706 
One must be clear not to confuse Eliot's stress on the phenomenal dimension of 
ideas in rhetoric with realism. As he pointed out in '<<Rhetoric>> and Poetic Drama' (1920): 
In plays of realism we often find parts which arc never allowed to be consciously dramatic, for fear, perhaps, 
of their appearing less real. But in actual life [. . .1 we are at times aware of ourselves 
in this way, and these 
moments are of very great usefulness to dramatic verse. A very small part of acting takes place on the stagcl 
707 
The artificial self-consciousness of rhetoric illustrates an aspect of the actual; and thus Eliot 
continues the philosophical expansion of the real beyond what is merely realistic. His 
promotion of the conversational style as rhetoric, shows his increasing willingness to embrace 
self-consciousness despite its obstruction of the immediacy of the vision afforded by medieval 
allegory. This acceptance goes as far as finding in this self-consciousness a finitude which 
703 'Donne in Our Time', A Garlandfor John Donne, p. 12. 
704 'Dante', SW, p. 163. 
705 The Clark Lectures, Lecture IV [The Conceit in Donne], VMP, p. 130. 
706 see -Rhetoric and the Sound of the Sense of the Word' in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
707, oRhetorico and Poetic Drama, SW, p. 83. 
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reclaims a phenomenal validity. So much so that Eliot is able to recuperate the phonetic finitude 
of language as part of meaning, without, that is, falling into a reification of language as a 
system of autonomous sound patterns in the manner of music. In the type of rhetoric Eliot is 
promoting, the sound of language is intrinsically linked to thought patterns, for there is always 
an implied cognitive observer which must interpret those sounds, even if one is the only 
audience to one's self-consciousness. Eliot adds in 'Donne in Our Time': 
To turn the attention to the mind in this way is a kind of creation, because the objects altcr by being 
observed so curiously. To contemplate anidea, because it is present for the moment in my own mind, to 
observe my emotion colour it, and to observe it colour my cmotions. 708 
The impossibility of recovering the immediacy of the perception of objects is transformed into 
a controlled creative activity which falls short of subjective and aesthetic indulgence. 
709 Eliot 
stays away from the serious danger of encouraging direct perception, while it restores the 
possibility of believing literally where the literal is not simply the real. 
The cognitive redefinition of what is a literal understanding of the world of objects 
is historically exploited by Eliot to refer to the situatedness of the individual in history. On the 
one hand Eliot rescues the problem of self-consciousness in rhetoric as a virtue simply because 
it is true of the way we think now. It amounts to the historical awareness of existing in time; 
itself a feature of contemporaneity. The literal dimension of history is the present, just as 
objects are the literal world in which our cognition is inevitably caught. The inescapability of 
one's present stops being a problem as soon as Eliot sees in its contents the means of a 
qualified escape; thus conformity becomes a form of historical release through the inevitability 
of the cognitive distortion of being in time. Historical conformity and creativity are thus played 
off against each other just like the real and the ideal struggle for reconciliation in cognition. We 
708 'Donne in Our Time', A GarlandforJohn Donne, p. 12. 
709 Eliot is tangentially refierring to the problem of colour as a secondary quality in John Locke's 'An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding'. This problem has important consequences in the debate over the physical 
foundations of cognition and in determining the degree of subjectivity it implies without undermining the 
existence of a causal ground of physical existence. Locke notes that othe ideas ofprimary qualities of bodies are 
resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by 
these secondary qualities have no resemblance of them all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies 
themselves. They are, in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us; and 
what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea is but the certain bulk, f igurc, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies 
themselves, which we call so>>, John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John W. Yolton cd., 
Everyman's Library (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1991), p. 60. 
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may not be able to believe like Dante could, but we can at least be sincere about our cultural 
environment however self-conscious one might be. Thus Donne is sincere because of his 
conventionality, which is to say that he is in our time precisely because he belongs to his time 
as evidenced by the conventionality of his rhetoric. 
Eliot insists that Donne is not medieval, and thus, in one sweep, he debases the 
relationship of all subsequent ages to his preferred period, the Trecento. Historical ideality is 
overrun by the finite particularities of every present. The difference between '<(Rhetoric and 
Poetic Drama' and Eliot's later developments is that, what is first idealized as the 
transcendentality of the finite centre's impersonality, now adopts the increasing finitude of 
particular cultural setting present to the individual perceiving subject. We do not overcome the 
isolation of the subjective ego by simply asserting the naked self-awareness of solitude, but by 
sharing the self-consciousness of the particular worldview present to ourselves. The bare soul 
of the impersonal finite centre must ultimately be clothed in with cultural interaction. For 
what is natural in one man is artificial in another; for a style is natural or artificial, just as it may be vigorous 
or insipid, according to the right expression of, whether its intimate union with a sincere, because integrated 
personality [ ... 
] And the artificial occurs when a man is trying to be, or trying to prctcnd to be, that which 
he is not and cannot be. 
7 10 
All one can be expected to do is to be sincere in the way one relates to the reality of one's own 
time; that Donne's ornind was decidedly the mind of a man of his own ageýý71 
1, is not a 
deficiency but a virtue illustrated by the right expression in the terms Eliot sets out as good 
rhetoric; terms which point to the particular allegorical disposition of phenomenal cognition 
which historically translates as a contemporaneity towards one's time. Thus Eliot's indecision 
about the relation of the poet to history is finalised. 712 It is through one's present that one can 
connect with all ages in their own presence to themselves. In this sense Donne is, after all, in 
our time, and to this extent - in the absence of faith - sincerity supplants impersonality as a 
trans-historical cognitive model. 
71 O'Donne in Our Time', A Garlandfor John Donne 
, p. 
18. 
711 'Donne in Our Time', A Garlandfor John Donne, p. 8. 
712 See 'Blake and the Personality of Impersonality' in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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Eliot contextualises his use of 'sincerity' by 1933 in The Use of Poetry and the Use 
of Criticisms with reference of 1. A. 
Richards's Practical Criticism (1929) which Eliot had read 
before writing 'Donne in Our Time'. The term is used by Richards as a means to provide a 
model for genuine poetry and criticism; 
it invokes an ideal cognitive harmony between 
emotions and thoughts, as an alternative to the antithesis between 
dogma and disinterested 
appreciation. Richards is ultimately interested in a perfect model whose attainability 
he must 
from the beginning put in doubt. Richards notes: 
Sincere motions, we say, are genuine or authentic, as opposed to spurious emotions We may mean 
that the emotion is genuine in the sense that it is every product of a perfect mind would be genuine. It would 
result only from the prompting situation plus all the relevant experience of that mind, and be free from 
impurities and from all interference [. . .1 
Since such minds are nowhere obtainable in this obstructive world, 
such a sense is useful only as an ideal standard by which to measure degrees of relative insincerity. 
713 
Richards's admission is pointless. He continues his argument with little regard for the insight 
taking for granted sincerity as an idealized plane which he models on the philosophy of 
Confucius. Richards demands an emotional purity only to be found, if at all, in the saint; and 
this is Eliot's point, that Richards omits the necessary historical content of the cognitive act he 
is promoting in criticism and poetry. This content, for Richards, forms part of the impurities 
and obstructions which undermine the sincerity of immediate emotional responses. To this, 
Eliot's response is clear: Richards, like Arnold, wants oto preserve emotion without the beliefs 
with which their history has been involved. )>714 Eliot's idea of sincerity attempts to import 
those very impurities as inherent parts of the cognitive process, by considering the importance 
of their proper incorporation in experience. Eliot appropriates Richards use of sincerity to 
invoke a historicized cognition and as a response to his own former theory of impersonality and 
to which Richards may be in effect alluding. (This shows the sort of misprisions Eliot has been 
subjected to by his followers, who paid little attention to his later critical development. ) This 
reaction is perhaps already prefigured in the epigram introducing Me Perfect Critic' which 
Eliot takes from Remy de Gourmont's Lettres 6 'Amazone: <(Eriger en lois ses impressions 
personelles, c'est le grand effort d'un homme s'il est sinc&e. >>715 Sincerity appears in this 
713 1. A. Richards, Practical Criticism: A Study in Literary Judgement (1929) (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1960), p. 28 1. 
714 TUpUC, p. 135. 
715 'The Perfect Critic, SW, p. 1. 
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quotation as the attempt at reconciliation 
between the historical finitude of the individual and 
universal laws; between the transient and the permanent. 
Sincerity is historical situatedness as a model for cognitive rigour in the personal 
experience of the world. It is a kind of 
faith whose rootedness in the Christian world is an 
admission one has to make if one is to 
be sincere. Richards mediates this religious link via 
Chinese philosophy as a means to neutralize the dogmatic 'interference' and 'obstructions' of 
his statement, but for Eliot he is simply oengaged in a rear-guard religious action. >>716 In the 
end this amounts to othe problem of religious faith and 
its substitutes>ý717 by which critics and 
poets ultimately aim to de-dogmatise the poetic experience only to make poetry a higher 
kind 
of religious experience: oa modem equivalent for the theory of divine inspiration. >>718 For 
Eliot, this to fall ointo the most dangerous of all dogmas - the dogma that we must do without 
dogma. )>719 Instead his own consideration of sincerity as a cognitive model deliberately 
addresses Christian dogma: mystical experience720 and the theological 
historicism of figural 
prophecy. And it is at this point that one must clearly consider the differences between being 
dogmatic and being sincere. The difference is ultimately rhetorical and depends on the sincerity 
of one's expression in as much as this last is symptomatic on one's relation to the world one 
lives in. 
The paradox of the permanent and the transient is perhaps more explicitly alluded to 
in Eliot's 'Baudelaire' (193 0): 
Baudelaire was in some ways in advance ofthe point of view of his own time, and yet was very much of it, 
very largely partook of its limited merits, faults and fashions. 721 
Baudelaire's sincerity lies in his engagement with his world, not only at the level of the 
conventional that it offers him, but in the inherited difficulties which obstruct faith. Much of 
716 TUpUC, p. 135. 
717 TUpUC, p. 125. 
718 TUpUC, p. 137. 
719 The Relationship Between Politics and Metaphysics', p. 11. 
720 See Chapter 5, sections 'The Mystical Via Positiva and Rhetorical Incarnation' and 
'Richards and the Theory of Belief. 
721 'Baudelaire', SE, p. 38 1. 
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this essay is devoted to Baudelaire's alleged Satanism, and Eliot's insistence that this is a form 
of belief valuable in itself oan attempt to get to Christianity 
by the back door. ))722 Eliot sccs in 
Baudelaire's Satanism. a convoluted necessity to develop strategies to regenerate the fragments 
which the present has handed down to him. So that <<[Baudelairc] might almost 
be said to be 
making again, as one man, the effort of scores of generations. )>723 He has to use anything that 
is given to him, however insufficient, as the basic material of reconstruction. In this lies his 
sincerity and heroism. This acquires further significance to Eliot given that part of the world 
Baudelaire inherits is a romantic one: 
Baudclaire belongs to a definite place and time. Inevitably the offspring of Romanticism, and by his naturc 
the first counter-romantic in poetry, he could, like anyone else, only work with the materials that were there 
( 
... 
] If he is sincere, he must express with individual differences the general state of mind - not as a duty, 
but simply because he cannot help participating in it. 
724 
Baudelaire's participation in romanticism does not amount to his being himself a romantic, in 
fact the opposite is true. Yet is it only through the participation that the reaction can be 
articulated. Thus Baudelaire's images strike one as second hand, Eliot tells us, but they also 
mean something else: ((Baudelaire is the voice of his time; but I would observe that in 
Baudelaire, as in no one else, it is redeemed by meaning something else. >>725 This omeaning 
something else>> is the transcendental opening of the literal historical time which stops our 
temporal belonging from becoming a mere prison of repetition; that is Baudelaire's redemption. 
The present is the inevitable cognitive and historical referent of every subject, which, in turn, is 
altered in the very process of being inhabited. This mechanism is thus allegorical. 
726 Yet, 
allegory amounts to the controlling effort of making this alteration coherent and not arbitrary: it 
accepts in as much as it makes the present something else. 
722 'Baudelaire', SE, p. 3 83. 
723 'Baudelaire', SE, p. 384. 
724 'Baudelaire', SE, p. 386. 
725 'Baudelaire', SE, p. 388. 
726 
((The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory)), Martin 
Heidegger's 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in Basic Writings: from 'Being and Time' (1927) to 'The Task of 
Thinking' (1964), David Farrell Krell ed. (London: Routlcdge, 1993), pp. 145-146. 
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The Historical Sense of the Present 
In an earlier essay entitled 'Baudelaire in Our Time' (1927), Eliot had dismissed the possibility 
of assessing Baudelaire's work on the assumption that the world present to the poet is 
recoverable. Eliot does this both in cognitive and historical terms. Ile states: 
We cannot be primarily interested in any writer's nerves (and remcmbcr please that 'ncrvcs' uscd in this way 
is a very vague and unscientific term) or in any one's heredity except for the purpose of knowing to what 
extent that writer's individuality distorts or detracts from the objective truth which he pcrccivcs. If a writcr 
sees truly - as far as he sees at all - this heredity and nerves do not matter. 
727 
The first thing to notice is Eliot's redefinition of the scientific vocabulary typificd by his theory 
of impersonality and scattered throughout the essays and reviews included in Vie Sacred Wood. 
What is perhaps interesting is to note that Eliot's reference to the scientific vocabulary of his 
earlier literary criticism demands its re-reading. This is in itself a test of the validity of his 
earlier methodology in the light of his later expansions; as re-readings may either prove the 
limitations of his earlier work or expand its meaning as the earlier work proves the 
prefiguration of the latter. The literal scientific meaning of 'nerves' is consecrated just as Eliot 
demands its figurative opening. The complexity of this demand is that in 'Baudelaire in Our 
Time' he means the term 'nerves' literally as a means to encourage the literal meaning along 
with the figurative. To achieve this, Eliot deliberately unden-nines the literal reading as a means 
to opening the figurative dimension, and thus reverses the expectations of a reader who can 
naturally be expected not to read the term literally in the first place. That onerves>> is used 
literally in the above passage becomes a semantic imperative if the reader is to understand what 
Eliot means by truly seeing. He is in fact making a distinction between perception and 
cognition as well as making clear that the importance of one's historical heritage is not one of 
immediate perceptual availability: to see one's time is not to perceive it literally but to mediate 
a vision through it, and in so doing figuratively seeing something else not necessarily 
representative of one's time. The strategy, however, insists on the importance of a literal 
dimension to our cognition; that both perception and the historical present remain as unchanged 
ground for the pseudo-creative ffort of cognition. The construction of a world is not simply an 
arbitrary 'something else' or an empty figure of speech, it is an allegorically controlled 
727 'Baudelaire in Our Time', FLA, p. 9 1. 
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modification. This is the allegorical effort 
Eliot is demanding in the reading and re-reading of 
his criticism; to show the reader how much of 
its literal meaning accepts figurative 
interpretations which do not ultimately alter the original meaning of the text; how much, in 
other words, can Eliot's criticism 
be read allegorically. This is a point of style as much as of 
historicism; of reconciling what was meant then with what it means now. 
The difficulty in articulating the degree to which historical context is important in 
the understanding of a statement is already inherent in Eliot's definition of poetic originality in 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent, 
728; only that in this essay the problem is attenuated by 
the implication that the history in which the poet participates is already atemporal and to some 
degree already original. As history is temporalized in Eliot's criticism, the reconciliation 
between heritage and originality becomes more difficult to articulate. So in 'Shakespeare and 
the Stoicism of Seneca' (1927) Eliot seems to move in the other direction: 
In truth neither Shakespeare nor Dante did any real thinking - that was not their job; and the relative value 
of the thought current at their time, the material enforced upon each to use as the vehicle of their fcclings, is 
of no importance. It does not make Dante a greater poet, or mean that we can Icam more from Dante than 
from Shakespeare. 729 
The implications are of an ambiguous historicism which must take into account not only the 
final product on the page, but the conditions under which this final object was produced; that is, 
the relation of the author to his own time. Yet the relation of an author to his own time Eliot is 
proposing is not a simple historical contextualization, precisely because whether the conditions 
are good or bad the quality of the poet ultimately transcends that context; it does not make 
Dante the better poet. It is the relation that counts - the sincerity - not the details of the context 
in itself, even if it means that, as he put it in 'Baudelaire in Our Time', we have to find the 
details for the <Turpose of knowing to what extent that writer's individuality distorts or detracts 
from the objective truth which he perceives. >>730 Eliot had rejected the very possibility of 
accurate contextualization in 'Hamlet and his Problems' because this means having to know 
728 
<(Not only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be those in which the dcad pocts, his 
ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously>>, 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 48. 
729 'Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca', SE, p. 136. 
730 'Baudclaire in Our Time', FLA, p. 9 1. 
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((something which is by hypothesis unknowable. >>731 By 1930 Eliot is not changing his mind 
about the knowability of past events, but considering the scope of its intelligibility. TIlis 
intelligibility is greater than he is prepared to admit in 'Hamlet and His Problems', but less than 
a simple understanding of the mind of the 
individual in the cultural terms set by a by-gone age. 
Eliot is most explicit in The Use ofPoetry and the Use of Criticism : 
We can learn something about poetry simply by studying what people have thought about it at one pcriod 
after another; without coming to the stultifying conclusion that there is nothing to be said but that opinion 
changes. Second, the study of criticism, not as a sequence of random conjectures, but as re-adaptation, may 
also help us to draw some conclusions as to what is permanent or ctcmal in poctry, and what is merely the 
expression of the spirit of an age, and by discovering what does change, and how, and why, we may bccomc 
able to apprehend what does not change. 
732 
Eliot is not proposing historical erudition as the sole means to achieve true interpretation. 
According to Bradley's doctrine of immediate experience, the empirical truth of the experience 
is never immediately available and always mediated through reflection. The present may be 
provisional, but one must attempt to articulate what is definite about this provisionality or else 
accept our ultimate isolation from other times and other people. This is the fundamental 
cognitive and historical premise which haunts Eliot's critical development, and which forced 
him into a negative method in the first place; the very method Bradley suggests in 'The 
Presupposition of Critical History'. 
733 Figural prophecy overcomes the problem of the 
isolation of the present without appealing to ideal historical realms or ineffable absolutes. It 
makes the finitude of the present the very link to other times, for they too are in the present, 
even if it is only their own. 
For Edmund Husserl, in The Origins of Geometry (1939), the present can be made 
to perform the universal function rather than obstruct a coherent view of history. For him, like 
Bradley, facts are not a sufficient ground for history, yet he is clearer in expounding the relation 
between received facts and present experience: 
All [merely] factual history remains incomprehensible b cause, always merely drawing its conclusions 
nawely and straightforwardly from facts, it never makes thematic the general ground of meaning upon 
731 'Hamlet and his Problems, SW, pp. 102-103. 
732 TUPUC, p. 27. 
733 
<<It would indeed be strange if every record were authentic and trustworthy Not one at the present time 
would dare say that such is the case; and such is not the case, then criticism, if it is to be criticism, must necessarily 
be to a certain extent negative>>, Bradley, 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', Collected Essays, 1, p. 35. 
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which all such conclusions rest, 
has never investigated the immense structural a priori which is proper to it. 
Only the disclosure of the essential general structure lying in our present and then 
in every past or future 
historical present as such, and, in totality, only the 
disclosure of the concrete, historical time in which we 
live [ 
... 
]- only this disclosure can make possible 
historical inquiry. 734 
Husserl is pointing out the importance of the essential general structures 
in historical inquiry; 
that is, the inner historicities of the persons taking part in their own present. 
This emphasis 
redeems the isolation of the ego 
by making its embodied historicity in the present the principal 
historical a priori, but which is thus relieved of its beforeness. This a priori must be emptied as 
much as possible of any idealizing implications, precisely because it refers to a concrete 
experience of the present not to an ideal origin 
in the past. This is perhaps the main historical 
point in 77ze Origins of Geometry, that, 
if the usual factual study of history in general, and in particular the history which in most recent times has 
achieved true universal extension over all humanity, is to have any meaning at all, such a meaning can only 
be grounded upon what we can here call the internal history. 
735 
'Mis confirms history as an epistemological and, hence, a cognitive enterprise which culminates 
in the allegorical vision and its prophetic mechanism in history - even if in the end Eliot settles 
for the attenuated version of rhetorical sincerity. 
A year after 'Donne in Our Time', Eliot returned to the problem of the relation of 
the transient to the permanent. In 'A Commentary' for the Criterion, he contextualizes the 
debate philosophically, and takes the chance to bring home the latent criticism of the positivism 
of Pragmatism and Bergsonianism. throughout his critical writings. He notes: 
We may have forgotten the philosophy of James, we may sneer at the idea of 'progress' but we arc 
still ovcr-valuing the changing and ignoring the pcrmanent. 
736 
Against all appearances, Eliot is not promoting the permanent against the transient, but 
allocating the permanent its proper role in relation to the transient. Seeing the conjunction of 
these two temporal dimensions in the present, Eliot seeks to stress the value of the past, not 
only to the present one inhabits, but to the present of that past. The past is part of our present 
insofar as we are that past's future, though not necessarily its ultimate fulfilment, because our 
present is itself only final in the provisionality of being ours. Thus <dhe doctrine of progress 
734 Derrida, Jacques, Edmund Husserl's 'The Origins of Geometry': An Introduction (1962), John P. Lcavey 
trans. (London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 174. 
735 Edmund Husserl's 'The Origins of Geometry, p. 180. 
736 'A Commentary', The Criterion, 12, no 46 (October 193 2), p. 74. 
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cannot make the future seem to us more real than the present. ))737 The reality of time 
is in the 
presence of its own present, and this 
dimension of history must be taken into account in 
whatever the past might mean to us 
in the future. Lewis Freed suggests that for Eliot othe artist 
must construct his picture through 
his experience of the present, which is the only reality he 
knows))738. Thus the doctrine of progress, Eliot adds, 
lead us to take for granted that the past, any part or the whole of it, has its meaning only in the present; 
leads 
us to ask of any past age, not what it has been in itself, not what the individuals composing it have made of 
themselves, but, what has the age done for us? 
739 
Eliot is very careful to stress that this is a theoretical position which does not translate 
practically. The present age may take itself seriously at the expense of appropriating the past as 
far as it is of value for itself because oin the practical activity, every living generation takes 
itself with equal seriousness. )ý740 It would be impossible not to. Yet, as Eliot told us in his 
thesis, there is a difference between the past and our understanding of it in the future although 
one habitually ignores it: 
We are accustomed to form in the imagination the notion of a perfect idea of the past experience identical in 
content with the experience itself, and differing only in that it is present as a memory instead of past as an 
experience. 
741 
It is a mistake to think that the present represents a simultaneous sedimentation of everything 
which has been, although it is only right to accept that the present is all we have to understand 
the past by. But just as we cannot pretend to understand the past in its own reality to itself one 
cannot expect the future to make absolute sense of our reality. The absolute function in history 
is thus reduced to the finite experience of the present by those in its presence; the only point of 
definite historical comparison being that relation in every present. It is on this aspect of finite - 
cognitive and historical - existence that one can find the key of pennanence. 
The main shift to 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' comes in the implied 
alteration to the famous dictum that othe historical sense involves a perception, not only of the 
737 'A Commentary', The Criterion, 12, no 46 (October 1932), p. 75. 
738 Lewis Freed, T. S. Eliot: The Critic as Philosopher (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1979), 
p. 206. 
739 'A Commentary', The Criterion, 12, no 46 (October 1932), p. 75. 
740 'A Commentary', The Criterion, 12, no 46 (October 193 2), p. 75 
741 KE, pp. 49. 
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pastness of the past, but of its presence. ))742 The twist comes in the re-interpretation of this 
sentence in the light of later criticism. It involves the semantic expansion of the sentence to 
include not only the presence of the past to ourselves, but the presence of the past to itself. It is 
this presence which controls the permanence of an ever-changing tradition as new 
interpretations and works are added on. In 'Donne in Our Time', Eliot suggests that he does not 
expect the future to confirm his high opinion of Donne; that <<[his] poetry is a concern of the 
present and the recent past, rather than of the future. ))743 Thus Eliot's historicism develops a 
critical self-consciousness which makes him wonder whether his opinions will survive the test 
of time; or is it a slyly prescriptive statement hiding behind the tone of eulogy and valediction? 
Eliot adds: 
We must assume, if we are to talk about poetry at all, that there is some absolute poetic hierarchy; we kccp 
at the back of our minds the reminder of some end of the world, some final Judgement Day, on which the 
poets will be assembled in their ranks and orders. In the long run, there is an ultimate greater and less. But at 
any particular time, we exist only in particular moments of time, good taste consists, not in attaining to the 
vision of Judgement Day, and still less in assuming that what happens to be important for us now is certainly 
what will be important in the same way on that occasion, but in approximating to some analysis of the 
absolute and the relative in our own appreciation. 744 
Just as Eliot emphasizes the finite scope of his critical interest in Donne as an interest of the 
present and not of the future, he wriust assume>> that there is a greater context to his meaning 
other than the historically immediate. This greater context is the fulfilment of all time in the 
Christian terms of Judgement Day. But what is crucial about this passage for our purposes, is 
Eliot's simultaneous commitment to the finitude of one's present; that <<at any particular time, 
we exist only in particular moments of time>>. We can only do, Eliot seems to suggest, the best 
we can with what we have got. Yet there is a method to this admission of limitation, and in this 
we should bear in mind the mechanism of figural prophecy. It recalls Erich Auerbach's 
statement that ofigural meaning in the strict sense, in the Old Testament is the prefiguration of 
the coming of Christ. ýý745 
742 'Tradition and the Individual Talent, SW, p. 49. 
743 'Donne in Our Time', A Garlandfor John Donne, p. 
744 'Donne in Our Time', A Gartandfor John Donne, p. 5. 
745 Erich Auerbach's 'Figura' in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, Theory and History of 
Literature, vol. 9 (Manchester university Press, 1984), p. 42. 
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When Auerbach argues that ofigura often appears in the sense of dccpcr mcaning in 
reference to future things>>746, 
he is pointing out the importance of temporal expectations in the 
re-capture of meanings in and by the world. The spiritual 
is thus posited materially as an 
achievable event in the future. But given that the 
figural method is modelled around tile coming 
of Christ -a prophecy which, 
in other words, has already happened - the future is somehow 
already posited in the past and futurity is automatically retrospective. To engage 
in the 
hypothesis of what we might mean to the future is already to consider the extent to which we 
understand the past in their own expectation of futurity. Ibe hinge of this temporal 
consideration is the present, which brings a ground to what could otherwise be seen as a 
ornetonymic chain of deflections [. ] that signifies a progressive creation of metaphors 
[which] give the illusion of an open structure that is impossible to terminate, and which has an 
arbitrary ending>>747, as Julia Kristeva points out in an examination of the changing fortunes 
of semiotics entitled 'From Symbol to Sign'. The closure of figural prophecy in Auerbach's 
terms completes Kristeva's account of the semiotics of the sign. This closure is both definitive 
but provisional. 
In the context of figural prophecy the relative affirmation that something is true in 
so far as it was ones own opinion at the time adopts a degree of permanence. Or as he puts it in 
the final sentence of The Criterion Commentary: <<My objection is that it just happens to be 
mistakewý748, that a legitimate reason for an expressed opinion is to have held it. And that 
admission is going far enough, particularly when one admits that one could have another 
opinion, but not at the time when one professed it. The present may change, but it does not 
change to itself, though it may always seek ultimate confirmation in the future. The important 
thing is to make that cohere with future changes of opinion: with the feeling that one was at the 
time, as much as one can tell, 'sincere9- This admission of change is thus controlled by a 
historicism of the present, precisely in a way that prevents the element of transience from 
746 Auerbach, 'Figura', p. 3 5. 
747 Julia Kristeva, 'From Symbol to Sign' in The Kristeva Reader, Toril Moi cd. (Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp 70- 
71. 
748 'A Commentary', The Criterion, 11, no 44 (April 1932), p. 473. 
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falling into mere historical relativism, or entrapment in one's finite solitude, or, as Eliot put it, 
othe stultifying conclusion that there 
is nothing to be said but that opinion changes. >>749 just 
where figural prophecy insists that othe prophetic figure [ ... 
] is a concrete historical fact, and it 
is fulfilled by concrete historical facts>>750, Eliot's historicism is nothing else than the 
affirmation of the present as a material entity which does not ultimately change but lies 
itself 
open to the confirmation of the future as it looks back on it as a past. This is the historical sense 
which ultimately seeks to redeem the inescapability of the present as a means to transcendental 
validation. 
The Historicism of Eliot's Rhetorical Development. 
The advantage of the allegorical method is that it allows us to apply a historical hermeneutics to 
Eliot's own critical rhetoric; to determine the extent to which what he meant then is still 
available now. We must test whether the Eliot of 'the historical sense' admits further readings, 
or semantic expansions. Or whether to read into it is to pervert its original meaning. In the 
context of allegorical readings we must consider whether the original, literal, meanings behind 
Eliot's critical statements are already prepared to admit re-interpretations in the future without 
losing their claims to permanence. In 'The Modernist Essay: The Case of T. S. Eliot - Poet as 
Critic', J. P. Riquelme notes that: 
Eliot was, in fact, not involved in redefining the canon only by means of conventional literary critical 
argumentation. In addition, through his writing practice he changed our understanding of the possibilities for 
expression in prose. 
751 
This statement indicates that, for Riquelme, Eliot was rhetorically enacting the very historicism 
he was promoting. He explicitly refers to the allegorical elements of Eliot's style, and he argues 
that the force of this allegorical rhetoric lies precisely in encouraging constant deferral of 
meaning by 
calling up and shifting between a variety of issues, often elliptically and incongruously, evoking one issue 
indirectly by means of another, even suggesting in a single comment or in a sequence of comments scattered 
among different essays that shifting from one context to another is the best we can hope to do. This sort of 
749 TUPUC, p. 27. 
750 Auerbach, 'Figura', p. 30. 
751 J. P. Riquelme, "The modernist Essay: The Case of T. S. Eliot - Poct as Critic' in Southern Review, 21, no 4 
(October 1985), p. 1026. 
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allegorical method relies in continual deferrals of meaning in response to multiple, interlocking issues and to 
unanswered, unanswerable questions. 
752 
The difficulty with this interpretation is that it gives up the possibility of there being a definite 
meaning; that all future interpretations collapse 
into an unrelated succession of reinterpretations 
with no hope of a resolution 
in the manner of Kristeva's rendering. This proposition makes the 
coherence of Eliot's thought impossible, making a virtue of what 
is in the end the ultimate 
critical condemnation. Riquelme ignores the more subtle mechanism by which Eliot seeks a 
form of closure to his statements without claiming absolute meaning. This mechanism is 
particularly evident in Eliot's critical self-historicism. 
It is a trait of Eliot's criticism to reflect upon earlier essays and articles and 
speculate - particularly 
in his prefaces - on the relation to the new ones, and the effect the new 
ones have on the old. Particularly he seeks to contextualize their moment of production. In the 
preface to the 1964 edition to The Use ofPoetry and the Use of Criticism, we find the following 
words: 
I reprint The Use ofPoetry and the Use of Criticism in the faint hope that one of these lectures may be taken 
instead of 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' by some anthologists of the future. That, the best known Of 
my essays, appeared in 1917, when I had taken over the assistant-editorship of the Egoist on Richard 
Aldington's being called up for military service, and before I had been asked to contribute to any other 
periodical [ ... 
] My earliest critical essays, dating from a period when I was somewhat under the influence of 
Ezra Pound's enthusiasm for Remy de Gourmont, came to seem to me the product of immaturity - though I 
do not repudiate 'Tradition and the Individual Talent'. 
753 
The consequences of this statement is to re-affirm the importance of 'Tradition and the 
Individual Talent', just as it purports to encourage its demise. In effect Eliot is urging us to read 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent' in its own terms. That is, telling us of the reasons why we 
should choose to read The Use ofPoetry and the Use of Criticism instead sets the tone in which 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent' should be re-read, if only because it makes its re-reading 
imperative. In the end Eliot does not repudiate it. The problem is an important one as Stan 
Smith points out: 
[1914] on the calendar, for Modernism, is the most up-to-date in the world: today - the very moment of 
writing, at the cutting-edge of the new. But the other side of the coin is that today rapidly becomes 
yesterday, and there is nothing more out-of-date than yesterday's news. 754 
752 Riquelme, Harmony ofDissonances, p. 112. 
753 TUpUC, pp. 9-10. 
754 Stan Smith, The Origins ofModernism (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 7. 
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'Me importance of the present in Modernism offers two alternatives: to concede to the incessant 
devalorization of its transient nature or to enact a constant contextualization of the present on 
its own terms as an act of temporal preservation. If Eliot is preserving the legitimacy of 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent' as a product of immaturity, he does so, as Smith notes, by 
misdating it; he places it in 1917 rather than the original date of publication in 1919. 
Furthermore, he refers to it as his earliest critical essay, forgetting perhaps 'Reflections on Vers 
Libre ', itself published in 1917. There is an element of undecidability about what exactly Eliot 
gets wrong: is it the title or the date of the critical essay? Smith adds that: 
A Modernism much concerned with simultaneity, with the past as co-presence, and with hindsight 
masquerading as foresight, misplaces it own founding moment, the point at which it first theorised itself. In 
its very inception, Modernism is not present o itself, is, indeed, ahead of itself by two whole years. In my 
beginning is, perhaps, not my end, but my absence. 
755 
As Eliot pointed out in 'Tradition and the Individual Talent': ofor order to persist 
after the supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, 
altered. )>756 Misdating is, indeed, a form of accuracy, particularly when by so doing Eliot is 
referring to the contextual imperative of every present. Even if the possibility of the fulfilment 
of the present is not absolute Eliot recognizes the dating process as a natural historical impulse. 
Contextualization is already to appropriate the past with the present precisely because it is 
bound to be inaccurate. Eliot embraces this inaccuracy as the only form of dating, preserving, 
as it were, the idea of a present without claiming the absolute access he must fail to achieve. 
One's origins are never experienced as a present, as beginnings go they are always in the past. 
That 'Tradition and the Individual Talent' is not Eliot's earliest critical essay suggests that the 
present has a way of not being self-evident; it implies an origin for itself which is never final. 
Eliot is not concerned with dhe simultaneity of the past as co-presence>) as Smith points out, 
although there is some truth in his ohindsight masquerading as foresight)). But that is quite a 
different point and not a criticism. It is an important strategy through which the ephemerality of 
the present is given permanent status. Hindsight is the method by which the present stops being 
755 Stan Smith, The Origins ofModernism, p. 24. 
756 'Tradition and the Individual Talent', SW, p. 50 
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an unnoticeable and meaningless instant. 
757 In 'Burnt Norton' Eliot confronts the idea of an 
absolute present, which brings the demise of temporality, 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 758 
All time is unredcemable. 
Yet the present makes temporality possible because there is always the possibility that it could 
have been otherwise, even if, having taken place, any alternative would seem an absurd 
consideration. Regret, like mourning, is a sentiment deeply entangled in the human experience 
of the present: 
What might have been is an abstraction 
Remaining a perpetual possibility 
Only in a world of speculation. 
What might have been and what has been 
Point to one end, which is always present. 
759 
The process by which one pretends to prophetically know the future of the past with the 
hindsight that one's present is that past's future is a form of legitimate historical engagement; it 
is a prophetic historicism rather than mythical-magical omniscience. This is the very strategy I 
have been describing as 'figural prophecy' and which Eliot refers to as a mythical strategy in 
'Ulysses, Order and Myth' (1923): 
[Myth] is simply a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense 
panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history. 
760 
The most important temporal myth is perhaps not that there is an ideal and final origin, but that 
there is such a thing as an intelligible present. In this early essay the idea of the present 
becomes a method of temporal reconciliation, of omanipulating a continuous parallel between 
contemporaneity and antiquity>>; it is oa step towards making the modem world possible for 
art. >>761 The present is only a deduction which can only be induced retrospectively as an event 
757 
<(Let us consider, then, 0 human soul, whether present time can be long [ ... 
I If we conceive of some point of 
time which cannot be divided into even the minutests parts of moments, that is the only point that can be called 
present: and that point flees at such lightning speed from being future to being past, that it has no extent duration at 
all. For if it were so extended, it would be divisible into past and future: the present has no length>>, St Augustine, 
Confessions, F. J. Sheed trans., Peter Brown intro. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1993), p. 220-221. 
758'Burnt Norton', Four Quartets, Collected Poems, 1909-1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), Il. 1-5, p. 189. 
759'Burnt Norton', 11.6-10, p. 189. 
760 'Ulysses, Order and Myth' (1923), SP, p. 177. 
761 Vysses, Order and Myth' (1923), SP, pp. 177 &178. 
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which will happen again because it has happened 
in the past; its end is the promise of its 
recuperation. It is not as Smith suggest that oin my 
beginning is, perhaps, not my end, but my 
absenceýý762, if anything that is the challenge, to see in the necessary end of every beginning 
qua beginning a definite presence whose termination 
is evidence of its having existed as a 
present experience. 
763 
This temporal presence becomes the essential cognitive imperative of history; that, 
as Husserl points out: 
Even if we know almost nothing about the historical surrounding world of the first geomctcrs, this much is 
certain as an invariant, essential structure: that it was a world of things (including the human beings 
themselves as subjects of this world). 
764 
In his doctoral thesis Eliot follows suit: <<Let us say, we have to present it as it would have 
looked had we, with our bodies and our nervous systems, been there to see itj>765 The 
historicism of the present as presence inevitably subsumes a theory of cognition as its lowest 
denominator: that man experiences things, not perceive facts, in time. 'Ibus Eliot writes in The 
Criterion: 
All great art is in a sense a document on its time; but great art is not merely a document, for mere 
documentation is not art. All great art has something permanent and universal about it, and reflects the 
permanent as well as the changing -a particular elation in time of the permanent and the transient. 
766 
It conditions what is generally accepted as factual history. Husserl sums up my complaint more 
eloquently. He says: 
For romantic spirits the mythical-magical elements of the historical and prchistorical aspects of mathematics 
may be particularly attractive; but to cling to this merely historically factual aspect of mathematics is 
precisely to lose oneself to sort of romanticism and to overlook the genuine problem, the intcrnal-historical 
problem, the epistemological problem. 
767 
Figural prophecy cuts across these two extremes offering not only a new epistemology, but a 
new serniology. It marks the end of the symbolic image and absolute history. It opens the 
possibility of the recuperation of things in the act of being experienced, that is, in time; a 
762 Stan Smith, The Origins ofModernism , p. 
24. 
763 Compare this idea with my analysis of Vita Nuova's temporal strategies in 'The Failure of Discourse: Vita 
Nuova and 'Paradiso', Chapter 6. 
764Edmund Husserl's 'The Origins of Geometry, p. 177. 
765 KE, p. 22. 
766 'A Commentary', The Criterion, 12, no 46 (October 1932), p. 76. 
767 Edmund Husserl's 'The Origins of Geometry', p. 180. 
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semiology deeply aware of human participation through interpretation. This is not symbol or 
metaphor, but Allegory, so that Dante's poetic virtue is to <(Make[s] us see what he saw. )>768 
ibis is not a simple allegorization of objects - which may in fact verge on the symbolic -, but 
one deeply aware of the mythologizing mechanism of perception. A rhetoric deeply entrenched 
in what I refer to as, the figural prophecy of allegory. This mythology must at any rate be 
distinguished from romantic nostalgia or Victorian rhetoric, to do so would be to miss the 
principal feature of Eliot's critical writing. Unfortunately this is what Edward Lobb insists on 
doing when he says that, 
Eliot also learned a good deal about the conduct of argumentation from the Romantics and their nineteenth 
century successors. The use of historical myth is in itself, of course, as much an argumentative technique as 
an idea. 
769 
Yes, but in Eliot this combination between rhetoric and history refuses to be merely figurative; 
and, without rejecting the influence of Romanticism, one must consider the fact that this 
comparison is not definitive as to the kind of tradition Eliot was working in. Nor is it true to say 
that Eliot's access to Medievalism is merely mediated by Romanticism. Quite clearly, he was 
well aware of the pre-Raphaelite misprisions to be avoided when dealing with medieval 
allegory. Historically or rhetorically, allegory was not, in itself, a figure of speech. 
The self-consciousness of the modem world undermines the visual immediacy of the allegorical 
method, yet offers the possibility for its compensation through a new form of expression which 
marks a move away from poetics to rhetoric. Rhetoric becomes an imperative of literary 
responsibility at the point where the immediacy of the poetic expression and time-less art is no 
longer available; when poetry has stopped being the expression of the mind of a whole people. 
Critical mediation demands rhetorical sincerity as a means to find coherence in 
judgement. The problem of coherence is thus an epistemological pursuit at a cognitive, and 
historical level, and which demands their simultaneous resolution. Eliot pursues this resolution 
768 Dante, p. 23. 
769 Edward Lobb, T S. Eliot and the Romantic Critical Tradition (London: Routledge Keegan & Paul, 198 1), p. 
136. 
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stylistically through the development of a critical 
discourse. For him, this resolution amounts to 
a latent philosophical struggle, not only about 
finding epistemological answers, but about the 
possibility of articulating them. Eliot's experience with philosophy was 
important in making 
apparent the urgency of the problem of style 
in criticism, and initially offered him provisional 
models on which to experiment. 
The scientific models Eliot uses in his early criticism gradually reveal a rhetorical 
tension with the positions he held as a philosophy student. This tension takes his criticism 
beyond the logical paradigm that he set for himself in the 1910s. The nature of this 
transgression can be seen as the residue of metaphysical discourse that Eliot is unable to 
exorcize in his early literary criticism. On the whole his critical development must be seen as 
his attempt to articulate this residue through the medium of literary studies. Literature offers 
Eliot a system in which to fulfil his demand for the absolute statement promised by the 
sciences. Logic as a model for poetics fails at the point that the articulation of the objective 
correlative, the impersonal theory of poetry and Tradition prove inconclusive. This is the point 
where Eliot's rhetorical compensations must be noted, and with it the parallel problem of the 
articulation of metaphysics. 
The critical imperative to see things as they really are becomes throughout Eliot's 
criticism a dynamic motto whose scientific nature gradually reveals a cognitive dimension and 
which, in the end, becomes a stylistic rule: to say what one means in the words one thinks them. 
This development becomes an admission about the limits of immediate perception, and an 
incorporation of the mediating role of thought which still insists on a cognitive ground in 
judgement. 'Mought becomes a problem of doctrine just as Eliot re-interprets cognition in terms 
of 'belief. The private finitude of thought-systems is thus partially over-come, as belief stops 
being a problem of doctrinal exclusivity but of an inclusive cognitive vision. For Eliot belief is 
integral to ordinary cognition, where understanding is a form of belief which, in turn, is about 
seeing what others see. In this process doctrine becomes a cultural object subject to the general 
problems of cognition; it must be seen rather than predetermine what we see. Doctrine must be 
cognitively validated as a cultural experience at which point it transcends the very cultural 
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barriers which make it available. This shift goes some of the way in resolving the metaphysical 
problem of philosophy. Culture offers the expression of the metaphysical a priori of judgement 
which Eliot ultimately embraces and includes in the cognitive experience as philosophical 
worldviews. He articulates this resolution in the term 'philosophical' poetry, which marks a 
commitment towards positive expression, just as the negative expression of 'metaphysics' 
becomes a logical cul de sac. This is what the Metaphysical poets make apparent; where the 
adjective 'metaphysical' fails to be more than a figurative description which fails to achieve 
philosophical or historical fulfilment. This failure is made explicit in the context of allegory, 
which gradually begins to dictate the workings of Eliot's critical discourse. 
Eliot exploits the visual dimension of cognition in terms of medieval allegory, but 
which is re-worked as rhetoric. This re-working becomes necessary as philosophy is no longer 
as culturally available as it once was, which parallels the moment at which poetry also ceases to 
be the expression of the mind of a whole people. This point marks the beginning of self- 
consciousness and criticism. Allegorical fulfilment becomes instead a problem of rhetorical and 
historical sincerity. History and rhetoric come together when to say what we mean in the words 
we think them becomes a historical problem once one has to consider the extent to which 
saying something in the past retains a value in what it means now and will mean in the future. 
Ibis problem can be contextualized in the figural prophecy of allegory and used to re-read 
Eliot's criticism and understand his development; particularly in terms of his increasing 
dogmatism and the extent to which his early scientific approach retains validity. This approach 
reveals an important rhetorical dimension to Eliot's critical style which can be focused on the 
importance of literal and figurative readings of his critical language. 
The importance of rhetorical fidelity to our meaning must ultimately be related to 
the position of the subject in time; to the context present to oneself. Yet, if all meaning is not to 
be simply contextual, this historical imperative must become a stylistic concern relating to the 
distinction between what one is saying from what one means; being capable, that is, to 
distinguish the literal from the figurative. Eliot is ultimately concerned with this historical 
dimension in relation to his own style: with the importance of accepting that one can only have 
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said what one meant then, while still claiming that one means the same thing now only one 
would put it differently. This is ultimately the problem tackled by figural prophecy 
in 
considering the extent to which events in time are literal to themselves, yet figurative in terms 
of the interpretations by which they become meaningful in the future. The present becomes the 
axis of coherence in judgement, just as it includes in its significance not only what it means to 
itself but it is actively engaged in predicting what it will mean in the future, as we try to 
understand what the past means both to us and to itself. 
By 1933 Eliot concludes a significant period of criticism which demands the asking 
of precisely these questions; it asks us to re-read its beginnings while it points to a new period 
in which Eliot's rhetorical commitment to criticism crystallises into a more open politicization 
of his discourse in what appears to be a further shift towards the cultural Te-construction of his 
time. It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider readings of this later work, if only to 
consider that Eliot's rhetorical commitment to say what he means in the words he thinks it 
becomes increasingly predetermined by ideology as the inevitable historical given to thought. 
One is left wondering whether Eliot believes what he says, or simply means to say what he has 
to after 1933; whether he is being ideologically sincere. The answer to these questions must be 
tackled from the rhetorical framework I have developed in this thesis; one must not look at his 
ideology alone, but to the way Eliot articulates it. Sincerity is, in the end, a rhetorical question. 
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